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Recent years have seen a re-introduction of the victim of crime into Irish 
criminal justice. This thesis intends to gauge the nature and extent of this re-
emergence. One of the ways in which the author seeks to achieve this is by 
examining the ‘axis of individualisation’ that both Foucault (1978) and Garland 
(2001) used to examine criminal justice in Europe and America. This describes 
how the exercise of power affects the groups that it happens to touch. The following 
study therefore seeks to show how the power dynamics and attention of Irish 
criminal justice have now moved from the offender onto the victim of crime. 
 
This work is therefore an attempt to extend this analysis to Ireland in order 
to demonstrate how the victim has re-emerged within the criminal justice frames 
of this country as both a subject and target of these power relations. These changes 
have, to a certain extent, helped to move them back into their previously influential 
criminal justice role. The author hopes that by approaching the task of writing a 
history of the modern crime victim in Ireland in this way that they will be better 
able to extrapolate how power dynamics have affected the subjectivity of 
victimhood, and how this has come to the fore of our late modern societies.  
 
This endeavour will not only draw upon some of the work of the intellectual 
giants that were previously mentioned but it will also evidence how a new legal 
culture of inclusion has emerged with regards to victims of crime. It will tend to 
focus particularly upon how this has found expression within some of the novel 
developments in human rights and legal regulation that have evolved in more recent 
years, which have considerably promoted the re-inclusion of some of the more 
historically marginal stakeholders within the legal system such as victims of crime. 
The thesis therefore attempts to study some of these major legal advances so as to 
ultimately better comprehend how legality helped to alter the victim of crime’s 
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PART 1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 CONTEXT  
The question at the heart of this thesis is what is the nature and extent of 
victim procedural re-incorporation and the ramifications of this more broadly. It 
also writes a history of the victim in Ireland. This charts the changes that occurred 
and attempts to answer what the historical context was for the unprecedented re-
inclusion of victims of crime. It also asks if there is any justification for these 
alterations and if there is indeed a justification for the pursual of these goals. In 
addition, the consequences of this have been accounted for, as well as what this 
will now mean for stakeholders such as society and offenders. 
The issues that are motivating such research are the historical legacies that 
exist in this country in terms of abuse. Indeed, these, as well as some of the recent 
game changing legislation in this area, have placed the emphasis back on the victim 





the victim of crime on a strong legislative footing. Although more that needs to be 
done in terms of victim engagement, enforcement and compliance these are major 
first steps on what is arguably a new inclusive trend. One that will potentially only 
increase the rights that victims are deemed to have within this particular country. 
Delving into the unique approach of this research, it is an attempt to chart 
a modern history of the victims from an Irish perspective which takes into account 
the historical position of victims, the sociological factors that drove their re-
inclusion and the major legal changes that have solidified their stakeholder 
position. Since this advancement has, in other contexts, led to the due process rights 
of the offender being diluted, with the US experience being an extreme example of 
this, it is also worth considering the offender. To do otherwise would overlook 
significant consequences and replicate the kind of victim exclusivity that plagued 
how the Irish history of offenders was formulated. This thesis will also consider 
what victim inclusion means to the offender’s position and their due process rights.  
The additional motivating factors for such research largely centre on the 
contemporary significance of such inquiry to scholars, students and stakeholders. 
It is therefore contended that this work is a timely assessment of where we are in 
terms of victim provision today. It also covers how exactly we got to this historical 
moment and what it means for actors within criminal justice in terms of rights 
provision and accountability. Additionally, it looks forward to how these trends 
might evolve and the dangers that lie ahead. This contextual introduction will now 
move on to explore what is behind these recent inclusive trends in Ireland. Whilst 
also considering what makes it a topic of study in a bit more detail before fleshing 





dichotomy between substantive and procedural rights and potential threat of victim 
inclusion for offenders and due process. These areas are outlined and explained for 
the sake of clarity, as many of these ideas act as pivotal linchpins of this thesis. 
The ideological impetus for victim re-inclusion was largely the result of 
schools of thought like victimology and feminism (Pearce 1992; O’Donnell 2005, 
p. 99; Connelly 2002, p. 188; Moore-Walsh 2013, pp. 182-189). These two 
important perspectives raised the public’s awareness with regards to victims of 
crime (in Ireland) by moving them from the periphery of popular thought, to the 
epicentre of public debate (Kilcommins and Moffett 2016; Garland 2002; Walklate 
2011, p. 177). This change in mind-set was crucial, as before this the forgotten 
crime victim tended to be an isolated and abstracted afterthought within the Irish 
public sphere. Yet the aforementioned ideological frames recast them as a group 
that was worthy of assistance and study, not only within academia but among the 
general public and media, who were now becoming increasingly aware of the 
victim’s personal and collective subjectivity.  
This more cerebral and ideological transition was also crucially 
complemented by several material changes in society that mainly occurred at a 
grassroots level. These factors included an increased level of recorded crime rates;  
(O’Donnell and O’Sullivan 2003) greater victim activism; (Maguire 1991)  the 
popularisation of mass media commentary on the subject of victims, as well as its 
increasing penchant for portraying victimisation (O’Connell 1999; O’Connell et al. 
1998) victimisation surveys; (Kelleher et al. 1995; McGee et al. 2002); historical 
child abuse, both by clergy members and familial relations, (Keenan 2001, p. 224) 





and O’Sullivan 2001, p. 32).  The shattering of the stable social sphere of the early 
twentieth century by the spike in the numbers of victims that were now coming to 
present themselves to the authorities also complemented the greater number of 
activists that were now campaigning for the more humane treatment of victims. 
This also tended to help with how the new, much more graphic and provocative 
media, which arguably became more liberalised with each passing decade, came to 
report these victimisations within the press and on television, which brought 
criminality into the living rooms of people across the nation in a way in which the 
Irish public had never seen before.  
The startling revelations within victim surveys also helped to uncover the 
prevalence of the victim perspective in Irish society, as well as the numerous issues 
with how the arms of the State attempted to provide for them. Probably the most 
disconcerting result of these inquiries also tied in with another, arguably even more 
perturbing phenomenon. The lack of reporting by victims was revealed to be a 
considerable problem in the country, particularly with regards to historical child 
abuse, the reporting of which has only really became commonplace in the later part 
of the twentieth century. The increased knowledge of the fact that such a problem 
had remained hidden for so long was devastating for Irish society, which now had 
to deal with the unpalatable reality that the victimisation of some of its most 
vulnerable social members was indeed rather prevalent, and often went unnoticed.  
Much like the barbaric brutality of the last World War, where several social 
orders held the sanctity of innocent life cheap, the realisation of the depths of 
humankind’s depravity and inhumanity was significant in Ireland. Indeed, it even 





socio-political capital and influence, while the victim of crime instead made 
considerable gains in these two areas. In fact, it was this monumental growth in 
public support that allowed Irish politicians to eventually use the latent political 
capital that this transition had generated to politicise criminality. This allowed them 
to  get “tough on crime” for the sake of the victim.1  Although the “tough on crime” 
measures were enacted in the name of the victim, they were instituted without a 
curtailment of due process rights. Yet some measures did arguably alter them in a 
minor way within certain limited scenarios so as to achieve proportionate aims.2  
 
1 “On 7 June 1996 a Garda detective (Jerry McCabe) was shot dead during an attempted robbery of 
a post office van in Adare, Co. Limerick. Two weeks later an investigative journalist (Veronica 
Guerin) was murdered as she drove home from a Dublin court where she had paid a traffic fine … 
These killings were defining moments in the debate about law and order in Ireland. They were the 
catalyst for a hardening in political attitudes. …Crime control became a national priority and for a 
time it was almost as if a state of national emergency had been declared. The Dáil … was recalled 
for a special debate …The government …proposed five pieces of legislation… the Criminal Justice 
(Drug Trafficking) Bill 1996, Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 1996, Criminal 
Assets Bureau Bill 1996, Proceeds of Crime Bill 1996, and Courts Bill 1996...” O’Donnell, I. and 
O’Sullivan, E. (2003) The politics of intolerance—Irish style. British Journal of Criminology, 
43(3), 253–66, p.48. 
2 “The events of the summer of 1996 left a tangible legacy through the ‘Summer Anti-Crime 
Package’ of legislation: the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) 
Act 1996 and the Bail Act 1997 made serious encroachments into the presumption of innocence 
through the constitutional amendment authorising preventative detention and by allowing 
inferences from silence…” Black, L. (2016) ‘Media, Public Attitudes and Crime’ in D. Healy, et al. 
eds., The Routledge Handbook of Irish Criminology, London: Taylor & Francis, 1996: An Irish 





The consequences of this were not only significant for offenders, as a result of the 
manner by which they came to be socio-culturally treated. They were also 
impactful for victims, in the legal and socio-cultural realms, as this desire to see 
their interests vindicated only grew with each political invocation of their plight. 
Even though the judiciary and legislature guarded against legal penal populism 
based on a zero-sum game mentality, from about the 1990s onwards, this kind of 
thinking came to a hold a degree of sway over political and media discourse. This 
was a consequence of the overwhelmingly sensationalist reporting of crime.3   
 
3 “… the Irish media tend to prioritise serious, atypical crimes…O’Connell analysed 2,191 articles 
… and found that extreme and atypical crimes were more commonly reported and that these 
offences received greater coverage in terms of word count than other crimes. O’Connell …found 
that murder was reported at 3,075 times the level of its actual incidence …armed robbery in the 
sample was 176 times the proportion of armed robberies recorded... 25.7 per cent of all words 
related to the crime of murder, while rape constituted the second largest category with 13.24 per 
cent of all words. Thus, the crimes which were the most dramatic, and yet which were negligible in 
official crime figures, were the most commonly reported in the newspapers. The preference for 
atypical crime has also been noted by O’Donnell (2005) who found that while rising levels of violent 
crime in the 1990s became a focus for media attention a late-1990s drop in property offences 
received little coverage… The media preference for negative stories has had a considerable impact 
in the context of Limerick city… with 70 per cent of print articles prioritising the issue of crime …  
O’Connell (1999) also found a general tendency towards pessimistic accounts…written from a 
‘meta’ or ‘macro’ perspective, i.e. stories written about the criminal justice system rather than a 
one-off crime event. ….” Black, L. (2016) ‘Media, Public Attitudes and Crime’ in D. Healy, et al. 
eds., The Routledge Handbook of Irish Criminology, London: Taylor & Francis, Content of Crime 





This is something which rather quickly descends, within both the media and 
political arena into the moralistic protectionism of the victim and their interests. A 
stance which inevitably ends up brutalising and curtailing the rights of the accused 
and/or offender.4  This can however also cut both ways, with the media often 
serving as a socio-cultural consciousness raising force. One that can often help 
bring issues of public interest to the fore, and, consequently, help their redress.5  
 
4 “… John O’ Donoghue… painted a disturbing picture of a country under threat… [i]n a speech in 
April 1997 … The social fabric of this country is being destroyed. The next government must wage 
war on the cause of that destruction. It must wage war on crime...” “Despite concerns about… its 
effectiveness and the danger of it veering into an oppressive form of policing, Fianna Fáil developed 
an infatuation with the idea. New York-style policing came to Ireland through the offices of 
Bratton’s deputy, John Timoney… Timoney helped Fianna Fáil draw up its “zero tolerance” … His 
influence shines out of the Fianna Fáil election manifesto for 1997: Fianna Fáil will make a broadly-
based war on crime a central priority …Crime in Ireland has become dramatically worse… “petty 
crime” has mushroomed. We have seen an alarming growth in serious violent crime, most of it 
drugs-related. Organized crime has suddenly emerged as a vicious reality…Crime threatens us on 
our streets, in our homes and in our businesses.” O’Donnell, I. and O’Sullivan, E. (2003) The 
politics of intolerance—Irish style. British Journal of Criminology, 43(3), 253–66, pp.48-49, p. 51. 
5 “Media representation is a double-edged sword. While it can be problematic … the media has also 
been instrumental in raising awareness about hidden issues like violent and sexual offences … 
mobilisation has also provoked legislative reform, such as the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) 
Act 1990 and the Criminal Justice Act 1993.... these developments are part of a legitimate 
realignment of … violence against women rather than a punitive project allied to the rise of the 
victim.” Black, L. (2016) ‘Media, Public Attitudes and Crime’ in D. Healy, et al. eds., The 
Routledge Handbook of Irish Criminology, London: Taylor & Francis, Content of Crime in the 





Despite the fact that the victim did not arguably impact upon the due 
process rights of the accused or defendant in an Irish context, several commentators 
in the area have flagged  potential areas where there are concerns about the risk of 
this materialising. Concerns have been expressed that some of the recent 
accommodations of victims would, due to the adversarial nature of common law, 
unfairly impinge on the due process rights of the accused by creating a false 
equivalency of procedural rights.6 Yet these fears have not materialised in the 
English and Welsh context and it is therefore contended that due to the similarities 
in this regard between the two jurisdictions in the areas of victim provision they 
are not presently concerns which need to be acted upon in a dramatic manner.7 
 
6 “Opponents … contended that they might breach the guarantee of a fair trial in Article 6(1) of the 
… (ECHR), and in particular the right of a defendant to examine witnesses against him under Article 
6(3)(d). The crux of the argument is that the common law adversarial trial model…places primacy 
on the rights of the defendant … [t]herefore, it is intrinsically incompatible with that model to 
balance those rights against the interests of other participants … and specifically witnesses. It is 
feared that special protective measures for witnesses will inevitably collide with this distinctive 
defendant-centred conception of justice..” Hoyano, L. C. H. (2001) ‘Striking a balance between the 
rights of defendants and vulnerable witnesses: Will special measures directions contravene 
guarantees of a fair trial?’, Criminal Law Review, DEC., 948–969, p. 950. 
7  “…the rights of witnesses cannot be coterminous with those of the defendant…[h]owever, 
affording witnesses some protection by mitigating the rigours of the orthodox adversarial trial does 
not necessarily mean that one is hollowing out the defendant's rights… [e]nabling witnesses to give 
the best evidence of which they are capable not only does not collide with the defendant's rights, 





Other scholars have echoed these concerns. They have done so by focusing 
on the idea that it would be advisable to pursue a more cautious approach to the 
area of victim rights provision. Mainly due to the potential infringement of the due 
process rights of the accused as a result of victim accommodation. These concerns 
centre on the manner by which the victim is incorporated, and the plea to resist the 
temptation to pursue this course in a ‘private’ manner. Victim Impact Statements 
are one of the most contentious areas due to their latent proclivity to bring about 
scenarios in which the interest of victims may be divergent to those of due process 
and accused rights.8 However, again, it is clearly iterated that this potentiality can 
be avoided where the inclusion of victims is pursued in a progressive manner that 
places the human rights of the accused and victim at the heart of this debate.9 
 
between the rights of defendants and vulnerable witnesses: Will special measures directions 
contravene guarantees of a fair trial?’, Criminal Law Review, DEC., 948–969, p. 968. 
8 “…further extension and enforcement of victims' procedural rights should not be undertaken until 
the issues…arising from the likelihood of conflict between such rights and those of defendants or 
prisoners have been addressed.  If … procedural rights means moving …towards a private model 
… in which certain decision-making powers are handed to victims, then they should be resisted … 
a number of the areas touched on … provide much material for future debate, particularly the points 
at which victim interests potentially come directly into conflict with due process through the use of 
[VIS].”  Fenwick, H. (1997) ‘Procedural 'Rights' of Victims of Crime: Public or Private Ordering 
of the Criminal Justice Process?’, Modern Law Review, 60(3), 317-333, p. 333. 
9 “…it would be possible to support the exercise of procedural rights by the victims of more serious  
offences so long as such exercise was subject to supervision and scrutiny within a public model …a 
model which maintained a degree of objectivity, consistency and impartiality. … the parameters of 





One of the other more controversial ideas that has received criticism from 
scholars is the idea that the defendant, should they be held responsible for a crime, 
has an obligation to compensate their victim. This has led to much consternation, 
particularly the idea that an offender might “bribe” a victim in order to receive a 
reduced sentence with money. Even though these objections have been raised, the 
fact is that in most cases, and indeed even in principle, the concept of victim 
compensation remains one that can be strongly and logically justified in law.10 To 
find otherwise would be to utilise theoretical dichotomies in order to deny the 
practical realities that urgently need to be addressed within our justice system.11 
 
due process and crime control must not obscure the need to take victims' interests into account ….” 
Fenwick, H. (1997) ‘Procedural 'Rights' of Victims of Crime: Public or Private Ordering of the 
Criminal Justice Process?’, Modern Law Review, 60(3), 317-333, p. 333. 
10 “Atiyah critizes this as a casual and anomalous way of creating new substantive rights… the result 
may appear to be an inconsistency in the administration of justice, but that cannot be a conclusive 
argument against criminal compensation without civil liability…the failure of the civil law to 
provide a remedy may be less defensible than its provision through the criminal courts.” Ashworth, 
A. (1986) 'Punishment and Compensation: Victims, Offenders and the State', Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, 69(1), 86-122, p.111. 
11 “Neither the debate about the functions of the law of tort nor the shortcomings of State provision 
for other victims … should constrain decisions about the appropriate procedures and sources of 
compensation for criminal injuries. The now conventional distinction between criminal and civil 
liability need not and should not be regarded as unalterable: there are strong practical reasons for, 
and no convincing theoretical reasons against, allowing criminal courts to order offenders to pay 
compensation to their victims …” Ashworth, A. (1986) 'Punishment and Compensation: Victims, 





Even when considering all of the previous concerns, the one which looms 
largest over the idea of how the victim and accused will now be incorporated into 
criminal justice is the propensity of the victim to be used for greater punitiveness. 
This is due to the victim’s sympathetic position, and the experiences of the use of 
victims to punish the accused in the US.12 The risk is probably most apparent for 
the suspect during pre-trial criminal proceedings, as they can be pressured into plea 
bargain deals to “save themselves” from greater punishment if they go to trial.13 
The operation of this in the US is particularly punitive, as it is accompanied by the 
threat of inflated charges, mandatory sentences as well as the death penalty. When 
contrasting the US position with our own the fact that we have not yet reached this 
 
12 “First, there are those who see the rise of the victim as part of the process of increased punitiveness 
… [t]his is what Andrew Ashworth has neatly called ‘victims in the service of severity’ (2000: 186). 
Those worried by this development point to the fact that some victims’ movements actively lobby 
for harsher sentences; juxtapose the interests of offenders and victims in a zero-sum game; 
campaign for victim impact/personal statements that are little more than mechanisms to generate 
harsher penalties; and contribute to the demonisation of offenders.” Matravers, M. (2010) ‘The 
Victim, the State, and Civil Society’, In: Bottoms, A. and Roberts, J., eds., Hearing the Victim: 
Adversarial Justice, Crime Victims and the State. Cullompton: Willan, pp. 1–16, pp. 2-3 
13 “Charge and plea discount are favoured under a crime control model since they speed up the 
process and conserve resources. Their use has also generally been perceived to be in the interests 
of victims. … the discount has been attacked on the basis that it may infringe the defendant's due 
process rights; it appears to undermine the right to a trial and may induce some innocent defendants 
to plead guilty.” Fenwick, H. (1997) ‘Procedural 'Rights' of Victims of Crime: Public or Private 





level of victim based, and indeed engendered, punitiveness is apparent. Yet the 
concern remains that a creep towards crime control could still be in the offing.14 
By the end of the twentieth century, the socio-political phenomenon of the 
victim had firmly cemented itself, within not only the hearts and minds of Irish 
citizens, but importantly within the media that they consumed and the secular 
figures of influence that they now increasingly looked to for moral and political 
guidance. These changes had other rather predictable legal consequences. Since 
victims of crime became more important in the later twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, a plethora of domestic and international case law and Statute gave them 
several important entitlements in Ireland. These crucially ensured that not only did 
the re-emergence of victims of crime influence in a socio-ideological manner, but 
the Legislature and Judiciary also came to codify this transition within the language 
of the law itself. This jurisprudential alteration was hardly smooth however, since 
although Irish society tended to agree that victims of crime should be re-centralised 
 
14  “… the perception of harmony between victim interests and the crime control interest in 
encouraging guilty pleas should be questioned:the perception that the victim will benefit if … spared 
the ordeal of the trial is in danger of obscuring the more mixed response of vicitms to the discount. 
Thus, there is a case for establishing rights of consultation and participation in these decisions for 
victims of serious offences. The mere fact that exercise of such rights might lead to refusal of a 
sentence or charge discount in some instances would not infringe due process, so long as the 
victim’s opinion could be overridden if it appeared to be influenced by arbitrary considerations…” 
Fenwick, H. (1997) ‘Procedural 'Rights' of Victims of Crime: Public or Private Ordering of the 






within the domestic legal sphere of the country, there was no fundamental blueprint 
as to how exactly its legal organs were to bring this about.  
This change was therefore produced through a gradual transition, where 
rights conferrals were increasing alluded to and incorporated by the law. However, 
it is only really with the benefit of hindsight that can we see the transition that has 
taken place (Kilcommins et al. 2004, p. 150). The impact of these twentieth century 
changes is that the victim of crime has slowly become part of the mainstream again. 
It could even be said that in the twenty first century a new idea of how justice was 
to function has congealed in Ireland, with a “vision of the victim as ‘[e]veryman at 
its heart’ (Garland 2001, p. 12). In fact, politicians have evidenced this fact though 
Statute that they have not only incorporated at an International and European level 
but also within the domestic context of Ireland.  
Although these phenomena appear somewhat fragmented, they paint a 
profound picture when contemplated together. The totality of these rights 
guarantees effectively re-centralised the victim of crime in Ireland back into the 
heart of Irish criminal justice in a somewhat less significant way than they were in 
the eighteenth century, but more or less in keeping with the spirit of that age. The 
victim is now procedurally central again, before, during and after a trial, and 
benefits from numerous dispensations. Perhaps the most important difference here 
is that since there is an enormous State edifice associated with the administration 
of criminal justice in this State, not only will most victims be included, but they 
will also be placed into a more equal and dignified circumstance by the State than 





Indeed, the State has now taken considerable steps in this regard to ensure 
that its criminal justice processes can assure the procedural safety and integrity of 
the victim of crime, which signifies a significant step in the right direction. Yet, 
such a change in tact was anything but straightforward, as the law often had several 
competing interests that it needed to accommodate, and rights that it had to remain 
cognisant of within this overall process (Kilcommins et al. 2004, p. 150). The re-
introduction of an actor like the victim, who for so long was such a minor player 
in the legal proceedings of Ireland created, if not actual tension, then at least the 
perception of considerable difficulties with how this group was to be re-
incorporated. This was particularly the case since it was re-emerging in a 
framework that had not really significantly altered since it was first established.  
So much of this potential tension was created between the roles and 
entitlements of past and present judicial actors, since commentators generally 
tended to perceive that there was an incongruity between the rights of the victim 
and those of an alleged offender. Since the accused now has considerable rights the 
re-incorporation of the victim of crime was perceived as, at least initially, 
incorporating potentially dangerous ideas that could do considerable disservice to 
the accused, in particular their guarantee to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty (O’Flaherty 2002, p. 375; Fennell 2001, p. 54). Yet the legislature and the 
judiciary managed to achieve a positive result by assuring that the State respected 
the rights of not only the accused but also the victim of crime, who was now to be 
considered as a key stakeholder in Irish criminal justice, with entitlements of their 
own. Therefore, a profound respect for Due Process and Human Rights has largely 





or scapegoat. In so doing, both the legislature and judiciary have wisely managed 
to secure the position and fair treatment of another key stakeholder within Irish 
criminal justice that will no doubt be essential to the future reduction in the number 
of victims of crime that criminal offenders and criminality create.  
The effective transition has also given voice to a ‘… background figure 
whose individuality hardly registered’ (Garland 2001, p. 179). Doing this has 
achieved the best of both worlds in an Irish context, as the victim has returned as a 
criminal justice stakeholder in the country, and the offender was not prejudiced by 
a re-introduction that embodies the idea that the law can be used to achieve 
procedural justice. This also tended to follow the European model, as opposed to 
the US one, which arguably predicates victim re-introduction upon the massive 
curtailment of the rights of the criminal suspect and offender. 
1.2  RESEARCH QUESTION  
The central research question of this thesis is - how did the victim of crime’s 
socio-legal position evolve in the early-to-late modern period within the Irish 
criminal justice system. The author here takes the victim to mean a natural person 
that fits the criteria that was first laid out in European and then domestic law.15 This 
approach is taken due to the strong internal validity of the legal definition of the 
term victim. As one quickly loses any strong and coherent reference point when 
moving beyond the relatively stable frames of the law and arguably ends up in a 
 






position in which anyone could arguably be labelled as being a victim.16 Therefore, 
this thesis adopts the clarity and functionality of the definition that is currently laid 
down under Irish law to define a victim of crime. As a result of adopting this 
legalistic definition of the term it can be, and consequently is, used throughout this 
thesis to describe a person that has contended that they have suffered a criminal 
act, as well as one who has had that fact proven in trial beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The major objective of this work is to therefore ascertain the extent of the 
victim’s re-emergence within an Irish context. In order to answer these questions 
this thesis will seek to assess the way in which victim’s position has changed over 
these periods. It will also study what this has meant for victims in Ireland and, 
tangentially, the position of suspects, offenders and the population more generally. 
Therefore, some analysis is consequently devoted to examining the impact of the 
transitions of the victim’s entitlements on the suspect’s and criminal offenders due 
process entitlements. Due process entitlements are vitally important as an analysis 
of them is very instructive when considering the evolution of the victim’s position, 
as the two conceptual areas have changed considerably in recent years. This is due 
to their interaction, and consequent reformulation by legal authorities.17 Such rights 
are also protected by the Irish constitution, EU law, legislation and case law in a 
 
16 Paglia, C. (1994) Vamps and Tramps, New York: Vintage. 
17 Ward, J. (2017) ‘Vulnerable Witnesses and Cross-Examination: A Path to Reform’, Irish Journal 





similar way to victim rights.18 However, as mentioned, these areas evidence a 
considerable degree of legal reformulation in more recent years.19 
The argument of this thesis is, at its core, that the modern victim of crime 
in Ireland has moved past its nineteenth century position of marginality. This has 
happened not only in a procedural legalistic manner but also as the consequence of 
the evolution of the victim as a key socio-political justice stakeholder. In 
contending this point this thesis not only flags the importance of pivotal victim 
rights conferrals, but also the larger societal transformations that are seen as further 
 
18 The main provisions of relevance here are the right to a fair trial in accordance with the law under 
Article 38.1 of the Irish Constitution and Article 6 of the [ECHR]. Relevant statutory provisions 
such as section 14C Subsections (3) - (6) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992, as amended by 
Section 36 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017 … s. 255 ss. (5) of the Children Act, 
2001 … and Section 9 ss. (5) of The Criminal Procedure Act, 2010 … have sought to safeguard due 
process in the context this thesis seeks to examine, and guard against its violation by victim 
provision. A crucial aspect of this is the presumption of innocence, that ‘…golden thread …that it 
is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt.’ Woolmington v. D.P.P. [1935] A.C. 
462. This has also been confirmed in Irish case law as an imperative entitlement of the accused in 
(A.G.) v. O’Callaghan [1966] I.R. 501 and O’Leary v. Attorney General [1993] 1 I.R. 102 (HC), 
[1995] 1 I.R. 254 (SC). Hamilton, C. (2011) ‘The Presumption of Innocence in Irish Criminal Law: 
Recent Trends and Possible Explanations’, Irish Journal of Legal Studies, 2(1): 3-21, pp. 3-4. 
19  Bacik, L. Heffernan, P. Brazil and M. Woods, (2007) Report on Services and Legislation: 
Providing Support for Victims of Crime, Dublin: Trinity College, p. 37, Bowden, P., Henning, T. 
and Plater, P. (2014) ‘Balancing Fairness to Victims, Society and Defendants in the Cross-






helping to complement this reformative trend. In this way the re-emergence of the 
victim is portrayed not only as a purely legal alteration, but as a manifestation of a 
wider socio-cultural one by encompassing macro level drivers and implications.  
In assessing whether the victim’s position has changed in an Irish context, 
as well as the wider implications of this for suspects, offenders and the public 
several issues arise. The monumental transitions that have occurred in this area,20 
have thrust the victim back into a somewhat more central role21 which is akin to, 
but altogether different from their position in the eighteenth century.22 It is also a 
far cry from the procedural marginality they endured in the nineteenth.23 As a 
consequence it is worth contemplating the implications of these changes. With 
regards to the legal and social position of the offender, there appears to be a 
disconnect, as although the judiciary in Ireland have largely prevented the rights of 
 
20 Predominately as a result of legislation like The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017, 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 and Domestic Violence Act, 2018. 
21 Kilcommins, S. and Moffett, L. (2016) ‘The Inclusion and Juridification of Victims on the Island 
of Ireland, in D. Healy, et al. eds. The Routledge Handbook Of Irish Criminology, London: Taylor 
& Francis, 379-398.  
22 Hay, D.  Linebaugh, P.  and Thompson, E.P. (1975) Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in 
18th-Century England, New York:  Pantheon. Lane London. 
23 Rock, P. (2004) ‘Victims, prosecutors and the State in nineteenth century England and Wales’, 
Criminal Justice: The International Journal of Policy and Practice, 4 (4) 331-354. Vaughan, B. and 
S. Kilcommins (2008) Terrorism, Rights and the Rule of Law: negotiating justice in Ireland, Devon: 
Willan Publishing. Garland, D. (2001) The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in 





suspects and offenders from being unfairly impinged by the rise of victims24 the 
social situation for them has deteriorated due to some of the tough on crime penal 
populist policies that were introduced in the recent past.25 Policies which used the 
victim as a pretext to alter the perception of these groups in the eyes of the public.26 
The author, when referencing tough of crime penal populist policies is here 
specifically citing the rise of phenomena such as the greater use of crime as a 
political football to race to the bottom in relation to penal severity.27 As well as the 
consequent increase in Gardai numbers,28 the promotion of broken windows theory 
as official State policy,29 in which small indiscretions are officially perceived with 
zealous vigour to resolve more serious ones. There has also been an alarming 
adoption of zero tolerance policing, in which even minor criminalities are actively 
 
24 Kilcommins, S., Leahy S., Moore, K. and Spain, E. (2018) The Victim in the Irish Criminal 
Justice Process, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
25 Campbell, L. (2008) ‘Criminal justice and penal populism in Ireland’, Legal Studies, 28(4), 559-
573.   
26 McCullagh, C. (2014) ‘From Offender to Scumbag: Changing Understandings of Crime and 
Criminals in Contemporary Ireland’, Irish Journal of Sociology, 22(1), 8-27. McCullagh. C. (2017) 
‘“Respectable” Victims and Safe Solutions: The Hidden Politics of Victimology?’, Northern Ireland 
Law Quarterly, 68(4): 539–53. 
27 O' Mahony, P. (1996) Criminal Chaos: Seven Crises in Irish Criminal Justice, Dublin: Round 
Hall Sweet and Maxwell. 
28 Walsh, D. (1998) ‘Who Guards the Guards?’, 88 (350), Studies: An Irish Quaterly Review, 154-
163.  
29 O’Donnell, I. and O’Sullivan, E. (2003) The politics of intolerance—Irish style. British Journal 





and enthusiastically pursued by the police and penal warehousing, which creates a 
negative perception of convicts by actively increasing their numbers without 
implementation of a concerted effort to deter offending or reform offenders.30 
Consequently, within modern Irish criminal justice, we see something of a 
recalibration and dissociation of the axis of individualisation between offender and 
victim of crime. The author takes the axis of individualisation in this context to 
mean the focus of attention and target for the exercise of power. In fact, they this 
as having shifted not only away from monarchical supremacy towards the offender, 
but now, in more recent times, in the direction of the victim of crime.  This 
understanding of the concept comes from the Foucauldian tradition, 31  and is 
something other authors of significant contemporary influence like Garland32 and 
Kilcommins33 have evolved. Their work is particularly consequential in relation to 
the contemporary bifurcation, or split, of this axis of individualisation between 
offender and victim of crime. It is used in this thesis in order to explain the way in 
which the victim has re-emerged. As the idea helps to support the argument of this 
 
30 Byrne et al., R.  (1983) Innocent Till Proven Guilty? Dublin: Irish Council for Civil Liberties. 
Daly, K. (1994) ‘Men's Violence, Victim Advocacy, and Feminist Redress: Comment’, Law and 
Society Review, 28(4), 777-786, p. 781. 
31 Foucault, M. (1978) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, New York: Pantheon. 
32 Garland, D. (2002) The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
33 Kilcommins, S. and Moffett, L. (2016) ‘The Inclusion and Juridification of Victims on the Island 
of Ireland, in D. Healy, et al. eds. The Routledge Handbook Of Irish Criminology, London: Taylor 





thesis that not only has the victim now become the refocused centre of scholarly 
and public attention, but it has also become subject to an official State power. A 
power which not only gauges and examines, but also empowers and legitimises.34 
This is symptomatic of contemporary justice within Ireland, and is therefore of 
assistance in evidencing the move towards evidencing greater victim participation. 
 The first sub-question to ask is what was the position of the victim of crime 
in the eighteenth century? This entails conducting a historically informed study of 
the legal context in Ireland at this time and considering how the victim of crime 
operated in this particular context. By examining the complicated manner by which 
the legal establishment of the day perceived victims, as both a wronged individual 
but someone who stands for the multitude35 certain parallels can be drawn. These 
occur between their perception in the past and the modern day, in which the victim 
as everyman36 is something that is in certain instances common to both.  
By also assessing the ways in which the victim was so procedurally central 
before, during and after a trial, and the power they held over the process in the 
eighteenth century the author is able to gauge to what extent the victim has re-
 
34 Smart, B. (1983) Foucault, Marxism and Critique. London: Routledge.  
35 Schafer, S. (1968) The Victim and his Criminal: A Study in Functional Responsibility, New York: 
Random House. Wright, M. (1991) Justice for Victims and Offenders, Milton Keynes: Open 
University Press. Rock, P. (2004) ‘Victims, prosecutors and the State in nineteenth century England 
and Wales’, Criminal Justice: The International Journal of Policy and Practice, 4 (4) 331-354, 
p.332-338. 
36 Garland, D. (2002) The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society, 





emerged against their previous position. This is done by contrasting various crucial 
moments in time and drawing various parallels. This is particularly interesting in 
relation to the compounding of offences,37 and the contemporary compensation 
order, where monies can be given in lieu of or in addition to a criminal penalty.38 
In effect, the section helps demonstrate that the re-emergence of the victim is less 
of an artificial addition, and more of a power fluctuation - a modern discontinuity 
in the criminological status quo, which mandates a return to form, in some respects.  
The second sub-question is how and why did the victim go from a central 
figure to possessing a more peripheral role during the nineteenth century and what 
did this cause? This section essentially involves outlining in what way the victim 
was procedurally excluded from criminal justice by the rise of the State39 and the 
 
37 Friedman, D.D. (1995) ‘Making Sense of English Law Enforcement in the Eighteenth Century’, 
University of Chicago Law School Roundtable, 2(2), 475-505, p.484. Sullivan, S., (2005) ‘A Just 
Method of Justice: Informal Ordering in Kent, 1770-1830’, unpublished PhD Thesis, Canterbury: 
Canterbury Christ Church University College. 
38 As now currently provided for under Section 6 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. Rogan, M. 
(2006c) ‘The role of victims in sentencing – the case of compensation orders’, Irish Law Times, 24 
(2), 202-208.  
39 Kilcommins, S. and Moffett, L. (2016) ‘The Inclusion and Juridification of Victims on the Island 
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& Francis, 379-398. Garland, D. (2002) The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in 
Contemporary Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.179. Vaughan, B. and Kilcommins, S. 
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negatives of this particular transition for the victim.40 This is done in order to 
measure the lowest point of victim inclusion in modern history, and use it to assess 
not only the advances of more recent times, but also evaluate the impact of these, 
by weighing them again the previous structural marginality of victims. It also 
demonstrates just how the reforms of the nineteenth century,41 which were so 
beneficial for offenders, 42  were devastating for victims. In fact, due to the 
predominant ideologies of the time,43  allegedly progressive reforms like the rise 
of adversarialism and the depersonalisation of punishment44 were predicated upon 
 
40 Christie, N. (1977) ‘Conflicts as Property’, British Journal of Criminology, 17(1), 1-15, pp.3-8. 
41 Wiener, M.J. (1990) Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, Law and Policy in England: 1830-
1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.49,p.65,104-105, Berlin, I. (1969) Four essays on 
liberty, London: Oxford University Press,p.6, Maine, H. (1927) Ancient Law, London: Dent 
Graveson, p.100, Norrie, A.W. (2001) Crime, reason and history: a critical introduction to criminal 
law, 2nd ed., London: Butterworths, p.21. 
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the procedural exclusion of the victim.45 The section fundamentally captures the 
profound impact and far lasting consequences of the procedural marginalisation of 
the victim during the nineteenth century. In so doing it consequently portrays the 
limitations of the offender based system and narrative as well as how it persisted 
right up until very recently, as well as the negatives of this for crime victims.46 
The third sub question is what were the ideological techniques which 
engendered the victim’s re-emergence during the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries? This sub question helps address the main research question as it 
necessitates an analysis of the ideological perspectives that motivated the victim’s 
re-emergence. As such it helps clarify not only that the victim went from procedural 
marginality to a position of centrality, both in terms of ideology and public 
perception, but also the thinking that motivated this. The analysis also helps 
 
45 Vaughan, B. and Kilcommins, S. (2010) ‘The governance of crime and the negotiation of justice’, 
Criminology and Criminal Justice,10(1), 59-75, Cusack, A. (2015) ‘From Exculpatory to 
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evidence the way in which feminist47 and victimological48 perspectives were key 
components as they challenged the offender-based narratives that had previously 
side-lined victims and victim discourse in academia49 and amongst the general 
public.50 This helps explain how victim marginality was entrenched and the manner 
by which it was eroded. Which in turn helps outline how attention was re-focused 
 
47 Connolly, E. (2003) ‘Durability and Change in State Gender Systems’, European Journal of 
Women's Studies, 10(1), 65–86, p. 67; Galligan, Y. (1998) Women and Politics in Contemporary 
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on the victim51 and how this eroding of their social and academic marginality 
motivated scholars and the public to campaign for their improved justice position.52  
 The fourth sub question is how did the more practical drivers of re-inclusion 
exert themselves? This explains how the victim became more central during the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries by looking at the grassroots victimological and 
feminist inspired social reforms 53  that contested and subverted the nineteenth 
century offender based narrative to win key gains for victims of crime.54 This helps 
 
51 Maguire, M. (1991) ‘The Needs and Rights of Victims of Crime’, Crime and Justice, 14(1), 370-
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address the central research question by evidencing, in a sociologically-informed 
manner, the way in which the victim was elevated into a position of justice 
stakeholder. One that now assumed a position of greater procedural centrality.55 In 
doing so it demonstrates that such change was predicated upon a fusion of 
ideological forces with drivers of change.  Indeed, these drivers, like increased rates 
of recorded crime56 and the increasingly graphic portrayal of crime57 created a 
confluence of factors that were conducive to the re-emergence of the victim as an 
important figure within Irish criminal justice by the end of the twentieth century. 
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 The adoption of a sociological perspective is useful when addressing the 
central research question, as it helps show how phenomena such the Irish mass 
media58 were pivotal factors in shaping the social forces which drove the victims’ 
re-emergence.59 In fact, some of the most interesting recent developments, which 
have arisen as a consequence of new forms of media60 evidence the important role 
that such media has played in further advancing the cause of victim re-inclusion.61 
Indeed, victim activism of all kinds has motivated significant portions of the 
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populace to promote the re-emergence of the victim. This has been consequential 
in the realm of criminal justice, but has also resulted in considerable support from 
the wider public,62 as well as from official and legitimate organs of the State.63  
The fifth sub question is what was the dominant legal framework behind 
the re-emergence of the Irish crime victim? The answer to this sub question helps 
resolve the central question as it goes to the heart of how exactly the re-inclusion 
of the victim impacted in a legal manner, by examining the legal concepts that 
helped shape their re-emergence. Answering this involves outlining all the major 
domestic and international changes that have occurred in the rights that the victim 
possesses. This consequently evidences how their previous position as marginal 
actor without rights transformed into their new one, of central criminal justice 
rights bearer.64  
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An examination of these rights transitions is important to the overall work 
as within the Anglo-American tradition the concept of rights and rights based 
discourse is central to our understanding of how the positions of a group can 
improve over time. 65  Indeed human rights were pivotal to the eventual re-
emergence of the victim and their rights in Irish criminal justice.66 As they formed 
the basis for the international and domestic legal instruments, statute and caselaw 
that saw their re-centralised position officially recognised at a domestic level in 
Ireland.67 It is crucial that this thesis, which seeks to chart the evolving position of 
the victim, addresses and discusses the concept in depth. The wider implications 
for other justice stakeholders such as the suspect, offender and public are also 
something that must be given considerable weight in this regard, 68  as an 
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examination of the rise of victim rights must also encompass an assessment of how 
the legislature and judiciary were able to mesh the entitlements of victims with 
those of these particular group.69 As they could have been prejudiced by the legal 
introduction of the victim rights concept into the Irish justice system.70 
The sixth and final question is when and how did victim inclusive legal 
reform solidify the victim’s new legal position in Ireland? In order to assess the 
changing nature of the victim’s  position in Irish criminal justice, and the manner 
by which their re-centralised position as rights bearing stakeholder emerged, the 
answering of this question catalogues the legislative and case law based reforms 
that cemented the victim’ new influential position. This assessment of the position 
of the victim before, during and after the criminal trial is pivotal in addressing how 
their position improved since the nineteenth century. As well as in helping to 
provide areas of contrast with their more predominant eighteenth-century role.71  
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In this regard, the greatest area of procedural accommodation is arguably 
the provision that has been made for vulnerable victims72 who were not properly 
accommodated in a dignified position in either the criminal justice systems of the 
eighteenth 73  or nineteenth century. 74  The highlighting of such changes helps 
assuage concerns that recent reforms were piecemeal or inconsequential.75 Since 
such accommodation of vulnerable victims is arguably the most progressive aspect 
of recent transitions in the area of victim rights.76 In fact, it demonstrates that 
victims have moved from being beholden to vested interests or dependent upon the 
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State to becoming privately powerful77 and publicly consequential actors.78 This is 
consequential for the purposes of this thesis as it evidences that the rights of victim 
are being legally vindicated within the contemporary legal structures of Irish 
society 79  in an equitable manner (considering suspects and offenders). 80  In 
addition, it also helps evidence how the transition from victim exclusion to 
inclusion in Ireland was really a societal evolution as much as a legalistic one.81 
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1.3 METHODOLOGY  
This endeavour is diverse in terms of methodology and therefore seeks to 
synthesise historical, doctrinal, socio-legal and jurisprudential methodologies. 
Although this might appear an ambitious project, an endeavour which seeks to 
outline the shifting position of the victim of crime within Irish criminal justice 
inevitably involves engaging with these areas and methods of inquiry, in order to 
capture the rich texture of transitions that have occurred over time in sufficient 
detail and in order to inquire as to some of the causes and impacts of these changes. 
The author therefore hopes that this treatise will not just document the evolution of 
how the victim of crime was re-integrated, but will also attempt to provide a 
methodologically informed narrative behind what exactly was driving these 
changes and shed some light on the way in which the authorities have affected 
them. Each of these particular ways of knowing the victim of crime in an Irish 
context is therefore imperative to a proper academic engagement with not only the 
transitions within this area of law but also with the wider socio-political and 
ideological forces that were at play when the Irish State adopted these particular 
stances. 
Before substantially engaging with the historical methodology issue it is 
worth briefly considering the question of historical sources and, in particular, the 
difficulties involved with accessing them in Ireland. This presents certain 
difficulties, as, in addition to the sub-optimal approach in Ireland to the 
 
Raitt, F. (2013) ‘Independent Legal Representation in Rape Cases: Meeting the Justice Deficit in 





preservation of historical documents from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
several archives have not long outlived their own time periods or have also been 
lost to us as a result of their destruction in the recent past during the Civil War. 
This information can be gleaned from the authors consultation of several leading 
archives within the State during the course of these studies in order to try to obtain 
first-hand source material in relation to victims of crime during the historical 
periods that this study sought to examine.  
The author consulted several archivists at: the Royal Irish Academy, King’s 
Inns Library and Garda Museum and Library, as well as the National Archives 
themselves. However, apart from the few interesting morsels, obtainable from the 
Chief Secretary’s Office Registered Papers,82 located within the National Archives, 
containing first-hand accounts from victims, there were no primary sources readily 
available concerning victims. The limited material that was, whilst interesting, 
rarely, focused on Irish victims or indeed their interaction with the Justice system. 
The early chapters of this thesis use a historical methodology to 
contextualise the criminal justice models of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
 
82 Like the 1824 “Petition of John Holland, tailor, Galway, County Galway, to Richard Wellesley, 
1st Marquis Wellesley, Lord Lieutenant, Dublin Castle, seeking a measure of financial support for 
himself and his ‘helpless family’. He claims to be the victim of deception at the hands of Edward H 
Montford, a police officer, whom he assisted with ‘work and labour’.” National Archives (2020) 
The Chief Secretary’s Office Registered papers, available: 
https://csorp.nationalarchives.ie/search/index.php?simpleSearchSbm=Search&category=27&searc
hDescTxt=victim&_ga=GA1.2.557946839.1579010759&PHPSESSID=428a9ab347899100e7e67





in order to help illustrate not only how the victim of crime was procedurally present 
or absent but also to demonstrate how this position fluctuated over time. This is 
imperative in order to comprehend why it was that politicians prevented the State 
from aggrandising itself in the eighteenth century and why it consequently relied 
so much on popular participation. Indeed, this also helps to clarify why the 
nineteenth century State needed to exclude victims and make the administration of 
justice more complex and professional in order to maintain its procedural 
impartiality. This contextualisation of criminal justice in both of these eras relies 
upon a wealth of expert knowledge in this area, which has been built up by an 
eclectic mix of astute commentators, some of which were alive at the time and 
others who have developed their understanding of the period and its people through 
years of study of primary and secondary source material. Students of history such 
as E.P. Thompson and Douglas Hay,83 among others, have all captured the realities 
of the material existence of the lives of victims in these periods and therefore 
provide some of the most accurate analysis of the social relations that existed at the 
time. They have also illustrated how the victim inhabited their world and the 
various social forces which moulded them. These historians are selected as they 
astutely catalogue the lived experience of victims within criminal justice at these 
particular times and therefore provide a window into the perspective of victims that 
helps the goal of this thesis of establishing what position the victim occupied in the 
 
83 Hay, D.  Linebaugh, P.  and Thompson, E.P. (1975) Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in 





recent past. Their work is also complemented by the likes of Terry Eagleton,84 
Friedrich Engels,85 Michael Davitt86 and Heather Laird,87 who have all helped the 
author portray a more holistic picture of what life was like for victims during the 
nineteenth century that is not only aware of issues of race and class but is also 
highly cognisant of the unique Irish particularity that was in existence at these 
pivotal moments and how exactly  victims manoeuvred within their social milieu. 
They are all therefore important to the work of this thesis as the early 
chapters are essentially an attempt to gauge the extent of the victim’s material 
conditions and how they improved and/or deteriorated over time. This is a 
significant departure from most contemporary works in this field as most histories 
of these times on the subject of victims tend to zone in on “great men”, but often 
tend to overlook the realities of the masses, whose experience would arguably be 
more representative of the operations of criminal justice for most individuals. The 
Irish context and particularity are also crucial here, as although Ireland was 
formally, and rather reluctantly, just another part of the British Empire the Irish 
social body and psyche is pivotal to an understanding of the colonial context in 
which the Irish victim of crime operated. This treatise also needs to take account 
 
84 Eagleton, T. (1995) Heathcliff and the great hunger: studies in Irish culture, London: Verso. 
85 Engels, F. (2009) The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844, New York: Cosimo 
Classics. 
86 Davitt, M. (1972) The Fall Of Feudalism In Ireland, Irish University Press: Shannon. 
87 Laird, H. (2005) Subversive Law in Ireland, 1879-1920: From ‘Unwritten Law’ to the Dail 






of the changing criminal justice situation in Ireland in order to develop a more 
complete picture of how the colonial authorities practically applied or indeed 
flouted British Law in an Irish context. A historical approach is therefore vital, as 
this thesis seeks to write a history of the modern victim of crime in Ireland “from 
below” and a constituent element of this is an attempt to portray how the State 
disenfranchised this particular body.88  
A history “from below” is one in which the author tends to not focus on the 
experiences of a minority of “great men”, but instead looks at the ordinary 
individuals of society. This involves considering what are their material conditions 
and how do these shape their experiences and ideological outlooks. Such questions 
are relevant to this thesis as although much has been said of important individuals 
and their well-known victimisations, thus far relatively little has been written to 
help contextualise the way in which ordinary people in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries were victimised and obtained redress. These approaches have 
a swath of material from analysis and leads to a skewed version of history in which 
the opinions and of a minute few take precedence over social realities. The adoption 
of this approach is therefore an attempt to try to rectify this imbalance, and 
construct a historical narrative that is a more accurate and class-conscious portrayal 
of what life was actually like for the victim at these particular times. 
 





This thesis therefore consequently adopts a Foucauldian history of the 
present approach. 89 This involves the construction of genealogies.90 These permit 
the contesting of hitherto dominant narratives and allow the consideration of 
discontinuities within these narratives. This permits the exploration and 
construction of a new narrative, one that has yet to be told or indeed has been 
supressed by traditional analysis of the area.91 In this context, the thesis mainly 
focuses on the marginalisation of victims.92 The original sources of this approach 
are outlined within the work of Foucault. The most famous of these is the 
Panopticon of Bentham.93 Another example that Foucault cites are  the ‘techniques 
 
89 ‘‘This approach … begins with a diagnosis of the current situation. There is an unequivocal 
…contemporary orientation.” Dreyfus, H. and Rabinow, P. (1982) Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, p. 119 ‘‘Writing a 
history of the present means … writing in a field of power relations and political struggle.’’ Roth, 
M. (1981) ‘Foucault’s ‘‘history of the present’’’, History and Theory, 20(1), 32–46, p. 43. 
90 Which entail “…using historical research to disturb contemporary conceptions …” Garland, D. 
(2014) ‘What is a ‘‘history of the present’’? On Foucault’s genealogies and their critical 
preconditions’, Punishment & Society,16(4), 365-384, p. 371. 
91 ‘‘The search…is not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was previously 
thought immobile ….’’ Foucault, M. (1991) ‘Nietzsche, genealogy, history’, In: Rabinow, P., ed., 
The Foucault Reader, New York: Pantheon, p. 82.  
92 In this case the position of the victim “… a present-day practice that is both taken for granted and 
… problematic…” Garland, D. (2014) ‘What is a ‘‘history of the present’’? On Foucault’s 
genealogies and their critical preconditions’, Punishment & Society,16(4), 365-384, p. 373. 
93 Bentham, J. (1791/1843) ‘Panopticon… a new principle of construction applicable to any sort of 





of discipline’ that evolved in the late eighteenth century, which were inexorably 
linked with the rise to prominence of the prison.94 These were used in order to 
explain the society Foucault was writing in and the way it had evolved.95 This thesis 
attempts to adopt a similar approach by considering the role of the victim of the 
past in such a way as to help comprehend and ultimately contribute towards the 
resolution of the question of how the victim is going to be presently accommodated. 
 It therefore does not perceive history, in this regard, as a march of 
progress,96 in which humanity becomes increasingly rational and free, or from a 
certain privileged position as a Whiggish account might but instead as a fluid time 
line in which the respective power dynamics of actors change over time. Since 
constructing a history of the present does not perceive of history in this manner it 
 
(1791/1843) The Works of Jeremey Bentham, Vol. 4, Edinburgh: William Tait. “The panoptic 
schema… was destined to spread throughout the social body... is the general principle of a new 
‘‘political anatomy’’ whose object and end are … the relations of discipline” Foucault M (1977) 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, New York: Pantheon p. 207, p. 208. 
94 “Foucault connects the modern prison’s emergence to techniques of discipline… prison…was 
from the start a disciplinary institution, condensing within its enclosed space a whole host of 
disciplinary practices...” Garland, D. (2014) ‘What is a ‘‘history of the present’’? On Foucault’s 
genealogies and their critical preconditions’, Punishment & Society,16(4), 365-384, p. 376. 
95 “The historian of the present does not commit the error of anachronism … He or she is instead 
engaged in the historico-critical project of identifying traces of the past (historic power struggles, 
modes of control … today.” Garland, D. (2014) ‘What is a ‘‘history of the present’’? On Foucault’s 
genealogies and their critical preconditions’, Punishment & Society,16(4), 365-384, p. 375. 
96 Hegel, G.W.F. (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction: Reason in 





opens up a space in which a different perspective can be adopted. The adoption of 
this techniques allows this thesis to question the previous offender-based narrative 
which saw the progress of nineteenth century criminal justice reform as being 
completely positive. This consequently allows the construction of an alternate 
victim-based narrative which demonstrates the cost of these transitions for the 
victim.97 This is a vitally important part of this thesis, as it is an attempt to provide 
a history of the modern victim within Irish criminal justice. 
To effectively construct ‘histories of the present’ in an Irish context does 
not however, despite the name, entail engaging in presentism, whereby the past is 
gauged in terms particular to the present. It instead allows for the tensions and 
problems of the present to be elucidated in clearer terms by analysing the struggles 
and fluctuations of the past.98  The construction of history in this way  means 
 
97 “…the effect of this displacement is to produce a shift in our understanding of the contemporary 
institution. Instead of a humane, reformatory institution that embodies a modern, enlightenment 
sensibility…Foucault’s genealogy suggests a set of disciplinary practices, normalizing knowledges, 
… “Garland, D. (2014) ‘What is a ‘‘history of the present’’? On Foucault’s genealogies and their 
critical preconditions’, Punishment & Society,16(4), 365-384, p. 376. “Foucault’s view of things is 
quite different. Instead of seeing these developments as liberating and empowering, he regards them 
as the products of an apparatus of power–knowledge … in the process of formation and expansion 
since the 19th century.” Garland, D. (2014) ‘What is a ‘‘history of the present’’? On Foucault’s 
genealogies and their critical preconditions’, Punishment & Society,16(4), 365-384, p. 377. 
98 “To scholars unfamiliar with – or unsympathetic to – Foucault’s work, the phrase will suggest a 
form of ‘‘presentism’’… such an approach entails, for historians, a fundamental error of method – 
the mortal sin of anachronism … as it projects contemporary values and meanings onto a past … 





assessing not only the historical changes that have taken place, but their impact 
upon both those historical actors that were affected by them as well as what we can 
learn from this when considering our present predicament. The author therefore 
hopes to focus particularly upon those parties that these fluctuations prejudiced, 
and therefore evidence how victims of crime moved from previously central actors 
to positions of marginality and how this transition continued to influence and 
indeed shape modern Irish criminal justice procedure for centuries to come.  
Using history in this way necessary involves an exploration of ruptures in 
the established offender based historical narrative of the eighteenth, nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, which allow the reader to subvert some of the established 
convectional prejudices about the evolution of the history of criminal justice and 
thereby construct an alternative victim centred narrative of these time periods.99 
The process itself is productive in the sense that these endeavours not only help to 
dispel some of our entrenched preconceived notions about the evolution of criminal 
justice, in much the same way as Foucault forces us to re-evaluate the prison and 
modern penology, but also allows us to conceive of the history of criminal justice 
 
… back into history or claiming to discover phenomena in earlier times with the same significance 
… they have today”. Garland, D. (2014) ‘What is a ‘‘history of the present’’? On Foucault’s 
genealogies and their critical preconditions’, Punishment & Society,16(4), 365-384, p. 375. 
99  Benjamin, W. (1999) Arcades Project, trans., Eiland, H. and McLaughlin, K. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. Benjamin, W. (2003) ‘On the Concept of History’, in Selected Writings, 







with a clearer lens, that allows further ruptures and indeed the potential for even 
more alternative histories of criminal justice to emerge and be studied.100 This 
endeavour of exploring these particular ruptures in history that tend to subvert 
popular notions therefore allow the author to construct a completely different 
historical narrative for the victim of crime, where history becomes something that 
is not merely known but functions as it ought, as a toolkit that can be effectively 
uses to learn from the past and  utilise it as an important practical implement for 
our everyday lives, in the genealogical tradition of Nietzsche and Foucault.101  
In so doing, one is empowered to discover a history of criminal justice 
which shifts our era of study towards a time in which such a history does not require 
incessant evocations and distortions and is instead located in “… the scattering of 
the profound stream of time”.102 This stream of time can be one that can not only 
nourish our thirst for knowledge but can also, more importantly, serve as a dam to 
power our attempts to intervene and improve the present. This work therefore seeks 
to utilise history in this way, in order to understand victims of crime, not in an 
 
100 “…Foucault’s reading of the historical sources disrupts these standard accounts and calls them 
into question.” Garland, D. (2014) ‘What is a ‘‘history of the present’’? On Foucault’s genealogies 
and their critical preconditions’, Punishment & Society,16(4), 365-384, p. 375. 
101Nietzsche, F. (1997) Untimely Meditations, 2nd ed., ed., trans. Breazeale, D., Hollingdale, R. J. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
New York: Pantheon Books. 






anachronistic sense, but in a manner that helps describe how we receive and 
perceive the victim of crime in the present day.103  
The use of a doctrinal methodology to outline the legal position of the crime 
victim in the latter chapters of this thesis fixes this research within the substantive 
law of Ireland. This gives the analysis of the victim’s  position within Irish criminal 
justice grounding within a framework that is of considerable import due to the 
domestic socio-political significance of legality in this country.104 In so doing the 
thesis effectively ascertains what the current legal position of the victim of crime 
is within the Irish criminal justice system and what entitlements to recourse a victim 
of crime might have when engaging with it. Such analysis requires an exploration 
of the rights that International and EU Law provisions have vested upon victims of 
 
103 “Foucault’s genealogies have… critical observations about the present, and…the analyst’s object 
of study...in the present. These genealogies begin with a certain puzzlement…about practices 
…[a]nd the inquiries that they pursue are designed to address that … a history of the present always 
involves a critical distancing from the present…a specific problematization that views that object 
as puzzling in ways that can be made less puzzling by…historical inquiry. Without this initial, 
critical moment…the genealogical project…simply cannot proceed. Foucault’s use of the 
genealogical method and …‘‘histories of the present’’ demonstrate how historical research can be 
… revealing.” Garland, D. (2014) ‘What is a ‘‘history of the present’’? On Foucault’s genealogies 
and their critical preconditions’, Punishment & Society,16(4), 365-384, p.379. 
104 “…persons have reason to take seriously the requirements that law imposes. They have reason 
to do so whether or not they are personally inclined to endorse the law’s requirements… There are 
powerful reasons for conformity, and these can have a daunting reality even for someone who… 
dissents … from the state’s rules requiring certain conduct.” MacCormick, N. (2007) Institutions of 





crime, as well as the codification of the rights and protection of victims of crime 
within the domestic statutes of the Irish parliament. Such an endeavour also 
necessarily entails outlining the judicial pronouncements on the subject of how the 
legal system has come to accommodate the rights of crime victims within the 
operation of domestic Irish criminal justice. 
 When discussing victim rights an important element of the current debate 
that ought to be recognised at this phase is the distinction that can be drawn between 
“service rights” and “procedural rights”.105 This is of fundamental importance as it 
helps illustrate those rights that can be vested to victims which will largely be about 
improving their experience of criminal justice without any impact on those accused 
of crime and procedural rights. Those which are, although potentially quite 
beneficial for victims and the manner in which they perceive the operation of 
justice can also potentially impact on the pivotal due process safeguards currently 
in place to protect an accused from arbitrary justice. The most important in this 
regard would be the presumption of innocence. As although procedural victim 
rights could help them better participate within our justice framework and guard 
against their alienation within it, it could also prejudge issues. Such as the perceived 
likelihood in the minds of trial actors about whether an accused is actually guilty. 
This analysis will therefore also involve an in depth study of the domestic 
impact of some of the more recent developments that the victim rights 
jurisprudence of bodies like the European Court of Human Rights has had, which 
 






were profoundly influential to the adoption of the victim rights concept in Ireland. 
By outlining all of these recent legal transitions the legal position of the victim in 
Ireland as a rights bearing stakeholder will be clarified for the reader and the basis 
upon which all of this legal privileging rests will be effectively elucidated.106 
Utilising the law in this manner necessarily involves both an empirical and 
rational approach, which is beneficial in gauging the extent to which the victim of 
crime has practically returned within the criminal justice system of Ireland, and 
how exactly the law has effected and codified their augmented legal position within 
Irish criminal justice as a rights bearing stakeholder.107  Doctrinal reasoning is 
empirical as legal professionals such as barristers, solicitors and judges use this 
 
106 “Doctrinal legal method is… premised on valid sources of law which serve to limit the scope of 
any legal question and its determination; in assessing conduct, legal functionaries cannot stray 
beyond these ontological sources, the ways in which they are coordinated to each other, and their 
hierarchical arrangement. This relates not only to law application but also to law creation. This 
institutionalisation is wholly routinised given its systematic acceptance by agencies ...” 
Kilcommins, S. ‘Doctrinal Legal Method (Black-Letterism): Assumptions, Commitment and 
Shortcomings’ in Cahillane, L and Schweppe. J. (eds) (2015) Legal Research Methods: Principles 
and Practicalities, Clarus Press: Dublin, Ch 1. 
107 “Doctrinal legal method emphasises coherence and unity. It involves the search for a ‘system’ 
of general, logically consistent principles, built up from the study of particular instances. This 
system is built on empirical and rational foundations. It is loosely empirical in that lawyers work 
with the raw data of cases and other legal provisions. It is rationalist because it presupposes that the 
system is logical and internally coherent...” Kilcommins, S. ‘Doctrinal Legal Method (Black-
Letterism): Assumptions, Commitment and Shortcomings’ in Cahillane, L and Schweppe. J. (eds) 





written law for logic-based propositions that are rational in the way in which their 
contentions tend to base themselves on previous legal precedent. This advances the 
overall analytical framework of the law since its body, within the Common Law 
tradition, has predicated itself on what previous courts of law have done and 
therefore tends to incrementally evolve with each case.108 The use of doctrinal case 
law throughout this thesis is necessary in order to help establish the incremental 
manner by which the legal rights of victims were recognised. This helps to evidence 
how the trend first began in Europe, and then influenced at an Irish level in order 
to answer to main question of this thesis regarding the contemporary victim’s 
position. It additionally assists with the elucidation of the situation in relation to  
other key stakeholders like the suspect and offender, which become clearer as the 
precedent on this subject helps clarify the evolution that has transpired in this area. 
The author gleans the overall imperative nature of such a perspective to this 
thesis from the fact that the doctrinal approach is required to capture the law’s 
‘internal point of view’ in relation to victims in order to ascertain the current 
position of the victim of crime within Irish criminal justice. 109  This must be 
 
108 “Propositions of law are not simply descriptive of legal history in a straight forward way; nor 
are they evaluative in some way divorced from history. Propositions of law are interpretive of legal 
history, which combines elements of both description and evaluation, but is different from both” 
Ronald Dworkin, 1985 A Matter of Principle, Harvard University Press, p. 147. 
109 “Legal reasoning is autonomous, and there is no need for recourse to non-legal reasons or 
justifications. Questions and solutions are founded upon distinctly legal materials, demarcated from 
competing normative claims to truth. In this sense, doctrinal law employs an epistemologically 





assessed since the way in which it perceives the world and its’ actors is crucial to 
any Rule of Law society, where authority is subject to the law and not mere 
authority. Since Ireland is a Rule of Law society which seeks to keep the actions 
of all its citizens within the remit of the law this approach is a major constituent 
element in the appraisal of the form of the legal provisions that were so imperative 
to the modern legal aggrandisement of the crime victim. In fact, since the 
presumption of innocence and equality of arms, which are key to the maintenance 
of any democratic legal system as well as to the outlining of the modern position 
of the victim of crime and its impact on criminal justice stakeholders, do not only 
need be understood but properly conveyed to the reader so that they can capture 
not only how the victim of crime’s victims’ position has legally transitioned but 
also how this was achieved by the legislature and judiciary whilst more or less 
maintaining the overall procedural integrity and fairness of the Irish legal system 
towards the suspect and the criminal offender. It is therefore hugely beneficial to 
the kind of victim research that this thesis seeks to tackle. Indeed, the ‘practical, 
pragmatic value’ of the approach is pivotal to both properly outlining the current 
legal rights and recourse to the courts that victims of crime possess but also the 
impact that its changing application towards victims of crime can have upon 
criminal justice stakeholders such as the suspect and offender.110 
 
Assumptions, Commitment and Shortcomings’ in Cahillane, L and Schweppe. J. (eds) (2015) Legal 
Research Methods: Principles and Practicalities, Clarus Press: Dublin, Ch 1. 
110 “As a mode of reasoning, it has a practical, pragmatic value; it is not undertaken its own sake. 





A socio-legal methodology both contextualises the social realities that 
victims, suspects and offenders experience and also helps explain how these 
changes have transpired over time, which helps the author to establish the kinds of 
societal transitions that were pivotal to not only the victim’s aggrandised position 
but also the unique societal position that they now occupy in Ireland, as well as the 
wider societal impact of these changes on suspects and offenders.111 The approach 
is also utilised in order to permit the deployment of some of the Foucauldian 
techniques that were previously explained. Such as how histories of the present can 
help construct an alternative victim narrative, and an extrapolation of how the axis 
of individualisation has now split between the offender and the victim. Something 
which supports the assertion that the victim has indeed become more central within 
Irish criminal justice. It similarly provides insights regarding the transfer from the 
victim inclusive justice model of the eighteenth century to a nineteenth century 
 
compliance, to maintain order, and to regulate behaviour along some agreed lines. The uncertainty 
and insecurity of a more arbitrary or ad hominem decision-making process not linked to rules or 
stable institutional practices would, in contrast, seem unimaginable. Moreover, the rules 
themselves, and their application, work most of the time. They are therefore decidedly useful, 
permitting authoritative resolution of disputes ...” Kilcommins, S. ‘Doctrinal Legal Method (Black-
Letterism): Assumptions, Commitment and Shortcomings’ in Cahillane, L and Schweppe. J. (eds) 
(2015) Legal Research Methods: Principles and Practicalities, Clarus Press: Dublin, Ch 1. 
111 “The relationship of the law, in its many aspects, to a social situation should be considered a 
necessary part of the understanding of that situation. The development of forms of analysis which 
allows interrelated understanding are therefore required.” Schiff, D.N. (1976) ‘Socio-Legal Theory: 





system of governmentality and victim exclusion by describing how the victim of 
crime became encased within a Weberian ‘cage’ of bureaucracy which is crucial to 
the assessment of how the victim was procedurally marginalised in the past.  
This method of inquiry is also probably most pertinent to those chapters in 
the middle of this thesis that seek to examine what socio-legal processes made the 
victim of crime into a socio-cultural phenomenon in the twentieth and twenty first 
centuries as well as the wider ramifications of this alteration. Two of the most 
imperative socio-legal perspectives in this regard are victimology and feminism. 
The imperative importance of both of these ideological lenses mandate that the 
author adopt a socio-legal lens in order to address the ideological significance and 
socio-cultural impact of both of these particular perspectives upon Irish society and 
how it has shaped the legal reform of the victim’s procedural position. They both 
illustrate the pivotal cultural role that their perspectives played in altering 
perceptions of the victim within society, and the consequent emergence of a 
discourse and movement that challenged the victim exclusive status quo and 
actively sought to bring about victim reincorporation through inclusionary 
reform.112 The wider societal and political implications for suspects and offenders 
 
112 “Use of the conventional and accepted characteristics of law, as enunciated by numerous writers 
on legal subjects, is not satisfactory; rather the orientation of the socio-legalist requires these 
common resources to be part of his research topic. In the field of criminology, the symbolic 
interactionists have used this reversal of resource and topic as a basic method. The resources used 
by criminologists at earlier stages were often the official figures and statistics of crime rates, etc. 





is also addressed as these perspectives had a significant impact in these contexts. 
This helps the author address the important aim of the wider societal significance 
of the procedural aggrandisement of the victim within Irish criminal justice. 
A socio-legal methodology therefore helps to properly address and portray 
how society’s perception of victims has changed over time because of the rise to 
prominence of victimology, and particularly feminism, which addresses the 
primary research question posed, as this inquires as to the nature of the transition 
which propelled the victim from near obscurity to a more aggrandised procedural 
position as well as how this impacted the suspect and offender. This grasps the 
changing social realities that were by in large the sociological driving force behind 
the alteration of the laws that led to the victim of crime’s procedural re-introduction 
and re-emergence as a rights bearing stakeholder, with entitlements that are similar, 
but altogether different to the procedural ones that they possessed in the eighteenth 
century. A socio-legal methodology therefore allows the author to encompass 
legally extraneous yet imperative material.113 This catalogues some of the societal 
 
Schiff, D.N. (1976) ‘Socio-Legal Theory: Social Structure and Law’, The Modern Law Review, 
39(3), 289-310, p. 288. 
113 “A socio-legal approach is conceptually distinguished from more positivistic approaches; the 
whole emphasis, the reason for it and its meaning cannot and should not be linked to other 
approaches. It does not disclaim other lines of thinking, but, it is considered, establishes alternative 
ones. The conceptual difference requires both theoretical assumptions and a new methodology. 
Moreover, the methodology in this context must always remain in critical perspective, indeed, it 
must be seen as part and parcel of any research project.” Schiff, D.N. (1976) ‘Socio-Legal Theory: 





transitions that occurred within Irish society as well as their impact upon criminal 
justice policy. Something which is pivotal to an elucidation of how exactly the 
victim has re-emerged. As their procedural re-integration, to a more central 
participatory position within criminal justice was not, strictly speaking, simply a 
legal matter. It instead involved a wider socio-cultural shift. A shift that was driven 
by forces that now demanded that the law react to the desires of the Irish people. 
These desires mainly mandated for the victim to play a more central role in Irish 
criminal justice and for the hitherto offender-based system to be altered to 
accommodate them. These drivers of change exerted institutional pressure that 
brought about victim re-inclusion by shifting the ‘axis of individualisation’ 
(Garland 2001) from its sole preoccupation with offenders onto a new target, the 
victim . By outlining these societal changes, the manner by which victims came to 
be procedurally re-centralised within Irish criminal justice can be elucidated for the 
reader. This also clarifies how this occurred in the unique particularity of Ireland, 
and the wider implications of this, which are the other major aims of this research.  
The change of emphasis within Irish criminal justice was therefore, in large 
part, a product of social factors that the law and its academic study have often 
previously ignored. It is thus a core part of the thrust of this thesis. As by examining 
how the unique social context of Ireland was a pivotal component and had a 
significant impact upon the procedural re-emergence of the victim within Irish 
criminal justice this thesis will be able to address it main target of inquiry. Which 







criminal justice. Key components of this analysis involve gathering and studying 
quantitative and qualitative data in an Irish context regarding the rate of 
victimisation, the media portrayals of criminality as well as the political tapping 
into crime and victims in order to secure a public desire for measures that curtail 
freedoms and increase surveillance. A socio-legal method is adopted here as 
although a purely legal study might overlook these events as well as their social 
causes, this particular treatise’s use of the socio-legal perspective takes full account 
of the wider societal transitions as well as the phenomena that caused them within 
Irish society which explains their impact on suspects, offenders and victims of 
crime but, more importantly, on how the Irish public have come to perceive these 
phenomena, and how they have promoted alterations in criminal justice policy.114 
A jurisprudential methodology helps to place the re-introduction of the 
victim of crime within criminal justice as well as the wider ramifications of this 
into a larger and more coherent theoretical framework that allows the reader to 
perceive the full significance of these transitions. This is important as although we 
might know how the victim was perceived and treated in the past, or what kind of 
social drivers were behind the legal changes that brought about their procedural re-
introduction in more recent time it is difficult to engage with the question of the 
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actual import of these kinds of phenomena without first utilising some of the more 
abstract frames of reference of philosophy within which to contextualise and 
theorise about these occurrences and their evolution. Indeed, the concept of the 
‘Event’ is one that is arguably vital to understanding how certain qualitative crime 
moments in Irish history were so decisive as to change the approach of how the 
society of Ireland came to perceive not only crime but its victims within a relatively 
short space of time.115 The concept is used within this thesis in order to help 
demonstrate the manner in which the decisive yet tragic events of 1996 assisted 
with the alteration of these perceptions amongst the Irish populace.  
The Event, as a concept, is the work of Badiou.116 However, although this 
philosopher developed it, as most of their work was predominately written in 
French the idea remains somewhat overlooked in an Anglo-American context. 
However, due to the works of Žižek, the topic has been introduced to a whole new 
audience.117  The author adopts this Žižekian approach as it is not only more 
linguistically accessible, but also far easier for an audience to grasp. Mainly due to 
the plethora of examples Žižek provides within their writings on the subject. These 
are also much more well known to a wider lay audience than the abstracted version. 
The concept of the Event as introduced and extrapolated upon by Žižek is 
a simple enough one to grasp. It merely asserts that shifts, or transitions, can be so 
decisive that they not only represent a decisive break from the past, but also 
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retroactively produce their own causes. Some of the rather accessible examples that 
Žižek provides in this regard can be found in literature. The phenomena of Kafka, 
for example, is used by Žižek to show how there are, in a sense, precursors to his 
work. Such as in the literature of Poe, Dostoyevsky, etc. However, the style of 
Kafka is so ground-breaking and innovative, so new, that it is sui genesis, of a 
completely different kind than anything which preceded it. So, in a sense, one can 
see certain markers of progress, but the move to Kafka presents a decisive shift.  
Another, perhaps even more understandable reference point, that Zizek also 
cites in their work which may be even more accessible to most audiences is the 
subjective experience of falling in love with another person. Something Badiou 
also references as significant in their own recent work on this subject.118 In this 
example, one person lives their life ordinarily, but then encounters another in an 
Evental moment that changes their life. In fact, a person in love often perceives 
their own life as leading up to the moment that they met their partner. So, in this 
example, we can see a decisive break with an ordinary past. As well as the 
retrospective appreciation of causal factors, i.e. that one’s life has led to a moment. 
 The rather interesting consequence of all of this is that most people 
therefore cannot really understand the true significance of an Event in advance of 
such an Event having taken place.119 As such Events often not only have to be 
accepted as such, but also have to be considered after they have occurred. This 
introduces a considerable degree of contingency to the Event. As not only is it 
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difficult to predict these Evental moments before their occurrence, but it is often 
difficult to predict how society will actually react to them. Making it difficult to 
prejudge whether they will be perceived as Events, or just part of our ordinary lives.  
As a result of these rather distinctive qualities, Events considerably differ 
from other concepts. Such as the sociological theory proposed by Gladwell of the 
‘tipping point’. In which the occurrence of significant changes is perceived as 
incorporating pivotal moments in which a certain point of critical mass is 
reached.120 There are therefore two fundamental differences between perceiving 
the circumstances which took place in 1996  as Events as opposed to tipping points. 
Firstly, with an Event, these circumstances do not have, like in a tipping point a 
neat linear causal trajectory. There may be markers or traces in the past but every 
Event is a break. One which produces its own causes rather than being produced 
by them like in the case of Gladwell’s tipping point. Although there are certain 
factors that come into the equation in 1996, to see the decisive murders of the epoch 
as Events is to perceive them as contingent occurrences. Ones are so jarring as to 
not be produced, but to rather produce their own causes. Secondly, there is the 
inherently contingent nature of the Event. To see the murders of 1996 as Evental 
moments is to see them not as preordained ‘boiling point’ transformations that 
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“have to happen”121 but instead as being heavily dependent upon the exercise of 
the will of their perpetrators. Not to mention the perception and acceptance of the 
Irish public that these activities had gone so far beyond the pale as to represent a 
decisive break with what was the hitherto status quo. It is the element of inherent 
contingency, as well as dependency upon individual and collective free will that 
renders the concept less deterministic than the tipping point. The Events of 1996, 
were, it is argued, in no way predetermined, but the result of the exercise of extreme 
brutality. This, coupled with the effective capturing of public sympathy, was not a 
predictable spread of burning flame, but the contingent flash of a bolt of lightning.  
1.4  CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE  
Although the area of victims’ rights in Ireland has flourished in recent years, 
the field of knowledge in the Irish context remains slightly fragmented and diverse. 
Even though a number of commentaries have considered doctrinal aspects, these 
inquiries are usually isolated from the historical and sociological context of Irish 
victims, which overlooks certain crucial aspects. These studies mainly limit their 
frame of reference to predominately legal questions, which clearly contribute in a 
significant way to the clarifying of various doctrinal questions that are relevant to 
victims. Like how the reform of the law in Ireland has influenced their evolving 
position within criminal justice.  
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However, despite these obvious contributions, they do have the tendency to 
analyse the victim in a legally abstracted way, that does not provide a holistic 
methodological and culturally specific account for the Irish specificity. There is 
also neglect of how its history and society has influenced, and been influenced by, 
the development of the victim as a re-emerging stakeholder in Irish criminal 
justice.122 By looking at the evolution of victim in such a black letter manner 
several insights within the unique particularity of an Irish context are overlooked. 
Therefore, this particular study seeks to redress this through an alternate study of 
the Irish situation, as well as the novel methodological approaches that it adopts. 
Such an approach by the author therefore attempts a deeper synthesis of the causes 
and impact of the victim as a re-emerging socio-legal phenomena. This is done in 
a way that is both unique in an Irish context in terms of its highly particularised 
socio-historical content, as well as the manner by which this is conveyed. Which is 
namely a novel synthesis of historical, sociological and doctrinal methodologies. 
Although there have clearly been several histories that chart the re-
emergence of the victim123 in Irish criminal justice the victim in Ireland has not yet 
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been examined in the way this thesis does, and with this level of detail. Kilcommins 
and Donnelly (2014) have looked at the specific context of the history of the 
vulnerable victim, but they limited their study to this specific group in a way in 
which this particular thesis does not. This work tends to focus upon the victim more 
generally, whilst obviously also including the broader category of ‘vulnerable 
victims of crime’, though not as a distinct group.  
Cusack (2015) has also looked at the history of victims in Ireland by tracing 
how they were factored into the rise of Adversarialism. Despite the unique 
contribution of this research, the present study departs from it through its non-
Whiggish approach to history, which is very much a social one, that approaches its 
history ‘from below’. This is achieved through a detailed exposition of economic 
and racial issues that pertain to the Irish particularity. Particularly within its 
exposition of the nineteenth century transition that brought about the move from 
victim centrality to victim exclusion.124  
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Ryan (2018) has analysed the border common law approach to victims and 
how exactly it has contrasted with civil law procedure in the recent past to ground 
their study of how common law criminal justice is moving closer to civil law 
tradition through harmonisation. The present study takes a much more detailed look 
at the Irish experience with regards to victims and traces how the position of the 
victim evolved from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. Although due regard 
is given to the doctrinal influence of supranational evolutions125 on the domestic 
position of victims this thesis forgoes a comparative analysis in order to trace the 
evolution of victims in a domestic Irish context.  In this way it is more focused the 
specificity of the Irish context as opposed to the common law tradition in general. 
Kilcommins and Moffett (2016) both chart how the victim has re-emerged 
as a stakeholder. They do this through the utilisation of the inclusive force of the 
law, and also use a historical lens to preface their discussion of how exactly this 
occurred. However, the amount of analysis they can bring to bear in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries is considerably limited by the scope of their work, and is 
therefore not able to go into considerable detail with regards to the specific contexts 
that were motivating these transitions. This work goes into considerable detail to 
not only provide a social history in which the contextual factors that either deterred 
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or motivated these changes are accounted for in detail but also involves an 
assessment of the particularity of Ireland from a completely different perspective. 
A perspective that that utilises contemporaneous scholars of the time like Engels126 
and Weber.127 This is done in order to help account for some of the causes of the 
alterations in victim perception and centrality that Kilcommins and Moffett (2016) 
identify, but did not need to tease out with the level of detail this thesis incorporates.  
Kilcommins et al. (2018) produce another history of the victim that is very 
illustrative. However it is altogether different from the historical approach that is 
taken by this thesis, which places greater reliance on the works of authors such as 
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Melossi, 128  Lea 129  as well as Hay 130 , E.P. Thompson131  and Hobsbawm 132  to 
produce something which is much more of a critically oriented narrative. One that 
tends to focus in greater detail upon issues such as how particular ideological 
frames of reference in the eighteenth century explain how a small government that 
predicated itself on victim participation in criminal justice was necessary.  
A far more critical stance towards the enlightenment project is also pursued 
than in some of the more Whiggish histories of the past. Not only in terms of its 
goals of human perfectibility and the de-personification of punishment, but the 
impact of all of this ideology. Namely, the trapping of the victim in a Kafkaesque 
matrix that placed administrative impartiality above end user accessibility. This 
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thesis tends to support these assertions with not only historical evidence but 
contemporaneous literary references. These help further contextualise the kind of 
criminal justice transitions that were occurring during the move from eighteenth 
century victim centrality to their nineteenth century procedural marginalisation. 
Recent years have seen an unprecedented level of growth in the level of 
academic discussion that addresses victims in Ireland. This has tended to focus on 
how victims are now becoming more procedurally important, and about the wider 
processes which have led to this situation.133 This inclusionary discursive trend in 
has therefore tended to create a socio-legal discourse, which has sought to discover 
the sociological roots of these changes.134 The unique sociological contribution that 
this thesis makes is the gathering and presentation of quantitative data. This is then 
presented is numerous trend graphs, which evidence the sharp increase in the levels 
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of recorded crime between the 1950s to the 1990s.135 They are also complemented 
by explanatory qualitative material, which attempts to account for the nature and 
extent of this transition. 136  This forms part of, and therefore helps further 
contextualise, a comprehensive analysis of some of the recent innovative drivers of 
change that helped re-integrate the victim as a socio-cultural phenomenon.  
Although this treatise considers various different drivers of change, such as 
the politicisation of crime137  as well as the media’s influence, one of its most 
innovative advancements is its engagement with media developments. Particularly 
in the areas of shock and awe programming 138  and victim-based 
cinematography. 139  This is a topic that academics have not yet given much 
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systemic analysis to in an Irish context. However, this particular work discusses it 
in great detail, and is therefore something of a criminological first in this area. 
However, most academic attention is paid, in the modern Irish experience, 
to the manner by which victims are accommodated within our adversarial legal 
system (Cusack 2017, 2018). Some Irish academics have gone so far as to say that 
that re-incorporation of crime victims could potentially destabilise the Irish legal 
system and might also lead to the undermining of the rights of the accused (Glynn 
2012). This is a point of great debate within the contemporary academic discourse, 
as others postulate that vesting rights to victims of crime need not destabilise 
procedural justice in this way, and does not necessarily pervert the course of 
criminal justice in this country (Duffy 2009).  
However, the predominant fear that the re-inclusion of victims within 
criminal justice frames will inevitably prejudice stakeholders, in particular the 
accused, seems to have garnered considerable currency. Even though this is 
predicated upon the idea that victims can be, and often automatically are, 
predisposed towards being biased juridical actors.140 This is something that will be 
addressed in this thesis which is another innovation in this field. As recent 
commentaries on the issue have not yet blended a historical, sociological and legal 
approach to the question of the due process implications of victim re-inclusion. 
This approach necessarily involves further consideration and re-evaluation of how 
the growth in victim-based activism undermined the previous victim exclusive 
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model of criminal justice and conventional way of doing things by demanding that 
the State treat victims more humanely (McGrath 2008; Ring 2013, 2017).  
Such discourse has sparked a plethora of works that have sought to enquire 
as to whether this activist based inclusionary trend, which broader sociological 
forces have appeared to drive, could increase penal populism and potentially have 
serious implications for the offender and their rights (Coen 2006; McCullagh 
2014). While others have alleged that there is an embryonic potential within the re-
inclusion of victims which could help decrease the worrying levels of violence that 
seemed to be peaking in and around the late 1990s (Davis 1999). These discourses 
were profoundly significant when they were written, since they tended to flag 
issues of great importance. Similarly, although there has been much apprehension 
and speculative debate regarding the impact of the re-introduction of the victim in 
Ireland on stakeholders like the accused, most commentaries within this area have 
tend to differ from the stance of this particular work. 
 Namely, a detailed and doctrinally based analysis of the pivotal judicial 
interventions that have largely ensured that the re-inclusion of the victim has turned 
out to be a more or less non zero sum game. As well as one that has not prejudiced 
the rights of other stakeholders such as the offender in an Irish context.141  Zero 
sum here is taken to represent the idea that a gain for the rights of the victim 
necessarily comes at the expense of the accused. This places both parties in 
adversarial positions. Something which consequently not only “others” offenders, 
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but is also typical of the kind of hyperbolic language that is often demonstrated in 
the media. Such language not only mischaracterises the issue, but also demonises 
these “others”. Indeed, this thesis clarifies that the issue is clearly not zero-sum.142  
Similarly, previous analysis of this subject has also tended to revolve 
around a single particular theme. Worse still, there is often no unified assessment 
of how the social and the legal often interact in this regard, as most commentaries 
tend to zone in on one particular area of interest without historical legacies or 
sociological causes.143 This thesis seeks to somewhat redress this imbalance. It 
does so by trying to contextualise the modern legal evolution of the victim’s 
newfound procedural centrality against the backdrop of the sociological and 
historical transitions that have occurred within the particularity of an Irish context.   
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This thesis seeks to make a contribution to knowledge in several ways. 
Firstly, from a purely stylistic point of view, the approach to the answering of my 
research question is unique. As an extensive history of the modern victim in Ireland 
that spans four epochs remains largely unwritten. This is particularly the case in 
relation to the manner by which this thesis seeks to achieve this end. Namely 
through the utilisation of a histories of the present approach, which subverts the 
traditionally established offender-based narrative. One that had been written about 
extensively in Ireland, even when addressing the issue of the victim. Consequently, 
few have charted the modern evolution of victims in the way this thesis proposes. 
Several of the existing historical accounts of the criminal justice system are 
offender narratives. Ones that provide considerable details regarding the rights-
based safeguards that are afforded to the defendant in the common law tradition.144 
Since the capriciousness of the previous system was seen as inappropriate in light 
of the significant procedural transitions that were being made in criminal justice145 
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sweeping changes were introduced146 in order the help protect the accused from the 
exercise of such authority by the victim and the State.147 However, in order to 
create an alternative narrative in which the victim is more centred the author will 
have to somewhat distance themselves from these perspectives. In doing so they 
can construct something akin to a narrative of suspicion, whereby the position of 
the victim is placed to the fore, and not simply treated as an afterthought. In order 
to open this space a decision was taken, which is justified in more detail in the 
methodological analysis, to approach the construction of this history using a history 
of the present approach. This approach views history not as a series of progressive 
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advances, but as one in which the relative positions of powers of social groups tend 
to fluctuate over time. Such a stance allowed the author to effectively chart the 
shifting power dynamics and position of the victim in criminal justice over time.  
This body of work also incorporates numerous features that are quite novel 
in an Irish context when considering the issue of victims. These include a class 
conscious and ideologically aware historical study of how the victim during the 
eighteenth century was not just an individual with a great deal of solitary influence, 
but also one that could pool their power within prosecutorial associations to help 
them better exercise their collective social authority.148 It also discusses the victim 
in the nineteenth century, through a particularised demonstration of the Irish 
context of this particular epoch. One which benefits from an extensive study of 
source material from authors such as Engels, who has a keenly aware understanding 
of the historical materiality of this era. This work also posits that we can consider 
victims as an example of Weberian iron cage captive par excellence, due to their 
encapsulation within a structure that not only debased and excluded them, but also 
largely relied on their input for the bureaucratic structure of the law to function.   
However, despite the aforementioned body of literature which is highly 
apprehensive in relation to the re-emergence of victims, other perspectives, 
particularly in more recent years in an Irish context, have emerged that note that 
this might not necessarily lead to procedural prejudice. Indeed, some argue that 
 
148 Friedman, L. M. (1994), Crime and Punishment in American History, New York: Basic Books. 
Friedman, D.D. (1995) ‘Making Sense of English Law Enforcement in the Eighteenth Century’, 





there is an argument for improving the level of inclusion that victims can avail of 
in Ireland, as well as benefits that might flow from this procedural re-inclusion 
(Kilcommins et al. 2013). In fact, certain academics have advanced upon this line 
of thought and honed in on the kinds of issues that can affect victims of crime 
(Haynes et al. 2017) or hinder their level of re-inclusion within the procedures of 
Irish criminal justice. In carrying out these studies, they have also noted the way in 
which the victim of crime can be structurally side lined within the criminal justice 
framework of this country, as well as the negative consequences that this can have 
upon them, particularly those who come from more vulnerable social groups 
(Cusack 2017, 2018).  
Previous analysis has also suggested that victims ought to be better included 
in order to overcome such obstacles, and release the potential benefits that the re-
inclusion of victims could have, for not only victims, but society more generally 
(Kilcommins et al. 2013, 2018). Within this intellectual field there are several other 
commentators that have noted how victims have been side-lined in an Irish context, 
and have therefore not been able to contribute in a meaningful way within processes 
of great interest to them (Carney 2007).149 Other commentators have also noted 
that the functions of the Irish State are increasingly becoming more inclusive of 
victims, and that the long-term trend at present appears to be in the direction of 
 
149 Bacik, L. Heffernan, P. Brazil and M. Woods, (2007) Report on Services and Legislation: 
Providing Support for Victims of Crime, Dublin: Trinity College. Spain, E., Gibbons, S. and 
Kilcommins, S. (2014) Analysis of Text for the Final Review of the National Strategy on Domestic, 





greater re-inclusion (Hamilton 2010). This procedural inclusivity primarily 
manifests itself in the trial process. Since the law has recently begun to give a 
greater procedural say to victims over the administration of justice (Christie 1977).  
Indeed, this particular work intends to bring forward all of the previous 
discourse that the aforementioned commentators have gathered. While, at the same 
time, providing a unique contribution to the debate in this field through a more in 
depth study of some of the benefits of victim re-inclusion in an Irish context.150 
The author believes that they will therefore be able to contribute something to this 
area that is a condensed advancement on some of the previous mappings of the 
area. One which catalogues many of the major Irish alterations that occurred in 
recent years which have made the victim more procedurally important within 
criminal justice. This will obviously be of considerable benefit to everyone with an 
interest in the legal changes that have taken place in this regard in the contemporary 
Irish legal system. Such a group includes members of the Gardaí, victim scholars 
and even victims, in effect anyone who desire a body of work that succinctly 
surmises the doctrinal re-introduction of the victim in a way that is accessible.   
 Probably the most well-known and discussed change in this particular area 
is the introduction of victim impact statements.151 This has led to a great deal of 
 
150 Erez, E. (1991) Victim Impact Statements, Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. Erez, 
E. (1999) ‘Who’s afraid of the big bad victim? Victim Impact Statements as victim empowerment 
and enhancement of justice’, Criminal Law Review, 49(26), 545–556. Erez, E. and Rogers, L. 
(1999) ‘Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing Outcomes and Processes: The Perspectives of 
Legal Professionals’, 39(2) British Journal of Criminology, 216-238. 





debate on the issue of the limits of the procedural re-inclusion of the victim of crime 
and the potential for prejudice to the rights of the accused due to the legal impact 
of such an impact statement on the judiciary. Academics have therefore assessed 
the merits of victim impact statements in a more abstracted way (McGrath 2008) 
as well as within the specific particularity of Ireland (Guiry 2006). The unique 
contribution of this thesis is that it will deal with and outline more of the procedural 
alterations to the position of the victim within criminal justice.  
This involves assessing aspects like impact statements, but also 
considerably advances upon this by systematically contemplating these changes in 
light of some of the more recent evolutions in the areas of consent,152 judicial 
protection orders153 and the implications of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) 
Act 2017.154  Finally, as just previously alluded to, all of the major legal changes 
that the latter chapters of this thesis outline are comprehensively addressed and up 
to-date. They therefore capture the law as it stands as of 2020. The doctrinal 
analysis of this thesis also illustrates how these changes have domestically evolved 
in Ireland, including the influence of the European Union and United Nations155 in 
 
152 Leahy, S. (2014) ‘Reform of Irish Rape Law: The Need for a Legislative Definition of Consent’, 
Common Law World Review, 43 (3), 231-263. 
153 Under The Domestic Violence Act, 1996. 
154 Leahy, S. and Spain, E. (2017) ‘Exploring the impact of the Victims’ Directive on service 
provision for victims of crime in Ireland’, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 68(4), 519-538. 
155 Doak, J. (2003) ‘The victim and the criminal process: an analysis of recent trends in regional and 





this context. An aspect that has not really been fully captured by most academics 
engaging with this area in an Irish context. It is therefore contended that this work 
will also contribute to contemporary knowledge within these areas. 
Despite a number of works having replicated these particular shortcomings, 
they have also crucially highlighted the important impact of the European Union 
upon the domestic re-introduction of victims’ rights in Ireland, although these 
tended to overlook some of the arguably even more interesting advances that were 
also being made by the International Criminal Court at a supra-European level 
which this thesis gives considerable attention to and details at great length (Doak 
2009; Coffey 2006). They did however tend to focus upon how European rights 
conferrals have led to an increase in the level of procedural victim inclusivity in 
Ireland as well as how the present European political situation and the impact that 
events such as Brexit might potentially have on the general trend towards greater 
harmonisation and victim re-incorporation in Ireland (Doak 2003; Coffey 2018). 
However, these studies have unfortunately tended to be somewhat fragmented, and 
only considered particular European provisions in isolation from each other and 
other supra-European developments. Indeed one of the unique contributions of this 
work is that most of the major European provisions in this area concerning victims 
are examined together, within the particularity of an Irish context.156  
 
Representation before the ICC and ECCC’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 15(4), 713-
740. 
156 Such as The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, art. 15,19,21, 43 65,68,75, 





Intellectuals have also alluded to the impact of European Union Directives, 
with some noting how these kinds of legal instruments will now oblige the Irish 
State to ensure that victims play a much more active role within Irish legal frames 
(Holmes 2012). The way in which these legal instruments were incorporated by the 
Irish state was also an area of considerable interest for scholars, who have 
particularly zoned in on some of the shortcomings that occurred in this regard due 
to the lack of a mirror image transition of these European Union Directives (Kane 
and Moore 2013; Leahy and Spain 2017). The fact that these Directives have by in 
large come into operation and now create State obligations within Ireland has made 
victims’ rights a topical area for debate. Irish research in this area has noted that 
this trend is emblematic of a more recent move towards a European system of 
criminal justice (Ryan 2018) and consequently heavily relies on comparative 
analysis in order to place victim re-inclusion into a wider context. The author will 
contribute towards academic discourse in this area by addressing specific aspects 
that are only given a passing mention in most contemporary commentaries, like the 
 
cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf 
[accessed 01 May 2019]. UN Model Law (U.N.) 2005/20 of 22 July 2005, on the guidelines on 
justice in matters involving child victims and witnesses of crime, available:  
https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Justice_in_matters...pdf [accessed 01 
May 2019]. United Nations (U.N.) A/RES/40/34, of 29 November 1985, arts. 4-17 Declaration Of 
Basic Principles Of Justice For Victims Of Crime And Abuse Of Power: available: 





impact of bodies such as the European Union and United Nations.157 As well as the 
wider impact of social forces and the details of how the law re-incorporated the 
victim within the fabric of Irish criminal justice. This last item is one that remains 
largely isolated from a historical analysis of the victim, as well as a doctrinal 
articulation of the rights that victims are presently entitled to in Ireland.   
Whilst having acknowledged some of the stellar work that previous 
academics have achieved in this area concerning the assessment of the safeguarding 
of victims’ rights in the Irish context (Rogan 2006b) and the merits of these 
potentially inclusive changes for victims along more comparative lines (Doak 
2005; Ryan 2018) the author ardently believes that, the particular subject addressed 
in this study is a ripe one for analysis. Although the most up to date and 
comprehensive research in an Irish context (Kilcommins et al. 2018) develops the 
analysis of this inclusionary trend regarding victims and the significance that this 
has had, there is clearly a need for an even more consolidated and thorough analysis 
of the re-emergence of the victim. This is something that can be achieved by 
incorporating all of the aforementioned knowledge into a consistent narrative that 
addresses their re-emergence in a more comprehensive way. While, at the same 
time also incorporating some of the new elements that most intellectuals on the 
subject have only addressed in passing. Despite the obvious advances that this 
 
157 McCarthy, C. (2012) ‘Victim Redress and International Criminal Justice: Competing Paradigms, 
or Compatible Forms of Justice?’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 10(2), 351-372. 
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section has charted in the area of victim research, the author respectfully tenders 
that this thesis will advance on the insights already been made and will hopefully 
spark more meaningful engagement with this topic. As it not only adopts a different 
approach in terms of its style, but also tends to employ a novel merger of historical, 
sociological and doctrinal methodologies within the execution of this approach.  
1.5 STRUCTURE  
Part I emphasises historical discontinuity by constructing ‘histories of the 
present’ which demonstrate that although we can see history as a linear progression 
it might be more accurate to perceive it as a space within which actors’ transition 
through varying degrees of power and freedom. This section best illustrates this in 
its first two chapters. These show how the State came to isolate the victim of crime 
through the procedural criminal justice advancements that it promoted during the 
nineteenth century, which meant that the victim of crime lost their authority and 
liberty within the administration of criminal justice. Part I will therefore evidence 
the way in which the victim of crime was central to the eighteenth-century criminal 
justice system, and how that all changed in the nineteenth century. This helps 
contextualise the re-admission of victims of crime during the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries, when they regained much of their procedural centrality. Presenting 
the history of the victim in this way allows the reader to see how their re-inclusion 
was more of a re-introduction than the addition of a foreign entity. 
Chapter 2 seeks to contextualise the criminal justice system of the 
eighteenth century and how it operated in a victim centred way. This exposition of 





contributes toward a historically informed assessment of how the victim inclusive 
criminal justice model effectively operated for victims of crime. Chapter 3 then 
concentrates on how the reformatory programme and thinking of the nineteenth 
century changed all this and led to the structural exclusion of crime victims from 
criminal justice. The chapter seeks to show how factors like urbanisation, 
industrialisation, the rise of more egalitarian political ideologies and the instability 
that slowly became normalised in Ireland brought all of this about by encouraging 
the colonial authorities in Ireland to change the terror based model they had 
previously used in the last century towards a different one that was more based on 
governmentality. It also hopes to demonstrate how this transition required the 
implementation of a police force, rational rules as well as penalties and the use of 
the prison as opposed to the death penalty as the primary method of maintaining 
order. Despite the criminal justice advances that the State made in terms of its 
aggrandisement and the vesting of rights to the accused, this process resulted in the 
victim becoming a voiceless figure. This chapter seeks to demonstrate this by 
looking at Weber’s iron cage in order to help conceptualise how the procedural 
marginalisation of a previously active juridical participant came to have a 
considerable detrimental impact upon the victim of crime in Ireland.   
Part II will explain how and why the victim of crime came to be re-
introduced back into the criminal justice system of Ireland in the twentieth and 
twenty first centuries. Since this involves more than a mere articulation of causes 
and outcomes, the author splits this particular part into two chapters to keep the 
abstract and material transitions separate. This part adopts this demonstrative 





crime’s re-inclusion as the chapter involves a study of what ideologically motivated 
this change and how this particular alteration in thinking helped mould the practical 
drivers of change. Chapter 4 therefore considers the primary ideological 
motivations, namely, victimology and feminism, which engendered this evolution 
in victim re-inclusion at a more abstract level, while Chapter 5 analyses much more 
practical changes, such as victim activism, increased rates of recorded crime, the 
emergence of historical abuse and victimological surveys, which were all quite 
decisive at a grassroots level. The purpose of Part II is to therefore outline all of 
the major changes that occurred in an Irish context at this time to the Irish mind-
set and the material conditions of Irish life. It is hoped that this will help illustrate 
how this assisted with the transition from a criminal justice system that was hitherto 
predicated upon the exclusion of victims of crime to one which was now more 
motivated to help bring about their procedural re-inclusion within criminal justice. 
Chapter 4 examines the emergence of academic discourse surrounding 
victims of crime and victimisation. Due to the near consensus in contemporary 
criminology that there was an inability, or at least a lack of desire, to resolve the 
enigma of crime, attention shifted from offenders, who were the focus of most 
previous scholarly attention, to victims, figures that were hitherto overlooked. 
Indeed, the emergence of victim centred discursive fields such as victimology and 
feminism have significantly reoriented the focus of the academic community, as 
well as the wider public, back onto the practical impacts of criminality in Ireland. 
They have done this by helping to re-focus attention onto the effects of crime rather 
than what may have caused it, as well as the susceptibility of victims of crime to 





the criminal justice system cope with their victimisation, rather than trying to 
rehabilitate offenders or prevent them from becoming offenders in the first place. 
In fact, the desire to pursue rehabilitation in its classical forms, such as the prison 
or medicalised counselling, appears to be dwindling across the Western world. In 
fact, the advent of technological solutions is now looked to as something of a 
panacea to the question of crime. Both in terms of its obvious potential for the 
reform of offenders, or would be offenders, through the leveraging of Virtual 
Reality. Yet obvious problems are present, like the infringement of civil liberties 
where surveillance techniques like facial recognition158 and the electronic tagging 
of offenders or would be offenders are utilized. These methods also carry their own 
very serious and obvious problems in relation to privacy rights. Yet these pragmatic 
interventions have been actively pursued in order to aid with the implementation 
of securitisation in an attempt to better secure the Irish social sphere.  
Chapter 5 stresses the material circumstances which led to the re-inclusion 
of victims of crime in Ireland. It catalogues the numerous drivers of change that 
contributed to the trend that gave birth to the new victim inclusive system of Irish 
criminal justice. This chapter charts all of these major drivers, from the quantitative 
and qualitative alteration in the very nature of criminality in Ireland, to victim 
activism, victimisation surveys, historical abuse, as well as the media and the 
politicisation of crime. It demonstrates how all of these helped contribute toward 
 
158 Purshouse, J. and Campbell, L., (2019) ‘Privacy, Crime Control And Police Use Of Automated 






the re-emergence of the victim of crime in Ireland. Although these factors may not 
appear particularly decisive in isolation, when taken together, as this chapter does, 
they collectively attest to this newly emergent phenomenon. The chapter therefore 
attempts to illustrate how, after over a century of neglect, the victim of crime has 
now come to take centre stage and become a key player that is in the perfect 
contemporary position to receive the new legal rights entitlements and procedural 
safeguards that the Irish legal system has bequeathed to them.  
Part III considers the legal consequences of the victim of crime’s re-
introduction in Ireland. It explores how Irish criminal justice altered in the 
twentieth and twenty first centuries, and why it became much more inclusive of 
victims. Chapter 6 consequently involves an exposition of how the concept of 
victim rights developed within a global and European context through international 
organisations and courts as well as how this human rights revolution inspired the 
Irish judiciary. Chapter 7 then outlines the entire framework of major victim 
reforms which the Irish Judiciary and Legislature helped to effect. This analysis is 
comprehensive, as it encompasses the various developments that occurred at a 
supranational level, and the impact that this has had upon Ireland’s eventual 
decision to adopt and implement the concept of victim rights in this country. It also 
importantly addresses some of the fears that have operated in this regard 
concerning the position of the accused and the safeguarding of their rights.  
Chapter 7 catalogues the various different changes that all collectively attest 
to the re-centralised position of the victim of the crime in Irish Law. By engaging 
with the actual Statute and Case Law relating to the re-introduction of victims of 





some of the more damming contemporary allegations that some commentators 
have made in this context (O’Flaherty, 2002 p. 375). Yet many of these allegations 
about whether ‘victim discourse’ has indeed become ‘unchallenged and 
unchallengeable’ (McCullagh 2014) remain largely circumstantial and unproven, 
as they do not really engage with a detailed and thorough exposition of all of the 
major up to date court decisions and legislative pronouncements on the subject. 
This thesis will interrogate these claims in order to see if they hold water, or are 
over-reactions to the contemporary criminological constellation that are abstracted 
from not only an in-depth analysis of the realities of these reforms but also from an 
Irish public that is now more cognisant and respectful of the rights of victims of 
crime in Ireland. The quality of the work of the Legislature and Judiciary is decisive 
here, as they approached the task of the legal re-introduction of crime victims in 
such a way as to maintain the delicate balance of interests and entitlements between 
the accused and the State then the re-introduction of the victim could indeed be a 
non-zero sum game where no one loses out. However, an overly heavy handed or 
light touch implementation could at the same time result in the tipping of the scales 
of justice out of balance. This thesis will now move on to Chapter Two, which sets 











































PART 1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
A CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF VICTIM CENTRALITY IN EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY BRITAIN 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
In Chapter Two of this thesis the author is attempting to illustrate the 
historical context of the victim in the eighteenth century in order to help address 
the first research question of what exactly was the starting point in terms of victim 
inclusion in the modern Irish experience. It will rely mainly on English primary 
source material which is not without its problems.1 It does this by first providing 
some historical context so as to help illustrate how the highly inclusive nature of 
 
1 Several British commentators in the area can attest to this. “In trying to understand the great 
developments of this period, legal historians have been bedeviled by source problems that to some 
extent must always remain insoluble.” Langbein, J.H. (1983) ‘Shaping the Eighteenth-Century 
Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources’ The University of Chicago Law Review, 50(1),1-
136, p. 2 “Criminal law reporting in the modern sense is basically a nineteenth-century tradition,… 
For most of the eighteenth century, when lawyers for prosecution and defense were rather peripheral 
figures, lawyers’ literature was not much produced.” Langbein, J.H. (1983) ‘Shaping the 
Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources’ The University of Chicago 
Law Review, 50(1),1-136, p. 3.  




victim procedural centrality that was predominant in the past was very much 
influenced by the societal context that was actually in operation at that time. It then 
goes on to outline the nature of victim inclusion within this particular period. This 
assists in the outlining of what exactly the victim procedural position was both 
before industrialisation and the re-formulation of the criminal justice system as we 
know it today. By doing this, the chapter helps to evidence how it might be more 
accurate to see the contemporary incorporation of the victim as more of a re-
introduction. In fact, it is one that, despite its obvious tensions, is more of a return 
to form when the justice system’s evolution is looked at from a historical context. 
Since this thesis seeks to outline a history of the Irish victim, from the 
eighteenth century to the modern day, a key part of this involves demonstrating the 
eighteenth-century’s way of knowing the victim, and capturing the epistemic vision 
of the age. As it was a period in which the victim arguably held a pivotal position 
within the British criminal justice system that operated at the time. Particularly 
within England, a jurisdiction upon which much of this study will base itself and 
draw its source material from for support. Since it can be argued that a similar 
victim-oriented system was operating within Ireland due to the strong similarities 
between the two legal systems of both jurisdictions. The era is one readers will find 
familiar in some respects, yet altogether different in others. At the time, both the 
law and property were revered and held sacred. A fear of despotism paralysed the 
subjects of a hegemonic, paternalistic order;2 whilst the horror of punishment and 
 
2 A paternalism that was essential to the very functioning of this system as the vicitms of crime at 
the time were seldom much better of than their alledged offenders and needed all of the asssitacne 




its abject futility loomed large, as the penal system neither deterred offenders 
efficiently, nor reformed itself.  
Yet, it is this chapters’ contention that victim centrality was so fundamental 
at the time that although the nineteenth century involved the exclusion of victims 
from criminal justice, the bringing of the victim back into the fold in the twentieth 
and twenty first centuries was more of a return to form than the addition of an 
artificial body. To this end, the chapter will seek to provide a historically informed 
insight into how the eighteenth-century’s Politics, Society, Legality and Penal 
system brought about this situation, by painting a broad-brush picture of the kind 
of world the victim of crime inhabited within eighteenth-century Ireland.  
Once the author sketches this preliminary portrait, the chapter will then 
move on to provide a more in-depth consideration of the importance of victims, by 
exploring how they operated in their social world. This involves explaining who 
they were, and how they went about obtaining justice in the courts. Their role as 
 
that they could get. “If the criminals were often poor, their victims …were not much better off… 
we often cross a class line when we move from the offender to his victim, but not a class gulf. The 
victim is usually more propertied than the person who victimized him, although often only 
slightly… anyone who studies a volume of the Old Bailey Sessions Papers will conclude that the 
victims seldom come from the propertied elite… Included on the list of victim-prosecutors for the 
first dozen cases in the October 1754 sessions…are a loom maker, a brass founder, a wine merchant, 
and a pewterer, each prosecuting pilfering employees; a baker’s servant and a journeyman tailor 
prosecuting thieving prostitutes; a lodging-house keeper and a former room-mate prosecuting for 
the theft of furniture and domestic goods from lodgings; and a calico printer who had been mugged 
on the street.” Langbein, J.H. (1983) ‘Albion's fatal flaws’, Past and Present, 98(1), 96-120, p. 101. 




decision maker, investigator and prosecutor in the legal system of the day also merit 
detailed examination. The chapter concludes its discourse by highlighting how this 
system positively worked for both the victim of crime and their community, 
through an articulation of the benefits inherent to the victim centred system that the 
Irish criminal justice framework of the eighteenth century came to typify. 
2.2 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY  
2.2.1 Politics 
The political framework that dominated eighteenth century Ireland was 
succinctly summarised in the words of the author of one of the most popular plays 
of the time, dramatist John Gay, a man whose satirical masterpiece, The Beggar’s 
Opera (McIntosh 1974) astutely ridiculed the political class of the age3 by noting 
how “… [T]he [t]alents requisite for a great Statesman are so scarce in the world 
since so many of those who possess them are every month cut off in the prime of 
their [a]ge at the Old-Baily” (Burgess 1966, p. 45; Fielding also likened politicians 
to criminals in Fielding 1973, p.18). ‘Old Corruption’ was rampant in this period. 
Politics was not about obligation, but instead was used as a tool by politicians to 
advance their station. Those who truly exerted control permitted this parasitism to 
thrive despite its wastefulness as it failed to curtail their influence. Paradoxically, 
 
3 “A lawyer is an honest Employment, so is mine. Like me too he acts in a double Capacity, both 
against Rogues and for em; for tis but fitting that we should protect and encourage Cheats, since we 
live by them.” Gay, J. (1983) The Beggar’s Opera: John Gay Dramatic Works, Ed. Fuller. J., 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, Act I, Scene I, p. 4.  




this deeply flawed political systems’ lack of governance facilitated enterprise, as if 
under the guidance of Adam Smith’s invisible hand (Thompson 1978, p.141). 
A certain ‘Country Ideology’, which considered the landed gentry to be the 
most appropriate to lead the nation, also existed, and was so ubiquitous at the time 
that it pervaded well beyond the marbled halls of power, galvanising minds and 
garnering crucial support among the propertied classes, who tended to incessantly 
debate constitutional matters. It also permeated politics, as the perspective had the 
backing of Classical Liberals, whose outlook was particularly hawkish regarding 
capricious exercises of authority, whilst at the same time enlisting the help of 
Conservatives, due to their frequent attempts to obstruct the excessive excises of 
monarchical power. As a result, the two main political blocks stymied attempts at 
supporting key governmental departments. This political frame was consequently 
a powerful paradigm, which held sway over legislative debate, with legislators of 
the Country persuasion eager to challenge any policy that involved even the 
perception that the State was to aggrandise itself. Without alternative cognitive 
frames within which to articulate these challenges, this ideology became the 
dominant frame of reference for parliamentary opposition. Legislative disputes 
dramatically altered as a result of this, often becoming loftier debates on good 
governance, since any attempt that politicians made to augment the State was seen 
as engendering an unrelenting march towards despotism of a particularly foreign 
and European kind (Willis 2008, pp. 413-414; Dickinson 1977, p. 102, p. 191; 
Brewer 1988, p. 157; Pocock 1971, p. 122).  
In fact, the primacy of the country ideology cultivated considerable fear of 
the State. This meant that politicians nearly always infected politics with a 




prejudice that curtailed expansions of governmental authority. Such a situation 
ensured that stringent oversight operated whenever politicians endeavoured to 
widen its ambit. An uneasiness towards governmental expansion, coupled with the 
prospect of dishonest bureaucrats motivated those in power to decree that the gears 
of governance always needed to constantly be open to “…cheque, inspection, 
control [and] supervision” (Brewer 1988, p. 158). This perspective therefore 
moulded the political affairs of the era, and ensured that there was a ubiquitous 
feeling of apprehension towards ‘executive’ governance, whilst defending a status 
quo that divided power between the Crown, Nobility and Parliament.  
There was a significant restriction of arms of the State because of this. At 
the time, the dominant political class and public would liken the raising a sizeable 
number of soldiers, or the construction of a centralised law enforcement agency to 
tyranny, of a particularly European, and specifically French kind. Frequently 
drawing comparisons with such behaviour and the worst “proto-totalitarian 
excesses” of the Reign of Terror, as well as the perturbing exploits of a General by 
the name of Napoleon Bonaparte. In fact, some quarters were so afraid that they 
advocated doing away with the army altogether. This consequently hampered 
increases in the numbers of State personnel. Such apprehension regarding the 
exercise of authority also hindered those legislative Acts, which sought to establish 
a permanent and professional law enforcement agency. In fact, Westminster only 
established these in the early nineteenth century after considerable resistance, and 
even then, the pervasive fear of the State circumscribed their ambit (Willis 2008, 
pp. 413-414; Gatrell et al. 1980, pp. 155–89; Christensen 1990; Porter 1982, p. 23). 





Eighteenth century British society was both patriarchal in its treatment of 
women, and paternalistic in its response to the poor. Those of power and influence 
were readily accepted as inherently fit to lead, often based solely upon their rank 
and title. Most perceived women and the less well to do as one might view a naïve 
child. Indeed, they saw them as basically incapable of looking after themselves, 
and so incompetent as to need ready instruction in most, if not all, of the elementary 
aspects of life. This often lead society’s perceived betters to dictate (often 
arbitrary), but by no means voluntary injunctions. These covered some of the most 
trivial matters one could think of, and lead them to frequently impart their 
unsolicited advice in a manner that was insulting of both groups’ intelligence on 
everything from decorum to dress, as well as conduct and thought. However, this 
hegemonic order restricted, rather than defined the boundaries of popular thought. 
Although an overbearing upper class often stifled freedom of thought, this 
remained secular, and did not dominate the minds of the masses, since there was 
no link between State regulation and religion. State regulation was actually the 
weaker of the two, as it failed to move people the way religion did.4 Religiosity 
 
4 This can be seen in the ineffectual way it dettered criminals, who acted more out of opportunity 
than desperation. “It is very hard to find figures worthy of romance, even social ro- mance, among 
the shop-lifters, pickpockets, pilfering housemaids and dishonest apprentices who populated the 
Old Bailey dock. To be sure, most of them were poor, as criminals tend to be. Anatole France made 
the most of that in a famous utterance. "The law [of France]", he said, "in its majestic equality, 
forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread"… 




gripped them and commanded solemnity, whilst society indulged those who defied 
its Laws. Although regulation outlined certain boundaries, these were 
conspicuously absent from the personal lives of most ordinary people. This should 
not however be taken for weakness, as ideologies often persist due to the flexibility 
of their application. Indeed, their very strength is their flexibility, which does not 
demand belief, but rather prefers people to see ideological constructs as emanating 
from within their own minds (Hay et al. 1975, p.55; Friedman 1994, p. 38; 
Thompson 1993, p. 9). 
Despite the fact that the class perspective is clearly a product of its age, and 
it would be anachronistic to presuppose societal divisions that do not reflect an era, 
as any keen student of history knows, one can find relationships of class in the most 
pre-industrial of periods. Although academics typically cite more ‘mature’ 
societies when discussing class, one should not conclude that any society that fails 
to reach such levels of development are incapable of harbouring class divisions. 
This is evident in the period’s conception of freedom, it existed, but it is worth 
asking who were free, and what were they free to do? Although the lower orders 
were more dependent, and particularly vulnerable to fluctuation in the price of 
food,5 ordinary people could occasionally transcend their bonds, since there were 
 
the culprits tried at the Old Bailey are seldom destitute. Some plead hunger or say they are 
unemployed, but in the main we see employed persons who have yielded to temptation rather than 
necessity.” Langbein, J.H. (1983) ‘Albion's fatal flaws’, Past and Present, 98(1), 96-120, p. 98.  
5 “It has been argued that for the middling sections of society the rise of food prices was not so great 
as to wipe out their gradually increasing purchasing power and so inhibit the broadening of domestic 
demand and industrial production.But for the agricultural labourer rising food prices could not but 




certain societal values that they could exercise free of upper-class control. These 
largely revolved around the defence of their own personal, yet heavily class 
influenced and constructed approaches towards freedom, equality and solidarity. 
Even the lower orders could be subversive, but only in a conservative sense, as they 
did this through the defence of their traditions, which the socially corrosive nature 
of capitalism frequently threatened.6 When the masses felt structural economic 
changes, they often perceived them as exploitative and unfair interferences with 
their cherished labour routines. The masses therefore used to act in a disobedient 
fashion in order to try to preserve their traditional way of life.7  This struggle 
 
have been a more serious matter especially when this is seen with other changes in rural society, 
and in particular the transformations that were, increasingly after 1750, making the agricultural 
labourer entirely wage-dependent.”  Beattie, J.M. (1974) ‘The Pattern of Crime in England 1660-
1800’, Past & Present, 62, 47-95, p. 87. 
6 “…changes in crimes against property appear to be related to necessity … the evidence … seems 
to point clearly to this conclusion: that crimes against property in the eighteenth century arose 
primarily from problems of employment, wages and prices… they increased when men found 
themselves squeezed by rising prices or lower wages or lack of work ...” Beattie, J.M. (1974) ‘The 
Pattern of Crime in England 1660-1800’, Past & Present, 62, 47-95, p. 95. 
7 “Hence … a rebellious traditional culture… of the plebs … resists, in the name of ‘custom’, those 
economic innovations … (… work-discipline…) which the rulers or employers seek to impose. 
Innovation is more evident at the top of society than below… but is the innovation of capitalist 
process, it is most often experienced by the plebs in the form of exploitation, or the expropriation 
of customary use-rights, or the violent disruption of valued patterns of work and leisure… when the 
people search for legitimations for protest, they…select … those parts most calculated to defend 
their present interests… artisans appeal back to certain parts (e.g. apprenticeship regulation) of the 




became even sharper when the capitalistic developments that certain members of 
the elite implemented, and stood to materially gain from, undermined the 
conventional lifestyles of the lower orders.8 These were not rare occurrences either, 
as the perpetual assaults of the revolutionary ‘market economy’ often tended to 
destabilize and threaten the more traditional ‘moral economy’ that the lower orders 
nearly always sought to protect (Thompson 1978, pp. 154-155, 1993 p.9). 
The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, more or less acquiesced to a ‘client 
relationship’ with the upper classes during this particular period. Although some 
charismatic individuals could often escape this fate, most were unable to avoid their 
sentence of servility. Ambitious individuals often tried to advance their station in 
life by either scaling the societal ladder or chasing their fortunes abroad. What 
drove these actions was the idea of buying ones’ way out of obscurity through the 
procurement of enough money to attain ‘land and gentry status’. Due to this 
relationship of dependency, the bourgeoisie rarely applied restraint to the 
 
Tudor regulatory labour code.” Thompson, E.P. (1978) ‘Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class 
Struggle without Class?’, Social History, 3(2), 133-165, p. 154. 
8 “… one shares some of the preoccupations of historians … of an ‘anthropological’ orientation… 
in de-coding rough music…or…the symbolism of protest… capitalist logic and ‘non-economic’ 
customary behaviour are in active and conscious conflict… in resistance to new patterns of 
consumption…time-discipline and to technical innovation or work-rationalization which threaten 
to disrupt customary usage and…familial organization…we can read eighteenth-century social 
history as a succession of confrontations between an innovative market economy and the customary 
moral economy of the plebs.” Thompson, E.P. (1978) ‘Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class 
Struggle without Class?’, Social History, 3(2), 133-165, p.155. 




exploitative control the upper classes exercised. These elites were often classified 
in terms of money, rather than by ‘birth or other marks of status’, which was fitting, 
as for them everything had its price. “[P]lace and office [could be] bought and 
sold”. Honours and freedoms “…translated into money” (Thompson 1978, p. 138). 
Although the toiling masses produced vast prosperity, it quickly moved up to the 
higher echelons, with the ‘real killings’ being incredibly lucrative for those 
involved in either commerce or finance (Thompson 1978, p. 143, p. 139). 
However, such stratification was not conducive to societal cohesion, as the 
ubiquitous threat of rioting impressed itself upon the minds of everyone who stood 
to lose what they had gained from a social order that predicted itself on disparities 
of wealth, power and influence. The widespread acceptance of classically liberal 
ideas, which fundamentally opposed the capricious excise of State authority further 
compounded this, as when a grievance ignited the people they could become a 
danger “…to a [S]tate that had no effective mechanism for restoring order” (Willis 
2008, p. 414). 9  Nor were these uprisings rare, and although protestors had 
numerous grievances, the central thread that nearly always united their frustrations 
 
9 “A large chapter of English constitutional and administrative history underlies the eighteenth-
century aversion to professional police forces and correction systems. Just as the prospect of a 
standing army evoked shivers in those who thought back to the days of James II, the suggestion that 
the police power in the localities be turned over to a corps of hirelings raised alarm. A tyrant might 
use this force to undercut or repress the liberties of the political community. The administrative 
challenge of organizing police and correction systems was also daunting … [t]he English had scant 
experience in dealing with the problems of recruiting, training, financing, leading and controlling 
such forces” Langbein, J.H. (1983) ‘Albion's fatal flaws’, Past and Present, 98(1), 96-120, p. 116. 




was the protection of their freedoms, as well as their opposition to overarching 
government. These perspectives were fundamental to the curtailing of the State’s 
ambit, a trend that the American, French and Haitian revolutions eventually 
solidified through their transformation of the relationship between governments 
and people’s liberties. Freedom therefore remained the embodiment of all that 
people held dear, and those acts that infringed it inflamed. Therefore, one need not 
see the period’s hegemon as enforcing total control, or imposing a subjugation 
people could not transcend, although this can happen, it did not here (Thompson 
1978, p.164; Willis 2008, p. 414). 
2.2.3 Law 
The Law in the eighteenth century now found itself being considerably 
raised up in both its standing and prominence in order to become the de facto 
adjudicative paradigm within Britain, since it had to compensate for and indeed in 
a certain manner replace an enfeebled Crown as well as a rather ineffectual political 
system, that only really in truth pretended to resolve the domestic disputes of the 
populace within Britain. 10  However, although the Private Law provided its 
 
10 Evidence of this can be found from the writings of noted British historian E.P. Thompson. 
“…there is ‘the Law’, elevated during this century to a role more prominent than at any other period 
of our history, and serving as the ‘impartial’, arbitrating authority in place of a weak and 
unenlightened monarchy, a corrupt and ineffective bureaucracy and a democracy which offered to 
the real intrusions of power little more than rhetoric about its ancestry.”  Thompson, E.P. (1978) 
‘Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle without Class?’, Social History, 3(2), 133-
165, p.144. 




adherents with a framework that allowed them to protect their material gains, whilst 
also supplying a structure that assisted them with the resolution of their disputes, 
the Public Law, and in particular the Criminal Law, confronted its subjects with a 
more terrifying visage. Its prosecutions were therefore “…nasty, brutish, and 
essentially short” (Cockburn 1972, p.109).  
The crucial trait of this period’s regulatory framework, and how it defended 
individual freedoms from oppressive governance, stems from the fact that the law 
required popular participation to function. One of the most remarkable aspects of 
legality at the time was how dependent the Rule of Law was upon popular 
contribution. To accommodate this, the Criminal Law was accessible to the lower 
and middle classes, who could utilise its inherent power to protect their proprietary 
interests, or resolve quarrels through personal lawsuits.11  This permitted weak 
members of society to essentially “…make the law their servant…” (Hay et al. 
1975, p.34). Employers and proprietors often initiated and financed these 
 
11 “Indeed, one of the main themes in the history of the administration of the criminal law in the 
second half of the eighteenth century was the effort to encourage prosecutorial activity by the lower 
orders. In one sense this is a development that traces back to the 1690s, when parliament began to 
enact the statutes that offered rewards for successful prosecution of certain heinous felonies, 
including highway robbery, burglary, housebreaking and horse-stealing the campaign waged by 
Henry Fielding to obtain a subsidy for expenses for poor prosecutors and witnesses came to fruition 
in legislation of 1752 and 1754, and we know from Dudley Ryder's assize diary that the statutes 
were being put to use. He tells us that it had become the convention to award five shillings per day 
in expenses, and in one case he reports that he refused an award to an innkeeper who seemed too 
prosperous” Langbein, J.H. (1983) ‘Albion's fatal flaws’, Past and Present, 98(1), 96-120, p. 102. 




prosecutions, making justice accessible. Yet what motivated this charity from the 
landed gentry was a web “of self-interest and paternalism…” (Hay et al. 1975, pp. 
36-37) that moulded “…the administration of justice toward the interests of the rich 
and the powerful” (Freidman 1994, p. 57; Willis 2008, p. 413; King 1984, p. 58). 
This particular system however was of little consolation to certain members 
of society, such as women, who were indeed prejudiced by its operation.12 Indeed, 
the agency of women was usually considerably constrained during the period, 
particularly in the more rural parts of Britain, which were more conservative.13 In 
fact, those female victims who were young and perhaps neither well connected or 
protected would often be prejudiced in this way and could very rarely raise the 
resources required to have their cases prosecuted. While, at the same time, powerful 
men of far greater wealth and influence often had their own property rights well 
protected through private prosecutions.14  
 
12 “The family was also frequently the scene of … conflict … common law… granted husbands the 
right to “correct” their wives’ … and … it was still thought by some to exist in the eighteenth and 
it was at any event clearly exercised. Women were able to … get some protection from the courts, 
but … the ancient right of a husband to chastize his wife was still assumed and that there was still 
a great deal of wife beating” J. M. Beattie, J.M. ‘The Criminality of Women in Eighteenth-Century 
England’, Journal of Social History, 8(4), 80-116, p. 86. 
13  “Rural life was especially restrictive…[y]oung girls were customarily bound into service… 
restraints that clearly had as one of their important objects the prevention of a pregnancy that would 
be an embarrassment to the girl's family...” J. M. Beattie, J.M. ‘The Criminality of Women in 
Eighteenth-Century England’, Journal of Social History, 8(4), 80-116, p. 98. 
14 “The mistreatment of apprentices by their masters sometimes resulted in indictments… a widow 
and pinmaker in Southwark in 1796 … was indicted for violently beating her two girl apprentices… 




In Ireland, these same issues were often exacerbated by the particularities 
of regions, leading to the curtailment of female economic freedom.15 Although 
some more well to do women had a greater degree of autonomy of action, this was 
obviously constrained by the patriarchal restrictions of the  time.16 This bias against 
female victims could be seen in the extraordinary lack of successful rape 
prosecutions, despite its accepted severity in Irish society.17 At the same time 
female victims would be prejudiced by antiquated and illogical laws that were 
 
… cases of this kind only rarely got into the courts...” Beattie, J.M. (1974) ‘The Pattern of Crime 
in England 1660-1800’, Past & Present, 62, 47-95, p. 62. 
15 “The growth of trade…among skilled male artisans led to …women [being] increasingly confined 
to a narrow range of job options.” MacCurtain, M. O'Dowd, M.  and Luddy, M. (1992) ‘An Agenda 
for Women's History in Ireland, 1500-1900’, Irish Historical Studies, 28 (109) pp. 1-37, p.14. 
16 “What was it like to be a woman of the gentry … Bushe … lived… as an independent … woman 
…free to take part in … social activities… [she] viewed … politics and war as… beneath her 
notice…the ideology of female subordination … [embodied by] the brutal realities of the marriage 
market [are] reflected in … the implications for Bushe of an uncertain inheritance combined with 
the after effects of smallpox.” Connolly S.J. (2000) ‘A Woman's Life in Mid-Eighteenth-Century 
Ireland: The Case of Letitia Bushe’, The Historical Journal, 43(2) pp. 433-451, p. 451. 
17 “Rape was removed from benefit of clergy in Ireland in 1612…[f]rom 1710… intercourse…with 
a girl under twelve … became a non-clergyable felony… [d]espite the fact that rape was clearly 
considered… a serious offence…it was an extremely under-prosecuted crime” Garnham, N. (1997) 
‘How Violent Was Eighteenth-Century Ireland?’, Irish Historical Studies, 30(119) 377-392, p. 383. 




difficult to even prove and the nature of trials at the time, where the character of 
the victim was often attacked.18  
Even when a case was strong a trial could be avoided and the wishes of a 
victim overlooked so that arranged marriages ‘from the dock’ could be engendered 
by the potential offender and parents of the alleged victim.19 Although the crime of 
rape was treated quite seriously, particularly by the more “respectable classes” and 
there was a concerted effort to encourage its victims to report experiences to the 
authorities the level of prosecutions was extraordinarily low. This is strong 
evidence that those female victims who suffered it had little faith in the justice 
system to afford them with an appropriate remedy, evidencing that Irish women, 
particularly those of little means were ill served by private prosecutions.20 
 
18  For a conviction … ‘penetration and emission [needed to] be proved’… a clear 
disincentive…hearings may well have degenerated into assaults upon the character of the alledged 
victims…[t]he situation was further complicated by the perception…that a woman who became 
pregnant could not be the victim of rape… the chances of mounting a successful prosecution for 
rape were limited… social stigma …may have been the greatest deterrent … any loss of moral 
integrity could be socially fatal.” Garnham, N. (1997) ‘How Violent Was Eighteenth-Century 
Ireland?’, Irish Historical Studies, 30(119) 377-392, p. 384. 
19 “… men may have avoided prosecutions altogether… by ‘marrying from the dock’…Victims 
…could even come under pressure from parents to consent to such matches”. Garnham, N. (1997) 
‘How Violent Was Eighteenth-Century Ireland?’, Irish Historical Studies, 30(119) 377-392, p. 385.  
20 “The relatively high proportion of cases returned for trial by the Armagh grand jury (76 per cent 
… as opposed to 55 per cent overall), seems to suggest that, at least among the county elite, there 
was a decreasing tolerance of violence against women…[t]hat rape remained an uncommon 
accusation in the Irish courts is borne out by the available figures. At the County Armagh assizes 




The procedural rules of these prosecutions were extremely strict, with 
minor inaccuracies regarding terms or times frequently collapsing cases. Since the 
judiciary strongly believed that these errors were ‘conclusive’, onlookers, or the 
people who occupied the public galleries frequently provided input during trials, 
with the intention of highlighting procedural mistakes for the magistrates. 
Although the formalism of these proceedings may be considered absurd by today’s 
standards, their justification centred on the idea that the law needed certainty, above 
all else. Even though those directly involved in cases often regretted losing the 
investment that they had made due to a technicality, a significant number of people 
began to take the opposite view. Namely, that these meticulous rules actually 
ensured that all those involved with the administration of justice abided by its 
procedure. The law therefore did not remain the simple plaything of those in power; 
it developed an authority all of its own, one that could bind everyone, from the 
lowly peasant to the wigged magistrate. “… [T]he law was the law…” for both 
parties, regardless of their social disparities. In fact, those judicial pronouncements 
that were provided in wilful ignorance of what the political class of the period were 
doing only “…heightened th[is] illusion” (Hay et al. 1975, p. 33). The magistrates, 
although landed gentry, were able to transcend their class through their allowance 
of such pardons, which promoted the idea that the law was not only fair but also 
 
between 1736 and 1775 the 88 indictments for rape …stemmed from only 60 incidents… barely 
more than two prosecutions per year… this low level of prosecution for rape is more indicative of 
a reluctance to prosecute than a paucity of offences.” Garnham, N. (1997) ‘How Violent Was 
Eighteenth-Century Ireland?’, Irish Historical Studies, 30(119) 377-392, p. 385.  




impartial. This actually made the strange formalistic procedures of the law one of 
its strongest ideological assets in its quest to receive the people’s popular approval. 
Indeed, this ideological power of the law encouraged obedience. Although 
it drew some of its strength from the application of force, it depended on its 
ideological influence to sustain itself. When reflecting on the law in this way it is 
worth considering the manner in which it appeared to the masses. The law 
captivated swaths of the lower orders. Since social relations were so polarised by 
the rift that divided extreme affluence from abject poverty, the sight of labourers 
bringing prosecutions whilst aristocrats swung from scaffolds was quite 
impactful.21  
Yet the safety of the upper classes inevitably necessitated the popular 
acceptance that the regime that they upheld was just and equitable. Consequently, 
those in power devoted considerable effort to shaping the outlook of the people 
towards the law. In fact, the judiciary’ were wise enough to occasionally pardon 
offenders, so that that the public’s views on justice were respected. These actions 
prevented popular indignation from progressing to a point in which the masses 
could become conscious of their power. It also safeguarded the Rule of Law from 
becoming the object of too close inspection or public derision. Since the upper 
classes’ main ideological tool was the law, they effectively utilised legality to shape 
 
21 “Consider another example, the celebrated case of Lord Ferrers, who as Hay tells us "killed his 
steward, was captured by his tenantry,tried in the House of Lords, sentenced to death, executed at 
Tyburn,  and dissected ‘like a common criminal’…” Langbein, J.H. (1983) ‘Albion's fatal flaws’, 
Past and Present, 98(1), 96-120, p. 114. 




popular thought into accepting a regime that involved the governance of the many 
by the few. The application of the Criminal Law permitted the maintenance of this 
status quo in England in particular, as the source material cited relates to this 
context, but can also be of value when contemplating the application of British law 
in Ireland due to the two jurisdictions similar legal traditions, as well as the fact 
that the authorities in both contexts lacked the protection of law enforcement 
agencies or standing armies and could arguably only really maintain control of both 
jurisdictions with the law’s ideological strength, which effectively helped secure 
the class dominance of the higher orders.  
Yet the popular lack of respect for order deeply perturbed the upholders of 
the Criminal Law during this period. Since the very idea of property is produced 
by a certain ‘social context’, and offences like theft cannot exist outside of certain 
‘social relations’, the ties that bound ownership and sovereignty needed to be, and 
were pronounced. In so doing, the law maintained the conformity of the masses, 
whilst perpetuating an order which primarily based itself upon proprietary 
supremacy. However, the fear of punishment, in of itself, did not bring this about. 
Instead, the deployment of penal chastisement made fear an exceptional tool for 
engendering compliance (Hay et al. 1975, p. 25, p. 26, p. 49, p. 51, p. 56). 
2.2.4 Punishment 
The Legislature passed various criminal acts in order to secure private 
property, as the upper classes assumed a legislative role that was largely free of 
monarchical and popular restraint. Their champion, John Locke buoyed these 




politicians to do so22 with his articulations that not only the “Laws of Nature”, but 
the “rules of the Divine” supported this kind of proprietary based system23 of 
private ownership.24 Locke was probably one of the most influential and eloquent 
justifiers of a system in which the private ownership of property was of real 
consequence.25 Not only in the sense of one’s immediate right to the product of 
one’s own labour or the goods that one accumulates, but even the labour of others.26 
From that point on few graces were entertained. Property consumed 
everything. This is discernible from the writings of the period’s leading jurists. In 
 
22  “Political power…a right of making laws, with penalties of death…for the regulating and 
preserving of property...” Locke, J. [1690] (1823) Two Treatises of Government, London: Sharpe 
& Son, Ch 1, p.106. 
23 “…God, by commanding to subdue, gave authority…to appropriate. And the condition of human 
life, which requires labour…necessarily introduce private possessions.” Locke, J. [1690] (1823) 
Two Treatises of Government, London: Sharpe & Son, Ch 5, p.119 
24 “…every man has a property in his own person…[t]he labour of his body… are properly his. 
Whatsoever, then, he removes out the state that nature…he hath mixed his labour with…and thereby 
makes it his property…[f]or this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man 
but he can have a right to what that is once joined to...” Locke, J. [1690] (1823) Two Treatises of 
Government, London: Sharpe & Son, Ch 5, p.116. 
25  “As much land as a man tills… and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his 
labour does as it were enclose it from the common.” Locke, J. [1690] (1823) Two Treatises of 
Government, London: Sharpe & Son, Ch 5, p.118. 
26 “…the turfs my servant [employee] has cut… become my property… removing them out of that 
common state…hath fixed my property in them.” Locke, J. [1690] (1823) Two Treatises of 
Government, London: Sharpe & Son, Ch 5, p.117. 




fact, Blackstone highlighted that few matters engaged affections like ‘…the right 
to property’ (Blackstone 1793, 5:2). The elite’s veneration of property had an 
impact when politicians went about codifying these rights, as it transformed 
property into the standard by which they could gauge almost everything. Indeed, 
they professed ‘the sacredness of property’ with a reverence that was hitherto 
‘reserved for human life’ (Hay et al. 1975, p. 19, p. 18; Himmelfarb 1984, p. 234). 
The Commons deployed a raft of brutal legislation, which historians have 
come to term “The Bloody Code”, where several offences, of an often trivial nature 
could, warrant the death penalty. Particular emphasis was placed on the protection 
of property. Having said that, it was not the case that every minor criminal was 
hanged. Rather there was always a delicate calculation as to which particularly 
grievous offenders would be made an example of, in order to try to deter the rest 
of society from considering a life of crime.27 However, the decision to do this 
 
27 This can be clearly seen in the astute articulations about the Code below. 
“During the long eighteenth century the capital code…the so-called ‘Bloody Code’, which 
subjected a vast and increasing range of property crimes to the death penalty, was the centre of 
much popular attention and of extensive debate.”  King, P. and Ward, R. (2015) ‘Rethinking the 
Bloody Code in Eighteenth-Century Britain: Capital Punishment at the Centre and on the 
Periphery’, Past & Present, 228 (1), 159–205, p. 159. “The scope for discretion in the 
administration of the law had arisen because the law was dominated by capital punishment; yet… 
not every prisoner charged with a capital offense or even convicted of a capital offense would in 
fact be hanged. A large part of the business of administering the so-called Bloody Code was the 
selection of those who were to be hanged as examples. And in that selection, key roles were played 
by the jury, through its power to reduce a capital to a noncapital charge, and by the judge, through 
his right to reprieve condemned offenders and recommend them for a royal pardon” Beattie, J.M. 




cannot be rationalised merely in terms of the codification of conservatism. In fact, 
on the contrary, it was the received wisdom of the day, imparted from on high by 
those in power. Even enlightened men like Shaftesbury, the same Shaftesbury that 
railed against the Leviathan of Hobbes,28  tamely acknowledged that the death 
penalty was necessary. Thus the death penalty was acceptable, while the bleak 
Hobbesian, realist worldview of Leviathan was less so.29 This is understandable, 
as although the received wisdom of the time could justify executing people for 
breaking laws, it was harder to justify Hobbes’ perception30 of our natural state as 
being one that he famously characterised as ‘nasty, brutish and short’.31 We can see 
 
(1991) ‘Scales of justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and 
nineteenth Centuries,’ Law and History Review, 9(2), 221-267, p. 231.  
28 “Hence Hobbes, Locke, etc., still the same man, same genus at bottom. – ‘Beauty is nothing.’-
‘Virtue is nothing.’- But these are the greatest realities of things…[t]hese philosophers…may be 
called by one common name…barbar[ians].” Shaftesbury, (1914) Second Characters; or the 
Language of Forms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 104-105.  
29  Porter, R. (2001) Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World, London: 
Penguin Books. 
30 “.…a condition of Warre, wherein every man to every man…is an Enemy, there is no man can 
hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himselfe from destruction, without the help of 
Confederates… he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason 
expect no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single Power.” Hobbes, T. 
(1991) Leviathan [1651] Tuck, R. ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 15, p. 102.  
31 “continuall feare, and danger of violent death but even his potentially short life is utterly miserable 
because without security there is no industry, agriculture, commerce, science or arts. In sum, the 




the nature of conflict32 between people33 in this acceptance of the justification of 
the death penalty by Shaftsbury, being compatible with a deep suspicion of 
Hobbesian realist ideology at the time. As the brutal punishments of the day were 
commonly seen as normal everyday realities. 
 The exercise of such brutality also found justification from influential men 
like William Paley, who also gave it their seal of approval. The sentence quickly 
became the order of the day, as it was the historical sanction of the law for stealing. 
However, this era also saw legislators working with record speed to pass legal acts 
that broadened its ambit, meaning capital punishment came to safeguard all kinds 
“…of property from theft or malicious damage” (Hay et al. 1975, pp. 19, 22; 
Friedman 1994, pp. 41-42; King and Ward 2015, p. 159; Gatrell 1994).34 
 
life of man is solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short.” Hobbes, T. (1991) Leviathan [1651] Tuck, 
R. ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 13, pp. 88–89.  
32  “…every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon 
himself… signes of contempt … (….is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to extort a 
greater value …by dommage; and from others, by the example.” Hobbes, T. (1991) Leviathan 
[1651] Tuck, R. ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 13, p. 88.  
33 “So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrell. First, Competition; 
Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; 
and the Third, for Reputation.” Hobbes, T. (1991) Leviathan [1651] Tuck, R. ed., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, ch. 13, p. 88. 
34 “No feature of English criminal law became more notorious, or aroused more indignation, than 
the nominally capital character of small thefts. A seventeenth-century tractitian reproached English 
law in the following words, which were echoed incessantly in reformist literature down into the 
nineteenth century: "Doest thou value the life of a man no more than so as to cut it off for the value 




In fact, the magistrates could deploy the death penalty for even the most 
trivial of offences. Although no centralised police force was in operation at the 
time, the law still managed to protect the affluent due to the growing number of 
laws that the death penalty covered. Most of this legislation involved the violation 
of proprietary rights, and each one was a stark warning to the law’s subjects that 
their next criminal act could well be their last. At the same time, commercial 
advancements produced novel statutes that purported to ensure that these newly 
created capital offences continued to safeguard proprietary interests.35 The greatest 
innovation of the century regarding currency revolved around the rise of paper 
notes. This allowed for the commission of new deviant acts, so the legislature’s 
response involved bringing about statutory extensions of the death penalty to 
dissuade fraudsters, with parliament strengthening these rules again before the turn 
of the eighteenth century (McGowen 1996, pp. 113-129).  
 
of a garment, yea even of a pair of shoes or stockings or a shirt or any other thing above such a 
piece of money"? Langbein, J.H. (1983) ‘Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View 
from the Ryder Sources’ The University of Chicago Law Review, 50(1),1-136, p. 37. 
35 “We can, of course, trace the hand of commercial interests… in a considerable fraction of the 
eighteenth-century criminal legislation, both capital and non-capital. I doubt whether anyone would 
argue with Jerome Hall's assessment that “it is in this century that one comes upon the law of 
receiving stolen property, larceny by trick, obtaining goods by false pretences, and embezzlement. 
Here, for the first time, the modern lawyer finds himself in contact with a body of substantive 
criminal law which he feels is essentially his own”. New forms of economic activity and commercial 
organization gave rise to new issues of definition.” Langbein, J.H. (1983) ‘Albion's fatal flaws’, 
Past and Present, 98(1), 96-120, p. 119 




Despite the horrors of the hangman’s noose, and the terror that the scaffold 
inspired amongst the populace, the penal model of the eighteenth century was 
terribly inefficient at actually preventing crime, since its adopted method of terror 
often failed to deter offending. There was also a catalogue of issues with its 
application, which considerably undermined its deterrent value, like the frequency 
of amnesty, the absconding of offenders due to the lack of a centralised law 
enforcement agency and the mercy of victims. Indeed, most offenders’ fear of the 
law was almost negligible, leading to prevalent civil unrest. The gallows also 
weakened the Rule of Law, as instead of striking fear into the hearts of offenders, 
it petrified those members of the public who actually sought to uphold the law. 
Indeed, they were mortified that they could affect a ‘judicial murder’ by asking that 
the relevant statutory provision be upheld (Hay et al. 1975, p. 18, p. 21, p. 23). 
The Bloody Code came under attack by progressives due to these 
shortcomings. As everyone from heavyweights like Henry Fielding, the famous 
literati who railed so strongly against the unchecked prevalence of crime in his 
age,36 and took steps to see to it that it was prosecuted more37 to lowly crime 
 
36 Fielding encouraged “….the poor to starve or beg at home; for there it will be impossible for them 
to steal or rob without being presently hanged or transported out of the way” H. Fielding (1751) An 
Enquiry Into The Causes Of The Late Increase Of Robbers,  A. Millar: London, p. 427. 
37 the “…Difficulty of convicting a Criminal is extremely great...” H. Fielding (1751) An Enquiry 
Into The Causes Of The Late Increase Of Robbers,  A. Millar: London. “Persons who…suffer 
…bring, or send, the best Description … to Henry Fielding at his House in Bow Street” Covent 
Garden Journal Jan. 1972, 3 col.1. These “Bow Street Runners” were established by Fielding to 
facilitate prosecutions by assisting victims. “And if they would send a special messenger…Mr. 




reporters could see the flaws inherent in the system. Reformers like Samuel 
Romilly began to champion the idea of abolishing certain penalties by contending 
that a more efficient approach could secure a greater number of convictions if the 
penal system abandoned its terror-based model 38  These progressives drew 
inspiration from Cesare Beccaria. Beccaria thought that the law ought to replace 
terror with penalties that were clear and humane.39 
 These progressive notions of reform found widespread support throughout 
not only prominent Enlightenment literature but also amongst the populace of 
Britain. However, this support did not move the legislature, which tenaciously 
fought any change. These authorities believed that reform of the area did not 
require turning away from cruelty, but instead simply mandated improving the 
competence and standing of the law. They felt that penalties needed to be “…more 
 
Fielding would not only pay that messenger…but would immediately dispatch a set of brave 
Fellows… ready to set out to any Part of this Town or Kingdom on a Quarter of an Hour’s notice.” 
Public Advertiser, Feb. 7, 1755, 1, col. 2. 
38  “… it is the certainty much more than the severity, of punishments which renders them 
efficacious.” Sir Samuel Romilly (1820) The Speeches of Sir Samuel Romilly, London: Ridgway 
& Sons, p.39. “no man would steal what he was sure he would not keep...” Sir Samuel Romilly 
(1820) Observations on the Criminal Law of England, London: J. M'Creery, p.21. 
39  “… punishments… should, … be selected so as to make the most efficacious and lasting 
impression on the minds of men through the least possible torment to the body…”  Beccaria, C. 
(1995) On Crimes and Punishments, ed. Bellamy, R. trans. Davies, R., Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 31. “Every citizen ought to believe himself able to do anything which is not 
against the law without fearing any other consequence...” Beccaria, C. (1995) On Crimes and 
Punishments, ed. Bellamy, R. trans. Davies, R., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 25. 




of a terror, not less.”40 Instead of scrapping The Bloody Code Parliament bypassed 
these reforms by refusing to dismantle “…the legal values of the Ancien Régime 
…” (Gatrell 1996, p. 568, p. 326; Hay et al. 1975 p. 23).  
No one could therefore foresee that these progressive assaults upon The 
Bloody Code would eventually prove fatal, and led to reform in the nineteenth 
century. In fact, the death penalty remained a mainstay well into that decade, and 
this position did not really alter until at least the 1820s. When outlining these 
alterations, academics mainly focus upon the developments of the next century. 
 
40 The European Enlightenment was influenced by Beccaria and wrote of  “…the atrocity of capital 
punishment…”  De Sade, M. D.-A.-F. (1965) The Complete Justine, Philosophy in the Bedroom 
and Other Writings, New York: Grove, p.310. begging readers “…prefer the science of 
understanding man to that of … killing him.” De Sade, M. D.-A.-F. (1966)The 120 Days of Sodom, 
York: Grove, p.47. Beccaria’s infleunce can also be seen in the British Enlightenment, who accepted 
him“…as an Angel from heaven …” Burns, J.H., and Hart, H.L.A. (1977) A Comment on the 
Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, London: 
University of London, p. 403.  Blackstone devoted considerable portions of his Commentaries to 
him, often adopting his ideas “… crimes are more effectually prevented by the certainty, than by 
the severity, of punishment.” Blackstone, W. (1765) Commentaries On The Laws Of England, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.17. Eden also used Beccaria to critique how “the increase of human 
corruptions proceeds, not from the moderation of punishments, but from the impunity of criminals” 
Eden, W. (1771) Principles of Penal Law, London: White, p.13. Bentham was similarly motivated 
“…punishment must not be less in any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of 
the offence.” Burns, J.H. and Hart, H.L.A. (1996) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p 166.  




However, at this time, our victors were those conservatives who ignored popular 
critique for well over half a century (Gatrell 1996, p. 237; Hay et al. 1975 p. 24).41 
2.3 THE VICTIM OF CRIME  
2.3.1 In the Popular Imagination 
This thesis has just examined how the personal liberties and rule of law of 
the eighteenth century was essentially secured through personal prosecutions. 
Indeed, this popular participation and acceptance of the law was pivotal to the 
upholding of hegemonic dominance, where it existed in Britain and her empire. 
This was due to the fact that the context of the time was deeply suspicious of the 
tyrannical rule of the State, and thus had little recourse to the army or private law 
enforcement, which in a sense existed, but whose ambit was considerably 
restrained by the ideological context and dominant thought pervading at this time. 
Therefore, it was the private prosecution, and indeed personal endeavours of 
victims that essentially maintained the smooth maintenance of public order. As 
 
41 Romilly, the forgotten man of British law reform, despite being profoundly influential as a 
politician within parliament consequently stood “…higher than that of any other…now alive. 
Probity, independence, humanity, and librality breathe through every word…” Mackintosh, J. (1836) 
Memoirs of the Life of Sir James Mackintosh, London: Moxon, p.34. He also recognised 
Rommilly’s achievements in whittling away at the hitherto unchallenged death penalty, as well as 
his attempts as a MP to curtail its exercise “[i]t is impossible to advert to the necessity of reforming 
this part of the law, without calling to mind the efforts of the highly distinguished and universally 
lamented individual, by whom the attention of Parliament was so often roused to the subject of our 
penal code.” Mackintosh, J. (1835) Miscellaneous Works, London: Longman p. 376. 




well as the functioning of the legal system, as its resolution of disputes provided an 
official outlet that discouraged personal violence. Although it by no means 
eschewed it when it came to be mandated by the State or received its sanction.  
This state of affairs led to a situation in which the victim, both due to their 
ideological and practical importance, had huge influence over the manner by which 
the criminal justice system operated. In exchange, and perhaps because of their 
agreement to resort to and recognise the official adjudicatory bodies and authorities 
of the Crown and State, these entities, perhaps in recognition of the symbiotic 
relationship that they both had with one another, provided a huge latitude to the 
individual victim. In fact, policy was often implemented and gatekeepers have spilt 
much ink regarding the ways in which the victim could be encouraged to play an 
even more proactive role in the operation of the justice system. This was likely due 
to the obvious realisation that the more active the victim was in the prosecution and 
deterrence of offences, many of which revolved around the protection of private 
property, the more secure they and their own property would also be. Indeed, so 
long as the law was not challenged outright, and its points of contestation were 
mainly at the margins, then the legitimacy of a social order that was in certain 
respects quite delegitimate in Ireland, would be secured with little effort. If one 
considers the French and American experiences at the time, and contrasts it with 
Britain, one can see how corrosive the toleration of crime and the allowance of 
vigilante justice can be to public order. Indeed, its presence, whether that be the 
destruction of tea in Boston or the hanging of aristocrats in Paris is often decisive. 
Despite this, the inclusion of victims within the criminal justice frame of 
this period was obviously not a faultless exercise. Although some perceive the 




operation of the system at the time through rose tinted glasses, and tend to overlook 
its obvious shortcomings it would be wrong to perceive the victim centred system 
of the age as not having blatant problems. In fact, the lack of protection that it 
afforded to vulnerable groups such as women and the poor, as well as the arguably 
overzealous protections it afforded to those who owned property (and had the 
means to secure it) is problematic. This very obviously betrays both the ultimate 
patrons of such a system, as well as the interests that it was set up to protect.  
Yet the general public tended to perceive victims of crime in a certain way 
during the eighteenth century. This is important to grasp, as this complexity goes 
to the heart of what it meant to be a victim at the time. Victims were seen in a 
nuanced way, since they could represent one person, or signify “…the supra-
personal many” (Rock 2004, p. 334).  In this way the in the eighteenth century 
could be said to both represent and co-exist with a duality of public interest. They 
were akin to the Garlandian ‘everyman’,42 where other people would look at a 
victim and say to themselves, there for the grace of God go I. In a way there are 
very interesting continuities with the perception of the victim today, especially with 
regards to their popular perception. However, at the same time, both the Crown and 
State could also be also be victims in a manner rather akin to the modern 
conception. This often meant ordinary victims could ensure, though not in every 
 
42 Garland, D. (2001) The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 11. 




case, and especially in those in which the Crown or State might be implicated, that 
their own, more personal interests, would correspond with the wider public one.43 
However, although ‘ideal victims’ might have existed,44 the majority of 
those that were unfortunate enough to come before the law eventually came to be 
perceived with a fair amount of suspicion and negativity in the eyes of the legal 
establishment who attempted to blame victims for being the root and cause of much 
of what eventually became rather reprehensible about private prosecutions. These 
charges ought to not be accepted unquestionably. As a degree of revisionism may 
way have been evident and deployed in order to help reconfigure the criminal 
justice system in the manner than the authorities wised it to take in future.45 Critics 
 
43 “… images of the victim that were on offer seem inescapably to have been something of a 
composite or hybrid, part pragmatic and part ideological, part corporeal, part incorporeal; showing 
the personal victim serving both as an embodied individual and as a cipher for the suprapersonal 
many… although their images are seldom explicit, personal victims did not disappear practically or 
symbolically… But they had to co-exist inextricably with another kind of entity altogether—
society, the Crown, the community or the State conceived as a metaphysical victim.” Rock, P. 
(2004) ‘Victims, prosecutors and the State in nineteenth century England and Wales’, Criminal 
Justice: The International Journal of Policy and Practice, 4 (4) 331-354, p.332. 
44 “The existence of ideal victims may at some level have been acknowledged, but those victims 
who actually presented themselves … were very rarely publicly typified …as sympathetic, heroic, 
capable or admirable. They were not the creatures of any sort of Golden Age…” Rock, P. (2004) 
‘Victims, prosecutors and the State in nineteenth century England and Wales’, Criminal Justice: 
The International Journal of Policy and Practice, 4 (4) 331-354, p. 337. 
45 This can be seen from the rather unsympathetic portraits that were painted by authority figures.  




of the time often highlighted how victims were open to the acceptance of bribes, or 
instigated proceedings so that they could pursue their own vendettas. Although, it 
is clearly difficult to say with absolute certainty whether these charges are true, 
what the author can assert with a degree of accuracy is that these allegations were 
influential. In fact, they considerably impressed themselves upon the minds of the 
populace to create a complex, if damming vision of the period’s victims (Rock 
2004, p. 332; Schafer 1968; Wright 1991). 
2.3.2 As Private Prosecutor 
Private prosecution was the commonly held right to instigate either a civil 
or criminal suit in order to determine whether a particular action was lawful. 
Ordinary people could often use this in order to resolve issues that were of 
particular importance to them. However, the authority to initiate these kinds of 
cases never fully relied upon, nor solely involved those parties that were directly 
involved in the case exercising total control over its proceedings. When a victim 
 
“The future Lord Chief Justice, Lord Denman, said in 1824 that prosecutors tended to be helpless, 
ignorant, interested, corrupt and irresponsible, and his observations were to be reiterated 
approvingly in reports for years thereafter ... His successor then continued in the same vein … in 
1855…Victims were represented as neither dependable nor disinterested. They could be intimidated 
… [t]hey could be venal. They might be bought off by defendants and, indeed, it was alleged that 
they sometimes mounted prosecutions precisely to be bought off … Private prosecution was said to 
often be deployed in the service of malice, harassment, blackmail …extortion … or what was, in 
effect, the pursuit of a civil claim through the criminal courts…” Rock, P. (2004) ‘Victims, 
prosecutors and the State in nineteenth century England and Wales’, Criminal Justice: The 
International Journal of Policy and Practice, 4 (4) 331-354, p. 338. 




invoked the law and such a lawsuit began the case in question demanded action, 
which in turn ensured prosecutors would carry it out to its logical conclusion. This 
situation did not really result from planning, but instead developed as an organic 
product of the historical context of the Common Law (Stephen 1883, p. 496). 
The radically libertarian but questionably egalitarian private prosecution 
deterred tyrannical rule, since a private prosecutor was usually a lay member of the 
public.46. However, this system could also be quite irregular in operation. Deceased 
parties were not able to take actions, and when prosecutors were wronged, they 
would often shun the courts altogether, whilst those that did go to trial were often 
ineffectual at doing so. As the public interest demanded a legal system that not only 
predicated itself on popular participation but also on the occasional successful 
prosecution of offender, private prosecution incorporated a touch of bureaucracy. 
This transpired when the law incorporated Justices of the Peace into the 
prosecutions of more serious offences. The reigning monarch mainly drew these 
particular individuals from the upper classes, and gave them a mandate to uphold 
the law of the land.  
 
46 “…the prosecutorial system was not an engine of egalitarianism. Of course, the prosecutorial 
system of so stratified a society will be sensitive to the patterns of deference that otherwise pervade 
the society.”  “The whole of the criminal justice system, especially the prosecutorial system, was 
primarily designed to protect the people, overwhelmingly non-e1ite, who suffered from crime.” 
Langbein, J.H. (1983) ‘Albion's fatal flaws’, Past and Present, 98(1), 96-120, p. 10 




The Marian Committal Act of 1555, An Act Appointing an Order to Justices 
of Peace for the Bailment of Prisoners47 further structured the whole process by 
making the preliminary inquiries that victims usually conducted before a trial 
available to these Justices when they took a prosecution in relation to serious 
offences.48 This considerably altered the position of the private prosecutor, by 
transforming what was previously their prerogative into a duty, as Justices could 
force them to take actions. Victims therefore faced the dilemma of either presenting 
themselves in court with all of their supporting evidence or with having to 
relinquish their financial interest in the case. The law could now compel potential 
prosecutors that abandoned their desire to prosecute, or resented trudging to the 
courthouse, into appearing at a trial (Langbein 1973, p. 318, pp. 321-322; Hay 
1983, p. 167).49  
 
47 The Marian Committal Act 1555 (2 & 3 Phil., c. 10), London: Westminster.  Helmholz, R.H., 
Gray, C.M., Langbein, J.H. Moglen, E., Smith, H.E. and Alschuler, A.W. (1997) The Privilege 
against Self-Incrimination: Its Origins and Development, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 
259. An Act Appointing an Order to Justices of Peace for the Bailment of Prisoners 1555 (1 & 2) 
Phil. & Mar. c.13.), London: Westminster. Cusack, A. (2015) ‘From Exculpatory to Inculpatory 
Justice: A History of Due Process in the Adversarial Trial’, Law, Crime and History, 2(1), 1-28.   
48  “Another way in which the JP might get the results of an investigation before the trial jury was 
to show up in court and exercise a forensic role, describing his inquiries and testifying about the 
circumstances of any confession. This practice may always have been relatively exceptional.” 
Langbein, J.H. (1983) ‘Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder 
Sources’ The University of Chicago Law Review, 50(1),1-136, p. 83. 
49“The Marian committal act of 1555… required the JP to “certify”… his written examinations … 
of victims, witnesses, and accused. In the second half of the seventeenth century, according to the 




2.3.3 As Decision Maker 
The period’s legal situation, before its rationalisation in the next century, 
led to a state of affairs which meant that when a victim alleged that an offence had 
occurred the potential consequences were rather dependent upon something that is 
almost akin to the personal vendetta of that particular victim. In fact, the victim of 
crime was always involved and continued to maintain their centrality within the 
whole process of criminal justice, even if the offence in question happened to 
warrant the death penalty. Victims were therefore key players, at every stage of 
proceedings, which the law, as well as all of the parties that were involved in its 
operation needed in order to carry out even the most basic of official functions. 
Eighteenth century criminal justice therefore centred itself upon the 
‘accommodation’ of crime victims. As a result, they held considerable sway over 
how a prosecution would actually progress. In fact, they could even decide when 
they would bring, settle and abandon a particular case. They also chose which case 
 
generally reliable Clerk of Assize manual, the JP routinely surrendered his depositions in advance 
of trial … I have been unable to trace a regular practice…for the eighteenth century, especially in 
the Ryder years, either at the Old Bailey or at assizes. Our sources do not suggest any immediately 
obvious reason for the declining use of the pretrial deposition. We may hazard as a guess that 
experience revealed that the depositions were ordinarily surplusage…the Marian committal act, 
under whose authority the depositions were produced and certified to the court, also required the JP 
to bind over for trial both the accused and anybody else who could ‘declare anything material to 
prove the…Felony against him’” Langbein, J.H. (1983) ‘Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal 
Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources’ The University of Chicago Law Review, 50 (1),1-136, p. 82. 
 




they would eventually pursue, and if they would even present a case at all. This 
victim indulgent framework allowed for the maintenance of a criminal justice 
system that based itself upon ‘popular participation’. Both operations were 
dependent upon the other, as this method of administering justice prevented the 
erosion of the law, and the ideological utility that it gave to the landed gentry. 
The victim was also able to select how harsh a lawsuit would be in terms of 
its penalty. They were able to do this as the system gave them the ability to mandate 
that a judge follow ‘the letter of the law’, which was often severe. Yet the law also 
allowed them to forgive crimes, and forgo prosecution. This permitted a victim to 
use the law as a tool to achieve their objectives. To the ordinary people, the victim 
appeared to decide an offender’s lot, making prosecution “…an expression of 
[their] will” (Hay et al. 1975, p. 41). When a victim refused to pursue a case, they 
were not subject to official scrutiny, since a voluntary action was revocable on the 
motion of a victim, who was not penalised for this. Victims were even able to 
abandon a case once a preliminary hearing had begun, but often had to relinquish 
their monetary interest in it. However, if they approached this with sufficient tact, 
they could even avoid forfeiting the money they had hitherto invested in the case 
(King 2000, p. 371, p. 22; Hay 1983, p. 169). 
The victim also had huge discretion due to the plethora of options that they 
had in lieu of a trial. The sheer number of alternatives open to them was staggering. 
Victims could avail of resolutions that conveyed assets, unofficial private penalties, 
communal punishment or unofficial recourse to government arms, which could 
penalise offenders. When a victim apprehended a criminal in the act, they could 
even circumvent official solutions by pursuing unofficial ones. The victim could 




also seek judicial approval to obtain a warrant, which allowed them to inspect the 
property of a suspect. If a victim actually met their offender before a trial, an 
official sanction was unlikely, as compromises and unofficial penalties were much 
more common. Indeed, the law was not, and ordinary people did not see it as being, 
the sole method of obtaining a sanction. On the contrary, magistrates only really 
spent their time presiding over those difficult cases that could not be resolved with 
relative ease, and therefore warranted “… the tougher teeth of the criminal law” 
(King 2000, pp. 22-23).50 The victim therefore became a major decision-maker 
during this period. They pursued most proprietary offences, while simultaneously 
being afforded several extrajudicial avenues. Even victims who were loath to hunt 
down stolen possessions could carry out preliminary examinations if they so 
wished. They could engage in cursory investigations and then abandon them, but 
they also had the option of tenaciously approaching this task, by enlisting the help 
 
50 Even then these trials were closer to sentencing hearings than proper determinations of guilt. 
“Only a small fraction of eighteenth-century criminal trials were genuinely contested inquiries into 
guilt or innocence. In most cases the accused had been caught in the act or otherwise possessed no 
credible defense. To the extent that trial had a function in such cases beyond formalizing the 
inevitable conclusion of guilt, it was to decide the sanction. These trials were sentencing 
proceedings. The main object of the defense was to present the jury with a view of the circumstances 
of the crime and the offender that would motivate it to return a verdict within the privilege of clergy, 
in order to reduce the sanction from death to transportation, or to lower the offense from grand to 
petty larceny, which ordinarily reduced the sanction from transportation to whipping.” Langbein, 
J.H. (1983) ‘Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources’ The 
University of Chicago Law Review, 50(1),1-136, p. 41. 




of professionals or members of their community (Emsley 2005, p. 185, p. 187; 
King 2000, p. 23). 
When a victim caught a suspect, they were often able to agree upon a 
monetary settlement with the offender, exact a range of potential unofficial 
punishments or enforce official justice through a private prosecution in the courts. 
Even before a case reached trial, a victim was often able to engender a settlement, 
or failing this, they had the option to swiftly try a suspect, pressgang them into 
military service or detain them until they were in a position to bring full 
proceedings. In court, a victim was able to control what sentences were open to the 
magistrate by carefully selecting the charges that they pursued. They could also 
manufacture an acquittal of the accused if they wished through the introduction of 
inadequate proofs, as well as by their own intentional absence. If the magistrates 
found that an offender was guilty, the victim was even able to direct them regarding 
what class of penalty they preferred. Indeed, once judgment was rendered a victim 
could even arrange and back “…a petition for pardon” (King 1984, p. 27). 
An interesting development during this era was the rise to prominence of 
Associations for the Prosecution of Felons. These united several members, who 
divided their fees, pooled the returns they gained from successful trials, gave 
compensation to witnesses and voted for boards, which were empowered to decide 
when an action ought to be brought. These organisations would occasionally even 
decide to bring actions for those underprivileged members of society who had 
suffered a crime, but whom the courts would deprive of a remedy due to their lack 
of funds. Having said that, these bodies usually only took actions for their 
members, with the approval of their board. They had an immense impact upon the 




operation of criminal justice. Some of the more reputable groups even tried to 
coerce their members into relinquishing the prerogative of pardoning an offence. 
However, the entitlement was so effective for victims in their obtaining of 
extrajudicial compromises, and so ubiquitous n society, that such organisations 
were seldom able to restrain their members in this regard (Bailey 1981; Hay 1983, 
pp. 171-172).  
2.3.4 As Investigator 
Without a centralised police force, victims initiated cases by giving lawsuits 
to Justices of the Peace, collecting evidence, compensating witnesses and 
expending money on legal expenses. They played a key investigative role in the 
finding and detaining of suspects, gathering of eyewitnesses’ testimony and in the 
commencement, as well as directing, of a prosecution itself. Trials were deeply 
personal affairs, and usually only involved a victim of crime and the people that 
they might have been able to persuade to help assist them with their case (Willis 
2008, p. 413; Rock, 2004 p. 333; Cornish and Clark 1989, p. 552). 
Before the State assumed the burden of combating criminality in the next 
century, and law enforcement began pursuing and detaining offenders, collecting 
proofs, organising suits and determining whether they ought to proceed, these were 
all issues that remained the prerogative of the victim. If they desired that a suspect 
receive justice, they usually assumed an active role, by either prosecuting a case, 
or expending their money to pay for it. The victim also had to alert the relevant 
officials of crimes, whilst organising their pursuit. They similarly gathered anyone 
that they could find willing to testify on their behalf, and were very proactive when 




tendering evidence, making it unusual for officials to pursue criminal cases 
concerning ordinary attacks on “…property or the person” (Beattie 1986, p. 35). 
Nearly every trial regarding these offences that ended up in court, which 
was by no means the norm, was usually because of the expenditure and/or industry 
of a victim. Indeed, a victim that was so incensed that they wanted the law to 
officially deal with an offender also needed to present their suspect before a judge, 
however the majority of magistrates did not feel that their responsibilities extended 
beyond merely weighing up the evidence that a victim happened to tender to them. 
This vested important tasks, such as the identification of suspects into the hands of 
the victim. The judiciary also occasionally empowered victims to obtain warrants 
that allowed them to search an area, and officially interrogate suspects in order to 
permit this. During ordinary proceedings, those in power rarely partook in either 
the search or detention of suspects; indeed, source material from the time not only 
illustrates the various forms that these explorations took, but also shows how 
victims were primarily the people who engaged in these kinds of activities.  
When the law did officially prosecute an accused, their victim, who 
occasionally enlisted the assistance of the public, usually detained them near the 
site of the offence in question. Victims sometimes apprehended their suspects 
within a short period, usually due to their erratic behaviour, or ineptitude at 
accounting for their newfound prosperity, with some victims even detaining 
individuals purely based on their previous ill repute. Therefore, if defendants did 
find themselves in the dock, in nearly every instance, it was due to the laborious 
and intricate pre-trial investigative endeavours of their victim. Although some of 
these investigations simply involved paying a visit to the local pawnbroker, which 




housed an appropriated piece of personal property, others entailed crisscrossing 
across rural landscapes in the pursuit of outlaws, discovering possessions and then 
pinning down witnesses that were willing to testify (Beattie 1986, p. 36, pp. 37-
38). 
2.3.5 As Prosecutor 
Nearly every action that a crime victim started in their own name typically 
progressed along the lines that they directed. Jeremy Bentham noted that this 
framework gave those victims who came to the law the right to decide what charge 
to pursue (Bentham 1830, p. 427). Consequently, a victim, rather than a crimes’ 
actual seriousness, usually decided the fate of an accused. Although anyone could 
initiate a prosecution, the private prosecution mainly remained the prerogative of 
victims of crime. They were the ones that would typically report criminal charges 
to Justices of the Peace and submit proofs to a jury, who would then decide whether 
to allow the victim of crime to submit further evidence in the main action. It was 
typical for victims to bring these cases. Indeed, their recourse to private suits was 
so common that it became ‘the paradigm of prosecution’ (Hay 1983, p. 167). In 
fact, victims prosecuted four fifths of all felonious crime in their own name, 
accounting for roughly fifty per cent of all of the crime that the law routinely 
prosecuted. Therefore, most actions relied upon victims of crime, or their agents 
(Emsley 2005, p. 183; Hay et al. 1975, p. 40; Friedman 1995, p. 476; Hay 1983, p. 
168) 
Yet despite the importance of such methods, these kinds of lawsuits were 
anything but elitist. In fact, the legal framework of the era actually enticed the poor 




to take such actions. We can see the roots of this within some of the more important 
seventeenth century acts,51 which promised incentives to those who successfully 
undertook criminal cases against particularly egregious offences. By the eighteenth 
century, Fielding was fighting for a grant to relieve deprived people that were 
seeking justice (Fielding 1751, pp. 168-171). Parliament eventually developed his 
work into Statute, which did not merely remain the preserve of the Statute Books 
either. Source material shows the frequency with which victims relied upon this 
Law, and notes how five shillings a day in expenses was customary (Langbein 
1983, p. 102; Emsley 2004, pp.190-195).  
When a victim decided to prosecute, they had considerable freedom of 
choice in a number of key areas. They could select which charge they were going 
to pursue, with these charges often allowing for considerable latitude for 
interpretation,52 as prosecutions often failed to identify offences with significant 
 
51 The major ones that were introduced in this regard during the seventeenth century were The  
Highwaymen Act, 1692 4 Will. & Mary, c. 8; and 6 Geo. I. c.and the Coin Act, 1694, “6 & 7 Will. 
and Mary, c. 17. 
52 “For the most part bills charging assault represent a great number of events that might have very 
little in common. Even the degree of damage or harm done to the victim is rarely known and yet 
clearly it could range from a scratch to, say the loss of an eye, as was reported several times in 
Surrey, or even on one occasion to the loss of a nose and fingers, bitten off by one enraged 
participant in a brawl in 1796…The same sort of problem of interpretation surrounds another 
general category of indictments, those for unlawful assembly, riot and other offences against the 
peace. Indeed there is with these an even greater possible variety of action and motive. Some seem 
to differ very little from simple assault (though to make a riot at least three persons had to be 




clarity, and there also existed a general right to try a person, with the help of a jury, 
for whatever crime that a prosecutor deemed to be most appropriate. The law also 
permitted victims of crime to draft an indictment, the charges’ official 
documentation, along the lines that they personally directed. This effectively meant 
that when they brought a prosecution, they could select sentences and ensure that 
their own paid experts would be able to iron out any issues regarding the drafting 
of these legal documents well in advance of a trial. Mathew Boulton, the renowned 
industrialist of Boulton and Watt, delighted in the artistry that the representatives 
in his employ displayed in one particularly complex breaking and entering case. 
This provided Boulton with an eight-count indictment, and confidence in achieving 
his preferred sentence of death. The impact of this was not lost on his son, who 
remarked that the document “… appear[d]to be formed like a swivel gun [,] and 
may be directed to all points as circumstances require" (Hay 1983, p. 168).53   
The official prosecutions that victims of crime pursued invariably involved 
a profoundly combative courtroom procedure. This persisted due to the 
 
involved) and it is frequently impossible even to guess at what might lie behind them. ” Beattie, 
J.M. (1974) ‘The Pattern of Crime in England 1660-1800’, Past & Present, 62, 47-95, p. 63. 
53 “ The victim of a felony (who most often acted as the prosecutor in a system that depended 
fundamentally on private prosecution) was free to hire a lawyer to manage the presentation of his 
or her case. But in fact few did so. The judges were generally the only participants in felony trials 
with professional training. They dominated the courtroom and orchestrated the brief confrontation 
between the victim and the accused that was at the heart of the trial.” Beattie, J.M. (1991) ‘Scales 
of justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and nineteenth 
Centuries,’ Law and History Review, 9(2), 221-267, p. 221. 




unprofessional way in which prosecutors approached trial confrontations. A judge 
was the only one policing the courtroom, which usually lacked professional 
advocates.54 This allowed for a fluid altercation between the prosecutor and the 
defendant. The courtroom therefore chiefly served as a venue where the law 
afforded the defendant an opportunity to appeal against their prosecution, by 
refuting the proofs that supported it. These ‘accused speaks’ hearings did not give 
the defendant a legal representative, as they were prohibited when a jury 
adjudicated factual issues, but this prohibition did however encourage the 
defendant to personally articulate their own defence. This proscription was largely 
predicated upon a concern, which was predominately vindicated with time, that 
such representation would hamper a judge’s capacity “…to have the accused serve 
as a[n] informational resource” (Langbein 1978, pp. 307-314, 1983, pp. 126-127, 
2003, p. 2; Friedman 1994, p. 57; Beattie 1986, pp. 352-356; Rock 2004, pp. 332-
333; Smith 1906). 
 
54 “Although some of the costs of prosecution could be recovered, one might presume that many 
victims of crime were not anxious to … pay for a solicitor to prepare a brief or a barrister to argue 
it. Reluctance to engage counsel also perhaps arose from victims’ perceptions of the process of 
prosecution and trial, particularly from the deeply entrenched notion that it was the magistrate’s 
duty as the king's agent to organize the prosecution. Most victims who chose to initiate a prosecution 
must have thought that the old system was adequate and that it would be enough if they came to 
court and told their stories to the judge and jury.” Beattie, J.M. (1991) ‘Scales of justice: Defense 
Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and nineteenth Centuries,’ Law and 
History Review, 9(2), 221-267, p. 229. 




Although defendants were often isolated during prosecutions, victims of 
crime could deploy both witnesses and counsel. The law gave private prosecutors 
a lot of sway regarding the witnesses that they could present at both the pre-trial 
and jury stages. As a preliminary hearing was often discretionary, yet nearly always 
invariably led to a jury trial, a victim of crime could even bypass this preliminary 
stage altogether by presenting a voluntary bill. This voluntary bill also effectively 
meant that the defendant would not be able to summon any witnesses for their trial. 
A prosecuting victim of crime was also able to bring charges and build a lawsuit 
whilst their suspect was not aware of the action that they were covertly building 
against them (Hay 1983, pp.168-169). 
The victim of crime also had powerful sway over how a prosecution would 
end, because the law permitted them to select a personal attorney who could advise 
prosecuting counsel, where present, on what punishment they should attempt to 
pursue, so that it broadly concurred with the wishes of the victim. However, this 
framework often left these legally trained individuals rather displeased when the 
magistrate eventually did pass sentence. Once a criminal was found guilty and a 
sentence was reached, the Crown and State were also particularly mindful of a 
victim’s desires when determining whether they would exercise their power to 
grant ‘a free or conditional pardon’, particularly when the sentence involved the 
death penalty. Due to the latitude afforded to prosecuting victims, there are records 
of these individuals solemnly contemplating the ramifications of the power they 
wielded. A particularly articulate larceny victim summed up the situation by noting 
that “if [he] succeed[ed] [he] shall most certainly hang the culprit…”. However, 
after recognising that there is greater integrity in the prosecution of a crime than in 




its performance, he nobly resolved “... to hold the scales of justice even and never 
suffer [his] power” to border upon [t]yranny” (Hay 1983, pp. 168-170). 
These reflections also hint at a pronounced appreciation, on the part of 
victims of crime of the interest that their actions would inevitably garner from 
almost every conceivable part of the public. Due to the considerable latitude that 
the law afforded to the victim as a private prosecutor, when they decided to 
personally prosecute a criminal offence, they frequently opened themselves up to 
the public’s moral appraisal of their conduct, which invariably involved hearing 
the opinions of the various different socio-economic elements that the social body 
constituted. Since the law easily permitted victims of crime to alter their decision 
to prosecute, societal influence could often become quite persuasive in this regard. 
If they persisted in the face of criticism victims of crime would often argue their 
case in the print media, take this entreaty from one victim prosecutor, which a paper 
published in the wake of a particularly contentious exercise of the death penalty: 
 “…one of the unfortunate [m]en who suffered … on [m]onday last for a 
[f]orgery … persisted in his [i]nnocence to the last, and accused me of being his 
[m]urderer, I think it a [j]ustice due to myself to state to the [p]ublic, through the 
[m]edium of your [p]aper, the [c]ircumstances which led to his detection and 
[c]onviction...” (Hay 1983, p. 170). 
Although these kinds of statements could perhaps assuage the complaints of the 
educated or prosperous, if a victim of crime happened to bring an action that 
offended against the prevalent social attitudes of the day they could often have to 
accept that the pursuit of such a case would put their shrubs, plants and livestock 
in imminent danger. The risk of such destruction often encouraged victims to 




scupper prosecutions, moderate allegations and sometimes not even pursue a case 
at all. A more personable criminal justice system also exacerbated this by 
engendering pre-trial compromises. However, this compulsion was inconsistent, as 
its strength was context dependent (Hay 1983, p. 170; Archer, 1990, pp. 147-7). 
2.4  HOW THE VICTIM CENTRED SYSTEM WORKED  
A very important pair of traits enabled this criminal justice system, which 
placed the victim of crime at its heart to operate. Although academics know these 
well, they often fail to grasp their significance. The first centres on how the 
paradigm made the prevention of crime a ‘private good’, whilst the second involves 
the official sanctioning of ‘compounding’. This was a pre-trial consensus, whereby 
a potential prosecutor agreed to refuse to pursue a purported offence in exchange 
for offender compensation (Friedman 1995, p. 484; King 2004; Sullivan 2005). 
2.5  THE PRIVATE GOOD OF CRIME PREVENTION  
It was often the case that victims of crime desired would-be offenders to be 
discouraged from pursuing a life of crime, at least within their own neighbourhood. 
However, this required victims of crime, who were always ready to deter 
criminality through their own detection, detention and prosecution of offences. One 
potential solution to this involved ‘reputation.’ Since the most likely victims of 
theft were usually shopkeepers, they would typically pursue any offender that they 
managed to seize, to demonstrate their determination to uphold the criminal law.  
Yet the majority, of even the most vulnerable victims, would be fortuitous 
if they managed to capture a single robber in their entire lifetime. Therefore, these 
individuals needed to inform likely thieves, long before the fact, that if they stole 




goods from them then they were certain to charge anyone they did catch, which 
would usually result in the exercise of the death penalty. They did this by becoming 
members of associations for the prosecution of felons. The majority of these had 
no more than one hundred participants, who mainly hailed from the locality.  
These associates would then donate a fee, which could then become part of 
a communal fund. This would consequently become accessible to pay any expense 
that an associate incurred in the pursuit of a criminal offence.55 The body would 
then circulate a register of their members within the local print media, in order to 
inform regional criminals that these particular individuals would be strongly 
inclined to prosecute any offenders. Although certain experts contend that people 
joined these bodies to secure their own personal property, one should also recognise 
the importance of the obligation that entering into such a collective agreement 
entailed, since upon enlisting, every member had to pledge that they would take 
proceedings whenever the board agreed to do so (Friedman 1995, pp. 484-485; 
Bailey 1981). 
 
55 “The association for the prosecution of felons was a benefit society for the purpose of bearing 
some of the costs associated with the risk of being victimised by a serious crime. Members adopted 
articles of association and paid a subscription. When a member suffered a crime of a type covered 
in the articles, the association would pay the expenses of criminal investigation and prosecution. It 
would advertise stolen goods and offer rewards for the return of goods and the apprehension of 
culprits. Sometimes the articles of the association contained a schedule of rewards to be offered and 
paid to persons…” Beattie, J.M. (1991) ‘Scales of justice: Defense Counsel and the English 
Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and nineteenth Centuries,’ Law and History Review, 9(2), 221-267, 
p. 344. 




2.6  THE COMPOUNDING OF OFFENCES  
Although it is common knowledge that parties can achieve a pre-trial 
resolution in a civil suit, what is much less known is that the law used to permit 
something similar in a criminal context, when a prosecutor could decide to 
compound a crime. This meant the victim of a particular crime reaching of an 
understanding with their alleged offender that reparations would be acceptable in 
lieu of a prosecution. Magistrates permitted this to be done in relation to minor 
offences during the eighteenth century. 56  Indeed, they actually believed that 
promoting these kinds of arrangements was one of their, admittedly few, 
professional duties, since they felt that it was a fair way of preventing the courts 
from becoming backlogged. Therefore, the usual consequence of a crime’s 
commission was not the grisly executions that posterity remembers so well. It was 
instead an economic sanction, which the victims of a particular crime could 
themselves impose upon their offender, so that they could compensate that victim 
for any losses they suffered. The benefit of this, when compared to contemporary 
damages and fines was its flexibility. These sanctions transpired without the 
 
56 Blackstone himself wrote extensively on the subject as he himself saw it. 
“It is not uncommon, when a person is convicted of a misdemeanor...as a battery, imprisonment or 
the like, for the court to permit the defendant to speak with the prosecutor, before any judgment is 
pronounced; and if the prosecutor declares himself satisfied, to inflict but a trivial punishment. This 
is done to reimburse the prosecutor his expenses, and to make him some private amends, without 
the trouble … of a civil action... prosecutions for assaults are by this means too frequently 
commenced, rather for private lucre than for the great ends of public justice” Blackstone, W. (1765) 
Commentaries On The Laws Of England, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p, 363-364. 




judiciary’s largely artificial appraisal of either a perpetrator’s liability or their 
capacity to pay. Victims and offenders instead settled this personally, and their 
negotiations only really involved those parties that were directly involved in the 
case (Friedman 1995, p. 486, p. 488). 
CONCLUSION  
This chapter illustrated the early modern victim within their eighteenth-
century context, as well as how they related to this particular environment. The 
author did this in order to help evidence how the realities of victimhood did not 
remain static, but rather changed over time. It also demonstrated how the 
eighteenth-century justice model was suspicious of State power, emphasised 
deterrence through terror and remained positive towards the ideals of Rule of Law 
and freedom. This illustrated how the social historical paradigm of the time allowed 
the victim of crime to adopt a key stakeholder position within Irish criminal justice.  
Victims were therefore highly valued by the courts, and enjoyed an 
authorised centrality when the law dispensed its justice. These revelations arguably 
indicate that, based on the English source material that this thesis references, the 
position of the victim in England could be said to be analogous in certain respects 
to that of the Irish victim. As they both often operated within the British legal 
system and both jurisdictions have roughly similar legal traditions. In this way, and 
with these provisos, it could be said that the eighteenth century crime victim that 
operated within the British criminal justice system of England and Ireland was not 
the powerless figure that they subsequently became in the next century, but were 
instead an individual, with rights, like the entitlement to take a prosecution. This 




chapter also stressed the complexity of victims, as well as how they were proactive 
within the legal process itself to demonstrate the strength and influence, they 
exercised. The victim had control within society, power before the magistrates and 
influence over their offender.  
Their position of authority explains how they managed to exert so much 
control over their conflicts. This discussion also lays the foundation for the next 
chapter of this thesis, which deals with how the State usurped the procedural 
centrality of the victim in the nineteenth century. This indicates that we must read 
their temporary dominance as a transient stage in their broader history of exclusion.  
The next chapter of this thesis examines how the victim went from a central 
actor to an afterthought in Irish justice. It first outlines the changing socio-historical 
context so as to evidence how this new situation drove the changes that necessitated 
the victims’ relegation from lead role to bit part player. Indeed, this chapter helps 
illustrate how these transformations transpired. Firstly, within in the field of 
ideology, and then within legal procedure. An operation which ultimately led to a 
circumstance in which victims found themselves, as a result of these changes, 
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THE CAUSES AND OUTCOMES OF THE EXCLUSION OF CRIME 
VICTIMS FROM THE IRISH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter seeks to answer the question of what caused the modern 
position of the victim to alter from that of centrality during the eighteenth century 
to marginality in the nineteenth. It also seeks to enquire as to how this was brought 
about by advancements in the overall dominant ideological frames and procedural 
processes that were implemented during this transition. Indeed, despite the fact that 
all of these transitions were beneficial for the offender, their impact on the victim 
was far from ideal. As they now found themselves being subsumed within a public 
interest, and were rarely, if ever, individually recognised as autonomous entities.  
This helps to recognise how the subjective position of the victim has 
radically transformed in modern Irish legal history. It also, at the same time, 
provides something of a backdrop and explanation for the contemporary position 
of victims. In so doing it also helps expose issues that are of consequence to victims 
and which were ignored for a considerable time. These were ignored as victim 
marginality was cemented by a whole host of presuppositions which became the 
bedrock of contemporary criminal justice. Indeed, some of these have only very 
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recently begun to be challenged within mainstream debate. This also illustrates the 
momentous nature of this change. As the transition from exclusion to inclusion is 
the re-evaluation of a privileging that was supported by centuries of precedent. 
Chapter three will also consider industrialisation; laissez faire economics; 
working time and the nature of time itself; urbanisation, industrial development; 
and deprivation. Not just as evidence of an altered social context, but as the cause 
of the transition from victim inclusion to victim exclusion. Since the confluence of 
all of these factors led to a new social situation. One in which the ideologies of 
small governmental regulation, and a symbiotic relationship in which order was 
maintained by public participation were no longer viable . Indeed, this created a 
huge governmental edifice. An edifice that not only promoted  trade but also 
engendered order through a broad and pervasive correctional apparatus. This 
system now no longer required victim input. In fact, the lack of regularity their 
influence tended to introduce jeopardised it. As procedural principles were much 
more sought after in this new system, the days of victim inclusion within criminal 
justice as a stakeholder were numbered. They could no longer be incorporated as 
their presence was intolerable within a new context and socio-political situation 
which prided itself on the detached and regularised method of processing offenders. 
 However, the tensions this chapter will explore with regards to victim input 
had always existed. Indeed, victims could often use their position to circumvent 
official justice, or use the system for personal advantage. They could achieve this 
by extorting or bribing people, pursuing cases with no grounding, or extracting 
unfair vengeance that was wildly out of proportion with the ill suffered. In short, 
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tensions existed between the desire for an upright system of justice that the public 
could perceive as fair, and the official desire to incorporate the public in its 
operation. However, since victims were now increasingly undermining this 
positive perception, mainly by introducing capriciousness into the day to day 
operation of justice, these tensions now eventually became unsustainable.  
Even though these tensions had existed within the previous century, during 
the altered context of the nineteenth they were exacerbated to such a degree that 
they embarrassed the powers that be who now operated them. This led to victims 
being perceived with greater suspicion by the experts that were now placed in 
charge of ensuring that procedures were fair and regularised. Therefore, the 
vagrancies that the victim introduced were now deemed a threat to the legitimacy 
of the justice system. A system which would now be operated by the state, and 
introduce checks and balances to deter arbitrary justice and increase public 
confidence. This mandated that victims, who had hitherto produced irregularity, 
needed to be curtailed in the interests of public confidence and fair procedures.  
The third chapter of this thesis will advance upon the narrative that the 
author previously alluded to in the last chapter by demonstrating how the victim 
centred criminal justice system of the eighteenth century radically transformed in 
Ireland during the nineteenth century. It does this by outlining the way in which 
the law marginalised victims from the system of criminal justice in nineteenth-
century Ireland through an account of how the power dynamics of victimhood 
changed during this period. This requires an analysis of nineteenth-century 
developments like industrialisation and urbanisation, which altered everyday life, 
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and thereby contextualises the world that victims occupied at this time. The chapter 
also illustrates how a continuation of some of the period’s longstanding problems 
with the Irish system of victim centred justice helped bring about the structural 
exclusion of victims of crime in Ireland.  
This involves an exposition of the way in which a popular rebellious 
inclination on the island of Ireland exacerbated these problems, which made it 
difficult, if not impossible to maintain Law and Order. In fact, rapid changes in 
circumstances made the continuation of eighteenth-century justice deeply 
problematic. Reformers,1 motivated by a fear of the kind of social upheavals that 
 
1 “…[i]n the 1830s [by] Robert Peel, [who] …introduced significant reforms to the Irish system, 
including a reduction in the number of capital crimes, Capital Punishment (Abolition) Act 1835 (5 
& 6 Wm IV, c. 8), the Capital Punishment Abolition (Amendment) Act 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. IV, c. 4), 
the Executions for Murder Act 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. IV, c. 30), the Capital Punishment (Forgery) 
Abolition Act 1837 (7 Wm. IV & 1 Vic., c. 84) and the Capital Punishment Abolition Act 1837 (7 
Wm. IV & 1 Vic., c. 91) a major overhaul of the jury system, Juries Ireland Act 1833 (3 & 4 Wm. 
IV, c. 91) reform to prisons and punishment, Prisons (Ireland) Act 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. IV, c. 51) and 
the Transportation (Amendment) Act 1837 (7 Wm. IV & 1 Vic., c. 36) changes to the organisation 
of the police The Constabulary (Ireland) Act 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. IV, c. 13), the Constabulary 
(Amendment) (Ireland) Act 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. IV, c. 36), the Dublin Police Act 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. 
IV, c. 29), the Dublin Metropolitan Police Act 1837 (7 Wm. IV & 1 Vic., c. 25) and changes to the 
way in which criminal cases were defended, Prisoners’ Counsel Act 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. IV., c. 114) 
in addition to changes to the substantive criminal law in The Burglary Act and Stealing 
(Amendment) Act 1837 (7 Wm. I & 1 Vic., c. 86), the Robbery from the Person (Amendment) Act 
1837 (7 Wm. I & 1 Vic., c. 87) and the Offences Against the Person (Amendment) Act 1837 (7 
Wm. I & 1 Vic., c. 85). After the Famine, the early 1850s also saw significant reform of the courts 
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had transpired in the previous century, felt that a novel legal system was required 
to bring about a more measured and peaceful transition from the previous economic 
model, which was primarily based around Feudalism, to our more contemporary, 
Capitalistic one. These reforms consequently engendered the rise of the 
aggrandised State, which politicians now provided with enough freedom and 
latitude in order to refashion the Criminal Law to help bring about this transition, 
which was of course implemented in a uniquely Irish centric manner.2  
However, the “march of progress” that this novel State engendered led to 
the near total excise of the victim of crime from criminal justice in Ireland, an 
exclusion that quickly gained a degree of permanence. This chapter finishes with 
 
and the justice system more generally with the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 (14 & 15 Vic., c. 
93), the Supreme Court (Ireland) Act 1850 (13 &14 Vic., c. 19), the Common Law Courts (Ireland) 
Act 1851 (14 & 15 Vic., c. 17), and the Constabulary (Ireland) Act 1851 (14 & 15 Vic., c. 85) …" 
Howlin, N., (2013) ‘Nineteenth-Century Criminal Justice: Uniquely Irish or Simply “not English”?’ 
Irish Journal of Legal Studies, 3(1), 67-89 
2 “The use of “special” legislation … was also a distinctive feature of the administration of justice 
in Ireland. In the 1850s and the 1880s… legislation was passed when it was considered that the 
ordinary law was not enough to keep order in the countryside. Between 1866 and 1892, there were 
five different coercion Acts passed … [The Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vic., 
c. 9), the Protection of Life and Property in Certain Parts of Ireland Act 1871 (34 & 35 Vic., c. 25), 
the Act for the Better Protection of Person and Property in Ireland 1881 (44 & 45 Vic., c. 4), the 
Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act 1881 (44 & 45 Vic., c. 5), the Act for the Prevention of Crime in 
Ireland, 1882 (45 & 46 Vic., c. 4) and the Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act 1887 (51 & 
52 Vic., c. 20)]. The measures…included…proclaiming districts and curfews, the removal of habeas 
corpus rights, the imposition of martial law, and provision for trial by special jury or…judge alone.”  
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an analysis of the impact that this had upon victims of crime, as their exclusion 
entrapped them physically, within the mire of bureaucracy, and mentally, within a 
prism of learned helplessness. This chapter thereby outlines why this transition 
occurred. The discussion will therefore involve examining the industrial 
developments of the time, the urban sprawl it created, the complications of victim 
centrality, Irish defiance, reformist angst and the rise of the State. Not to mention 
how this new State was fundamental to the modernising of the Irish criminal justice 
system that it eventually helped bring about, in this particular order.  
3.2  THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CAUSES OF VICTIM EXCLUSION  
3.2.1 A Fading Noblesse Oblige and a Laissez Faire Revolution 
Nineteenth century industrialisation transformed the Island of Ireland. Even 
though the industrial revolution began in Britain, it quickly spread across the globe, 
and although Britain was its birthplace, its growth remained uneven within and 
between its kingdoms. This explains why there were such varying degrees of 
industrialisation between Ireland and Wales, as well as the significant disparities 
in wealth between the inhabitants of rural and urban Ireland. However, having said 
that, there were considerable industrial areas of growth right across the island, 
which are perceptible in Cork, Galway, Limerick and Dublin, several of which 
were presided over by the Scottish civil engineer Alexander Nimmo, who oversaw 
the conducting of this work during the 1820s. These projects had a considerable 
impact upon the Irish economy and infrastructure particularly within its harbours, 
which Friedrich Engels noted when he returned to Ireland on a journey from Dublin 
to Galway in the 1850s (Wilkins 2016; Engels 2009). 
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 Since the nineteenth century was also the quintessential age of 
individuality, the duties of noblesse oblige, which were hitherto laden within the 
aristocratic value system, fell into disuse. Indeed, society, or at least the upper 
echelons of it, seemed to jettison most calls for a ‘just price’, or earnings that bore 
a degree of semblance to popularly held standards of decency. In this, we see some 
of the first growing pains of a laissez faire Market Economy. However, it would 
be wrong to portray the era’s sufferings as being the sole product of the potent 
combination of unscrupulous bosses and unbridled Capitalism.  
Viewed through the prism of history, industrialisation always necessitates 
a considerable degree of transition, coupled with the irreparable damage that this 
invariably does to the cherished labour routines of the masses. In fact, 
commentators have spilt much ink in examining the problems that have 
characterised the emergent industrial development of these Isles, from market 
failures to austerity, as well as the pressures of residential growth. These issues 
typically resulted from ‘take-off’ issues, where the State jettison government 
spending in favour of future expenditure. Several generations of the nineteenth 
century underclass therefore significantly, if not completely, forfeited their own 
standard of living for an future time period that they would ultimately not live to 
see (Melossi 2008, p. 43; Samuel 1998, p. 52; Thompson 1980, pp. 222-223). 
3.2.2 The ‘Tyranny of the Clock’ Work in the Industrial Century 
Labour in the nineteenth century became an altogether different activity 
than it was in the eighteenth century. The major difference being that it was now 
primarily engaged in by wage labourers, rather than serfs, who frequently, due to 
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their own lack of capital, needed to toil for long hours in poor working conditions 
to earn a, normally low, wage that they could then try to use to sustain themselves 
and their families, if that was possible. Before this, familial relations generally 
conducted labour amongst themselves, and typically held everything in common in 
this regard from their work studios to their land (Hobsbawm 1968, p. 66). 
Nineteenth century industrialization therefore brought about vast changes 
in employment conditions and routines. Automation dramatically altered the 
professional schedule, since it tended to alter the rate of productivity by supplanting 
the more circumspect and time consuming artisan labour that was more typical of 
the previous century. This also made work less physical, but also much more 
productive, thereby reducing the prices of commodities, whilst also simultaneously 
broadening the market of potential consumers (Samuel 1977, p. 7).  
However, employment in the nineteenth century, particularly when 
conducted within an industrial factory, foisted a level of monotony that was 
altogether different from the labour that was typically associated with the 
eighteenth century. In fact, before the nineteenth century, work patterns factored in 
climate and even amusement into their routines, which often ebbed and flowed like 
the tides. This situation even existed within specialized employment arrangements. 
Indeed, eighteenth century journeymen often preferred to forgo plying their trade 
on the first day of every week, much to the annoyance of their Masters, and usually 
took it off, in a tradition that eventually became known as ‘St. Monday’.  
The manufacturing environment of the nineteenth century on the other hand 
preferred to engender the ‘tyranny of the clock’, a perspective that functioned as a 
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way of helping to establish a brisk work tempo. Since time was now gauged, as 
Kipling came to measure it in his poem If, by the ‘unforgiving minute’ rather than 
by the season, a consistency was introduced that clashed with the more lenient work 
conventions of the previous century. Since working people often found it hard to 
pick up these habits, as they were accustomed “…to labour[ing] under the 
discipline of the sun and season…they [may] resist[ed] the discipline of the factory 
and machine, which, [al]though it [was] no more severe…seem[ed] so because it 
[was so] alien…” (Melossi and Pavarini 1981, p. 15). Employers therefore imposed 
work discipline via the rubric of the law, with pieces of statute like the Master and 
Servant Act, 1889, being legislated, which severely penalised workers for even the 
most minor breaches of their employment contracts. The impact of all this, when 
taken together with the meagre salaries that most working people earned was 
considerable, as the masses often had to engage in persistent drudgery in order to 
earn barely enough money to feed themselves (Hobsbawm 1968, pp. 66-67).  
3.2.3 The Time Transition – Cyclic Time becomes Linear 
The technologically innovations of this century promoted laissez faire 
enterprise by not only relentlessly commodifying workers, but by also promoting 
“…task-oriented toil over time-oriented toil” (cited in Vaughan and Kilcommins 
2008, p. 55). A number of distinctions can be drawn to extrapolate the differences 
between ‘task’ and ‘time’ based labour. In time-based work, wage labourers focus 
on whatever goal they need to achieve first, rather than eventualities. Furthermore, 
‘task’ based societies evidence a less well-defined separation between business and 
pleasure, incorporate more latitude for communal association and the expansion 
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(or contraction) of labour periods in line with the duration of a project, as well as 
its circumstances and the permission of informal discourse while all of this is being 
carried out. Yet these traditions were rarely encouraged under the ‘time’ based 
regime of the nineteenth century. Since industrial capitalists inherently felt that the 
‘task’ based perspective was now far too permissive. In fact, they were all too 
familiar with, and probably the era’s greatest proponents of, the insatiable drive for 
efficiency that the time-based conception of work now demanded of wage 
labourers (Thompson 1967, p. 60).  
This revision in the nature of time fundamentally involved a re-
conceptualisation of time’s duality. The construct’s seasonal interpretation, which 
was more irrational, although materialistic, started to wane. However, its calendar-
based understanding, which was more logical, although intangible flourished. 
Industrialisation therefore revolutionised the nineteenth century world, by altering 
how the labouring public conceptualised time. This change now prompted a shift 
from more pastoral labour routines to ones of urban graft (Lefebvre 1991, p. 49).  
3.3 URBANISATION WITHIN AN INDUSTRIALISING IRELAND  
3.3.1 Greater Resident Numbers Move to Cities 
Industrialisation also drove an increase in urbanisation, as populations grew 
and centralised around large cities. Since Feudalism no longer tied farmhands to 
“their” land, landowners could dismiss these individuals, who now sought 
sanctuary within the urbane confines of the industrial city. There was consequently 
often a plentiful supply of wage labourers, who could now begin toiling, often 
through economic compulsion, in factories, which usually located themselves 
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within the outer margins of urban developments, or within specific manufacturing 
zones. One of Ireland’s greatest economic thinkers of the age, and an astute 
forerunner to the future ideas of historical materialism that were proposed some 
years later was the economist William Thompson, of Clonkeen, Roscarbery, 
County Cork, who summed up the material conditions in Ireland at this time: 
 “The productive labourers, strip[t] of all capital, of tools, houses, and materials to 
make their labour productive, toil from want, from the necessity of existence, their 
remuneration being kept at the lowest compatible figure with the existence of 
industrious habits” (cited in Connolly 1917, p. 81). 
The working populace therefore began to conduct their labour during the 
nineteenth century within an increasingly metropolitan confine, as industrial 
“[p]opulation[s] [became] centralised just as capital [did]…” (Cited in Engels 
2009, Ch I). In fact, technological advancements established manufacturing 
communities that encompassed everyone from miners to minor craftspeople. The 
growth of cities, as well as the progressive cultivation techniques that they 
employed engendered even further expansion in trade that occurred in the later 
decades of the century, which enticed even greater numbers of people towards these 
kinds of settlements (Melossi 2008, p. 40; Hobsbawm 1968, p. 67). The migration 
patterns that Marx and Engels so astutely described therefore perpetually resonate 
here, as an aspiring working class moved from the island’s more pastoral regions 
to those that were more urban and densely populated. Yet the technological 
advances of the period in the realm of transport were what really accelerated this 
shift in emphasis, as well as the rate at which this trend progressed, by negating 
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those previous barriers that were typically associated with the large-scale relocation 
of the forces of productive labour (Melossi 2015; Harvey 1990; Giddens 1984).  
Whilst the British Isles of the eighteenth century only housed about a 
handful of cities with a population of greater than fifty thousand, the early 
nineteenth century quadrupled that number to almost ten, and by the mid-
nineteenth century, this had exploded to nearly thirty. Their residents were 
primarily urban lodgers, with a quarter occupying settlements with populations that 
surpassed the hitherto rare fifty thousand mark (Hobsbawm 1968, p. 67). 
3.3.2 The Challenges of Ad Hoc Industrial Development 
This extraordinary influx of people, who were all congregating and living 
within what were essentially unplanned developments led to the emergence of 
several challenges for all of those who attempted to live within the nineteenth-
century industrial city. These existed because these zones were unable to 
accommodate the enormous numbers of migrants who were now inhabiting them. 
The state of affairs led to a situation where new city residents inundated “…slums, 
whose sight froze the heart of the[ir] observer” (Hobsbawm 1968, p. 67).   
In fact, an urban settlement during the nineteenth century was often much 
greater in its unpleasantness and annoyance than a rural one. Although pastoral 
inhabitants could occasionally pollute their own communal springs if they placed 
them within an unfortunate location, they never had to wake up hours early like 
municipal residents to purchase temporary access to a solitary ‘stand-pipe.’ 
Pastoral residents had crisp country air and beautiful scenery, whilst municipal 
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residents could never really escape the pungent odour that the putrid by-products 
of industrialisation tended to spew around them (Thompson 1980, p. 352). 
The urban relocation of this period also tended to forge ‘the dangerous 
classes’. The ‘canaille’ whose existence and activities so perturbed the more 
respectable members of society. However, the level of industrialism of the age 
directly caused the squalor that this ragtag group occupied by helping to exacerbate 
an already unfortunate situation. In fact, a young Engels painstakingly studied how 
the settings and actions of the poorer urban residents of Dublin was largely the 
result of the socio-economic conditions that the ruling class in Ireland at the time 
had foisted upon them (Thompson 1980, p. 356; Melossi 2015, p. 10).  
3.3.3 ‘Devastation and Deprivation’ in Irish Cities 
Anyone who examines the manufacturing hubs of the early to mid-nineteenth 
century never fails to notice how these regions suffered ‘devastation and 
deprivation’. Although scarcity was often never too far from abundance, most 
urban neighbourhoods usually harboured conditions of abject destitution. In fact, 
each British capital had notorious ghettos, which typically accommodated the 
poorer working classes, who often had to put up with unspeakable conditions. 
Indeed, a lack of proper waste disposal ensured that the inhabitants of these areas 
frequently disposed of all kinds of waste within their own grubby paths, which 
lacked even the most basic standards of hygiene. It was this spoiling of the natural 
world that so disturbed the poet and critic John Ruskin, who noted how these kinds 
of urban settlements were often “…— rattling, growling, smoking, stinking, — a 
ghastly heap of fermenting brickwork, pouring out poison at every pore…” (cited 
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in Briggs 1993, p. 75).  Although the domiciles of the past had certain inadequacies, 
the settlements that their inhabitants resided in tended to incorporate community 
mores, aesthetic refinement, economic balance and diversity. However, the 
nineteenth century city, which landlords now helped to recast as utilitarian 
boroughs predominately earmarked for the cheap provision of labour, were a 
flagrant contravention of the hitherto established architectural traditions that were 
predominant within eighteenth century Britain (Thompson 1980, p. 356).    
Indeed, Ireland’s capital Dublin was no exception, and possessed several 
notoriously unpleasant regions. Although the living standards that the occupants of 
these zones had to endure beggar belief, statistics from the period give us a picture 
of how the deprived Irish assembled themselves. During the early years of the 
century approximately a thousand individuals crammed into just under fifty 
domiciles in Barrack Street, on the more affluent south side of the city, whilst 
nearly two thousand people occupied around seventy residences in Church Street 
within the historically poorer north side of the capital (Engels 2009, p. 26, p. 33).   
“…[T]he early decades of the nineteenth century were years of serious social 
turmoil…” (Melossi 2008, p. 39). Indeed, the “…continuous pressure of economic 
transformation[s]…” caused significant pastoral “…marginalisation and 
expulsion…”. The resulting “…vagrancy, crime and banditry…” that occurred, 
simply further accentuated tensions . Particularly the ones which existed as a result 
of the prevalence of crime, and the paltry number of offenders that were actually 
apprehended and punished. Although these kinds of issues had plagued the victim 
centred criminal justice system of the past, their exacerbation as a result of the 
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aforementioned social changes served to further highlight them. Indeed, it was this 
increased focus which ultimately led the progressives of the day to try rectify the 
situation via reform (Melossi 2008, p. 39; Foucault 1978; Lefebvre 1973).         
3.4 PROBLEMS WITH THE VICTIM-CENTRED SYSTEM ARE EMPHASISED  
3.4.1 The Prevalent Hesitancy Regarding Pursuing Actions 
The structural instability and social disorder of the nineteenth century that 
this chapter has just mentioned underscores some of the enduring issues that 
plagued the victim centred system of criminal justice. These included the 
widespread reluctance to pursue private prosecutions, as well as the physical and 
verbal threats that deterred them, the corruption and inducements, which 
undermined the integrity of the framework, as well as the considerable effort that 
such a prosecution typically entailed. In fact, reformers now began to openly 
acknowledge and condemn these shortcomings. Lord Brougham denounced the 
“…perversion of the criminal law for personal and guilty purposes…” (Rock 2004, 
p. 339) and how the important right of prosecuting crime, which should have really 
served ‘the public good’, was actually bestowed upon individuals, whose chief 
motivation was their own selfish desires. Lord Brougham consequently condemned 
private prosecution as “…irksome, expensive and inconvenient…” and maligned 
it as something that would often breakdown when a victim died without people 
who were willing to act in their stead, and frequently concealed vices like child 
neglect. This was often the case since the bringing of a private prosecution by a 
victim nearly always necessitated people who possessed the requisite means to 
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pursue a suit. Indeed, the procedure ran aground every time a victim lacked the 
authority, affluence and autonomy needed “…to go to law” (Rock 2004, p. 339). 
A rather prevalent attitude of reluctance to initiate private prosecutions also 
existed amongst those victims who sought to utilize the British system of criminal 
justice to bring offenders to justice. Since prosecutions were usually highly 
dependent upon the personal whims of victims, serious lawbreakers would often 
be able to habitually evade the hangman’s noose “… due to the distaste, 
compassion or fear of their victims” (Hay et al. 1975, p. 41). A major problem with 
the victim centred legal system was therefore “…the difficulty of inducing people 
to prosecute” (Friedman 1995, p. 477). These dilemmas prompted legislative 
incentives, which empowered the law to confer benefits on those victims of crime 
who successfully helped to bring some of the gravest wrongdoers of the time to 
justice in the courts (Friedman 1995, p. 477; Hay and Snyder 1989, p. 316-22).     
3.4.2 Censuring Perpetrators Subjected Victims to Coercion 
This reluctance to prosecute was often a direct result of the fact that those 
victims who prosecuted suspects often ended up exposing themselves to the rather 
disquieting physical and verbal threats of their community, which frequently took 
exemption to their actions. The communal harassment of groups like victims, often 
termed ‘Rough Musicing’, usually transpired when the wider public believed that 
a specific criminal deserved clemency. The inherently altercative element of the 
criminal trial was also influential, as it usually involved a “…face-to-face 
confrontation between the prosecutor and the accused” (cited in Emsley 2005, pp. 
197-198). There were even instances in which a suspect refused to speak and did 
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not deny the accusations that were levelled against them, since they often possessed 
neither the occasion nor opportunity to appropriately prepare to be able to do this, 
as they were kept isolated within their own jail cell. A victim of crime could even 
change the case that a suspect would ultimately encounter at trial at the very last 
minute, and the law often did not provide suspects with the identities of the 
witnesses that were providing evidence against them on behalf of the victim that 
was prosecuting them. In such instances, many suspects simply tried to character 
assassinate their alleged victim in order to try to save themselves from a conviction 
(Emsley 2005, p. 184, pp. 197-198).   
3.4.3 Fraud and Corruption Became Rampant Vices 
Private prosecutions generally provoked widespread corruption and illicit 
actions within the British system of criminal justice. They were frequently utilised 
by victims for spiteful exercises of “… malice, harassment [and] blackmail” (Rock 
2004, p. 338; Skelhorn 1981, p. 66). In fact, the blatantly extortive prosecutorial  
methods of the time basically allowed “…the pursuit of [a] civil claim[s] through 
the criminal courts…”, which inevitably lead to the unlocking of “…the door to 
bribery, collusion and illegal compromises” (Rock 2004, p. 338). The aspersions 
that were common of this era highlight how certain suspects could even find 
themselves lured into unlawful conspiracies “…by confederates[,] whose real 
purpose was to betray them for [a] reward." (cited in Friedman, 1995, p. 477; 
Radzinowicz 1956, pp. 326-332). The popular complaints of the time actually insist 
that the permissive attitude taken by the authorities towards the exercise of private 
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prosecutions was what actually facilitated the prevalence of these kinds of 
dishonest ventures (Rock 2004, p. 338; Hay and Snyder 1985, p. 37).   
3.4.4 The Infamy of Private Prosecution 
The entire method of private prosecution ended up becoming notorious. 
Prosecutions that were the result of entrapment frequently occurred, and involved 
collaborators inducing offenders into engaging in offences that they would then 
ultimately disclose to the authorities for money. Larceny victims could even 
employ ‘thief-takers’, by informing them of those items that a criminal had stolen 
from them so that they could then reimburse these particular individuals to find and 
seize their lost possessions. Victims utilized thief takers in order to salvage their 
own belongings and identify culprits, enabling them to take private actions against 
them. However, deceitful ‘thief-takers’ often worked alongside criminals, and 
frequently agreed to work for victims of a crime and then divide up any 
compensation that they received from them between themselves and the offenders 
they were also in league with (Friedman 1995, p. 477; Emsley 2005, p. 187).  
 In fact, even the few legal representatives that the system did incorporate 
were characterised as very ‘improper people’ that ‘scrambled’ to find litigation, 
ballooned caseloads so they could earn more, misused expenses and could even 
scupper actions on the behalf of criminals. Judges also often convinced prosecutors 
to abandon cases, and did so without regret, as they did not regard this as an 
injustice; but merely saw it as the assertion that since it was not possible to prove 
that an actual criminal act had transpired there really was no wrongdoing at all. 
Certain suits, mainly involving assaults, were also often resolvable through the 
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compensation of a victim by their offender, whilst a victim could even abandon 
litigation if their culprit swore that they would not prejudice that particular victim 
again. Indeed, an apology, published within the print media, could occasionally 
bring about the same kind of result (Rock 2004, p. 339; Emsley 2005, p. 189). 
3.4.5 Attending Hearings Entailed a Sacrifice of Income 
The onerous expense of money that pursuing a private prosecution involved 
created major difficulties within the victim centred system of criminal justice in 
Britain. The fact that most of the victims who attempted to bring cases in their own 
name could never really afford to maintain legal professionals on their own simply 
compounded this expense. Furthermore, the pursuit of offenders, petitioning of 
judges and attending of hearings usually involved a slow, laborious process, which 
frequently meant that victims of crime often received insufficient notice regarding 
the progression of their case. Victims of crime therefore, along with any entourage 
they had, could expect delays of at least a few days until their hearing actually 
began. The disadvantaged parts of society readily equated this with lost wages, and 
therefore those segments of society who did tend to heavily rely upon their meagre 
salaries frequently decided against pursuing cases, as it was often not worth their 
while (Langbein 2003, p. 123; Emsley 2005, p. 190).  
The additional charges of attending court also compounded this, making the 
price of justice even more exclusionary. In fact, the underprivileged still found the 
accessing of legal remedies problematic by the latter half of the century, and even 
when they did gain somewhat better access, the acquisition of proper representation 
remained problematic, since the legal sector was in desperate need of legislative 
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oversight to curtail its exorbitant costs. This invariably led to structural barriers, 
which unfairly prejudiced some of the most deprived parts of society. One 
distinguished judge went so far as to say that “…as a general rule nobody takes up 
murder prosecutions in the lower ranks of society” (cited in Rock 2004, p. 338).  
Although victims and prosecution witnesses could obtain support during 
this period from prosecution syndicates and government bodies, this remained 
piecemeal, and only partially covered their expenses. In fact, the poorer victims of 
the age often relied upon the charity of their legal representatives. This typically 
covered their essential payments; however certain legal representatives were far 
less selfless, and prosecutions frequently had to be abandoned due to a “…lack of 
funds” (cited in Rock 2004, p. 338). The victim-centred system therefore dissuaded 
legal engagement; endangered victims of crime; produced corruption and required 
an extraordinary expense of time and money. These issues, when taken together, 
considerably weakened the Rule of Law within colonies like Ireland, which were 
now becoming increasingly unstable (Rock 2004, pp. 338-339; Schubert 1981). 
3.5  BRITAIN’S CLOSEST COLONY LISTS TOWARDS REVOLUTION  
3.5.1 British Hegemonic Rule Becomes Almost Impossible  
Britain’s arguably most rebellious neighbour began its slow march towards 
independence in the nineteenth century. This made the maintenance of British 
hegemony within Ireland almost impossible for the colonial authorities to maintain. 
Indeed, Eagleton has noted that the British were “…[never] able to attain a 
hegemony [that was] sufficiently widespread, enduring and well-founded…” 
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(Eagleton 1995, p. 29). In fact, Ireland remained intransigent in this regard long 
after it was colonised, refusing to accept either the norms or customs of Britain.  
In fact, the ancient laws, language and traditions of Ireland had actually 
survived colonial repression, which  considerably impacted the native population. 
This situation led to a strange nineteenth century phenomenon where Gaelic Irish 
people would often form associations along unclear lines. This was particularly 
perplexing for the British, since the sole aim of these actions appeared to be 
ritualistic conflicts, that involved rival groups “… hammering one another” (Engels 
1986, p. 169). Yet, as Engels, who not only studied Irish, but read it ancient texts 
at a time in which most people tended to dismiss the value of the language (even 
in Ireland), has pointed out, these ritualised conflicts were not as meaningless as 
the British felt they were. He perceived these eccentricities as behaviours that 
actually served as novel rehabilitations of previously dislodged customs, and 
therefore evidenced the enduring allure of these customary traditions to the 
traditionally native Gaelic population of Ireland (Engels 1986, p. 166, p. 169).  
The British also found the lack of etiquette that the indigenous Irish 
displayed toward them to be particularly galling. These individuals rarely, if ever, 
‘bowed or curtseyed’ towards their colonial masters if they could avoid it, which 
the British perceived to be particularly suspect behaviour, which highlighted the 
palpable antipathy that was often conveyed toward the colonial elite when they 
ventured around their colony. What became increasingly obvious during this period 
was the defiance that was present within both the domestic thought and action of 
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the Irish, as well as the disregard that the people of Ireland had for the cultural 
impositions that British rule traditionally foisted upon them (Palmer 1988, p. 52). 
3.5.2 The Deprived Irish Suffer British Colonial Repression 
These popular attitudes in Ireland towards the British are perfectly 
understandable, since the Irish historically faced severe dispossession and 
persecution at the hands of Britain. However, the outlook of the British at the time 
was optimistic, since a “Glorious” Revolution had solidified the authority of the 
upper class in Britain and helped secure the leadership of their empire. Their 
“Bloodless” victory was also ideologically perceived as, and therefore symbolized, 
a coup for “…Protestantism, Parliament, and the people’s liberties” (Palmer 1988, 
p. 36). However, the perspective of the native Irish, who had backed the losing side 
during this latest monarchical contest, was almost the complete opposite.  
Further expropriations of land enabled the seizure of even greater tracts of 
hitherto indigenous Irish territory. Indeed, the ruling British class now outlawed 
Catholicism, the faith that eighty percent of Irish people passionately held. The 
inhabitants of Ireland also found themselves “…subject[ed] to penal laws…” that 
severely curtailed the excise of their “…civil and political rights…” (cited in 
Palmer 1988, p. 36). Not only that, but a new model of economic thinking now felt 
that any assistance to the poor “… permitted the survival and reproduction of a 
surplus population which was both useless in itself and actively harmful to 
economic development…” (cited in Melossi and Pavarini 1981, p. 37). 
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Westminster consequently introduced new legislation in keeping with this within 
Ireland that they modelled upon similar British statutory reforms in the area.3 
This took the form of The Poor Relief (Ireland) Act, 1838. This piece of 
legislation was predicated upon the previous implementation of similar reforms in 
England. Therefore, it was, in many ways, something of a simple transposition of 
these laws onto Ireland. The idea of such a transposition was advocated by George 
Nicholls, and was mainly predicated upon the perceived “success” of similar laws 
in England.4 Since the powers that be were “[c]onvinced with Malthus and the rest 
of the adherents of free competition that it is best to let each take care of himself 
they would have preferred to abolish the Poor Law altogether...”  
 
3 “Modelled on the English poor law…the Irish Poor Relief Act of 1838 established a nationwide 
system of poor relief based on the workhouse and financed by a local property tax… From its 
inception, the poor law was the focus of criticism and complaint.” Virginia Crossman, V. (2013) 
Poverty and the Poor Law in Ireland 1850–1914, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press , p. 1. 
4 “…the opinion of George Nicholls, whose report recommending the application…of the New 
English Poor Law to Ireland was accepted by the government and led to the 1838 Irish Poor Law… 
the Poor Law fell most heavily on…mendicity societies…[w]ith the exception of the Dublin and 
Ballymoney…all…appear to have been dissolved around the time of the introduction of the Poor 
Law. As charities that concentrated on suppressing beggary… mendicity societies were especially 
vulnerable…given that work-houses were designed to cater for this … mendicity societies were 
closed in the years 1839–42, as the two most visible signs of… the new Poor Law…appeared: the 
collection of the poor rate and the opening of the local workhouse…”. Ciaran McCabe, C. (2018) 
‘The Going Out of the Voluntary and the Coming in of the Compulsory’: 
The Impact of the 1838 Irish Poor Law on Voluntary Charitable Societies 
in Dublin City Irish Economic and Social History 2018, Vol. 45(1) 47–69, p. 54. 
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“…[H]owever, they had neither the courage nor the authority to do this, 
they proposed a Poor Law constructed in harmony with the doctrine of Malthus, 
which is yet more barbarous than that of laissez-faire because it interferes actively 
in cases where the latter is passive.” (cited in Melossi and Pavarini 1981, p. 37). 
Although the system was primarily predicated on a systemisation of assistance to 
the poor, so long as they were settled and respectable, for the undeserving poor and 
the less respectable the workhouse now became the panacea for poverty. As 
poverty was now perceived to owe as much to lack of work, as a lack of means.5 
The Poor Relief (Ireland) Act, 1838 is seen as Malthusian. Since instead of 
leaving the poor of Ireland to the vagrancies of a highly deregulated market, it 
actually took the radical step of interfering with the market in a negative way. As 
 
5 “Liberalism envisioned as subject the self-governing individual…To mold the working class into 
independent individuals, government officials instituted the massive poor law. Its centrepiece was 
the workhouse, a “total institution,” in the Foucauldian sense, which was to run with perfect 
efficiency and rationality. But this ideal was far different from the reality ...” Clark, A. (2005) ‘Wild 
Workhouse Girls and the Liberal Imperial State in Mid-Nineteenth Century Ireland’, Journal of 
Social History, 39(2), 389-409, p. 389. “Under the poor law system, relief was both targeted at and 
largely limited to the settled poor. Poor law guardians and officials sought to restrict relief as much 
as possible to local residents…[t]his is particularly evident with regard to vagrants. Vagrancy was 
…[w]idely associated with crime… the mobile poor were viewed as…subversive…the epitome of 
the undeserving poor; people who could work but chose not to....”Virginia Crossman, V. (2013) 
Poverty and the Poor Law in Ireland 1850–1914, Liverpool:Liverpool University Press , p. 
198.Ciaran McCabe, C. (2018) ‘The Going Out of the Voluntary and the Coming in of the 
Compulsory’:The Impact of the 1838 Irish Poor Law on Voluntary Charitable Societies 
in Dublin City Irish Economic and Social History 2018, Vol. 45(1) 47–69.  
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opposed to a positive manner, which might have relieved poverty and famine.6 It 
was instead designed under the premise, that Malthus himself never drew tired of 
advocating, that the true cause of these problems was overpopulation. Therefore, 
the corrective measures needed to remedy them were, within this perspective, 
solely those that would actively promote the curtailing of “overpopulation”. 
 A considerable part of this legislative interference was not only the reform 
of previous Poor Laws to bring them more into line with what was now 
conventional thought on the subject of poverty. It was also to penalise poverty with 
new forms of discipline. These were now extended beyond the mere denial of aid. 
For certain groups such as the so-called able-bodied, to be poor was now to be 
punishable with time in a workhouse, which was as inhumane as it was pointless.7  
 
6 “The traditional and recurrent criticisms that such assistance would encourage indolence and 
refusal to work and would thereby maintain high wage levels was reinforced by the Malthusian 
vision of population growth - the extreme form of economic liberalism. Relief permitted the 
survival and reproduction of a surplus population which was both useless in itself and actively 
harmful to economic development. This was the basic view of the Commission of Inquiry of 1832-
4, the product of whose labours was the New Poor Law.” Melossi, D. and Pavarini, (1981) M. The 
Prison And The Factory: Origins Of The Penitentiary System, trans. Cousin, G., London: 
Macmillan, p. 37.  
7 “The law sought to give a directly political content to formal control over the wage-earning 
proletariat, coming as it did after the French Revolution…Engels very clearly described life in the 
workhouse which was so similar to prison in every detail that the poor renamed them ‘poor-law 
bastilles’. Not only did the workhouse ensure a standard of living frequently lower than that of 
prison, it also imposed a similar series of limitations on individual liberty. Among other things - 
and this is particularly significant - the work was usually pointless, having no real importance, being 
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The Act mirrored the ‘Malthusian triumph’ of The Poor Law Amendment 
Act, 1834 in England and Wales. It even embodied what Malthus himself had been 
personally advocating for Ireland since 1817 as he felt that “…to give full effect to 
the natural resources of the country, a great part of the population should be swept 
from the soil into large manufacturing and commercial [t]owns” (cited in Foster 
2000, p. 101). These changes brought about the ideological framework for the 
Famine, where, as Marx noted, the “… Irish peasant…[could] only choose to eat 
potatoes or starve, and he [was] not always free to make even this choice” (cited in 
Slater 2018, p. 17). However, this did not lead to the kind of unified social upheaval 
best typified by the Parisian mob of the last century, or the freed slaves of Saint-
Domingue. It instead led to emigration, starvation and the demoralization of a once 
 
designed more for the needs of discipline and training than for profitability.” Melossi, D. and 
Pavarini, (1981) M. The Prison And The Factory: Origins Of The Penitentiary System, trans. 
Cousin, G., London: Macmillan, p. 38. ‘…in Ireland, the idealized workhouse never materialised; 
instead of order, there was chaos and squalor. During the famine, workhouses were crammed with 
starving, fever-ridden people…the impressive workhouse facades still lay crumbling, ill-maintained 
buildings with sewage pooling in the yeard…[o]f course, many English workhouses were also 
unhealthy and decrepit, but the standards seem to have been much lower in Ireland…the principle 
of the poor law was “less eligibility”- the idea that in order to deter pauperism, conditions in the 
workhouse ust be worse than those of the lowest paid labourer. In Ireland, where living conditions 
of poor laborers were lower than that of English laborers, the workhouse therefore had to be 
extremely grim to deter them.” Clark, A. (2005) ‘Wild Workhouse Girls and the Liberal Imperial 
State in Mid-Nineteenth Century Ireland’, Journal of Social History, 39(2), 389-409, p. 390. 
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carefree and proud people. This outcome effectively ensured that the populace 
permitted the mismanagement of the country to continue, even though this had 
largely produced and exacerbated the profoundly tragic outcomes of this socio-
political experiment (Davitt 1972). 
 The Protestant triumph of the “Bloodless” Revolution also meant that the 
new colonial regime in Ireland, which predominantly consisted of a gentry class 
that the British had artificially created through the proprietary dispossession of the 
native Gaelic population of their land remained understandably anxious, since their 
territorial gains of dubious legitimacy were the only thing that really underpinned 
the authority that they now exercised. In fact, the difference between the mentalities 
of the British and Irish is quite unsurprising considering how land appropriation 
was what supported the colonial rule of the British in Ireland. These proprietary 
and sectarian disparities created such an ideological rift in Ireland that the Irish 
forced the British establishment to change their penal policies (Palmer 1988, p. 36). 
3.5.3 Colonial Compromises Maintain British Influence 
The British establishment, having been made aware of, and taking note of 
these frustrations, were often wise enough to adapt their correctional techniques 
just enough to not completely destabilize their authority in the region.8  These 
 
8 “One consequence of this in the first decades of the nineteenth century at least was that, compared 
with England…relatively fewer persons found guilty by Irish courts were sentenced to death” Greer, 
D. (2002) ‘Crime, Justice And Legal Literature In Nineteenth-Century Ireland,’ Irish Jurist, 37, 
241-268, p. 252. “It is striking also that the proportion of murder cases which led to execution fell 
below 50 per cent for the first time in the period between 1836 and 1840…[i]t may be that the 
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judicious changes were what permitted the colonial powers to continue to maintain 
their rule on the Island of Ireland. The surge in the number of remissions that the 
magistrates of the time granted to the sentence of death reflects this, as this mainly 
stemmed from the British establishment’s concern with the preservation of their 
supremacy in the colony. Indeed, the authorities were now beginning to realise that 
maintaining the habits of the previous century regarding the excise of the death 
penalty could have the paradoxical outcome of imperilling British governance on 
the island. The establishment therefore took the shrewd decision to curtail its 
deployment. Executions consequently only really transpired during periods of 
 
reduction in executions was part of a broader policy of conciliation…[o]ne petition…praised the 
government … noting that the reduction…had ‘done more to reconcile men to law and therefore 
tend to preserve peace and order than the bloody system which, till lately prevailed’. “Whereas, 
only 45.45 per cent of those sentenced to death for capital offences earned a reprieve between 1806 
and 1810… 65.19 per cent did do between 1816 and 1820… this rose further to 87.23 per cent… 
between 1826 and 1830 and just over 90 per cent between 1836 nd 1840…” “Why did the authorities 
in Ireland become more willing to commute …[a] likely explanation…is that they increasingly 
exercised the prerogative… to keep the numer of executions within some kind of limit. As the 
under-secretary, William Gregory… remarked…in April 1822, ‘I do not know what can be done 
with so many persons…it will not be possible to execute them all’! The administration was probably 
acutely aware of the risks of carrying out too many executions … 100 executions a year in the late 
1810s may… have … exposed the potentially brutal nature of the state rather than enhancing the 
authority of the law.” Brown, M. and Donlan, S.P. (2011) The laws and other legalities of Ireland, 
1689-1850, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, p. 155, 156, 158. 
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turbulence,9 and even then, the authorities only tended to enact such penalties 
before subservient and docile audiences.   
Yet what arguably grounded all of this penal variation by the ruling British 
elite was the upholding of the functionality of the death penalty in the country. The 
British authorities who ruled the colony therefore adopted a permanent state of 
penal pragmatism regarding the deployment of this disciplinary measure. This 
practical approach not only aided with the administration of British Law, but also 
allowed the colonial establishment to carefully measure and apportion the 
chastisement that they would carry out so that they would not excessively offend 
the social mores of the Irish people. This not only ensured that the Rule of Law 
was upheld, and that the law was seen to be done, but it also ensured that the 
 
9 “Our sample also suggest that… offences…from agrarian conflict, were more likely to undergo 
the extreme penalty of the law. This was so even where they could raise serious doubts about their 
trials. Michael Mullins and James Delaney, convicted of the land-related murder of Laurence 
Hoynes at the Kilkenny summer assizes of 1843, were both executed despite considerable 
complaints about the nature of their trial … despite complaints about the trials of Patrick Woods 
and Francis Hughes in Armagh in 1841 and 1842…both were executed for the murder of Mr 
Thomas Powell, an ‘agriculturalist’ employed to make improvements on a local estate. Even where 
considerable support could be mobilised…the authorities remained reluctant to mitigate the 
sentence… despite…support of their landlord, an MP and a bishop as well as the local clergy and 
gentry…[g]iven that this case arose from a land dispute, it may again have been felt in government 
circles that an example needed to be made…” Brown, M. and Donlan, S.P. (2011) The laws and 
other legalities of Ireland, 1689-1850, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, p.148-149. 
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indigenous populace did not rise up in a sufficiently co-ordinated fashion that could 
have threatened the integrity of the State and/or British rule.  
The commuting of the death penalty was pivotal to this, by facilitating 
discussion within the social body of Ireland about the legitimate limits of penal 
chastisement. However, despite the fact that the pragmatism of the British was 
often rather successful at circumventing the emergence of any significantly 
widespread domestic opposition to British rule in the area, since the British could 
only continue to hold onto Ireland in this heavily restricted manner, their rule 
involved considerable compromise. Even though this was largely acceptable to the 
ruling elite, it evidenced the limitations that the governed could place on Colonial 
British rule at the time, as well as how this ultimately unsustainable balancing act 
could not ultimately prevent a series of miscalculations from leading to the eventual 
loosening of Britain’s grip on Ireland (Brown and Donlan 2011, p. 162). 
3.5.4 British Supremacy is confronted within Ireland 
Despite the adaptive penal measures of the British regime, it still 
encountered stiff opposition in the nineteenth century, as a wave of nationalist 
sentiment swept across Europe. This led to the rise of several of these kinds of 
organizations and tensions in Ireland, which now contested British rule in the 
colony, creating rifts in the hitherto calmer administration of the region. This began 
with “[t]he mightiest outbreak of popular agitation in early-nineteenth-century 
Europe…”, (Eagleton, 1995 p. 91) which was organised by the successful 
campaign of Daniel O’Connell to emancipate the Catholic populace through the 
THE CAUSES AND OUTCOMES OF THE EXCLUSION OF CRIME VICTIMS 




partial repeal of the Penal Laws that had hitherto provided “…for the [wholesale] 
transfer of ‘property’ from Catholics to Protestants…” (cited in Slater 2018, p. 8).   
Indeed, Irish Nationalists aspired to reach these levels of popular protest 
again with the Land League, a movement which Michael Davitt and Charles 
Stewart Parnell spearheaded by organizing an agrarian campaign to secure ‘fair 
rent, free sale and fixity of tenure’ for the masses on what was traditionally their 
own land (Veldeman 2005, p. 76). These goals were set against the backdrop of a 
brutal system of ‘rack renting’, where poor Irish tenants often possessed ‘…a 
temporary lease concluded for one year – [which] merely enable[d] the landowner 
to demand a higher rent [up]on the expiration of the existing lease (cited in Slater 
2018, p. 16). Proprietors often employed these particular techniques in order to 
ensure that the Irish were strong-armed into “…the choice between the occupation 
of land, at any rent, or starvation” (cited in Slater 2018, p. 13). 
  However, the effective use of methods of popular protest like boycotting 
and the contestation of evictions proved extremely successful. This was largely 
because the native Irish population was desperate to avoid the evictions that had 
cleared so many tracks of natively held land during the Famine. At that time, these 
actions were described in the following terms by a Galway paper, “[l]and agents 
direct[ed] the[se] operation[s]. The work [was] done by a large force of police and 
soldiery. Under the protection of the latter, the ‘crowbar brigade’ advance[d] to the 
devoted township, [and] [took] possession of the houses...The sun that rose on a 
village set[s] on a desert…” (cited in Slater 2018, p. 33). 
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 Yet the successes of nineteenth century protest can be seen in the ability of 
Charles Stewart Parnell, that ‘Uncrowned King of Ireland’, to convince William 
Gladstone that “[n]o man has a right to fix the boundary [upon] the march of a 
nation” (cited in Curtis 2002, p. 328; Veldeman 2005, p. 77). This allowed him to 
consent to presenting the Home Rule demand of Irish Nationalists to Parliament. 
This, were it properly implemented, would have created a devolved Irish 
government in the Irish mainland to legislate on Irish issues. In fact, many people 
saw this as a positive goal after the British mismanagement of the Famine, which 
had transformed politics on both sides of the Irish Sea (Veldeman, 2005).  
The Bodyke Evictions (1887) evidences the kind of agrarian grassroots 
contestation that was typical of the heavily politicised nineteenth century. It also 
nicely evidences the transition from the more apolitical agrarian protest that was 
more common of the eighteenth century. These disputes were no longer the reactive 
and fragmented protests “of the belly”10 that more typical of the eighteenth century 
and motivated by baser ideals of hunger. They were instead a concerted effort to 
challenge and undermine the British establishments’ maintenance of law and order 
in the region. This was attempted by the members of such movements through the 
stated goals, and by establishing limits to the means used to pursue them.11 This 
 
10 Thompson, D. (2001) The Essential E.P Thompson, New York: New Press, p. 217. 
11 “The land league, an agrarian corollary to the Home Rule movement, was founded by Michael 
Davitt in 1879…[h]is organization had a dramatic impact on rural Ireland…the objectives of the 
league, which emerged at a tme of economic depression, included the protection of tenants from 
rack rents and, ultimately, tenant ownership of their land…[s]upported by priests, artisans, and 
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protest, although local, should, by no means, be understated. As it represented an 
organised, class-aware spark of civil disobedience. One that was a challenge to the 
status quo, and something the authorities by no means wanted to spread.12 
 These endeavours also complemented parliamentary successes, by not only 
breaking the power of unscrupulous rack renting proprietors like Colonel John 
O’Callaghan, but by securing greater fixity of tenure on the land for the native Irish 
population that was renting. In addition, although agrarian protest had been 
engaged in during the last century, this tended to be spontaneous, and less effective. 
Therefore, this change of tact was worrying for the British establishment. As it was, 
in the main, non-violent, making it much more difficult to delegitimise. It also 
provided a dangerous example, one which was subsequently followed, dealing a 
real blow against the British establishment’s hitherto unchecked governance.13  
 
shopkeepers, it ostracized anyone who occupied a farm after an eviction, and marshaled the 
populace against landlords…”  Ó hAllmhuráin, G. (2016) Flowing Tides: History and Memory in 
an Irish Soundscape, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 76. 
12 “…evictions at Bodyke were among the most notorious of the Land War. Unlike the Great Famine 
clearances of 1849-1854, these evictions were public affairs that attracted journalists and 
photographers…[i]n an effort to win justice, several … tenanats barricaded themselves inside their 
homes and refused to forfeit their property. After a tense bout of police intimidation…tenants were 
allowed to plead their case before the land court, which awarded them a 35 percent reduction in 
rent, thus vindicating their case…”.  Ó hAllmhuráin, G. (2016) Flowing Tides: History and Memory 
in an Irish Soundscape, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 77. 
13 “Other landed estates in Clare experienced similar scenes of brutality. By the end of the 1880s, 
however, it was clear that the old order was at breaking point. The landed gentry could no longer 
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In fact, Michael Davitt took a particularly hands on approach here by 
“…depriv[ing] [one of the members of the leasing O’Halloran family] of the[ir] 
pitchforks…” to avoid unnecessary bloodshed during the eviction of their home. 
He even “…got permission…to accompany the [female resisters in the family] to 
jail” after the siege ended without incident and the protesting family were arrested 
by the authorities that tried to evict them (O’Halloran 1887). This kind of action 
was typical of the period, and significant in achieving concessions on a whole range 
of issues, from the betterment of tenancies to the release of civil activists. 
At the same time, groupings that were even more rebellious arose like the 
Ribbonmen, which Richard Murphy described in his poem Droit de Seigneur as:  
           “A secret band, swearing oaths by moonlight,  
Refusing to pay tithes or rent to the landlord,  
Who battered on lonely doors after midnight,  
And wore round their sleeves a white ribband…” (Murphy 2000, p. 33). 
These entities became strong advocates of rural violence. This compounded the 
insurrectionary impact that the aforementioned class-conscious opposition to 
eviction had upon the tactics of the British authorities. Such secretive societies 
actively sought to harm the owners of capital in revenge attacks, which they 
calibrated to right perceived injustices. Despite their noble goals, the means they 
employed were illicit which increasingly tended to create a feeling of general 
disorder in the sections of the country that their behaviour impacted (Davitt 1972).  
 
stem the tide of popular politics and land reform”.  Ó hAllmhuráin, G. (2016) Flowing 
Tides: History and Memory in an Irish Soundscape, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 77. 
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This all further evidences areas in which the British establishment was 
being undermined, and therefore again highlight how the terror-based mode of 
maintaining public order was not working. Indeed, it now became obvious that it 
was totally unsustainable within Ireland in this altered nineteenth century context. 
Therefore, and with the victim more in mind, such events also helped to ensure that 
the days in which the victims would now be relied upon to help maintain the justice 
system of the British within Ireland were numbered. Since most were coming to 
the realisation that wholesale reform was needed. Particularly in order to help 
pacify the situation and ensure a much more effective level of public compliance.   
The reformatory turn in Ireland really began with Sir Robert Peel,14 who 
felt that the cause of all of this disturbance really owed more to the defective 
structures of British governance in the colony than to the legitimacy of this 
emerging nationalist sentiment, which evidences his strong focus upon policing 
and its reform as a means through which order might be restored. This was initially 
pursued by Robert Peel through The Peace Preservation Force, an experimental 
law enforcement unit first established in Ireland in 1814. 15  This was then 
supplemented by a system of county constabularies, which were eventually created 
 
14 For a full list of the refomrs passed by Sir Robert Peel see the introduction of this chapter.   
15  Under The Peace Preservation Act, 1814 (54 Geo III, c. 131).“Faced with the collapse of 
traditional methods of law-enforcement, Peel launched his first expereiment in government-directed 
police authority-the peace preservation Force of 1814”. Broeker, G. (1961) ‘Robert Peel and the 
Peace Preservation Force’,The Journal of Modern History, 33(4), 363-373, p. 363. 
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under the Appointment of Constables, etc. (Ireland) Act, 1822 for each applicable 
country within the island of  Ireland.16  
A single police force, the Constabulary of Ireland 17  to be initially 
spearheaded by Thomas Drummond 18  was then set up in 1836 under the 
Constabulary of Ireland Act, 1836.19 Whilst Dublin, Belfast and Derry had their 
own local police forces, 20  with Dublin having two, these were all eventually 
subsumed within a central force, The Constabulary of Ireland. This subsuming of 
the various disparate forces that had previously existed was by in large advanced 
due to concerns that each of these segmented forces would be improper, as well as 
insufficient to successfully tackle the scale of crime in the country unless they were 
 
16 Appointment of Constables, etc. (Ireland) Act, 1822 (3 Geo. I, c. 103).   
17 “The Irish Constabulary, granted the title Royal from 1867, was the force that patrolled the vast 
majority…[b]efore its disbandment in 1922 it…was supervised and managed by an especially 
recruited officer corps …after the consolidation of 1836, officer positions in … continued to be held 
predominantly by Protestants, while the religious composition of the rank-and-file more closely 
represented that of the Irish population...” Lowe, W. J. (2005) ‘Irish Constabulary Officers, 1837–
1922: Profile of a Professional Elite’, Irish Economic and Social History, 32(1), 19–46, p.19. 
18  “the Royal Irish Constabulary…[f]ounded in 1836, and owing much in its earliest years to 
Thomas Drummond, Under Secretary for Ireland from 1831-1839…”  Boyle, K. (1972) ‘Police In 
Ireland Before The Union’, Irish Jurist, 7(1), 115-137, p. 115.  
19 This was done throught the Constabulary (Ireland) Act 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. IV, c. 13), which was 
then later amended by the Constabulary (Amendment) (Ireland) Act 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. IV, c. 36). 
20 Which were established throught The Dublin Police Act, 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. IV, c. 29), The Dublin 
Metropolitan Police Act, 1837 (7 Wm. IV & 1 Vic., c. 25) The Belfast Police Act, 1800 (40 Geo III 
c.47) and The Londonderry Improvement Act 1848 (11 & 12 Vic c. 41) respectively. 
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unified. 21 Whether the defects of the apparatuses of the British State had indeed 
caused dilemmas in Ireland or not, it is uncontentious to recognise that they had 
exacerbated them. Indeed, other significantly pressing issues were also starting to 
concern the administration of British Law on the island.  
The elite, who typically would have helped to uphold the law by serving as 
judicial members, could have established a much greater degree of supervisory 
control within the country, but often failed to do so, as they frequently neglected 
“…what Peel and others considered [to be] the functions of their class” (cited in 
Broeker 1970, p. 22). These derelictions of duty were what arguably led to such a 
state of prevalent and pervasive violation of British Law, social discord as well as 
to the near perpetual condition of turmoil which can evidently be seen in both the 
measures that were resorted to by the British establishment as well as the 
considerable numbers of insurgent social protest movements which were now 
coming to the fore in nineteenth century Irish society, particularly in the rural 
regions of the country, where this problem was particularly entrenched and resulted 
in waves of different protests causing considerable problems for the smooth 
operation of the colony,22 which was responsible for the fact that the effective 
 
21 “Dublin, Derry and Belfast…were deemed inadequate in the face of the sectarian violence and 
alleged partisanship…of 1864 and 1869. This led to the integration of the Belfast and Derry 
municipal forces into the Irish Consabulary in 1865 and 1870 respectively.” Dukova, A. (2016) A 
History of the Dublin Metropolitan Police and its Colonial Legacy, London: Springer, p, 7. 
22  “Among movements of the early nineteenth century, Rockites have been 
anatomized…Ribbonmen…Post-Famine combinations have received less attention, with the 
exception of the Land League…the United Irish League… [y]et many outbreaks remain 
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constraint of the populace by conventional means was all but unachievable. Peel 
therefore thought that a key aspect of resolving these kinds of difficulties required 
enticing the Irish elite, “…into the proper performance of their traditional duties…” 
(cited in Broeker 1970, p. 22; Eagleton 1995).  
Benjamin Disraeli, who surmised what was at the heart of the issues that 
plagued Ireland, expanded upon these policies. He did this by providing an 
eloquent articulation of how the British now went about trying to resolve them. 
 “I want to see a public man come forward and say what the Irish question is… 
they have a starving population, an alien church, and in addition the weakest 
executive in the world…what [then] would gentlemen say if they were reading of 
a country in that position? They would say at once, ‘The remedy is a revolution.’ 
… If the connection with England prevented a revolution and a revolution was the 
 
unexplored…[t]hese include the Molly Maguire movement of the 1840s …the Westmeath ‘Ribbon’ 
disturbances of 1870-71…” Fitzpatrick, D. (1985) ‘Unrest In Rural Ireland’, Irish Economic and 
Social History, 12,  pp. 98-105, p. 99.“Many scholars…have explored the consequences for unrest 
of the deprivation of … privilege or sources of livelihood… by state or landlord… virtually any 
disturbance of the status quo … was capable of generating collective action in rural Ireland. 
However, many cases of unrest resist explanation in terms of group response to dislocation of the 
‘moral economy’… many disputes arose from the failure of family groups to provide equitably for 
their members… no simple model of structural dislocation can embrace the astonishing diversity of 
rural unrest…distinct forms of unrest were encouraged by different processes. Thus Famine 
impoverishment gave rise to unparallelled incidence of violence…whereas the temporary reversal 
of post-Famine enrichment set the scene for record rates of ‘agrarian outrages’ and offences against 
the peace, indicative of larger-scale and more calculated collective action…” Fitzpatrick, D. (1985) 
‘Unrest In Rural Ireland’, Irish Economic and Social History, 12,  pp. 98-105, p. 102. 
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only remedy, England logically is in the odious position of being the cause of all 
the misery of Ireland. What then is the duty of an English minister? To effect by 
his policy all [of] those changes which a revolution would [have] effect[ed] by 
force” (cited in Dworkin, 2000 p. 140). This stance effectively became a blueprint 
for the political approach of the British authorities to the question of what was to 
be done with Ireland in future. However, this policy of revolution through reform 
ultimately proved to be one that failed to satisfy Nationalists and Loyalists alike. 
This approach arguably reached its zenith and most eloquent articulation 
with William Gladstone’s objective of ‘pacifying’ Ireland. An Ireland that he saw 
as a “…cloud in the west, that coming storm, that minister of God’s retribution 
upon cruel and inveterate and but half-atoned injustice!” (Cited in O’ Beirne 
Ranelagh 1994, p. 130; Veldeman 2005, p. 73). In fact, the political courage in the 
face of adversity of Gladstone was what largely responsible for granting major 
concessions to Irish Nationalists. Although these were genuine attempts to appease 
them, their slow implementation could not stem the tide of violent resistance. 
Due to its unpacified state of near permanent restlessness and de facto 
‘weakest executive in the world’, the native Irish did not feel the full power of 
British Law. 23  In fact, circumstances curtailed the penal capabilities that the 
 
23 “Under official law, the farmer could not be punished for his enforced co-operation in the boycott 
of the piece of land. Under what Michael Davitt and many others referred to as ‘the unwritten 
agrarian code’, his punishment for failing to uphold the boycott could potentially result in his death. 
…T. Wemyss Reid, the chief secretary was to compare these two methods of monitoring behaviour 
in Ireland and find the British system lacking in efficiency:all law rests on the power to punish its 
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authorities could enact upon the populace, and while official sentences were often 
inconsistently applied, informal punishments flourished in their place. Since this 
retribution was much more likely to follow a transgression. Even though the British 
maintained their dominance in Ireland, the uncertainty Irish Nationalism tended to 
engender facilitated a burgeoning set of indigenous norms that came to rival British 
Law. This evolution consequently produced something of a rarity, a formally 
British jurisdiction that nevertheless encompassed an official and unofficial system 
of legal duality (Eagleton 1995, pp. 92-93; Reid 1888, pp. 294-295). 
3.5.5 A Dualistic Regulatory Arrangement Creates Conflict  
This binary nature of the law in Ireland, which separated the official law of 
Britain from the unofficial law of the indigenous population, ossified the practical 
and ideological opposition to the legal norms of the British in Ireland.24 Indeed, the 
 
infraction.There being no such power in Ireland at the present time, I am forced to acknowledge 
that to a great extent the ordinary law is powerless; but the unwritten law is powerful because 
punishment is sure to follow its infraction.” Laird, H. (2005) Subversive Law in Ireland, 1879-1920: 
From ‘Unwritten Law’ to the Dail Courts, Dublin: Four Courts Press, p. 35. 
24 “Frederick Engels, who took a keen interest in the translation process [of Brehon Law], was 
adamant that this system of law, though ‘forcibly broken up by the English[...] still lives today in 
the consciousness of the people’ …in such customs as … faction fighting. Another commentator, 
David Fitzgerald, was…to find a much wider contemporary significance for the old Irish legal 
system, arguing that ‘traditions and ideas derived from it continue to influence the mass of the Irish 
…’ [a]mong the ‘survivals’ referred to by Fitzgerald was a custom of landholding that resulted in 
the ‘deep-lying feeling of the Irish farmer that so long as he pays rent_for the land he has a right to 
live on it, and that to evict him from his holding is in a certain sense to deprive hjm of his lawful 
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aforementioned social context of rapid industrialisation and cultural difference 
between the Irish and their colonial masters served to accentuate this still further. 
Clifford Lloyd’s Ireland under the Land League 25  describes how the power 
dynamics of Irish legality during the nineteenth century evidence the way in which 
discontent within Ireland regarding conventional British legality made this 
‘subversive or alternative law’ rather influential.26 Although the Acts of Union had 
formally made the Irish landmass simply another British borough, only perpetual 
authoritarian regulation ensured that the people of Ireland obeyed the legal rules 
that the colonial British authorities dictated to them.  
 
property’. … [w]hat … Fitzgerald and Lloyd observed…was, perhaps, less a tangible system of law 
directly derived from the Brehon laws, than a space outside official law that this legal system had 
once inhabited. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this space was filled by 
various alternative courts…(Repeal Association arbitration courts, Ribbon Association courts, Land 
League courts, National League courts, United Irish League courts … boycotting, an ‘unwritten 
agrarian code’, or a mixture of these and other elements.” Laird, H. (2005) Subversive Law in 
Ireland, 1879-1920: From ‘Unwritten Law’ to the Dail Courts, Dublin: Four Courts Press, p.23.  
25 Lloyd, C. (1892) Ireland under the Land League, William Blackwood: Edinburgh.  
26 “In his memoirs, Ireland under the Land League (1892), Clifford Lloyd provides…a study of two 
conflicting systems of control operating in Ireland during the 1880s, demonstrating the extent to 
which popular disaffection towards one of these systems - official law - allowed for its displacement 
by the other - subversive or alternative law. Lloyd, [self]described as a ‘loyal Irishman’ who had 
been given the ‘duty of restoring order in a succession of disturbed localities’, was one of a number 
of employees of the crown sent to Ireland during the 1870s and 1880s who were chosen primarily 
for the experience they had gained in…Africa or India.” Laird, H. (2005) Subversive Law in Ireland, 
1879-1920: From ‘Unwritten Law’ to the Dail Courts, Dublin: Four Courts Press, p. 16. 
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As Eagleton notes: “[w]hat precedes the law, so to speak, is its own 
legitimacy; and a lawless society, as parts of Ireland have been at certain points in 
their history, is less one which flouts this or that law than one which refuses to 
accept the legitimacy of the law as such” (Eagleton 1995, p. 41). Therefore, the 
popularity of customary Irish legal norms,27 and the force of the resentment that 
was felt for British Law amongst the native Irish populace at the time made the 
formal seeking of justice by Irish victims exceedingly difficult in the official courts 
that the British authorities administered as the efficacy of these were often being 
undermined by unofficial subversive Irish courts (Laird 2005, p. 16, p. 42).28 
 
27 “Traces of alternative courts…can be found in numerous official and non-official accounts … as 
a fundamental component of Irish agrarian agitation…archives…at UCD contain written records of 
oral testimony concerning agrarian violence that occurred… [m]uch of the violence recounted… is 
interpreted as just retribution in response to obvious injustices...” Laird, H. (2005) Subversive Law 
in Ireland, 1879-1920: From ‘Unwritten Law’ to the Dail Courts, Dublin: Four Courts Press, p. 25. 
28 “The court system…was patterned on its official counterpart … In 1885 the Tory Lord Lieutenant 
of Ireland, the Earl of Carnarvon, outlined [how]… these ‘informal’ courts... ‘assumed to revise and 
judge the relations of landlord and tenant[…] [a]nd when I say ‘informal’ courts, perhaps I should 
say ‘formal’, for they were formal in every respect except that they were secret [...]…’” “Indeed, 
the police were unable to protect even themselves…In 1886…a special store was opened in Co. 
Galway to supply boycotted police with goods …[a] local Land League …charged as the instigator 
of a boycott… was unlikely to be found guilty under ‘ordinary’ law… an Irish populace that had 
the option of taking their own legal cases to the League courts were reluctant participants in the 
official court system…the vast majority of the Irish people tended to disregard British institutions 
of law and order in favour of an alternative discipline. The refusal of the majority of the Irish 
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3.5.6 Irish Victim Prosecutions Became Problematic  
The unpopularity of official legality meant that victims found prosecuting 
criminals challenging within the British courts system of the era. In fact, the 
resentment that the Irish displayed toward British legality often offended the 
sentiments of their colonial masters. The British were so incensed because they 
usually accepted the official pronouncements of Colonial Law and backed its 
processes without question, whilst the Irish rarely did. In fact, the Irish also 
considered crime to be a collective wrongdoing, contradicting the predominant 
British view that liability began and ended with an offender (Palmer 1988, p. 47).  
Irish juries further complicated this situation, since they would rarely, if 
ever, reach decisions in favour of the prosecution under official British law. 
Resentment toward the government, and the tight social bonds that existed among 
Irish trial participants, as well as their own sympathetic sensitivities, often caused 
problems, which frequently made it a challenging task to prove a suspect’s guilt 
within a colonial court. An Irish jury member would also be particularly reticent in 
finding guilt regarding crimes that were particularly controversial or divisive; 
however, testimony indicates that this hesitancy could even be present within 
uncontentious prosecutions as well. The author can draw this inference from data 
that confirms that the finding of guilt was far rarer in Ireland across the board when 
 
populace to participate in British law…was to demonstrate the extent to which the successful 
administration of ‘ordinary law’ requires the co-operation of the people.” Laird, H. (2005) 
Subversive Law in Ireland, 1879-1920: From ‘Unwritten Law’ to the Dail Courts, Dublin: Four 
Courts Press, p. 27, pp. 40-41. 
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compared to comparable English figures (McEldowney 1980, p. 20; Johnson 
1996).  
Irish legal history frequently cites the pardoning of rebellious offenders. 
The most famous of which involved an exasperated magistrate freeing a suspect 
with the words: “[y]ou have been acquitted by a Limerick jury, and you may now 
leave the dock without any other stain upon your character!” (Jackson et al. 1999, 
p. 205). This has now become emblematic of the dilemmas that the trials of the 
period involved. Similar results often transpired due to the subjective elements that 
the ostensibly ‘objective’ application of the law vis-a-vis trial by jury invariably 
incorporated. When British regulation offended the widely held standards of the 
Irish populace, it amplified the spontaneous compassion that Irish people already 
felt for an accused, causing substantial interference with the smooth operation of 
the domestic application of the law. However, these incidents occurred with an 
alarming degree of frequency in an Irish context, and therefore often lead to a near 
mutinous situation, in which the authorities could rarely achieve successful 
prosecutions “…for murder, sedition, seditious libel, [or even] for treason…” (cited 
in McEldowney 1980, pp. 23-24; Jackson et al. 1999, p. 205). 
As a result, participation within the domestic legal system of Ireland was 
often quite “…perilous [,] and at best extremely difficult” (cited in McEldowney 
1989, p. 430). These consequences mainly emanated from the fact that “…the [l]aw 
[wore] in Irish eyes [an unmistakably] foreign garb” (cited in McEldowney 1989, 
p. 430). This pervasive antagonism rendered British legality largely inadequate, 
and often hampered the prosecutions of offenders, which exacerbated the popular 
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anxieties that were now propelling the reformatory legal transformations of the era 
towards a point of critical mass. Evidence for this point is discernible from the 
patently unjust trial and execution of Myles Joyce, for his allegedly illegal criminal 
participation in the Maamtrasna Murders of 1882.  
The travesty that the hanging of Joyce represents occurred in large part due 
to the single-minded application of British Colonial Law in Ireland. This combined 
with a complete failure to accommodate, or even acknowledge, that linguistic 
differences could result in injustices. In fact, the tragedy of this case was that even 
though the accused did not understand English the authorities still prosecuted him 
without any interpretive assistance. The trial and execution of Joyce, who 
subsequently received a historic exoneration from the Irish State for the crime that 
he allegedly committed and protested to the last that he had no involvement in, 
stands out as one, if not the most, egregious failures of British Law to achieve its 
stated aim of justice in its centuries long tradition (Howlin 2015; Kelleher 2018). 
3.6 THE ‘FEAR OF THE CROWD AND A MOVE FROM ‘STATUS TO 
CONTRACT’ 
3.6.1 Disorder Sees Social Unrest Become a Persistent Irish Issue 
As we have previously seen, there was a reformist tendency sweeping 
Britain at this time, in large part due to the changing social context that the 
establishment were now operating within. Not to mention the unique issues that 
Ireland and its populace were presenting and how it was further exposing the 
problems with the previous system of maintaining order in the British Empire. In 
addition to this, it is vitally important to understand that were other strong 
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motivators of this particular alteration, which also held huge sway over the 
establishment and its eventual decision to alter their methods of maintaining order.  
One of these was the intense fear that was developing of social unrest. This 
is not surprising as British ego had been wounded by its colonists. Furthermore, 
the experiments occurring on the continent deeply unnerved the ruling class in 
Britain, who now saw any and all dissent as being potentially insurrectionary in 
nature and a viable threat to British order. This is also not surprising when one 
considers the lack of mercy show to agrarian violence, as well as the effectiveness 
of mass protest which has already been alluded to within this very chapter. 
The second factor is the idea that Britain as a whole, and Ireland as part of 
it, was moving from a status society to a contract based one. Indeed, Capitalism 
eroded Feudal demarcations, and erected its own in their place. Yet in doing so 
British society was becoming more democratic, and based upon Capitalistic values. 
These did not discriminate as much as the old markers had against those lacking in 
titles or aristocratic pedigree. Such things became less important in a society based 
upon money, allowing the strict class structure of the past greater flexibility.  
Such pervasive fear of insurrection evidences that not only was the previous 
system of maintaining order failing, but a new world and Capitalistic reality was 
forming. Such a reality was of course now becoming more predominant within 
Britain and Ireland. This ensured that, what was now seen as the barbarism and 
irrationality of the previous justice model, was out of step with modern thought. 
Indeed, the fear of crime and insurrection was ill managed by a terror-based justice 
model, as it was primarily predicated on punishing a few examples, not the masses 
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which the cities of the time had assembled. Worse still the scaffold was more of a 
focal point of upheaval than its resolution. In a Contract based society the ideas and 
methods of a terror-based model seemed excessive, wasteful of labour as well as 
life. In a “free” society, where people met on the market, the idea of a justice system 
based on fear and popular participation seemed quite nonsensical and impractical 
and so its days were numbered as a consequence of this altered social context.  
These two factors complemented the positives reform of the justice system 
promised. Namely, a stable order with predictable laws, and the apprehension and 
rehabilitation of offenders back into a productive pawn of the market economy. All 
of this ensured that the stage was set for a massive overhaul of the previous model 
of doing justice, as well as the pivotal role that the victim played within it. Indeed, 
it would be the offender who would largely gain. They would be given new rights 
and the chance of redemption, whilst the victim went from leading role to bit part. 
Throughout this era, the beliefs that had hitherto maintained a delicate 
balance of power amongst all of the various disparate classes that the British social 
body comprised began to deteriorate. In fact, the expanding bourgeoisie were 
pivotal in accelerating this trend by undermining the previously influential 
principles of authoritarian and conservative governance. The resulting rise of 
liberalism saw politicians and the wider public begin to jettison these ideological 
frames in favour of philosophies that were much more egalitarian. This permitted 
the standard of democratic accountability to improve in this period, as intense 
upper-class fears about assemblies, industrialisation, urbanisation and the 
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difficulties surrounding the divisive “Irish question” led to a change of tact from 
the colonial leadership in the country (Vaughan and Kilcommins 2008, p. 55).     
However, this alteration actually led to the ostensible dissolution of the 
previous hegemonic order, which actually caused even greater concern with social 
unrest. The retribution that had ensured the harmony of the preceding epoch now 
appeared more flawed than ever, mainly due to the dim view that the now dominant 
liberal paradigm took of such chastisement. The overt unfairness of this kind of 
punishment, its exorbitance, as well as its penchant for brutality, therefore suffered 
from a damming nineteenth century re-interpretation. Yet what proved equally 
ruinous for its continued existence was the ineptitude with which the approach 
tended to display towards those anxieties that were now increasing dramatically in 
response to the brutality of the offences that criminals were now engaging in across 
the British Isles. Indeed, these fears had reached boiling point with the rather public 
and unnerving rise to prominence of the phenomenon of the ‘serial killer’ within 
the very heart of the British Empire (Wiener 1994, p. 49).  
The public consciousness began perceiving all of these various anxieties as 
one overarching terror, namely the ‘fear of the crowd’. That urban horde now 
became a nineteenth century obsession. It amassed and assembled not only 
members of the urban middle-class, but labourers and the underclass within its 
bloated and innately threatening ranks. The body coursed through metropolitan 
boulevards, providing bystanders with spectacles that aroused disconcerting 
images that were all too visible reminders of the seditious attitude and mentality of 
large social groupings, which had so often rocked the very foundations of 
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eighteenth-century politics and society. Although the near unbridled power that the 
social hierarchy of the previous era had exerted had really now all but collapsed, 
the reformers of the age were able to exploit the profound sense of unease that all 
of this upheaval was generating amongst the populace. They did this by using the 
opportunity that all of this apprehension now presented to advance their own 
political programme, which they claimed would effectively remedy all of the social 
ills that were now becoming all too apparent (Melossi 2008, p. 40). 
3.6.2 Social Upheaval Provokes Governmental Adjustment 
Although the public may have reacted somewhat hysterically to the Law 
and Order concerns of the day these were not however figments of their overactive 
imaginations, as an alarming level of social upheaval ensued, almost from the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, creating a level of volatility that was poorly 
resolved by the legal paradigms of the previous century. This prompted the 
structural change of these juridical frames. Indeed, British civil unrest in the 
nineteenth century began with aggressive agrarian struggles from bodies like the 
Luddites. The consciousness of the public, and indeed historians largely define the 
uprisings of this group by its ambitions, which mainly centred upon the doing away 
with the newly mechanised technological advances that had largely facilitated the 
wholesale demise of the more lenient work traditions of the eighteenth century 
within swathes of British manufacturing (Thompson 1963, p. 484). 
 The class conflict that was so central to the actions of the Luddites, as well 
as disputes surrounding the “Irish question”, by both the Land League and the 
illegal activities of secretive organizations such as the Whiteboys, and not to 
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mention the experiments in democracy that produced Liberté, Égalité et Fraternité 
on the continent, all threatened the British establishment in Ireland. The last of 
these was probably the most offensive to the prevailing British sentiments of the 
time. To see why the ‘spectre of Jacobinism’ so perturbed one need look no further 
than the writings of Dr Jean-Paul Marat, who only a few years earlier had argued 
that:  
“[i]f society abandons [the poor] they return[s] to a state of nature… [and] when 
they forcefully vindicate the rights they have lost with the sole aim of improving 
their lot, any authority which stands in their way is tyrannical and the judge who 
condemns them to death is nothing but a vile murderer”. Even more worryingly for 
British rule in Ireland he then goes on to provide his answer to criminality “…what 
is the remedy? Here it is. Don't keep the poor in idleness, give them work, make it 
possible for them to satisfy their wants through labour. They must be given a 
trade…” (cited in Melossi and Pavarini 1981, 52-54).  
These fears prompted appeals, mainly from the growing urban middle-
class, that the political class alter the legal so as to give it greater clarity “…than 
[hitherto] espoused under the prevailing hegemonic order” (Vaughan and 
Kilcommins 2008, p. 56). This strained state of affairs also highlighted some of the 
major deficiencies with the traditional justice structure in Ireland, which envisaged 
legality through a particularly insular lens that was now subject to a much greater 
level of political critique (Vaughan and Kilcommins 2008, p. 55).    
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3.6.3 Reformers Create Precise Laws 
The Reformers of the nineteenth century worked tirelessly at exchanging 
the capricious legal subjectivity of the eighteenth century, which they saw as 
hindering the paramount good of the personal fulfilment of each individual, for the 
rigorously objective legality that they now felt would allow it to flourish. These 
reformers would therefore implement the re-structuring of the entire Irish legal 
system to bring it more into line with the English one. They would seek to affect 
this through the extensively legislative reformative movements, which saw the 
creation of a eventually unified major law enforcement agency. This brought 
together some of the other police forces that had been previously set up under The 
Dublin Police Act, 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. IV, c. 29), The Dublin Metropolitan Police 
Act, 1837 (7 Wm. IV & 1 Vic., c. 25) The Belfast Police Act, 1800 (40 Geo III 
c.47) and The Londonderry Improvement Act 1848 (11 & 12 Vic c. 41)  and 
subsuming them within the Royal Irish Constabulary under The Constabulary 
(Ireland) Act 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. IV, c. 13), the Constabulary (Amendment) (Ireland) 
Act 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. IV, c. 36). The change  encouraged them to pursue crime 
themselves rather than rely on victims.  
There was also the establishment and fine tuning of a more structured court 
appeals process. A reform that created lower and higher courts, as well as greater 
regulation of court procedure and operation with the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 
1851 (14 & 15 Vic., c. 93), the Supreme Court (Ireland) Act 1850 (13 &14 Vic., c. 
19), the Common Law Courts (Ireland) Act 1851 (14 & 15 Vic., c. 17). Novel penal 
methods and their alteration such as Transportation, the effective banishment of an 
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offender to another usually far flung part of the colonies most usually Australia 
under the Transportation (Amendment) Act 1837 (7 Wm. IV & 1 Vic., c. 36) were 
also introduced, as well as the increased use of prisons. A service which would now 
be maintained and governed by the State under the clear rules of the Prisons 
(Ireland) Act 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. IV, c. 51).   
Although these organs would shun bloodshed, some quarters argued that 
their use could still modify, or even remedy undesirable conduct. However, it was 
the uncertainty that the prevalence of criminality and insurrection in Ireland 
generated that was what really prompted the official direction and popular 
acceptance of these kinds of reformative adjustments. 29  Indeed, all of the 
aforementioned reforms in Ireland that brought its criminal justice system into line 
 
29 These can be gleened from writings about the crime situation which influenced public debate in 
Britian regarding the government’s response.“[t]here can be no doubt of the extent to which 
assassination and intimidation prevail in certain districts… people are absolutely so accustomed to 
it that they talk of it without any particular horror.” The Morning Chronicle, 17 Apr, 1846.“[a] large 
class of Irish crimes…are nothing else than an embodiment of high treason…Irish murders…extend 
their influence far beyond…victims. These influences are…levelled against the state – against the 
established system of social order.” The Aberdeen Journal, 5 Dec,1838 and The Leeds Mercury, 23 
Jun, 1862. “…one of the great causes of the lawlessness which exists in Ireland is owing to the 
sympathy of the tenant farmers and peasantry with assassins…which renders it difficult for the 
police to obtain any reliable information…it appearing to be deemed a point of honour to protect 
them, and baffle the law.” The Era, 28 Mar, 1869.“The Government cannot expect to sustain the 
authority of the law in Ireland, where the established courts of justice are held in contempt. Trial by 
jury has been proved a solemn mockery.” The Era, 24 Sept, 1848. 
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with Britain revolved around the attempts of the progressives to try to bolster the 
practical efficacy of the law within Ireland by improving its overall rationality and 
structure (Wiener 1994, p. 49). 
The main legal alterations of this era involved key advances regarding the 
logic and form of the law. This typified the demands of Sir Robert Peel that 
parliament discontinue the use of private prosecution. He instead supported the 
bringing of State proceedings, which would now ensure that the prosecution of 
offenders would remain neither fervent nor malevolent. However, this weakened 
the previously predominant prosecutorial model of victim centred actions. He also 
felt that prosecutions initiated by the State would prevent vindictive and vexatious 
complaints, whilst also consequently encouraging the bringing of genuine and 
morally upstanding litigation. These reforms necessarily revolved around the 
‘rout[ing] [of] the personal from the courtroom’ by converting the community 
based ‘morality play’ of the last century into a more individualised and uniform 
operation, which necessarily mandated that hitherto informal quarrels would 
become much more ordered and officious affairs. The procedural impact of all of 
this was transformative, as the dramatic altercations, which had caused so many 
erratic outcomes, were now converted into formalised and predictable proceedings, 
which tended to ensure that the law became more “…expectable and respectable” 
(cited in Wiener 1994, p. 65; Parliament 1812, p. 1232). 
An idea that epitomises the predominantly utilitarian thinking of the period 
was the attempt of Jeremy Bentham to omit the innate intimacy of retribution 
through a fictional flogging device of his own conception. His “…rotary flail made 
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of canes and whalebone…” (Wiener 1994, pp. 104-105) would ensure that identical 
blows fell on criminals for the entirety of their penalty, which a person could even 
calibrate. Even though no one ever implemented this, it is “at one and the same 
time an [ideological] concept and the embodiment of its own ideology’ (Melossi 
and Pavarini 1981, p.40) and was, like his Panopticon, indicative of the increased 
desire to eliminate the personal element from the era’s techniques of punishment. 
Indeed, the reformers of the time actually believed that the more de-personalized 
an authority was in its procedure the more appropriate, and competent it would be 
in its actual practical application of the law. However, this unfortunately meant that 
many of the purportedly compassionate aforementioned reforms, such as the 
official reluctance to deploy the death penalty, and the increase in the utilisation of 
prison as a punishment for lesser offences which the British establishment came to 
implement within the previously cited legislative Acts were often astonishingly 
inhumane. As they were often attempts to de-personalise the criminal justice 
process in the name of procedural fairness. Yet, despite this, many of the 
aforementioned reforms that these British progressives enacted, such as the 
creation of appeals courts and the various police forces led to profoundly influential 
changes in Irish Criminal Justice. These honed the rationality and composition of 
how the law operated and was deployed, and meant that its previously excessive 
sentences now became much more pragmatic (Wiener 1994, pp. 104-105). 
3.6.4 Restructured Correction Engenders Novel Chastisement  
What the aforementioned reforms invariably involved was the effective 
replacement of gratuitous penal exercises with punitive policies that were much 
THE CAUSES AND OUTCOMES OF THE EXCLUSION OF CRIME VICTIMS 




greater in their efficiency. Indeed, the accusations that the reformers provided at 
this time extended well beyond the historical brutality of punishment, and really 
focused upon the ‘bad economy of power’ that this kind of chastisement tended to 
engender. In fact, the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that a ‘paralysis 
of justice’ often transpired, mainly due to the poorly structured ‘distribution of 
power’ of the previous legal system. This allowed blockages of authority to occur 
within key areas, which created considerable administrative friction that tended to 
hinder the overall operation of the legal system (Foucault 1979, p. 79, pp. 57-58).  
Although the reformers overtly denounced the unpredictability of the 
previous legal order, as well as its overindulgent displays of sovereign authority 
through punishment, what they really sought to condemn was the ineffectual 
deterrent value of the penal extravagance that this kind of justice system necessarily 
incorporated. In fact, they loathed the embellishments, ambiguities and omnipotent 
commands that it necessarily required. The driving force of their reform was 
therefore never just the foundation of a more progressive and egalitarian mode of 
chastisement like, for example, when the death penalty in Ireland was curtailed 
through legislative amendment. In fact, the reformative changes of the era always 
necessarily entailed the establishment of an entirely new penal model based on the 
replacement of death as a penalty with prison. In fact, their alterations actually 
guaranteed that penal chastisement became much better structured, making its 
application more consistent by arranging its organs so that they could smoothly co-
operate, thereby ensuring that their new penal system could exert a greater level of 
coercion upon every social member (Foucault 1979, pp. 80-81).  
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This revolution in penal discipline made chastisement much more 
predictable and reliable. It also profoundly enhanced the outcomes of punishment, 
whilst reducing its expenditure, since nineteenth-century discipline now no longer 
required eighteenth-century levels of corruption and bribery. However, the 
progressive nineteenth century ideal never led to the relief of censure, as discipline 
now became nearly an inescapable certainty within society, enabling it to pervade 
right down to the social body’s most constituent element, the individual, who 
would now become a docile body and servile cog in the wheel of capitalism. 
Although the era did see the punitive improvidence of the last century extinguished 
by the enlightened revision of its antiquated methods, the new social order that the 
reformers now codified created an entirely new system of punishment from its 
ashes. This order was not only able to reform its subjects through the exercise of 
penal discipline, but it could now, having effectively secured the more or less 
wholesale compliance of society, ensure its hegemonic dominance by subverting 
the social order of the past. It did this through emancipatory declarations, which 
ensured that although its subjects were more regulated and subservient than ever, 
they perceived themselves as never having been freer (Foucault 1978, pp. 80-82). 
3.6.5 New Assertions Destabilise the Previous Regime 
This new social order and its fresh demands for greater levels of personal 
autonomy fundamentally subverted the status quo of the previous decade, which 
had tended to structure itself according to sharp distinctions of class. Its ancient 
social ladder, which was primarily based upon transferable wealth and the 
accumulation of land, now found itself being usurped by a much more liberal and 
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utilitarian standpoint, which assumed that citizens should enjoy special 
dispensations against the intervention of the State into their ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
spheres of action. The proponents of these standpoints alleged that the constraint 
of a people’s freedom of choice, or the use of threats when individuals do not accept 
such conduct, regardless of its humane intentions or ostensible benefits, inherently 
violated their dignity. Since these reformers now proclaimed that every individual 
had, and should give full expression to, their own personally unique subjectivity, 
individuals therefore needed to be as free as legally permissible to act in accordance 
with what they deemed to be in their best interests. These ideas came to typify the 
contemporary liberal conception of freedom, a model that existed since Erasmus. 
 However, this conceptualisation of freedom, although its advocates often 
waxed lyrical with regards to all that it had to offer ,obviously did not much benefit 
certain groups that were not embraced by this perspective. Whether that be those 
too poor to ‘contract’ their way out of ignominy, or women, who were still treated 
like second class citizens. Indeed, the freedom of women was usually to do what 
their parents or husbands decreed. It was also of little benefit to the mad, who, now 
engaging in the dual vices of not being able to work, or contract, were increasingly 
placed in asylums, where liberty was in short supply. 30  The excise of these 
freedoms all generally presupposed an ‘individualistic’, but by no means entirely 
agreed upon, human ideal. The emergence of this reflected the materialisation of a 
new ‘social contract’, one that fundamentally undermined the previous 
 
30 Foucault, M. (2001) Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the Age of Reason, London: 
Routledge. 
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understanding of how society might function through its ideologically based 
assertions of personal independence, as opposed to the blind following of the 
dictates of either the Church or State. This new social configuration would now 
attempt a move from ‘status to contract’, by attempting to create a new social order 
in which ones’ abilities would come to define social distinctions more than ones’ 
pedigree (Vaughan and Kilcommins 2008, p. 56; Berlin 1969, p. 6; Rousseau 1973, 
p. 175; Maine 1927, p. 100). 
3.6.6 Britain Undergoes a Movement from Status to Contract 
This new liberal regime meant that ties built on exchange now superseded 
those of standing. This brought about a novel arrangement whereby voluntary 
interaction was what prefaced most official interactions between people. Therefore, 
it could be said “…that [this constituted] a move[ment] from Status to Contract” 
(Maine 1927, p. 100). The social implications of this remain apparent to this day, 
as the law tends to not usually officially intertwine titles or duties with socio-
economic rank, making high social status theoretically attainable to anyone in this 
regard, either through their own personal resolve or by the accumulation of wealth. 
However, the reformatory administrations of the nineteenth century promoted the 
kind of laissez faire governance that largely helped to facilitate this development 
from Status to Contract. Indeed, it was this outlook that effectively laid the 
foundations for our contemporary world. Yet this social transformation also 
effectively meant that legal authorities were now going to measure social members 
against a much more rational standard than they had done previously. Since the 
rational actions of ordinary people were now to be what determined their place in 
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the world, the masses were now going to be subject to a much greater degree of 
scrutiny and inspection than they had hitherto been within the social orders of the 
recent past (Graveson 1941, p. 261; Maine 1927, pp. 99-100; Tocqueville 1969). 
3.6.7 The Subject Becomes Instilled with Superior Judgment 
Due to the newly emergent socio-legal paradigm and political landscape of 
the age, the British authorities came to perceive the Irish legal subject as being a 
more rational entity, and started to judge them with a more exacting gaze than they 
had done in the past. In fact, this idea of the ‘reasonable man’ began to assume a 
much greater importance within jurisprudence, as the reformers of the age began 
to correct and thereby transform the vagrancies of the previous legal system 
through their pursuit of more rational first principles. Their new laws now began 
to suggest that those who came before the law held a greater degree of foresight 
and accountability than they had done in the eighteenth century. However, this 
conferral and recognition of increased blameworthiness was a disingenuous 
exercise, as the establishment never truly believed that the masses, at least in the 
form that they inhabited at the time, merited the receipt of such an onerous burden. 
This was particularly true in the Irish context, where the native Gaelic populace 
were often generally perceived as possessing the innately “aboriginal faults of the 
Celtic race” (cited in Slater 2018, p. 18). It is probably more accurate to say that 
they simply thought that by indulging, and pandering to the populace in this way 
that they would be able to work out a way of remedying what they had only now, 
in the nineteenth century, recast as ‘moral deficiencies’ (Wiener 1990, p. 54).     
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The additional, but nearly superfluous, proof, which confirms the 
increasing rational operation of the law, appeared when the ‘reasonable man’ began 
to epitomise the zenith of nineteenth century legal thought. 31  Although legal 
scholars and practitioners frequently cite the concept as a class of ‘subjectivity’, 
these assertions are misleading. The concept actually symbolises something greater 
than a mere standard of legal behaviour32 – as it personifies judicial intention. The 
hypothetical entity can therefore serve as an agent that can represent the entirety of 
collective concern for and understanding of the law’s subjects.33 The personal 
concerns of this entity therefore become synonymous with the “public interest” 
(Farmer 1996, p. 66).  In addition to this “public interest”, the ‘reasonable man’ is 
also invariably something of a legal abstraction that the law began to strongly 
impose at this time in order to cement the new standard of behaviour that was now 
required of the public. 34  Indeed, “[i]n place of real individuals belonging to 
 
31 This first happened in nineteenth century case law. Although there is some controversy as to the 
exact date, this is generally agreed upon as being 1837, with the leading civil case of Vaughan v 
Menlove (1837) 132 ER 490 and seminal criminal case of  R v. Kirkham (1837), 8 C. & P. 115. 
Both now placed reasonable man fiction at the heart of common law thinking and operation. 
32 Although it does embody this, as was the case in Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks (1856) 11 Ex 
781 where Alderson B noted it is not only a component of negligence but a standard of behaviour. 
33 As was clearly evidenced within Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 at 607 by Blackburn J., 
who used it to gleen the details of a problematic contractual agreement. 
34 Provocation is a classic example of this, as Coleridge J. iterated at 119 when it was recognised as 
being a lawful excuse, but one delineated by strict rational parameters: 
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particular societal classes, possessing the infinite differences that constitute 
genuine individuality, the reformers proposed an ideal individual … in an ideal 
world” (Norrie 2001, p. 21). 
 The ‘reasonable man’ therefore invariably involved a new kind of legal 
gymnastics, whose theorising transcended the vulgar particularities of authentic 
subjects and disproportionately stressed and presumed the rationality of their 
thought. The reformers of the time largely achieved this transition at the expense 
of emotive self-expression (Kilcommins et al. 2016), and without considering how 
philosophical perspectives create and frame those classes of knowledge that 
emerge, as well as how the dominant paradigms of the day come to evaluate the 
value of this knowledge. This ensured that the reformers were unable to grasp how 
crime was, and remains, something communal, since the relevant authorities 
effectively created it within a specific proprietary based environment, and refined 
 
“[T]hough the law condescends to human frailty, it will not indulge to human ferocity. It considers 
man to be a rational being, and requires that he should exercise a reasonable control over his 
passions.” R v Kirkham (1837) 8 Car & P 115, Indeed Keating J. would re-emphasise this point, at 
338, in the later and more influential case of R v Welsh (1869) 11 Cox CC 336. In which he surmised 
the parameters of the principle, and how it was to be adjudged : “[t]he law is, that there must exist 
such an amount of provocation as would be excited by the circumstances in the mind of a reasonable 
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it through debates amongst different classes regarding the limits of social and 
personal conduct. However, the topic was much more black and white for the 
reformers of the industrial age, since the radical horizon of their thought was the 
rational actor, who inhabited a largely neutral social context (Norrie 2001, p. 21).  
Yet these reformers never really acknowledged, at even the most 
elementary theoretical level, how being from within a particular class or 
background frequently transforms ostensibly ‘impartial’ settings into conflictual 
fields of political contest. Although their philosophical constructs obfuscated this 
unpalatable reality, the inconvenient truth never disappeared. These matters simply 
became unsettling obstacles that the reformers needed to give further thought to 
within their dominant progressive paradigm. Yet such irreconcilable problems 
ironically drove their ultimately futile efforts to try to resolve these kinds of issues.  
Their endeavours to address the dual questions of social order, and how the 
law was going to be able to teach the masses to embrace the accentuated position 
of rationality, as well as its norms, led the reformers of the age to fashion an 
aggrandised State. Indeed, this aggrandised State now came to exert a more 
powerful influence over several aspects of nineteenth century life. This would 
consequently serve as the symbolic father to the masses, a la Freud, and would 
therefore impart its own ethical superego injunctions in order to “teach them how 
to behave”. These social transformations took on the form of the ‘Leviathan’ State, 
“…[b]ecause [since] the State [now] rested on the willed consent of 
rational…individuals… a society of such persons became the objective of the State 
itself” (Melossi 2008, p. 19). Pursuing these two idealised goals of greater 
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rationality and order consequently meant the State needed to begin to address the 
task of human perfectibility in both of these departments through the chastisement 
of their transgression in society (Norrie 2001, p. 21; Melossi 2008; Foucault 2001). 
When taking the move made from status to contract, as well as the new task 
of human perfectibility into consideration, we can see that these too were factors 
that sounded the death kneel for the terror based, victim inclusive mode of justice. 
In a contract-based society, which Britain was becoming, the implementation of 
the death penalty was now perceived as terribly wasteful of consumers and labour, 
the lifeblood of capitalist economies.35 Also, it is worth noting that in contract-
based societies the maintenance of public order is no longer so reliant upon 
autocratic rule. It instead necessarily involves a new social contract, in which the 
sovereign is not absolute. Therefore, an autocratic order based on popular victim 
participation is consequently outmoded.36 Finally, the whole idea of terror-based 
justice, which intrinsically necessitated both the death penalty and victim 
participation, was anathema to human perfectibility. Since it depended on killing a 
significant proportion of most of the people the stance wished sought to save.37 
 
35 Rusche, G. and Kirchheimer, O. (1968 [1939]) Punishment and Social Structure, New York: 
Russell & Russell. 
36 Maine, H. (1927) Ancient Law, London: Dent Graveson. 
37 Beccaria, C. (1995) On Crimes and Punishments, ed. Bellamy, R. trans. Davies, R., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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3.7 THE ‘LEVIATHAN STATE’  ENGENDERS PUNITIVE ADVANCEMENTS  
3.7.1 Novel Organisations Begin Dictating Chastisement  
The State now began coordinating a level of organized retribution that was 
much greater in its application and pervasiveness that it had hitherto been. The 
reformers also consequently entrusted the legal system of the nineteenth century 
with a greater mandate to implement punishment through its own bureaucratic 
frameworks. Its ambit considerably broadened as a result, and now began to 
encompass a far wider role in the investigation, deterrence and punishment of 
offences. These new measures also triggered the foundation of a legal structure that 
predicated itself upon an ‘Equality of Arms’ paradigm, which balanced the rights 
of the State and the accused. This counterbalanced the capabilities that the populace 
now entrusted to the ‘Leviathan State’, a State which now began to offer its 
suspects guarantees as a check against the oppressive excise of its power (Vaughan 
and Kilcommins 2010, pp. 65-68; Habermas 2008, p. 124).   
To cement this new order in which the State was to play a much larger role, 
the victim and private prosecution would no longer be required to personally 
uphold public order. Indeed, the previous century’s concept of democracy, in which 
the state and its organs were kept rather small, and the franchise was constrained 
to a small group of wealthy elites, now began to change. The transition began 
during the nineteenth century in Britain in order to better reflect the idea that it was 
a democratic society which needed public support for its larger state institutions. 
This alteration was required in order to help secure British rule in a new context, 
one which not only necessitated projects like human perfectibility but also a greater 
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degree of buy in from the wider public. A public who were now required to 
relinquish their claim to the much more personalised justice of the previous century 
and support the new depersonalised prosecutorial and penal institutions of the state.   
Due to the liberalization of the highly restrictive qualifications, which the 
ruling class had hitherto placed upon those who could participate in voting, the 
numbers of potential voters grew. This alteration in the size of the electorate meant 
the supremacy of the aristocracy slowly dissipated, which allowed for the 
emergence of a new democratic turn towards popular sovereignty, as the voice of 
the people became the voice of God. This new legal order also began contending 
that its laws ought to communicate the preferences of the wider public. Even 
though the passing of laws remained solely permissible through parliamentary 
organs, these bodies now became more egalitarian than they had been in the 
eighteenth century, meaning they could no longer purely embody the sole interests 
and preoccupations of those influential and privileged few who had hitherto 
exercised an unwarranted hegemonic influence over them. This broadening of the 
electorate meant the law could now better articulate the desires of the populace it 
claimed to govern. The advance also helped to bring about the more routine 
functioning of the law, which now set about trying to establish an order in which 
the power that the sovereign had hitherto displayed was not the only thing that 
governed the law’s subjects. Instead, the disciplinary techniques of punishment, 
which the aggrandised State now administered, would come to educate its subjects.  
This point clearly illustrates the greater latitude now afforded to the state 
across most of the western world in the nineteenth century, even in Britain, where 
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this had been resisted so vehemently a century earlier. Governments now based 
their legitimacy on democratic ideas like popular will. They therefore now required 
a new social contract to help maintain order. One that purported to be more 
egalitarian. Specific evidence for this in Ireland presents several obvious 
complications. As the country was subsumed within the British Empire the true 
wishes of the Irish public would be difficult to ascertain. Furthermore, even if this 
were evident, there would be a natural divide between loyalist and nationalist 
sentiments. However, if we take something of a formalistic view, and perhaps see 
Ireland as being part of Britain at the time, as it formally was, we can see this trend 
being clearly evident in most industrialised countries, including Britain, and 
therefore, by extension, Ireland (Rousseau 1973, p. 250; Garland 2001, p. 30). 
3.7.2 Efficient Chastisement Moulds Behavioural Guidelines 
These State-run facilities consistently worked at manufacturing consent 
through conformity. It was in this way that the penal technique of incarceration, 
which effected subservience within intensely private disciplinary environments, 
replaced the extravagance of the death penalty, which had hitherto tried to keep 
order through its ostensible demonstrations of monarchical supremacy. In stark 
contrast to the retribution of the past, an evaluation and classification of offender 
deviance and blameworthiness could now have a much greater influence over the 
punishment that the State would enact in these particular institutions. Since 
discipline thrived without the violent demarcations that the Crown had previously 
made between monarchical friend and foe, which had typically characterized the 
punishment of the previous century, varying degrees of chastisement would now 
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tend to predicate themselves upon how far an offence strayed from what the 
relevant authorities deemed to be the established standards of appropriate 
behaviour for that time. The impact of all this was the emergence of a ‘normalizing 
society’, one in which what was “normal” was encouraged, not only within 
criminal justice and the law, but also within a whole host of other extra-judicial 
institutions. The legality and criminal justice of the nineteenth century therefore 
progressively behaved more and more like an (oppressively inhumane) yardstick 
of humanity, which strictly specified the benchmarks of social action through the 
close inspection, measurement and correction of the public. The allegedly 
emancipatory project of human improvement, which the State had now embarked 
upon therefore, ironically, ultimately ended up transforming into a distorted version 
of autocratic idealism (Foucault 1979, p. 144). 
3.7.3 The Desire for Human Perfectibility Engenders Oppression 
The attempts of the reformers of the nineteenth century to bring about the 
perfectibility of the subject therefore oddly led to the oppressive imposition of 
those characteristics that they felt the “ideal human” ought to possess. In fact, this 
inconsistency between the reformatory principles that had initially motivated this 
goal and the practical steps that were required in order to allow the aggrandised 
State to implement the kinds of changes that the reformers believed were necessary 
in order to reach it pervaded the entire venture. The obvious tension between its 
enlightened ideals of freedom and progress, and the oppression and destruction that 
its practical imposition necessarily involved enthralled some of its staunchest 
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ideological disciples like John Stuart Mill, but also, at the very same time, deeply 
perturbed many of its most ardent detractors such as Friedrich Nietzsche.  
Although the blueprint of human perfectibility involved penal rehabilitation, these 
endeavours were arguably far more dependent upon the ideologically based 
promotion of the transformative properties of disciplinary chastisement. Indeed, 
the Enlightenment’s two greatest proponents, Bentham and Beccaria, felt that the 
soundest way of successfully implementing a disciplinary strategy of human 
perfectibility through punishment involved the perpetual widening of the ambit of 
the correctional establishments of the State in order to embrace an ever expanding 
category of deviance being applied to what the State had hitherto considered to be 
legal. 38  This invariably meant that the embracing of the goal of human 
perfectibility by the State helped further advance law reform, since the reformers 
of the time felt the State needed to create “ideal humans” through “ideal 
regulations”. The first step towards achieving this, within the turbulent context of 
 
38 “If in fact, on the one hand the project of the Enlightenment implied legal principles inspired by 
the safeguarding of civil liberties and the utility of punishment, on the other hand it is deeply rooted 
in historically given anthropological concepts implying projects of the transformation of the 
individual by means of education and penality. The most authoritative interpreters of the 
Englightenment on matters of law and punishment, such as Bentham and Beccaria, in fact saw the 
best penal policy in a wider and wider implementation of a “penitentiary” institution.” Melossi, D. 
(2008) Controlling Crime, Controlling Society: Thinking about Crime in Europe and America, 
Cambridge: Polity Press p. 29-30. Bentham, J., (1791/1843) The Works of Jeremey Bentham, Vol. 
4, Edinburgh: William Tait. Beccaria, C. (1995) On Crimes and Punishments, ed. Bellamy, R. trans. 
Davies, R., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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Ireland, which the reformers sought to realise, therefore required the creation of 
new emergency regulations. These would attempt to bring about the much stricter 
enforcement some of older ones that had hitherto been overlooked. The State 
therefore passed various novel pieces of legislation in order to affect this. While 
also stamping out tolerance for previously ignored acts of deviance or defiance 
from the local populace. Something the authorities had not previously pursued 
effectively, or indeed deterred much. These were the Peace Preservation (Ireland) 
Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vic., c. 9), the Protection of Life and Property in Certain Parts 
of Ireland Act 1871 (34 & 35 Vic., c. 25), the Act for the Better Protection of Person 
and Property in Ireland 1881 (44 & 45 Vic., c. 4), the Peace Preservation (Ireland) 
Act 1881 (44 & 45 Vic., c. 5), the Act for the Prevention of Crime in Ireland, 1882 
(45 & 46 Vic., c. 4) and the Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act 1887 (51 & 
52 Vic., c. 20). These pieces of legislation suspended rights, upheld curfew as well 
as martial law and dispensed with most of the positives of ordinary law in Britain. 
As such it was a cruel irony that for the reformers to begin their project of 
“correcting” the Irish public that they had to frequently dispense with some of the 
most cherished freedoms of the common law, such as habeas corpus and trial by 
jury.39 The reformers could no longer permit open defiance, as the authorities could 
not construe the flouting of the basic rules they established as being in keeping with 
the new paradigms that the State now sought to strongly enforce. Namely those 
modelled on ideas like compliance and citizenship (Melossi 2008, pp. 29-30). 
 
39  Howlin, N., (2013) ‘Nineteenth-Century Criminal Justice: Uniquely Irish or Simply “not 
English”?’ Irish Journal of Legal Studies, 3(1), 67-89, p. 69. 
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3.8  REFORM ALTERS REGULATION OF JURIDICAL FRAMES  
3.8.1 Traditionally Overlooked Transgressions Are Prosecuted 
Due to their incongruity with the ideals of nineteenth century justice,40 the 
reformers of the day found certain crimes so irreconcilable that they had to make a 
concerted effort to ensure the law was able to stamp them out. The most obvious 
example of this would be prostitution. This can be seen in the attempts to restrain 
sexuality, which reflected the altered mores from the previous century. The offence 
was now much more effectively curtailed through the operations of the police. 
Indeed, it was treated in a different manner than it had been in the past, where it 
was perceived as a deviance the authorities did not concern themselves with all that 
much. However, a plethora of legislation was implemented in this century in order 
to clamp down on the operation within Ireland.  
 
40 “… in 1871 the police instigated proceedings against 17,153 women .… 10,456 or 61% were 
labelled prositutes...” “… under the Police Clauses Acts of 1847 [10 & 11 Vic. c.89] a woman 
deemed to be “a common prostitute or night walker loitering or importuning passengers for the 
purpose of prostitution”, could be arrested. That section was extended under the Town’ 
Improvements Acts of 1854 [17 & 18 Vic. c.72] to include women being “otherwise offensive” … 
…It was however, under the Contagious Diseases Acts that the broadest powers were given to the 
police… the acts subjected women who were on the street to arbitrary and compulsory medical 
examination...”. “before the repeal of the Contagious Diseases Acts [1864 27 & 28 Vict. c. 85] the 
powers of the police were further strengthened by the introduction of the … Criminal Law 
Amendment Act of 1885 [48 & 49 Vic. c.69] which gave the police power to summarily convict 
brothel keepers ….” Luddy, M. (1997) ‘“Abandoned women and bad characters”: prostitution in 
nineteenth-century Ireland’, Women's History Review, 6(4), 485-504, p.486, p. 488, p. 491.  
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This not only led to the active pursuit of such conduct, but also to the 
arbitrary criminalisation, detention and inspection for disease of those that engaged 
in it. Yet it was also an attempt to police the sexual behaviour of the age under the 
guise of tackling sexually transmitted diseases. Although women could be 
imprisoned for relatively minor infractions, these new rules were not equally 
applicable to the male procurers of such services, who were, in fact, legislatively 
ignored. The authorities consequently now saw customary proprietal 
appropriations, which the justice regime of the past had previously ignored,41 as 
serious actionable offences when committed with the appropriate state of mind.42  
In fact, it was the need of the middle class to have their assets sufficiently 
protected that brought about the growing resentment for these kinds of traditionally 
 
41 “For trees and their wood…custom meant that the boundaries between what was illegal… and 
that which was defiantly legal were hazy. Community support…made this distinction even less 
meaningful. The British state attempted to remove such potential ambiguities in use rights and 
ownership through ever more specific legislation.”  Griffin, C.J. (2010)  ‘Becoming private 
property: custom, law, and the geographies of `ownership' in 18th- and 19th-century England’,  
Environment and Planning, (42), 747-762, p. 752. 
42 “… the first major departure from manorial custom… represented a continuance of the trend for 
ever-greater specificity in regulating relationships between trees and humans. Subsequent mid-18th-
century acts maintained this course through proscribing specific punishments for the theft of, or 
damage to, specific types of tree … an act passed in 1825 specifically dealt with orchards [Protection 
of Property in Orchards, etc. Act 1825 c. 127] (6 Geo. IV, c.127, [Stealing from Gardens Act 1826 c. 
69] 7 Geo. IV, c.69)… the 1820s marked a shift…towards fast-tracking the prosecution of wood 
takers.” Griffin, C.J. (2010)  ‘Becoming private property: custom, law, and the geographies of 
`ownership' in 18th- and 19th-century England’,  Environment and Planning, (42), 747-762, p. 753. 
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permissible transgression, at least amongst the legal establishment.43 However, 
their proscription invariably necessitated the criminalisation of centuries old 
behaviour that had epitomised the hitherto conventional understanding that 
previously existed between Labour and Capital. Several honoured gratuities now 
disappeared, farmhands no longer held claim over leftover crop; miners had no 
licence over the surplus produce of their site and peasants no longer possessed a 
right to the fallen wood from common land that was now enclosed and privatised. 
In fact, the outlawing of the hitherto permissible gave these actions a certain 
‘delinquency’ that hampered most labourer “…opposition to the advance of 
capitalist social relations” (Lea 2002, p. 37; Wiener 1994, p. 68).44  
 
43 The Dean and New Forests Act, 1808 48 Geo. 3. c. 75. “…made illegal…the unregulated… 
collection of deadwood, snapwood, and fallen branche.” In fact by the “… mid-19th-century a… 
prosecutors' attitudes to customs had hardened… juries could still act against advice …[a]t the 1847 
Cambridge Midsummer Assizes, three men were charged with stealing firewood to the value of a 
shilling…the three…were acquitted…at the 1850 Hereford Midsummer Assizes, Eleanor Bywater, 
a labourer, was indicted for stealing wood…[a]gain, the case rested on whether she had transgressed 
[the] custom … the jury found Bywater not guilty…” Griffin, C.J. (2010)  ‘Becoming private 
property: custom, law, and the geographies of `ownership' in 18th- and 19th-century England’,  
Environment and Planning, (42), 747-762, p. 755-756. 
44 “If common law initially evolved out of custom…this relationship fundamentally changed… 
reformers sought to centralise law making and legal practice…customs…were… criminalised… 
agrarian capitalism…occasioned…landowners seeking to protect ‘their’ capital.” Griffin, C.J. 
(2010) ‘Becoming private property: custom, law, and the geographies of `ownership' in 18th- and 
19th-century England’,  Environment and Planning, (42), 747-762, p. 751. 
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A newly minted and dedicated constabulary, which operated alongside a 
much more diligent and re-invigorated judiciary now ensured that the law of the 
land was neither as malleable nor as lenient as it had been in previous decades. In 
fact, it was the rigorous severity with which the new reformers systematically 
declared the centuries’ old traditions, that had benefited so many in the past, to be 
illegal and wiped them out in Britain and Europe that led to some of the most 
eloquent socio-political critiques of the rise of bourgeois social relations. Take this 
particular articulation from 1842, when the issue came to a head in Prussia: 
 “[t]he gathering of fallen wood and the theft of wood are therefore essentially 
different things… in spite of this essential difference, you call both of them theft 
and punish both of them as theft…The law is not exempt from the general 
obligation to tell the truth… [however] if the law applies the term theft to an action 
that is scarcely even a violation of forest regulations, then the law lies, and the poor 
are sacrificed to a legal lie” (Marx 1842, No. 298).  
Yet despite this resistance, the organs of criminal justice were now 
beginning to tackle minor wrongdoings with a determination that was hitherto 
unfathomable, frequently ensnaring the more “undesirable” elements of society 
within the net of the Criminal Law. Societal deviants like beggars, inebriates, 
prostitutes and boisterous youths were no longer safe from the expanding web of 
what the authorities could now officially deem to be serious criminality. Vagrants 
were a particularly vulnerable catch all term 45  that legislative reform now 
 
45 “… the vagrant has been defined as somebody who ‘could not give good account of him/herself’ 
(in French, gens sans aveu, literally, people without affiliation/alliance) - no family responsibilities, 
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criminalised with the passing of the Vagrancy (Ireland) Act, 1847 10 & 11 Vic., 
c.84. This introduced entirely new categories of criminalising poverty as can be 
seen from the legislative innovations that were contained within it.46 
 In fact, the lack of material wealth and idleness become serious charges 
that were perceived with greater negativity and contempt than they had been in the 
previous century. A century in which they were more tolerated and not deemed to 
be as conclusive as to an individual’s innate nature and character.47 Eyewitness 
accounts from the time in Ireland are particularly reflective of this scorn. Indeed, 
even enlightened literati would find themselves easily able to look down upon the 
 
no fixed dwelling, no master or other ‘respectable’ person to speak up for him or her, no money or 
wherewithal to make money in a legal fashion…the homeless person who fitted this description in 
Ireland from 1850 to 1914 could either be brought before the magistrate in the police court as a 
vagrant… accommodated overnight in the Union workhouse as a ‘night lodger’. The wandering 
homeless person…stood uneasily at the interface between criminality and pauperhood…” Clear, C. 
(1998), pp. Homelessness, Crime, Punishment and Poor Relief in Galway 1850-1914: An 
Introduction, Journal of the Galway Archaeological and Historical Society, (50), 118-134, p.119. 
46 Section 2 “Every person who shall desert or wilfully neglect to maintain his wife...so that such 
wife…shall become destitute…shall on conviction…be committed to…gaol or house of 
correction…to hard labour for any time not exceeding three calendar months.” 
47 “Vagrancy was seen as a symptom of ‘degeneration’….supposed hereditary…weakness used as 
an explanation for many social, economic and even medical conditions …[t]he vagrant, combining 
…’criminality’ and ‘poverty’, was the perfect ‘’degenerate’.” Clear, C. (1998) ‘Homelessness, 
Crime, Punishment and Poor Relief in Galway 1850-1914: An Introduction’, Journal of the Galway 
Archaeological and Historical Society, (50), pp. 118-134, p. 120. 
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unfortunates that crossed their path.48 This poor perception only grew and attracted 
the attention of the legislature and police due to the numbers of fraudsters 
concealing themselves among the needy. Something which eroded to the point of 
non-existence any public and official sympathy for the beggars of Ireland.49  
This unfortunate situation was of course exacerbated by the Famine. A 
period in which scores the poor and hungry flocked to cities in search of relief. 
Unfortunately, it was rare to find any in such places. Indeed, they were, on the 
contrary, met with new laws and an energised police force. One that now purported 
to criminalise and pursue them. These unfortunates were consequently swept into 
jails, and, for some, this was a kind of relief, due to the difficulties at the time.50  
Indeed, the judicial system considered that the commission of certain kinds 
of misconduct so reprehensible and offensive to what were now the motivations of 
criminal justice that they arguably became much more successful at deterring these 
new offences than the authorities of the last century had been at censuring serious 
 
48 “I think the beggars were more plenteous and more loathsome here than almost anywhere. To 
one hideous wretch I was obliged to give money to go away...and as for the rest of the beggars, 
what pen or pencil could describe their hideous leering flattery, their cringing, swindling humour!” 
Thackeray, W.M. (2005) The Irish sketchbook of 1842, Dublin: Nonsuch, p. 215.  
49 “There were there the lame, the blind, the dumb, and all who suffered from actual and natural 
infirmity; but in addition to these, there was every variety of impostor…”. Carleton, W. (1968) The 
autobiography of William Carleton, London: Macgibbon & Kee, pp 164-5.  
50 “All flocking to the metropolis in vain hope of relief…but alas, on their arrival sad disappointment 
… they find nothing but distress and destitution...” Prunty, J. (1998) Dublin slums 1800-1925: a 
study in urban geography, Dublin Irish Academic Press, p. 287. 
THE CAUSES AND OUTCOMES OF THE EXCLUSION OF CRIME VICTIMS 




criminality. Due to the increasing numbers of suspects, as well as the more 
pervasive impact of State operated justice within society, the law of the nineteenth 
century also began to create a more professionalised and structured courtroom. This 
would eventually lead to the introduction of representation for the accused,51 an 
adjustment that went hand in hand with a re-distribution of the evidential burden 
onto the party that now had to prove a suspect’s guilt (Wiener 1994, p. 50). 
3.8.2 Offender Advocates Pushes the Onus onto the Prosecution 
Introducing legal assistance for offenders placed the burden of proving the 
guilt of an accused on the prosecution, which the State now typically carried out. 
The emergence of a limited right to defence counsel can initially be seen in its 
provision for misdemeanour classified crimes, which tended to be less serious 
criminal offences. Yet this exemption, although significant, was perhaps more 
striking in that it ensured that defence counsel would, at the same time, not be 
extended to those accused of more serious felony offences. Since these were 
typically the graver class of crimes in terms of both societal deviance and severity 
of punishment, the situation contributed towards something of a paradoxical state 
of affairs. One in which those who most needed counsel usually went without.52 
 
51 Under the Prisoners’ Counsel Act 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. IV., c. 114) 
52 “Until the eighteenth century lawyers played little part in the trial of felonies in England-… the 
defendants in such cases were prohibited at common law from engaging lawyers to act for them in 
court. In the case of less-serious crimes-misdemeanors-defendants were allowed counsel….” 
Beattie, J.M. (1991) ‘Scales of justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,’ Law and History Review, 9(2), 221-267, p. 221. 
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The extension of defence counsel to those accused of more serious offences 
was a slow process, which can trace its roots back to the Treason Act, 1696.53 This 
legislation was quite limited in scope, and therefore remained the preserve of those 
rich and powerful enough to commit such crimes. Defence counsel did not see a 
wider extension of the right to those accused of felonies, which would require its 
conferral to alleged offenders from far less illustrious backgrounds until the 
Prisoners’ Counsel Act, 1836.54  Despite the highly procedural and specialised 
nature of these changes the significance of both pieces of legislation should not be 
underestimated. Indeed, they had serious implications for the new norms 
surrounding what constituted a fair trial55 as well as the use of evidential maxims.  
 
53 “This sense of imbalance… explains… the Treason Act of 1696. That legislation gave defendants 
in treason cases…the right to be represented… as a means of redressing a wrong the now-dominant 
Whig political class had suffered …the use of charges of treason to destroy political opponents.” 
Beattie, J.M. (1991) ‘Scales of justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,’ Law and History Review, 9(2), 221-267, p. 224. 
54 “Changing notions of what constituted a fair trial helped to extend the rights of the defendant… 
accused felons had been allowed to employ a lawyer to speak for them … [b]y the early nineteenth 
century… restrictions began to appear…unfair, and efforts were made in Parliament to remove 
them...” Beattie, J.M. (1991) ‘Scales of justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in 
the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,’ Law and History Review, 9(2), 221-267, p. 250. 
55 “The unfairness of a procedure under which the case for the Crown was presented by lawyers, … 
while defendants were on their own to respond to what might be several hours of oral evidence....”   
Beattie, J.M. (1991) ‘Scales of justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,’ Law and History Review, 9(2), 221-267, p. 224. 
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The 1696 Act was pivotal in ensuring the politicisation of trials was avoided 
in preventing the full force of the State from “extracting” confessions. Indeed, the 
1836 Act clarified, standardised and depersonalised what was now viewed by a 
court as admissible evidence. They were both, effectively a significant overhaul of 
the procedure of administering justice in Britain. So, whilst “…[t]he prohibition 
[up]on defence counsel was [only] relaxed in stages from 1696 until 1836…” 
(Langbein 1994, pp. 1047-1048) by the nineteenth century a novel system of 
administering justice did bestow a professionalised official rebuttal to the accused.  
Such a profound procedural alteration fundamentally re-focused attention 
onto the arguments of the State. In “…the later eighteenth century and especially 
in the nineteenth century…” (Langbein 1994, p. 1048) the addition of defence 
counsel transformed the function of a trial, by repositioning the evidential burden 
onto the State. Hearings developed a distinctly modern feel, and began operating 
as a defence lawyer’s most important avenue for contesting the charges the State 
was alleging. Indeed, it was the duty of an accused’s lawyer to shift the emphasis 
of a criminal hearing towards a thorough interrogation of the State’s case. This now 
turned justice administration into a head-on collision between the contentions of 
the State and accused person (Ryan 2016, pp. 59-60; Langbein 2003, p. 271).56  
 
56 “In arguing for the virtues of certainty and regularity, and for a more impersonal administration 
of the law over a system that required discretion and that was by its very nature variable and personal 
in its application, those who supported the Prisoner's Counsel Act condemned the present system 
of trial in the way that law reformers condemned the reliance on capital punishment as a remnant 
of ancient severity.… the proponents of the Prisoner's Counsel Act not only wanted a more humane 
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3.8.3 A New Legal System Pits the Accused against the State  
The aforementioned changes meant that prosecutions now involved a 
robust exchange between the State and the accused. The reformers therefore began 
to ground the application of the law upon the principles of competitive and 
confrontational debate. The criminal trial therefore adopted a completely different 
visage, and became a forum in which individualised and regimented people 
resolved their disputes. The reformers also bequeathed this enthusiastic 
deliberation to professionals, whose sound and fury reverberated within the narrow 
confines of the law, inevitably ensuring they never jeopardised the hierarchical 
status quo they helped maintain. These animated quarrels, which resembled 
impassioned yet respectable marketplaces, yielded palatable outcomes, as 
barristers could now pursue arguments, and “…out of their noisy contest would 
emerge fairness as well as truth” (McGowen 1983, p. 124). All of these procedural 
adjustments meant the operation of the law from the nineteenth century onwards 
involved exchanges between the defendant and the State. This ensured that legal 
professionals ingrained an adversarial, yet highly professionalized level of 
 
form of trial, but also a more effective form of trial as part of a more effective administration of 
justice… they sought a trial that would uncover the truth of the matter at hand and that would 
eliminate narrowly personal considerations and the discretion that the old system inevitably placed 
in the hands of prosecutors and judges…” Beattie, J.M. (1991) ‘Scales of justice: Defense Counsel 
and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,’ Law and History 
Review, 9(2), 221-267, p. 257. 
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argumentation in the very procedure of how the State pursued prosecutions 
(Damaska 1986, p. 88; Cusack 2015; Ryan 2016, pp. 59-60; Wiener 1990, pp. 66). 
3.8.4 The Emergence of the Adversarial Hearing 
The criminal justice system now increasingly began to incorporate 
confrontation within its legal frames. In place of a personal and solemn pledge of 
honesty, which was the cornerstone of eighteenth-century procedure, the jurists of 
the time now felt that cross-examination was the authoritative feature of the 
nineteenth century trial. In fact, legal experts began treating lawsuits like conflicts, 
as trial actors started to pursue goals that became synonymous with the accusatorial 
frameworks of today. Since the adjudication of liability was dependent upon a lay 
group of participants, the jury, which now needed sufficient evidence before they 
could reach a binding verdict regarding the blameworthiness of a suspect, the 
deliberations of lawyers now became rather significant, because the result of a 
prosecution frequently depended upon the standard of their argumentation. 
Bentham, one of the period’s most candid commentators regarding the manner by 
which the trials of the time operated strongly supported this method of conducting 
prosecutions.57 He did so because he favoured verbal deliberations over written 
 
57 “Even the most outspoken critic of then-existing courtroom procedure, Jeremy Bentham, seemed 
to accept much of the adversarial view with his sweeping endorsement of oral testimony, broad re- 
liance on adversarial interrogation, and recognition of the need for zealous advocates” Landsman, 
S. (1990) ‘The rise of the contentious spirit: adversary procedure in eighteenth century England’, 
Cornell Law Review, 75(3), 497-609, p. 602. 
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ones, tended to trust the validity of the adversarial-based inquiry58 and believed 
that this administration of justice required the zealous pursuit of the contentions of 
the State and their accused through their respective legal representatives. Since the 
legal order of the time promoted an arrangement in which the adversarial trial 
became the predominant frame of reference, proceedings came to base themselves 
upon a fierce yet professionalized contestation of diametrically opposed narratives. 
59 However, these debates constrained, and emasculated the hitherto central role of 
previously active courtroom participants, such as the judiciary, who now tended to 
adopt a more peripheral position during prosecutions. 
3.8.5 Adversarialism Curtails the Magistrates Procedural Power 
This adversarial legal structure limited the previously more active 
procedural role of the judiciary during the nineteenth century prosecution. In fact, 
 
58 “When each witness is examined by the parties…examined primarily by the party by whom his 
testimony was called for.... cross-examined by the adverse party; he is examined by two persons, 
who, taken together, have every interest…to draw from him the whole truth: each having every 
interest…in drawing forth so much of the truth as makes in favour of his side. So far as the extraction 
of the truth is concerned, justice, under this system, has nothing to fear but such casual deficiency 
…in respect of the intellectual sufficiency of the parties and their agents in relation to this task”. 
Bentham, J. (1978) Rationale Of Judicial Evidence, London: Garland Publishing, Inc., p. 406-407. 
59 “When the business…is taken out of the hands of both parties, and lodged in the hands of the 
judge…the business is as badly arranged as possible. General deficiency of zeal, variegated by 
occasional excess of zeal…general carelessness, varieated by occasional partiality, both of them 
almost without control: such is the natural result of so incongruous a state of things”. Bentham, J. 
(1978) Rationale Of Judicial Evidence, London: Garland Publishing, Inc., p. 407. 
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the flourishing of the argumentative approach was inversely proportionate to the 
decline in the influence of the magistrate over the course of proceedings. The 
lawyer now superseded the magistrate as the most active participant in settling legal 
disputes. Indeed, legal protocol invariably mandated this curtailment of judicial 
involvement, since critical debate now dislodged inquiry as the predominant mode 
of resolving legal disputes. This variation in approach predicated itself upon 
ideologies that claimed that a laissez-faire magistrate would be best at upholding 
the cherished freedoms of the law, whilst an overly involved one often risked 
reproach (Landsman 1990, pp. 598-604; Ryan 2016, pp. 59-60). 
Cottu, a French commentator whose first-hand accounts offer a description 
of the framework that was in operation at this particular time, felt that not only had 
criminal prosecutions involving the argumentation of legal representatives with 
opposing narratives become quite common at this time, but he also noticed that 
“…the judge…remain[ed] almost a stranger to what [was] going on” (Langbein 
1994, p. 1071). They simply made notes of the arguments presented by the lawyers 
that were involved in a case and then gave the jury some advice about the relevant 
law when the litigation of the issues had ultimately concluded. The growing 
influence that legal representatives gained over how a case progressed undermined 
the traditional arrangement whereby power resided, to a far greater extent, with the 
jury. This also weakened the previous relationship between the judge and jury, 
leading to the severe constraint of the magistrate’s previously more interventionist 
role during criminal prosecutions (Ryan 2016, pp. 59-60; Langbein 1994, p. 1071). 
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 All of the previously outlined points: industrialisation; urbanisation; victim 
based structural issues; the Irish question; liberal anxieties; the burgeoning State 
and its fledgling reform of criminal justice undermined the paradigm of justice that 
had subsisted within eighteenth century Ireland. As the model had operated so 
poorly during the turbulence of the nineteenth century the British establishment 
had to implement new legal frameworks, which largely came to Ireland first and 
were then extended to the rest of the British Empire. However, these 
reconfigurations also caused victim marginalisation, which prejudiced their 
position. This chapter will therefore also examine the structural relegation of 
victims, and the way in which the outcomes of their isolation began to impact them. 
3.9 THE IMPACT OF VICTIM EXCLUSION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY 
BRITAIN  
3.9.1 Punishment becomes Successfully Centralised 
Penal discipline would become almost the exclusive prerogative of the State 
during the nineteenth century. In fact, the transition from the eighteenth to 
nineteenth century saw the indicting, convicting, and chastising of offenders, 
actions which had hitherto involved the implementation of some degree of civic 
involvement grow into “…privatised…and discrete state-accused event[s]” 
(Vaughan and Kilcommins 2008, p. 61). The authentic and legitimate excise of 
penal coercion was now professionalised by the State, transforming it into its 
prerogative, whilst the previous paradigm of justice, which was primarily victim 
centred now began to capitulate. In certain instances, the disputes of legal issues 
even stopped becoming a victim’s prerogative altogether. The criminal justice 
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system therefore began to relegate some of its previously more influential 
stakeholders, such as crime victims, within its procedural frames, which 
marginalised victims within its bureaucratic structures. The once victim-centred 
justice system now began to implement not only a thriving bureaucracy, which 
exemplified a shift towards new first principles, but also the novel ideological 
structure which now supported this. State organs would now become the primary 
penal authority, but their expropriation of the penal function prejudiced victims, as 
the transition came to marginalise them (Vaughan and Kilcommins 2008, p. 62). 
3.9.2 The Appropriation of Penal Power by the State  
The consolidation of penal power by the State disadvantaged victims of 
crime because it excluded them from the new legal arrangement that was created 
at this time. Their procedural demotion quickly developed a significant amount of 
procedural ‘immovability’ since their unique outlook became hopelessly lost 
within the newly adopted ‘Equality of Arms’ standpoint. This guaranteed victims 
of crime neither support nor dignity. However, this result was to be expected, as 
the ‘Equality of Arms’ idea is primarily focused upon the conflicting narratives of 
the State and the accused, which primarily seeks to guarantee the procedural rights 
of suspects, as opposed to victims of crime. In fact, due to the shift in regulatory 
emphasis that the State brought about through its procedural reforms, like the rise 
of adversarialism and the provision of legal counsel to the accused, the excluded 
discourse of crime victims was now no longer even detectable or comprehensible 
to the reformed legal order, as the new procedural regime that it upheld now found 
itself being informed by different assumptions. Indeed, the victim began to barely 
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matter within the entirety of its legal edifice. The governmental decision to adopt 
and substantially direct penal chastisement therefore came at a considerable price 
to the victim of crime. However, victims were also made to cede something to the 
justice system that was of arguably of even greater consequence, the very conflict 
itself (Kilcommins and Moffett 2015; Garland 2001, p. 179). 
3.9.3 Victims Vest their Disputes with the Government 
The State therefore mandated that the victim of crime, that entity which an 
offence typically most directly touched, also had to surrender their complaint unto 
the State. The new legal bureaucracy of the State not only marginalised the 
subjectivity of victimhood but also effectively turned the victim into a passive actor 
within the legal administration of justice. This was effectively done at every stage 
of criminal. Pre-trial investigations and detentions were now pursued by the police 
instead of victims. During the trial itself, the state now pursued a prosecution in the 
name of society and not the victim. Indeed, the victim would be lucky if they were 
summoned as a witness at all, so little were they needed within the overall operation 
of the law. In fact, trials could now be started and brought the whole way through 
to conclusion without the slightest intervention from the victim, who was rarely if 
ever given dedicated time within the new official procedure. Even at sentencing, 
their once influential control over proceedings had been eviscerated, and judges 
rarely looked to the victim in the same way. As they were more concerned with the 
potential for reform that an offender may have, which did not require their input. 
 This consequently changed the victim’s position within criminal justice. 
As they were once a stakeholder within the process, but now they were much more 
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of an afterthought. A person that one did not have to really give much attention to, 
when in the past they were, by in large, one of the most pivotal actors in the process. 
One whose interests were nearly always accounted for if the matter made it to trial. 
Outside of the official legal process they were now emasculated by the police, as 
they had little control over offenders which now passed over to the police or legal 
profession. Within the justice process too their position suffered to such an extent 
that the previous position whereby the judge was something of the puppet of the 
victim now changed with the shift in power dynamics pushing this previous 
relationship towards the legal profession, which would now take the position of the 
victim in prosecuting cases. This made the victim’s sway over the judiciary 
redundant. Since the victim no longer held sway as sentencing their criminal justice 
position altered here too, as other stakeholders like the police, lawyers and 
judiciary, who would all now have a say over the penalty to be imposed. This 
moved the victim from an actor that had to be appeased, to a on looker, who hoped 
that the powers that be might be enlightened enough to consider their plight.60  
The unfortunate victim was therefore victimised a second time, initially 
through the illegal act that they endured, but then again, within the very edifice of 
the criminal justice system itself, which refused to immerse them in a meaningful 
 
60  Christie, N. (1977) ‘Conflicts as Property’, British Journal of Criminology, 17(1), 1-15. 
Kilcommins, S., Leahy S., Moore, K. and Spain, E. (2018) The Victim in the Irish Criminal Justice 
Process, Manchester: Manchester University Press.Kilcommins, S., O’Donnell, I., O’Sullivan, E. 
and B. Vaughan (2004) Crime, Punishment and the Search for Order in Ireland, Dublin: Institute of 
Public Administration. 
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way within a framework that could potentially afford them with one of the most 
consequential moments of their life after they have suffered a criminal act. The 
victim consequently had to relinquish something that the law had hitherto respected 
as their own, since the State had now effectively all but confiscated their possession 
of it through its increasingly bureaucratic tendencies. Not even compensation could 
substitute this loss (even though the State did not tender it) since commodities came 
to significantly outweigh disputes in capitalist orders. This gave them a far greater 
import, meaning legal disputes came to embody something greater than stolen 
belongings. Although victims of crime had to place their contentions within the 
hands of the State, their forced renunciation of what was previously their own 
personalised conflict was arguably an even greater loss, both to the private 
individual and to the social order itself. 
3.9.4 The Renunciation of their Conflict Deprives Victims  
The ceding of victim complaints in the nineteenth century symbolised a 
painful sacrifice, both at the intimate level of the particular victim, but also to 
society more generally. Since the victim of crime is typically an individual who 
most directly experiences the physical and psychological harm that is associated 
with a criminal offence, these experiences tend to elicit severe physical and/or 
psychological injuries, which may never truly heal. However, the State now began 
to conduct trials without any input from those individuals that a criminal had most 
directly touched. Indeed, it was the State, rather than the victim, that the law now 
considered to be most prejudiced by an offender’s crime, and the party most 
deserving of consideration. The State therefore became a party that enumerated all 
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of the various injustices that it had suffered because of an offender’s criminality, 
rather than the actual victim who had suffered its impact. In fact, State bodies and 
actors slowly became ubiquitous celebrities within the media, while the unknown 
victim, rarely, if ever, read about themselves within the reporting of a criminal 
prosecution. The conflict that victims of crime therefore waived represented a 
considerable deprivation to the victim and the public, and meant that the State-run 
structures that the Irish criminal justice system now deployed to administer justice 
came to almost entirely disregard the victim of crime (Christie 1977, p 3, pp. 7-8). 
3.9.5 This Victim Exclusive Legal Framework Ostracises Victims 
The legal arrangement that the State established during the nineteenth 
century came at the cost of the exclusion of crime victims. In fact, their procedural 
exclusivity effectively meant that there were no longer any sincere moments 
offered by the legal system aimed at developing the bond that connected a victim 
of crime to the person who had wronged them. Indeed, the process of prosecuting 
offenders now excelled at keeping victims of crime marginal, annoyed, and 
frequently embarrassed. This usually occurred due the tactless public questioning 
that they often had to endure as part of the overall criminal justice process, which 
effectively thwarted any chance of a meaningful interaction that a victim could 
have had with either their offender or the criminal justice system itself. Although 
the State and its legal processes now denied victims of crime anything remotely 
resembling genuine dignity these poor souls persevered like the unfortunate 
characters in a Kafkaesque novel. Indeed, the State so deprived the victim of crime 
of any opportunity or tools with which to achieve a more meaningful interaction 
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with their offender in its new system of criminal justice that most victims of crime 
were usually only able to unfortunately rationalise their experiences through the 
stereotyping of criminal offenders. They frequently departed from the painful and 
anonymising process in an emotionally distressed and volatile state, having already 
developed, or being strongly inclined towards accepting, crude oversimplifications 
of why their victimisation had occurred, which only really served to aggravate the 
alienation that criminal offenders already suffer (Christie 1977, p. 8).  
The law of the nineteenth century therefore came to adopt a level of 
administrative functionality that now discounted the desires and viewpoints of 
victims of crime. As this new bureaucratic administration of justice rapidly 
‘transcended’ the victim centred paradigms of the past, it also modified the way in 
which the law managed, communicated, and justified its procedures. In fact, the 
law now systematically curtailed the victim centred methods of the previous 
century through a consolidation of the ‘State/accused’ paradigm of administrative 
justice. The State achieved this through its subsuming of victims within a new 
intangible communal essence, which it termed the ‘public interest’. Governmental 
authorities therefore rationalised the legal reforms that they implemented by 
making frequent reference to this ‘public interest’, however the new legal 
procedures that they constituted almost completely ignored the outlooks of crime 
victims, which the authorities now deemed to be more or less prejudicial and vague. 
This all led to the State’s disregarding of the victim within its newly reformed legal 
system. However, it also caused the marginal victim of crime to become an 
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effective prisoner within a Weberian ‘cage’ of bureaucratic criminal justice 
(Vaughan and Kilcommins 2010, pp. 65-66; Habermas 1992/2007, p. 146, p. 309). 
3.10  A  BUREAUCRATIC ‘IRON CAGE’  ENSNARES THE EXCLUDED VICTIM  
3.10.1 Industrialisation Undermines Personal Autonomy 
The introduction of a more mechanised and dynamic means of production 
during the nineteenth century paradoxically made the survival of the average 
person a much more elaborate affair. This change fundamentally undermined the 
idea that people could self-govern themselves in a libertarian manner, which 
became more unrealistic than ever in a society in which people were so heavily 
dependent upon others for the most basic and constituent elements of their own 
personal lives. The renowned Sociologist Max Weber was one of the first to grasp 
how the commercial market that was driven by rapid industrialisation best 
embodied the philosophy of utilitarianism, something which reinforced his 
convictions regarding the latent, yet innate ‘undemocratic’ tendencies of 
technological advances. This outcome impressed itself within the writings of 
Weber, as he saw how these technological advancements invariably transformed 
the achievement of the most basic prerequisites of life into a complex exercise. 
Indeed, he was at pains to point out that this nearly always ensured that ordinary 
members of society rarely comprehend the problems that they now faced, which 
ended up ingraining societies’ dependence upon experts (Douglass 2015, p. 9).  
Although Weber accepted that capitalist markets and free enterprise could 
clearly produce a certain degree of self-sufficiency, he also anticipated that this had 
an inevitable endpoint. Since technological advances typically involve a 
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destabilisation, or “disruption”, to use the now popular term, of the status quo, this 
invariably thwarted what the general populace itself began to perceive as ‘outdated’ 
desires for personal independence. Weber claimed that this trend would perpetually 
persist because a different way forward was almost unimaginable due to the 
pressures that the public created for the economy to continue to grow in line with 
the industrial rates of development that the nineteenth century had now introduced. 
Indeed, Weber went to great pains to underline how, within what he termed to be 
the era ‘high capitalism’ of the nineteenth century, every indicator was actually 
suggesting “…a growing loss of freedom” (Weber cited in Douglass 2015, p. 10). 
 Therefore, although the nineteenth century saw an increased availability of 
goods, as well as an increase in the capacity to produce these commodities, the 
growth of this kind of industrialised bureaucratic society fundamentally 
complicated the task of living. This made the achievement of self-sufficiency and 
personal independence for the vast majority of people a much more difficult 
enterprise than it was previously in the last century. Weber explained this using his 
image of an ‘iron cage’, which was emblematic of these structural confines and 
limitations. Indeed, the victim of crime actually became an ‘iron cage’ captive par 
excellence, who was simultaneously marginalised, dependent upon and confined 
within an order of bureaucratic legality that they now came to serve. 
3.10.2 Weber’s “Iron Cage” Demonstrates Victim Marginalisation  
The ‘iron cage’ representation that Weber symbolically utilised illustrates 
the demotion and confinement of entities within bureaucracies that are both 
difficult to navigate and participate in. The State arguably detained victims of crime 
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within such a cage in the nineteenth century, as its system of courts and laws came 
to both overlook yet restrain victims of crime within its newly reformed organs of 
criminal justice. In fact, the ‘iron cage’ explicitly portrays the nineteenth century 
dilemma of victims of crime, as the State effectively imprisoned them within the 
very criminal justice institutions that they themselves helped to uphold and 
maintain through their own albeit restricted participation. The victim of crime was 
therefore arguably the model ‘iron cage’ prisoner, disregarded, yet ensnared within 
the very bureaucratic arrangement that they were now required to help sustain. 
Indeed, Weber’s ‘iron cage’ embodies the abject relegation and internment that 
victims of crime endured as inmates of this ‘iron cage’ through the legal 
discounting and detention of them by the State (Baehr 2001, p. 153).  
The structural expulsion of victims during the nineteenth century had 
significant outcomes. Indeed, the State now undermined the hitherto central 
procedural role of victims, who now found themselves thrust aside by a newly 
rationalised legal procedure. This ensured that the disagreement that a victim of 
crime previously owned now became the exclusive prerogative of the State. 
Although the procedural omission of victims from the administration of justice was 
a tremendous dispossession, the loss of their struggle was the ultimate deprivation. 
Indeed, the way in which the legal establishment came to treat victims also 
compounded this, and further isolated them within Irish criminal justice. These 
actions meant the State now caught victims of crime within a dehumanising 
bureaucratic ‘iron cage’. The nineteenth century therefore saw victim 
marginalisation by an officialised justice paradigm as well as their incarceration 
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within a Kafkaesque legal procedure. The variation in the procedural position of 
victims between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is therefore startling; as 
the once pivotal entity became an unrecognizable abstraction within a reconfigured 
criminal justice system that barely included them within its own procedural frames, 
and often did so at considerable personal expense to the victim. 
Before concluding there are two key issues that need to be emphasised with 
regards to this overall point concerning the victim and their new iron cage. The 
point is of supreme relevance with regards to this chapter about the nineteenth 
century, as this was the epoch in which this alteration is probably most pronounced. 
Indeed, there is a massive wave of expertise that serves to lock huge swaths of 
society in rubrics that they are confounded by due to their complexity. In fact. the 
complexity of industrial life, as well as industry, is a hallmark of the nineteenth 
century which serves as a rupture which transports society from its agrarian past 
into its industrial future. The victim is yet another example of a field, namely 
criminal justice, in which popular participation was too complex to incorporate lay 
individuals, who were excluded. This essentially made such realms the preserve of 
experts, for which justice was a profession and something they saw as their domain.  
This issue is also of major relevance to the overall thrust of this thesis, 
which seeks to chart the victim’s re-emergence and its wider implications. This is 
due to the fact that this rupture clearly evidences for the reader how the victim went 
from occupying a pivotal stakeholder role to becoming a mere bit part player. It 
also helps to effectively capture and iterate what was effectively lost as a result of 
this transition. Indeed, not only was the change in this case de facto undemocratic, 
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but also all of the input that the public had contributed in this area was now 
dismissed and deemed irrelevant. This is key to understanding just what a loss this 
presented to the victim but also to criminal justice and society more generally. As 
public perspectives were now side-lined as a consequence of such change.  
The change is also crucial to an understanding of how the re-emergence of 
the victim in the modern age might be better seen as a re-integration as opposed to 
an artificial introduction. Its exposition therefore incorporates some of the lost 
subjectivity and public input that has been all but ignored since the days when the 
victim was procedurally central. It also intends to address, in a much more 
tangential way, the threat of penal populism. As it must be said that, as this chapter 
has shown, there were major issues that existed with victim centred justice.  
In fact, it is hoped that through charting the past of the victim this process 
might help further elucidate how one might best address these contemporary issues. 
This is of course not to engage in presentism, but to grapple with how exactly the 
victim came to be re-introduced back into Irish criminal justice. Particularly in light 
of some persistent tensions, such as those between the victim and offender. As well 
as ideas like popular participation and procedural justice, which are engaged with 
when charting the progression of these issues over time. This study of the iron cage 
is therefore of considerable advantage to an articulation of this thesis. Namely, that 
not only has the victim now re-emerged as a more influential justice stakeholder, 
but that this has not, as a consequence of our socio-legal context, unfairly 
prejudiced other more vulnerable stakeholders, such as the criminal offender.   
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This chapter explained how victims went from occupying one of the most 
important roles in eighteenth-century criminal justice, to becoming the forgotten 
face of nineteenth century crime. It demonstrated the realities of industrialisation 
and urbanisation to contextualise the victim within the harshness of nineteenth 
century life in order to reveal the driving forces that were changing society and 
making it fundamentally ungovernable by the victim centred paradigms of the 
previous century. The chapter also considered the issues surrounding victim 
inclusion to help illustrate how persistent problems with the victim centred justice 
system of the eighteenth century made it a particularly ripe framework for reform. 
The Irish situation was also alluded to in order emphasise this trend, as the 
worsening of that situation accentuated those flaws that had already existed within 
the previous model of victim centred justice, which ended up obliging its 
replacement with paradigms that were now much more victim exclusionary. It 
similarly stressed popular anxieties to emphasise that it was fear, rather than some 
unadulterated humanistic tendency, which tended to end up promoting the reforms 
that brought about the legal move from the inclusion of victims to their exclusion 
from the procedures of nineteenth century justice. The growth of the rational State 
also helped to explain the demise of victim inclusion, as victims quickly became 
procedurally marginal once the reformers of the era had implemented the victim 
exclusionary models of rationalised nineteenth century justice. The chapter then 
discussed victim exclusion in order to highlight the impact of this bureaucratisation 
of the law upon victim of crimes. This uncovered several of the mainly undesirable 
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outcomes that these reforms had upon them, which evidenced the fact that although 
rational reforms were advantageous for the State and the accused, they were a 
dramatic step backwards in terms of the procedural accommodation of victims. 
The imagery of Weber’s ‘iron cage’ was also acknowledged in order to 
demonstrate how these reforms ended up impacting upon the isolated victim, 
leaving them unequipped to try and navigate their own path within the labyrinth 
that the Irish criminal justice system now became. This chapter complements the 
next segment of this thesis, which explains how the predicament of the Irish victim 
only began to improve in a gradual sense in the twentieth century after the public 
began to make demands of those in authority for the more humane treatment of 
victims. This demonstrates how their exclusion in the nineteenth century was so 
impactful that it effectively hindered, until quite recently, the attempts that people 
have made in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries to provide victims of crime 
with more rights-based guarantees within the Irish system of administering justice. 
The next chapter of this thesis moves on to discuss the ideological 
transitions which began to question the victim exclusive model of criminal justice 
in Ireland. These transitions took place in the fields of feminism and victimology. 
The chapter takes each of these ideological frames, and, after a brief explanation 
of it, as well as its contribution, assesses the impact that each had upon the 
willingness of pivotal gatekeepers to readmit the victim as a justice stakeholder and 
participant.  The material force of twentieth century ideology is therefore seen here 
not only in the way in which an intellectual awakening of these perspectives forced 
a re-evaluation of criminal justice priorities, but also in how such thought inspired 
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collectives and individuals to campaign for a greater level of victim provision. So, 
in this respect, the adoption and promotion of these particular fields of intellectual 
inquiry became the cognitive frame, and indeed vector, for a paradigm shift from a 
world in which the victim was an afterthought to one in which their individuality 
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PART 2 SOCIOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION 
FEMINISM AND VICTIMOLOGY HIGHLIGHT THE HIDDEN 
EXPERIENCES OF VICTIMS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Chapter four will seek to address the question as to what exactly was the 
catalyst for the re-introduction of the victim within Irish criminal procedure. In 
addressing this area of inquiry this chapter will focus more upon the ideological 
narratives and consciousness raising which prompted this alteration. In so doing, it 
will not only gauge the impact of such ideologies on the re-incorporation of the 
victim into the mainstream, but will also evidence the influence that these particular 
schools of thought. Particularly how each subcategory helped to bring this about at 
a practical grassroots level. This will also importantly allow the author to gauge the 
extent and nature of the victim’s re-introduction back into Irish criminal justice. 
The following chapter outlines two theoretical frameworks that are 
fundamental to an accurate understanding of the re-emergence of victims which 
occurred in Ireland after the Second World War, since the feminist and 
victimological researchers who conducted these studies were among the first to 
challenge the victim exclusive ontologies of the previous century. In fact, the 
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highlighting of this group and their issues helped to flag the realities of victimhood 
as an issue. As these discursive fields evolved, even more victim centred 
approaches began to isolate the study of victims from their offenders. These studies 
raised greater awareness and revealed more, hitherto latent, information about 
victims of crime. The following chapter addresses the contributions that each one 
of these standpoints has made by first examining its ideological content, and how 
this has helped to better describe victimhood. It ends by considering the impact that 
each ideological frame has had upon the eventual re-centrality of victims. For the 
sake of clarity, both sections on feminism and victimology will adopt more or less 
the same structure. Although there are other, more grassroots factors that assisted 
with the re-introduction of the victim of crime within Ireland, this thesis begins by 
first considering the frames of feminism and victimology. This is because both of 
these perspectives are quite abstract, and therefore more separable from the 
practical drivers of change that the next chapter of this particular thesis will 
explore. 
4.2 VICTIMOLOGY  
4.2.1 The Birth and Evolution of the Study of Victims 
In the aftermath of the Great Depression, academic concern focused upon 
victims of crime, creating the field of victimology. In fact, the endeavours of its 
adherents, victimologists, helped to erode the previous exclusionary discourse that 
had hitherto side-lined victims of crime and hampered their visibility. It is in this 
way that victimology was as much an academic evolution as an ideological one. 
Victimology’s star began to rise after the Second World War, and it gained even 
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greater prominence in the Reagan and Thatcherite eras, becoming a global 
phenomenon thereafter. Although early studies in the field largely attempted to use 
the victim of crime to grapple with the enigma of criminality, latter scholars began 
to argue that what victimology really needed to do was take a more victim-centred 
approach. This engendered even further research, which tended to focus upon the 
victim of crime in isolation, thereby broadening the appeal of victim issues 
(Wolhuter et al. 2009, p.1; Mawby and Walklate 1994, pp. 69-70; Walklate and 
Walklate 2007, p. 12, p. 26, p. 122; Von Hentig 1948, 1967, p. 448; Wolfgang 
1958; Kilcommins and Moffett 2016; Garland 2002; Williams and Goodman-
Chong 2009, p. 1; Spalek and Campling 2006, pp. 7-8; Van Dijk 1997; Cressey 
1986; Elias 1994). 
Post-World War II victim perspectives broadly fell into three categories: 
positive, radical and critical. Since the advances of all of these schools tended to 
be ideologically distinct, each tended to progress the cause of victim inclusivity in 
their own unique way. Indeed, as the field of victimology evolved, each theoretical 
lens began to provide a far richer portrayal of victims of crime. The following 
sections will therefore demonstrate the unique contributions that each one of these 
ideological standpoints have made to the promotion of our awareness about victims 
of crime, as well as their issues, and how this has helped to bring about their 
effective re-centralisation (Walklate and Walklate 2007, p. 28; Miers 1990). 
This section addresses positive victimology because it effectively created 
the study of victims as a sub-branch of criminology. In fact, positive theorists like 
Von Hentig broke new ground by highlighting how society could prejudice victims, 
influencing figures like Mendelsohn and Schafer to further hone these ideas. 
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Indeed, it was through the creation of these new dynamic frames of reference that 
each subsequent positivist theorist began to forward the overall victimological 
perspective. This initially involved the creation of more elementary models of 
thought like the ‘lifestyle’ theory, which argued that victim routines created 
situations that became advantageous to the commission of crime. The positivists 
also complemented this through the promotion of ‘routine activity’ theory, an idea 
which indicated that certain vulnerable groups of victims could promote their 
victimisations through their personal actions. Contemporary positive 
victimologists have also stressed the impact of crime upon victims, prompting 
further rights conferrals that have fostered their increased re-integration within 
criminal justice. Indeed, figures like Garland argue that this is rather symptomatic 
of the modern tendency to re-conceptualise victims of crime as central to the overall 
criminal justice process within developed societies such as the United States. 
Although he does suggest that this has created a certain degree of tension within 
criminal justice which ultimately requires resolution, he also remains adamant that 
it did indeed bring about a golden age of public and academic interest in the victim.  
This golden age was encapsulated by the ideas proposed by the three major 
figures of the movement. These three thinkers were Mendelsohn Von Hentig and 
Schafer.1  Each contributed considerably to the understanding of the victim by 
 
1 Mendelsohn “…created a short taxonomy of six categories that centered on the relative guilt of 
victims… designed to facilitate the degree to which a victim shared the responsibility for a crime 
with the offender... 1. The completely innocent victim. 
2. The victim with minor guilt. 3. The victim who is as guilty as the offender. 4. The victim who is 
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looking, in many cases for the first time, at the relationship between offenders and 
victims and developing working typologies and theories which sought to explain 
how they believed that this relationship actually functioned. The unifying and 
probably most problematic idea behind all of these three thinkers, as well as many 
of the early positive victimologist, was that you could ascribe a certain amount of 
responsibility to the victim for the offence they had suffered. To add insult to injury 
this assessment would often point to the victim’s personal constitution to explain 
this responsibility and use such an explanation to essentially argue that they 
themselves actually created as situation in which they were likely to be victimised.  
 
more guilty than the offender.  5. The most guilty victim. 6. The imaginary victim.” Von Hentig 
“… created a taxonomy that described how victims were responsible for their harms… based on 
psychological, social and biological factors….he developed three broad categorizations of victims. 
1. General: age, gender, vulnerabilities.2. Psychological: depressed, acquisitive, loneliness. 3. 
Activating: victim turned offender. … expanded his categories to 13: 1. The Young 2. The Female 
3. The Old 4. The Mentally Defective and Deranged 5. The Immigrants 6. The Minorities 7. The 
Dull Normals 8. The Depressed 9. The Acquisitive 10. Wanton 11. The Lonesome and the 
Heartbroken 12. The Tormentor 13. The Blocked, Exempted, or Fighting.” Schafer “…developed 
a taxonomy based on the victim’s functional responsibility for the crime:  1. Unrelated Victims (no 
victim responsibility) 2. Provocative Victims (victim shares responsibility) 
3. Precipitative Victims (some degree of victim responsibility) 4. Biologically Weak Victims (no 
victim responsibility) 5. Socially Weak Victims (no victim responsibility) 6. Self-Victimizing (total 
victim responsibility) 7. Political Victim (no victim responsibility).” Dussich, John P. J. (2006a) 
Victimology – Past, Present and Future, 131st International Senior Seminar,Visiting Experts’ 
Papers, UNAFEI, Fuchu,Tokyo, Japan, p. 45-46.  
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Therefore, although these typologies and theories were novel, they were 
also deeply problematic on a number of levels. By studying victims in this way, the 
concern of early victimologist was very much bound together with assessing the 
“culpability” of victims for an offence. This was, and is, deeply problematic. as it 
lends itself weight to arguments that seek to blame victims for their situation. 
Indeed, in certain contexts, such as rape, for example, such reasoning seems to 
encourage the adoption and entrenchment of false premises. It would also be 
considerably out of step with the commonly held societal mores and standards now 
predominant within most mainstream discourse on the subject of victimisation.  
There is also a considerable lack of concern and empathy for victims 
evidenced in such views, with these pioneers often simply using the victim as a 
means to a criminological end. This is something which has ironically led to the 
reflection and reinforcement of antiquated criminological bias. In fact victim 
blaming, for example, is, and continues to be, deeply prejudicial to the safety and 
interests of victims.2 (Williams Goodman-Chong 2009, p. 1, p. 4, p. 12; Von Hentig 
 
2  “Early victimologists like Mendelsohn and Von Hentig developed typologies based on the extent 
of the victim’s own culpability…[t]he preoccupation of the first victimologists is neatly summed 
up in the title of Fattah's first monograph on the subject: La victime, est-elle coupable? … It has 
been pointed out that an analytical focus on the victim's guilt can be misused for victim blaming, 
especially when applied to victims of sexual violence…[e]arly victimologists have indeed often 
exhibited precious little sensitivity for victims… Mendelsohn purposefully developed his first 
victim typologies as analytical tool for his work as defence lawyer. With hindsight early 
victimological analyses can be seen as criminological expressions of the biases about victims of 
crime prevailing among many criminal lawyers at the time. In the earliest victimological studies the 
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1948/1967, p. 442, 1947, p. 383 Mendelsohn 1974, p. 6; Schafer 1968; Hindelang 
et al. 1978 p. 3; Wolhuter et al. 2009, p. 15, p. 20; Cohen and Felson 1979; Garland 
1990, 2002).  
Even though the claims of positive victimology were occasionally rather 
problematic, they arguably seemed to strongly resonate with certain portions of the 
population. Its theories have therefore remained significant, despite their obvious 
shortcomings, because they were so pivotal in helping to make the victim of crime 
a much more topical subject within personal and professional debate. However, as 
positive victimologists tended to focus upon the victim of crime in isolation, this 
still overlooked certain classes of crime victim. Yet such neglect inspired future 
academics to study what positivism had failed to unearth, thereby forwarding the 
overall victimological project. In fact, every member of the radical school was 
pivotal to the task of helping to better encompass the victim of crime within the 
thought and scholarship of the twentieth century (Williams and Goodman-Chong 
2009, p. 3, p. 2, p. 4; Von Hentig 1948/1967, p. 436; Walklate 1989; Wolfgang 
1958; Ben-David 2000; Von Hentig 1940; Wolhuter et al. 2009, p.18, p. 24, p.16; 
Wilson 1985, p. 260; Spalek 2006, p. 42; Melossi 2008, p. 52; Slapper and Tombs 
1999). 
Indeed, the radical school of thought in this area now increasingly began to 
explore victims of crime from more marginal groups and genders in an attempt to 
 
experiences or needs of victims seem of little interest to the authors. They were more interested in 
offenders.” van Dijk, J. J. M. (2009) ‘Free the victim: A critique of the western conception of 
victimhood’, International Review of Victimology, 16(1), 1-33, p. 19. 
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highlight the victims which positivism had overlooked. This all started to occur 
when radical victimologists began to perceive victims through a predominantly 
Marxist lens, with their arguments surrounding the victimisation that white-collar 
crime engendered proving to be quite influential. They argued that such crime led 
to economic and ecological catastrophe, while their studies considerably broadened 
the scope of victimisation, making both the concept of victimhood and the idea of 
being a victim issues of real importance (Taylor et al. 1975, p. 44, p. 263, 1975, p. 
34; Wolhuter et al. 2009, p. 20, p. 21; Box 1983; Melossi 2008, p. 60; Pearce 1976).  
 Left Realists took up this mantel by deliberating upon the impact of crime, 
thereby familiarising the public with its realities, as well as the impact that it can 
ultimately have upon victims of crime. This consciousness-raising exercise about 
victims of crime also demonstrated how street crime disproportionality affected 
some of the poorest members of contemporary society. They also tended to study 
historically neglected groups of victims, such as the sufferers of racist and domestic 
abuse. This came to prompt even further debate about why different classes of 
victims had different vulnerability levels, as well as why certain victims of crime 
often found it more difficult to overcome their victimisation (Wolhuter et al. 2009, 
pp. 21-22, p. 23; Young 1999, p. 485; Lea and Young 1984; Melossi 2008, p. 60).  
The feminist idea that gender was socially constructed and thereby not 
deterministic also helped to promote the emergence of feminist victimology, which 
flagged the victimisation of women in society, something which victimologists had 
hitherto tended to overlook. Although the feminist perspective was initially 
somewhat ‘essentialist’, it did help to mainstream what were previously obscured 
instances of abuse. It did this by elevating “...the consciousness of women to the 
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oppression of criminal violence” (Young 2006, p. 3; Moore-Walsh 2013, pp. 182-
189). Feminists also promoted the idea that victims could overcome the impact of 
criminality, thereby lessening its stigma and encouraging a more authentic debate 
surrounding these issues. Indeed, modern developments, like ‘intersectionalism’, 
have helped to raise awareness about how victims can labour under multiple layers 
of marginalisation, thereby affording society with a better explanation of how 
exactly the victimisation of these kinds of individuals can often be magnified 
within society (Lengerman and Niebrugge 1996, p. 462; Wolhuter et al. 2009, p. 
24, p.23, p.25; Mackinnon 1989, p. 141; Spalek 2006, p. 42,p. 43; Crenshaw 1993b, 
p. 1242; Laster and Raman 1997, p. 211; Bond 2003, p. 76; Chana 2005, p. 18).   
Even though radical victimology could hardly have encompassed every 
kind of victim typology, it contributed to the procedural re-inclusion of victims of 
crime within criminal justice by advancing the analysis of the subjectivity of crime 
victims within both lay and scholarly discourse. Although its investigations of 
victims of crime from different classes and genders considerably broadened the 
horizons of victimology, it was still unable to fully capture certain types of crime 
victim, which continued to remain elusive. Critical victimology was therefore the 
perspective that remedied these shortcomings with a much more detailed 
exposition of the subjectivities that the radical school had overlooked, trading the 
confines of strictly positive methodology for the subjective insights that could be 
gleaned from extending the study of victims beyond its previous boundaries. 
In fact, critical victimology took the radical victimological stance to its 
logical conclusion. The approach first emerged when victimological scholars began 
assessing the approaches of the positive and radical schools. The critical 
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perspective argued that the offender based, rather than victim centred agenda of 
positive victimology failed to consider the victim in isolation. It also highlighted 
how radicalism had similarly neglected certain victim perspectives (Mawby and 
Walklate 1994, p. 14-15; Spalek 2006, p. 44; Wolhuter et al. 2009, p. 26, p. 27). 
Critical victim theorists therefore claimed that a lot of information about 
victims lay beyond the frames of positivism and radicalism, since these 
perspectives had tended to overlook those victim subjectivities that had tended to 
only really be perceptible beyond these parameters. They therefore systematically 
began to take much greater notice of these types of hidden victimisations, which 
mostly tended to occur ‘... behind our backs’ (Wolhuter et al. 2009, p. 27; Walklate 
2003, p. 122). Critical victimology even found out that victims could often 
transcend their victimisation, by citing inclusion advocacy as a potentially cathartic 
route. Its proponents, who had now armed themselves with such knowledge, began 
to popularize the notion that victims of crime deserved, and could benefit from, a 
much more meaningful role within criminal justice. In fact, they argued that 
expansive human rights guarantees were imperative to this, in order to ensure that 
the re-integration of victims of crime would ultimately be fulfilling (Wolhuter et 
al. 2009, p. 28; Mawby and Walklate 1994, p. 20, p.19, p. 28, pp. 177-179). 
The preceding paragraphs of this thesis illustrate how victimological 
discourse began to make a contribution to the re-emergence of victims after the 
Second World War. It did so by unearthing hitherto unexamined typologies of 
victim, raising awareness about these through academic as well as public discourse 
and providing a normative justification for victim inclusion that has helped to 
promote laws that have proactively re-integrated the victim of crime. In fact, “…the 
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past twenty years have seen a surge in the political and scholarly interest in the 
needs and experiences of victims in the criminal process” (Ring 2017, p. 89). 
However, although Ireland has certainly been influenced by these inclusionary 
trends there is room for improvement if it wishes to replicate the standard of 
analysis that currently exists in countries that are more developed in this area, such 
as the United States. This disparity is largely understandable, as the professional 
domestic networks and infrastructure could not be as evolved within this particular 
field in Ireland. Yet, as one of criminology’s latest developments, victimology has 
the potential to bridge the gap that exists between abstract theory and practical 
reality in this country, despite some of the constraints that exist in the area. In fact, 
the evolution of the criminological discipline in the country tends to indicate that 
this vibrant sub-field of victimology will almost certainly end up being one of its 
most promising avenues for future inquiry (Bosworth and Hoyle 2011; Pearce 
1992; Garland 2001; Rolston and Tomlinson 1982; Kilcommins et al. 2004; 
O’Donnell 2005, p. 99).  
Victimology as a whole has already prompted considerable information 
gathering about the gender and socio-economic status of crime victims. In fact, the 
emergence of so many different classifications have actually commoditised the 
subjectivity of victimhood itself. Indeed, increased public awareness about 
victimisation has effectively opened up several newly emergent markets, which 
have permitted governments of a more neo-liberal persuasion to increasingly shift 
their policies in the areas of terrorism and crime toward the private securitisation 
of what was previously perceived to be the remit of the State (Walklate and 
Walklate 2007, pp. 14-15; Green 2007; Simon 2007; Zedner 2003, p. 160).  
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This unearthing of such information also clarified victim experiences and 
statistics. In fact, the development raised greater awareness, and promoted 
reintegration, something that has helped re-centralise victims within civic and 
intellectual life. Indeed, such knowledge became invaluable, as academics and 
laypeople now wished to familiarize themselves regarding such topics. Scholars 
have also used this data to reveal the advantages that the procedural re-
centralisation of victims could offer. This has also provided the impetus for 
grassroots activism, which was another aspect that has played a key role in helping 
to bring about the re-inclusion of victims. The next part of this thesis will now 
attempt to explain how feminism was another important discursive field that has 
really played a very central role in helping to bring this development about. 
4.3 FEMINISM  
4.3.1 The Feminine Turn Consciousness Raising and Changing 
Feminism played a pivotal role in the re-integration of the Irish crime victim 
back into the procedural frames of the Post-World War II justice model. Although 
its impact might not have been as dramatic as it was in other jurisdictions with a 
longer history of popular female protest, such as France or the United Kingdom, 
the author contends that feminism was imperative to transforming what was 
practically possible for the Irish victim of crime in terms of their procedural 
inclusivity. It did this by raising awareness within Ireland about female victims of 
crime and their structural marginality within society. This section illustrates this by 
first outlining some of the core tenets of feminism. It then goes on to demonstrate 
how international feminists helped promote domestic progress in Ireland. The 
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outcomes of this also merit explanation, which leads to a summation of the 
contribution that feminism has made to the re-integration of the Irish crime victim. 
 Although feminism might be a concept that is somewhat difficult to define, 
a number of broadly common assumptions and commitments are immediately 
recognisable. These are the marginality of women, gender-based prejudice and the 
necessity of progressive social change in the area of sexual difference. However, 
due to the inevitable fragmentation of feminism’s ideological perspective, it is 
important to bear in mind that it is something of an oversimplification to conceive 
of the entire perspective as one uniform ideology. The author must therefore 
approach it as a conglomerate of lenses, which may share certain theoretical 
characteristics but still contain considerable areas of disagreement (Daly and 
Chesney-Lind 1988, p. 502; Mitchell and Oakley 1986, p. 3; Delmar 1986, p. 88). 
Despite the fragmentation of its ideological perspective, feminism was 
pivotal in helping to expose the marginalisation of women within society and their 
neglect within public discourse, which re-conceptualised the gendered crime that 
women suffer as a serious societal problem. It also altered standpoints on gendered 
violence by transforming ignorance of these issues into awareness. It was in this 
way that feminism helped to keep the public informed, combated victim blaming 
and provided structural supports for those suffering crime. Although this mainly 
tended to aid female victims of crime, it also moved the victim of crime more 
generally from the periphery of debate, to the epicentre of contemporary dialogue. 
This next segment evidences how feminism effectively prompted this by 
examining its global constellation and influence that this ultimately had on the 
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island of Ireland (Connolly 2003, p. 67; Connell 1990, p. 523; Edwards 2014, p. 
687, p. 689: Smart 1989; Spalek 2006; Walklate 2011, p. 132). 
Global feminism before the Second World War primarily focused itself 
upon equality in terms of opportunity, which often unfortunately stifled widespread 
debate regarding female crime victims. Although various groups and individuals 
attempted to broaden the ideological frame of feminism before World War II, 
change did not really occur in any meaningful way until after The Second World 
War had effectively ended. It was in this period that Simone de Beauvoir’s 
published her magnum opus, The Second Sex. In it she argued that the suppression 
of femininity by masculinity was both wide and pervasive. She also highlighted 
how this impacted everything from the limited opportunities that existed for 
women outside of the home to the kind of drudgery that they had to engage in 
within it, for, “[f]ew tasks are more like the torture of Sisyphus than housework, 
with its endless repetition: the clean becomes soiled, the soiled is made clean, over 
and over, day after day… (De Beauvoir 1968, p. 451). 
These commentaries were profoundly influential upon society and 
essentially created the blueprint for feminism after the Second World War ended. 
Simone de Beauvoir, along with other key figures such as Germaine Greer, that 
astute observer who noted how the “…opposite [of] patriarchy is not matriarchy 
but fraternity…” (cited in Franks 2004, p. 258) now argued that society needed to 
advocate for sweeping socio-legal reforms. This tide of feminist activism 
eventually emerged in the sixties. In fact, feminism was so influential at this 
particular time that its impact upon conventional cultural forms globally impacted 
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(Daly and Chesney-Lind 1988, p. 498; Gross 1986; Van Houten 2015, p. 113, p. 
115; Willis 2012; De Beauvoir 1972; Greer 2006; Kelly 2000, pp. 161-163). 
Feminism grew at an exponential rate during the 1960s, even though it had 
initially primarily involved educated women who were frustrated with 
‘malestream’ protest. The dramatic impact of the Warren Court, which had 
entrenched the gains of the civil rights movement, also led to remonstrations such 
as ‘[w]hat about the victim?’ being tendered by feminist activists (Kilcommins et 
al. 2018; Maguire 1991 p. 368). These calls effectively helped to bring about a 
move from ‘protection from the State to protection by the State’ (Kilcommins et 
al. 2018; Henderson, 1985 p. 937). Sixties feminists, inspired by the civil rights 
movement, argued that women, much like the Black populace of the United States, 
were deprived of their civil liberties, and effectively treated like second class 
citizens in their own countries. This commonly perceived subjugation and mutually 
defiant solidarity in the face of resistance was what mainly drove feminist demands 
for greater inclusion within scholarly and social discourse (Daly & Chesney-Lind 
1988, p. 497; Evans 1979; Hooks 1981, 1984; Kelly 2000, p. 166, p. 174; Connolly 
2003, p. 67; Connell 1990, p. 532; Walklate 2011, p. 119, p. 44; Smart 1977).  
The widespread popularisation of iconic books like Hinton’s Fanshen 
(1966) also led to an increase in the use of ‘consciousness raising’, which tended 
to promote the feminist discursive technique to a much wider audience. In fact, the 
technique itself eventually became the hallmark of sixties feminists. The 
popularisation of consciousness-raising was therefore what really helped to allow 
this period’s feminists to be able to discuss the social-political issues that were of 
major importance to them, such as their own victimisation, as well as how they 
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were going to translate their communal consensus into concrete action. However, 
feminist activism was rarely able to present a wholly united front, as its ideological 
differences often led to considerable discord between the various factions that the 
movement constituted (Michaels 2002, p. 44; Kelly 2000, pp. 166-167, pp. 168-
173 Sarachild 1975, p. 145, p. 148; Hanisch 1970, p. 133). 
 These internal divisions split feminist thought as well as action in the US 
along two major lines, its moderate and radical camps. Indeed, the more moderate 
feminists of the 1970s lost a lot of traction due to the decision of its activists to 
pursue reforms through establishment channels. This position sharply contrasted 
with the radical feminists of the 1970s, who were much more suspicious of these 
kinds of institutions. In fact, radical feminists also desired a far greater degree of 
socio-political change, which inevitably made this part of the movement politically 
dissident. However, radical feminism eventually ran out of steam, and the decision 
of the more moderate feminists to embrace the emerging neo-liberal spirit of the 
post-1980s political consensus tended to accelerate its demise as a major political 
force (Kelly 2000, p. 172, pp. 161-165; Hanisch 1975, p. 163; Willis 1975, pp. 171-
172; Van Houten 2015, pp. 121-122, p. 125; Fraser 2014; Hegeman 2012; Firestone 
1970). 
The impact of globalisation in the eighties also tended to post-modernise 
feminism in the US, which increasingly embraced the study of much more 
peripheral ontologies than they had done in the past. This emphasis upon the 
analysis of marginalised subjectivities particularly revitalised the popular 
understanding of more previously understudied topics such as victim-centred 
justice. However, such reflexivity effectively deterred protest, with the ‘post- 
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[19]68 disillusionment’ ending the kind of widespread grassroots political activism 
that had been more common in the sixties and seventies. This focus on marginalised 
groups undermined the protest movement. As it eventually exacerbated the 
tendency of the movement to split across different lines. Lines which were more 
often than not based upon identity politics, and inspired by approaching the 
question of oppression by focusing on the individual.3 The outcomes resulted in 
the crippling of the movement to present a united front. As although feminism, if 
anything, became more widespread, its stances on core issues became increasingly 
frayed, leading to tensions in the movement and disputes regarding basic ideals.4 
 
3  “…an attempt to demonstrate the experiencial narrowness of the “woman” … have simply shifted 
the frame…[t]his has, in part, lead to a near obsession with discovering a separate 
feminist…epistemology …by treating the fundamentally political construction of gender as a matter 
of ontological or epistemological discovery, political action itself is threatened…contemporary 
feminist theory has become dominated by postmodern perspectives … such an position has also 
lead to a type of political paralysis...” Kelly, C.A. (2000) ‘Whatever Happened to Women's 
Liberation? Feminist Legacies of '68’, New Political Science, 22(2), 161-175, p. 164. 
4 “This trajectory will sound very familiar to the critical history of American feminism…the Fourth 
United Nations Conference on Women in 1995…marked a “gender turn,” which shifted the 
discussion… to an exploration of “gender analysis” in the 1990s. This …becomes an important 
intervention in feminism … the terminology emphasizes…critiquing universalizing or essentialist 
tendencies within feminist theory… the “gender turn” marks a transition from a Marxist theory of 
“equality between men and women” … to “gender equality”…the development…informed how de 
Beauvoir is read… The ways…include the following: demystifying gender and sexual difference; 
…and calling on women to assume men’s public roles; emphasizing individual choice and 
reinforcing that women are individually responsible for their freedom …” Van Houten, C. (2015) 
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A knowledge of the feminist activism and thought that was predominant in 
these periods is of utility to the analysis of this thesis as they were of considerable 
influence on the kind of feminist action and framing that came to be used in Ireland. 
Indeed, it was very influential regarding the manner by which Irish feminism 
broadly transitioned from radical iterations to more modest and eventually post-
modern frames of reference and (in)action.5 (Young 1990; Giardina 2010; Simons 
1999; Echols 1989; Benhabib 1995, p. 30; Eagleton 1983, p. 145).  
This postmodern tendency also produced a new cohort of feminists, who 
each highlighted, in their own unique way, the advances of victim re-inclusivity 
within their work. Indeed, it is a sign of how much things have progressed that 
these academics could now even claim that the pervasiveness of the victim and 
feminist perspective could cause tension. Even though it was progressive that 
‘consciousness-raising’ surrounding victims became so prevalent that victimhood 
can now be openly discussed within most societies, these academics began to 
demonstrate how these kinds of developments were not totally unproblematic. In 
fact, issues often arose, as although the politics of victimhood usually tended to 
flag and expose ‘hierarchies of dominance’, the newly emerging culture and 
politics of victimhood, “…where everyone was a victim” (Paglia 1994, p. 100) 
could occasionally have the paradoxically regressive outcome of obfuscating or 
 
‘Simone de Beauvoir Abroad: Historicizing Maoism and the Women’s Liberation Movement’, 
Comparative Literature Studies, 52(1), pp. 112–129, pp. 126 - 127. 
5 Connelly, L. (2002) The Irish Women’s Movement: From Revolution to Devolution, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
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cementing those burning structural inequalities that continue to plague society. Yet 
it is also clear that the international feminist movement helped to play a pivotal role 
in informing women about the issues of the era that pertained to them and victims 
of crime, something which provided Irish feminism with the impetus to promote 
the kinds of reforms that bolstered victim re-inclusion after the Second World War 
had come to an end (Roiphe 1993; Paglia 1994; Wolf 1993, p. 135; McCaffrey 
1998, pp. 266-267, p. 269; Foucault 1978, 1979, 1980; Kilcommins et al. 2018). 
The ability of globalised feminism to raise consciousness about victims 
conveyed inclusionary arguments to an international audience, leading to calls for 
reform in Ireland. This desire is clearly evident in the ideological links that can be 
drawn between the intellectual forces of feminist consciousness raising, by groups 
such as the Irish Women's Liberation Movement 6 and the successful activism of 
individuals like Lavinia Kerwick, and several others who confronted, and suffered 
as a result of the predominance of patriarchal force and oppression.7 The nexus of 
 
6  “…the strategies used by the Irish Women's Liberation Movement in the early 1970s were 
spectacularly successful in challenging dominant discourses. They included the public launch in 
1971 of the [IWLM] on the most popular television programme of the time…and…the 
‘contraceptive train’… [T]hese…galvanized substantial numbers of women to publicly voice their 
support a process facilitated by the non-hierarchical consciousness-raising…”  O'Connor, P. (1999) 
‘Emerging Voices’, The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies, 25(1/2), 147-163, p. 152. 
7 “This was further underlined by the public emergence of a sequence of individual women whom 
I have called “victims and saviours.” …they inadvertently shattered the silence surrounding various 
aspects of patriarchal control … …  Eileen Flynn … the woman in the Kilkenny Incest case; Livinia 
Kerwick, the first woman who publicly identified herself as a rape victim; the girls who became 
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feminist theory and action is also evident in the opening of centres like the Dublin 
Rape Crisis Centre and the Cork Sexual Violence Centre. Yet both are merely a 
few examples of the preponderance of victims centred facilities established in this 
period as a result of Irish feminist thought being put into action to help women.8 
 Much of this was inspired and successfully complemented by the increased 
growth in feminist thought within academia. A frame which had until this period 
tended to be curtailed and overlooked. A whole new range of scholars, publications 
and courses emerged, which provided the framing, as well as cognitive mapping, 
for the kind of feminist mass mobilisation that eventually occurred in Ireland.9 We 
can therefore see the material force of feminist ideology as well as its impact in the 
gains it secured. In fact, arguably the most significant gain Irish feminism during 
 
known as X and C all that catalogue of horror right up to Sophia McColgan …” O'Connor, P. (1999) 
‘Emerging Voices’, The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies, 25(1/2), 147-163, p.154. 
8 “In the early 1970s a wide range of organizations emerged from within the women's movement 
…Fertility Guidance Clinics; Rape Crisis Centres; Cherish…the Women's Progressive Association, 
… AIM committed to family law reform; and the Irish Women's Aid Committee, which established 
the first hostel for battered wives …”  O'Connor, P. (1999) ‘Emerging Voices’, The Canadian 
Journal of Irish Studies, 25(1/2), 147-163, p.151. 
9 “By the late 1980s a new phenomenon had emerged Women's Studies courses … [i]n the late 
1980s and early 1990s feminist publishing also flourished…[b]y the early 1990s approximately 
forty courses in Women's Studies had been established…”  O'Connor, P. (1999) ‘Emerging 
Voices’, The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies, 25(1/2), 147-163, p.151. 
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this period was the official recognition that women’s issues are issues of 
importance that need to be addressed by the state in a progressive manner.10  
Indeed, much of the contemporary negative reaction to feminism can be 
traced back to the materialisation of fears expressed in the past. Namely that the 
aforementioned societal changes could lead regressive forces to retaliate from a 
place of emasculation. This appears to be particularly true of the gains Irish 
feminism secured. It seems such regression will consequently shape present debate, 
but there are, at the same time, promising alternatives being put forward.11 
Despite the inability of Irish feminism to completely match the traditionally 
more radical popular base of British feminism, or the profound intellectualism of 
some of its continental counterparts, its achievements are just as respectable and 
 
10 “… the sensitizing of the State to issues relating to women…. through the convening of the Joint 
Oireachtas Committee on Women's Rights; the highlighting of the issue of … marital violence…by 
groups such as the Rape Crisis Centres; the ongoing struggle for independent representation for 
those…raped; the establishment of the Council for the Status of Women (1973); and the reports of 
the First and Second Commissions of the Status of Women (1973 and 1993); as well as the ongoing 
attempts by the National Women's Council to define child care as a State policy issue.” O'Connor, 
P. (1999) ‘Emerging Voices’, The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies, 25(1/2), 147-163, p.154. 
11 “… many men and women will yearn for the certainties of what is nostalgically seen as a simpler 
world. Some men will turn to violence to extract that submission from women….[o]thers will react 
with despair to a situation where they feel diminished because gendered privileges are not available 
to them. Some will recognize that in this changed social and cultural context there are possibilities 
for a different kind of relationship with women, and indeed a different life style.”  O'Connor, P. 
(1999) ‘Emerging Voices’, The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies, 25(1/2), 147-163, p.160. 
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consequential considering the historical context of this particular country. In fact, 
Ireland went from a society that found it difficult to even discuss victimisation, to 
one in which Rape Crisis Centres function in nearly every major city. Yet, to be 
able to make such progress, Irish feminists first had to transcend the regressive 
standpoints of their own, largely conservative, society (Galligan 1998, p. 44, p. 64; 
Ring 2017, p. 89; Kilcommins et al. 2018; Moore-Walsh 2013, p. 188; Cohen 2006; 
Coffey 2006; McGovern 2002; Rogan 2006b; Cotter 2005). 
The prevalent views regarding women in Ireland before the Second World 
War are still discernible from the wording of the Irish Constitution, which are as 
outdated and male chauvinist as they were when its drafters first signed them into 
law in 1937. Indeed, the document reflects the traditionalist viewpoint that the 
structural primacy of men ought to exclude women from the public sphere of 
influence. The intimate Church-State relationship considerably compounded this, 
and helped to cement gender-based marginalisation. This produced what can only 
be described as an ‘archaic social order’ when it came to inclusivity across a whole 
range of social issues. This situation persisted throughout the decades before the 
Second World War, with State organs frequently closing ranks in order to help 
defend what largely became an impenetrable and insurmountable status quo. 
Female advocates therefore rarely contested gender inequality, and largely 
accepted the views of authority figures regarding the primacy of “domestic duties”. 
They did however attempt to seek reform of some of the more patently unfair 
restrictions that were placed upon them, such as the circumscription of married 
women from public sector work. However, gender equality became a more 
contentious issue once Irish feminist activism began to take off in the 1960s and 
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consequently brought about major socio-cultural transition (Connolly 2003, p. 68, 
p. 66, p. 82; Scannell 1988, p. 124; Galligan 1998, p. 29; Kenny 2015, p. 48).  
Although the rise of Irish Feminism after the Second World War seems 
unprecedented, most academics agree that it was largely the result of the massive 
global advances that were occurring at the time, which effectively helped to spark 
its domestic resurgence in the country. Indeed, several major changes in Post-
World War Two Ireland demonstrate the increased influence of feminist arguments 
such as the opening of the first Rape Crisis Centre, the Women’s Right to Choose 
Group and Open Line Counselling. These were all designed to offer essential 
frontline services and assistance to female victims of crime. Such organisations 
were complemented by the creation of the commission for the Status of Women, 
an official state body to enquire as to the issues that prejudice women in Ireland. 12  
Due to the context in which Irish feminism operated increased social 
movements tended to centre around the issue of reproductive health. An area that 
which was heavily regulated both by society and the state, both of which were 
deferential to religious interests and often adopted their perspectives on issues as 
 
12 “…important women’s organisations such as the first Rape Crisis Centre in 1977, while the 
Women’s Right to Choose Group and the crisis pregnancy and abortion referral organisation, Open 
Line Counselling, were founded in 1979.” “In 1970 the Irish government established the 
Commission for the Status of Women to report on the injustices facing Irish women.” Kelly, L. 
(2019) ‘Irishwomen United, the Contraception Action Programme and the feminist campaign for 
free, safe and legal contraception in Ireland, c.1975–81’, Irish Historical Studies, 43(164), 269-297, 
p. 270, p. 276. 
FEMINISM AND VICTIMOLOGY HIGHLIGHT THE HIDDEN 
EXPERIENCES OF VICTIMS 
259 
 
government policy.13 The greater purchase that Feminism was now commanding 
in Ireland is probably best evidenced in the manner by which its adherents were 
now able to openly flout, challenge and overturn the laws on contraception in force 
at the time. This was achieved through popular and highly visible campaigns. Like 
the one that involved the establishment of symbolic travel by “Contraceptive 
Train” as well as political selling through a “Contraceptives Unlimited” store.  
These grassroots feminists’ movements struck at the heart of the basic 
irrationality of the rules enforced upon the Irish public, as well as their 
discriminatory impact. The blatant civil disobedient nature of the protest 
movements was devastating for those that sought to uphold the ban on possession 
contraception. By the end of the campaign the previous situation was undermined 
to such an extent that the legislative ball that started to role in 1979 eventually led 
to the deregulation of the area. These social movements were therefore successful 
challenges to the remit of state and social regulation in gendered areas. They also 
represented a decisive shift in the key areas of female emancipation and bodily 
autonomy. As such they were pivotal stepping stones in undermining previously 
 
13  “Under 1935 legislation, the sale, import and advertising of contraceptive devices were 
criminalised…[p]olitically, the Catholic Church led a vigorous campaign to prevent the legalisation 
of contraception based upon church teaching that sex should take place only within marriage, for 
the purpose of procreation. It spoke to a succession of governments receptive to its position 
…”Bacik, I.2013. “Bacik, I. (2013) ‘The Irish Constitution and Gender Politics: Developments in 
the Law on Abortion’, Irish Political Studies, 28 (3), 380–398, p. 381. 
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heavily restrictive patriarchal norms that had significantly curtailed the position 
and contribution of women in the workplace, but also in society more generally.14 
The impetus for such changes was the development and key successes of 
feminist organisations that sought to bring women together in order to fight for a 
greater appreciation of their rights. In fact, organised social movements which 
espoused feminist principles such as The Irish Women’s Liberation Movement, 
who were a decisive catalyst in helping to bring about such change. Indeed, the era 
represented a watershed moment for women in Ireland as the period saw the 
consensus of the political establishment on gender issues fragment, leading to 
widespread division on such topics. Although the weakening of the patriarchy in 
Ireland did not occur overnight, the Irish establishment did eventually find itself 
 
14 “Contraceptives Unlimited was established… as a means of challenging the law on the sale of 
contraceptives...” Kelly, L. (2019) ‘Irishwomen United, the Contraception Action Programme and 
the feminist campaign for free, safe and legal contraception in Ireland, c.1975–81’, Irish Historical 
Studies, 43(164), 269-297, p. 292.  “…members of the IWLM travelled to Belfast and back to 
Dublin on a ‘Contraceptive Train’, importing contraceptives illegally in a public act of defiance. 
…Mary Robinson… introduced an unsuccessful contraceptive bill…in 1971; feminists rallied 
around to support the McGee case in 1973…and a new Contraception Action Programme 
campaign…was formed in 1976… concerted campaigns paid off … in 1979 with the introduction 
of the Health (Family Planning) Act, legalising contraceptives and making them available on 
prescription for ‘adequate’ medical reasons or for ‘bona fide’ family planning purposes …[f]urther 
legislative reform was introduced in 1985, with a range of different outlets being permitted to sell 
condoms and spermicides to persons over the age of 18 without a prescription.” Bacik, I. (2013) 
‘The Irish Constitution and Gender Politics: Developments in the Law on Abortion’, Irish Political 
Studies, 28 (3), 380–398, p. 382.  
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pressured into action by the advances of global feminism on a more international 
level. In fact, the reforms that the Irish government did eventually implement are 
evidence of this shift. However, the gradual turn away from the exclusion of 
women and victims of crime would not have been possible without the gains that 
were effectively secured by Irish feminism, as well as its comprehensive 
engendering of the kind of new politics of inclusion that has now become so 
popular within this country in recent decades (Ailbhe 1993, p. 253; Galligan 1998, 
p. 49; Connelly 2002, p. 89, Connolly, 2003, p. 66, pp. 81-83; Horgan 1997; Lee 
1989; Connolly, 1996, 1998, p. 90).  
Irish feminism after the Second World War used this newly emergent 
politics of inclusion15 to begin to shift concern back onto the consequences of 
criminality within this country, which ultimately allowed them to secure 
considerable gains for victims. They did this by highlighting how the conventional 
 
15  “The establishment of a Women’s Studies Forum in UCD in 1983…was integral to the 
establishment and wider acceptance of women’s studies…[i]n 1987 a group of students, academics 
and administrative staff…highlighted the deficiency of women’s studies courses…[i]n order to 
promote…an interest…a forum…the UGG Women’s Studies Centre was established. Women’s 
studies programmes…are for the most part under-resource…Roseneil makes some pertinent 
observations on the propensity of many feminist academics to move continually between and across 
the boundaries of their own discipline and women’s studies…(Roseneil, 1995:191-205). … partly 
from the location of feminism at the margins…since the 1980s…a flowering of feminist 
publishing… in…sociology, the arts, politics and the law…reach a conscience constituency that 
otherwise may remain unaffected by feminist ideas. Feminist texts are clearly integral to the 
diffusion process which generates public consciousness.” Connelly, L. (2002) The Irish Women’s 
Movement: From Revolution to Devolution, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 194-196.  
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structures and procedures of academia had traditionally tended to marginalise the 
feminine perspective. This was profoundly influential because it allowed feminist 
academics to occupy positions that would now empower them to attempt to remedy 
this historical imbalance. Feminist scholars therefore began to examine how the 
criminal justice system had previously treated women by focusing upon female 
victims of crime and their real life experiences.16 This afforded them with the 
opportunity to study the kinds of criminal justice frameworks that were (or were 
not) put in place to help victims of crime cope with their victimisations. Feminism 
therefore significantly broadened the ambit of criminology by flagging neglected 
issues (Walklate 2011, p.177; Mallicoat and Estrada 2014, p. 6; Maguire 1991). 
It was in this way that Irish feminism helped re-calibrate attention back onto 
the victim of crime.17 This happened because their inquiries disturbed what was 
 
16 Shanahan, K. (1992) Crimes Worse than Death: How Violence is Terrorising Irish Women, 
Dublin: Attic Press. “The November 1994 crisis… provoked unprecedented public interest… 
especially with regard to changing gender relations in the Republic...” Smyth, A.(1995) ‘States of 
Change: Reflections on Ireland in Several Uncertain Parts’, Fem Rev, 50 (1) , 24–43, p. 24. 
“Individual women…have emerged who have highlighted various "faces" of patriarchal control … 
Joanna Hayes… was interrogated following the birth and death of her own baby… and subsequent 
“confession” to the murder of what turned out to be a completely different baby), In a society where 
being a “victim,”…is part of the discourse of both femininity and Roman Catholicism, the 
emergence of these women as symbols is perhaps not surprising.” O'Connor, P. (1999) ‘Emerging 
Voices’, The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies, 25 (1/2), 147-163, p.185. 
17 'Connor, P. (1995) ‘Defining Irish women: dominant discourses and sites of resistance’, Eire-
Ireland, 30 (3), pp. 177-187. “… recent debates about the meaning of sexual victimization…have 
implications for feminist praxis…specifically…the term ‘victim’ or ‘victimhood’…‘the 
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previously considered to be conventional academic discourse by the intellectual 
establishment of the past. Indeed, the link that they discovered between criminality 
and misogyny emerged when they initially began recording the types of crimes that 
were predominantly committed and perpetuated against women in Irish society. 
These efforts positively interacted with the increasing numbers of women that were 
now beginning to enter academia, and who also usually wanted to help prevent 
gender-based violence and assist the victims of these kinds of crimes. The impact 
of this was significant, as prior research often tended to de-humanise victims before 
more feminist perspectives tended to become commonplace. Their ideological 
outlook was therefore able to advance victim inclusion by combating this, which 
not only aided victim visibility within society, but also acknowledged the resilience 
that victims of crime needed in order to overcome the usually traumatic impact of 
their victimisations (Daly and Chesney-Lind 1988, p. 513). 18  
 
victim/survivor dichotomy’...” Kelly L., Burton S., and Regan L. (1996) ‘Beyond Victim or 
Survivor: Sexual Violence, Identity and Feminist Theory and Practice’,  In: Adkins L., 
Merchant V., eds, Sexualizing the Social, Explorations in Sociology, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp 77-101, p. 77. “…the "X" case…implicitly highlighting legal patriarchal 
control…Lavinia Kerwick … raised the issue of the personal effect of rape and the issue of sexual 
patriarchal control. The Patricia O'Toole murder…raised issues about… the extent to which the 
state was actively colluding with physical violence toward women. The personal revelations of a 
twenty-seven- year-old incest victim in Kilkenny exposed … domestic patriarchal control, and the 
attitude of the state toward domestic violence …” O'Connor, P. (1999) ‘Emerging Voices’, The 
Canadian Journal of Irish Studies, 25(1/2), 147-163, p. 186.  
18 “The first postgraduate program…was initiated…in 1990…[UCD] and [TCD] have established 
courses…Cork and…Galway are planning to...” “…programs … can no longer afford to be “gender 
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Feminists were therefore able to expose how a culture of silence often 
benefited the perpetrators of criminality at the expense of their victims. This also 
helped to re-invigorate debate surrounding gender-based violence, prompting 
numerous investigations of its unfortunate victims. However, feminists also noted 
how the unscrupulous proponents of deterrence-based policies could often seize 
upon these realities in order to promote their own distorted and regressive ideals, 
which frequently tended to relegate, rather than re-integrate the victim of crime 
(Karstedt et al. 2012 p. 531; Renzetti, 2009; Schwendinger and Schwendinger 
1983; Klein 1982; Schechter 1982; Dobash and Dobash 1979 MacKinnon 1982, 
1983; Stanko 1985; Brownmiller 1975; Griffin 1971; Martin 1976; Pizzey 1974; 
Mardorossian, 2002; Bullimer 2008). As the activism and conscious raising of 
feminist academics made victims more visible within society, the techniques and 
 
blind,”…if they are dealing with contemporary issues in Irish society.” “Teaching women's studies 
is a form of "activism" ...” Byrne, A. (19920 ‘Academic Women's Studies in the Republic of 
Ireland’, Women's Studies Quarterly, 20(3/4),15-27, p. 17,18, 21.“ prostitution… came to the fore 
when Lynn Madden gave evidence against the pimp John Cullen…June Levine…wrote about… 
the abuse Madden had suffered…”“Female journalists…influenced the way society looked at issues 
that affected women, including the manner in which the law and the legal system affected them… 
Bacik recalled, [how] “…In 1985, [TCD] law lecturer…McAleese told her…to read In the Eyes of 
the Law, a collection of McCafferty’s columns…insightful, often poignant descriptions of…law in 
action had a huge effect...” “female journalists often broke new ground…Geraldine Kennedy, editor 
of the Irish Times…summed this up by saying of Holland that “she interfered with our comfort 
zones...” One of the reasons the female journalists wrote so powerfully…was because of the 
hostility…directed toward women…in the 1980s.” Ferriter, D. (2008) ‘Women and Political 
Change in Ireland since 1960’, Éire-Ireland, 43(1&2), 179-204, p. 196, pp. 191-192.    
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politics of exclusion found themselves becoming increasingly subject to feminist 
critique. This helped to expose what were dubbed to be “malestream” narratives.19  
A “malestream” approach, based on the linguistic fusion of the terms 
mainstream and male, is one which is mainly predicated on the experiences of men 
and the research and knowledge that this produces. Yet the gendered nature of such 
an approach was not acknowledged and was simply presumed to be a generalisable 
norm for society. Indeed, this often resulted in those traits associated with this 
approach like objectivity, being privileged over those which tended to be more 
common in women like subjectivity. In fact, it also tended to create the perception 
that those that did not fit its frames were in a way lacking or incomplete as humans.  
The concept was first introduced by Mary O’Brien in her 1981 book The 
Politics of Reproduction, in which she examines some of the leading lights of 
modern thought and illustrates how these are often susceptible to feminist critiques. 
 
19 “Hegel’s view of reproduction is very valuable…though it is hardly the easiest way into the 
ramifications by which the malestream thought has elaborated the ideological justification of male 
supremacy.” O'Brien, M. (1981) The Politics of Reproduction, Routledge: London, p.34. “The basic 
feminist challenge to the malestream curriculum is to reveal how it is oppressive to women and to 
eliminate that oppression.” “…the traditional malestream curriculum was built …on male examples 
of what it was to be human being engaged in so-called human activities… [i]t…took white male 
examples as examples of human experience and knowledge, as non-gendered … applied too 
whatever characteristics were historically associated with maleness…” (such as reason and 
rationality)…defining or exalted characteristics of what it is to be human. To the extent that women 
failed to exemplify these…women were either not fully human or were assumed to have 
characteristics…assigned lower status…” Warren, K.J. (1989) Rewriting the Future: The Feminist 
Challenge to the Malestream Curriculum, Feminist Teacher , 4(2/3), 46-52, pp.  47-48. 
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Particularly when they deal with gendered issues. The conservative approach of 
Hegel is used as one such example to evidence how some of the most phenomenal 
thinkers have been susceptible to “malestream” ideas, which supports the 
ideological edifice of patriarchal order. Therefore, the influence of feminism in this 
regard was profound. As it endeavoured to attack the “malestream” status quo in 
such a way as to expose and eliminate the manner by which it subjugates women. 
The long-term impact of these criticisms of the “malestream” narratives, which had 
hitherto consequently suppressed certain examinations of the victimhood of 
women were profoundly revelatory in nature. As a consequence of the information 
and knowledge that it exposed governmental reform overhauled the safeguards that 
were available to victims, and promoted progressive legal changes that tended to 
re-integrate them back into the procedural frames of Irish criminal justice.  
This trend would be very much evident in the feminist gains that were 
secured in the 1980s and 1990s. Feminist intellectual activism in the 1980s was 
forged during the debates surrounding Abortion and Divorce, and managed to 
secure key legal safeguards for married women who were at risk of suffering from 
domestic violence at the hands of partners.20 In the 1990s this feminist intellectual 
 
20 “Radical action centred mainly on the two abortion (1983 and 1992) and two divorce referenda 
(1986 and 1996)…[u]nder pressure from women's groups… he state introduced legislation to 
provide greater physical and financial protection to married women...” O'Connor, P. (1999) 
‘Emerging Voices’, The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies, 25(1/2), 147-163, p. 153. “Without a 
mandate to introduce divorce…government settled for comprehensive reform of the existing 
ecclesiastically based law governing judicial separation. The Judicial Separation and Family Law 
Reform Act 1989 apportioned blame for marital failure, facilitated suspension of the obligation to 
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activism continued its work in all these areas but also made advances into new 
ones, which is reflective of its greater concern with wider social issues. 
 Such a change was probably the result of the incorporation of more class 
diversity. This far broader base was then able to secure key governmental 
reformative concessions, such as the Second Commission on the Status of Women 
report of 1993. As well as a Department of Equality and Law Reform in 1993 on 
the "elimination of inequality". These both effectively laid the groundwork for 
considerable future legal reform in the areas of sexual violence and domestic abuse. 
The National Women’s council also became an integral aspect of the manner by 
which the Irish state was now going to address both of these issues in future.21  
 
cohabit, and allocated property between spouses. It also adopted new ways of thinking about 
managing marriage breakdown; reconciliation, mediation and separation by agreement were an 
integral part of the legislative framework. For those unable to manage the breakdown of their own 
marriage, an intricate, court-based machinery was established designed to re-make post-relationship 
lives in the image of lifetime marriage.” McGovern, D. (2016) Governed by Marriage Law, Social 
and Legal Studies, 25(3), 311-331, Saving marriage with divorce.  
21 “The 1990s also saw the rapid growth of locally based…women's groups…often non-hierarchical 
structures concerned with empowering women…[m]ost working-class groups…played an 
important role in empowering…[t]he 1990s has also seen…“general movement gains” … the 
establishment of the Second Commission on the Status of Women and the publication of its report 
in 1993; and the (brief) establishment of a Department of Equality and Law Reform in 1993 charged 
with the “elimination of inequality.” In the 1990s, the National Women's Council also became part 
of the machinery advising on the formulation of State policy...” O'Connor, P. (1999) ‘Emerging 
Voices’, The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies, 25(1/2), 147-163, p. 153. 
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 The positive impact of feminist thought and action, as well as the official 
government bodies that it helped to promote, is clearly seen in the states reform of 
its approach to domestic violence, sex crimes and rape. This was very much the 
result of feminist pressure to not only repeal outdated laws, but to promulgate new 
ones. Indeed, the 1990s and early post-90s era saw important changes. These 
involved the repeal of the marital rape exemption in Section 5 Subsection (1) of the 
Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act, 1990. As well as the passing of The 
Domestic Violence Act 1996. The latter Act assisted with the facilitation of victim 
protections in order to prevent the domestic re-victimisation of at-risk groups such 
as women or children. The re-definition of both the crime of rape in Criminal Law 
(Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 and consent in Section 9 of the Criminal Law 
(Rape) (Amendment) Act, 1990, were also pivotal advances. As was the offender 
monitoring victim safeguards introduced by the Sex Offenders Act 2001. These 
changes were spearheaded by feminist lobbying. This was assisted by many of the 
same governmental organisations that were already mentioned. Indeed, these were 
vital in communicating women’s issues to lawmakers and those of influence.  
This re-conceptualisation of domestic violence and crimes such as rape was 
an important reformative development. Since feminist approaches to the topics of 
domestic violence, rape and consent were now being officially adopted into law, 
which ensured a more victim cognisant approach was embraced on such issues. 
There was also considerable transformation in Irish social consciousness, where 
patriarchal behaviours that were detrimental to victims such as paternalistic 
dominance in the home and machoistic exploitation of intimate affairs were 
undermined. In fact, they quickly became unacceptable to most of the population. 
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This, in addition to legal reform, consequently helped to ensure that certain victims 
were much safer than they had hitherto been in the past. 22  
Other socio-cultural advances, such as the emergence of victim refuges, 
also helped to complement these kinds of legal alterations, by socially eroding the 
various taboos and cultures of silence that had hitherto prevented female victims 
of crime from gaining greater standing within Irish society. Although the 
opposition of the establishment in Ireland delayed, and indeed continued to delay 
these kinds of progressive reforms at every turn, this thesis contends that even the 
progress that society has made thus far has effectively sowed the seeds of 
significant change. As the patriarchy and exclusion of victims were both re-
enforced by over a century of gender based segregation, the proper restoration of 
 
22  “During the 1980s the conceptualization of rape changed from a proprietorial crime to a violation 
of individual bodily integrity due to feminist lobbying efforts and the emergence of a victim-
centered approach in the criminal justice system…this changing conceptualisation has led to 
significant attitudinal change…surrounding the issues of acquaintance and marital rape…” Molloy, 
C. (2018) ‘The Failure of Feminism? Rape Law Reform in the Republic of Ireland, 1980–2017’. 
Law and History Review, 36(4), 689-712, p. 689. “From the 1970s to the 1990s, a public discourse 
about marriage and related issues was created by individual married women, groups of women, and 
by what was then the Council for the Status of Women. Through the development of talk shows … 
women's private experiences of abuse, marital violence, issues surrounding marital power, sexual 
experiences, contraception, and sterilization were all exposed to public view. In this way, issues 
which might in another context be seen as, at best, topics for private negotiation between a wife and 
husband…or consultation with a medical practitioner, became part of a wider discourse. The very 
fact of publicly exploring such issues implicitly undermined the traditional discourse.” O'Connor, 
P. (1999) ‘Emerging Voices’, The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies, 25(1/2), 147-163, p. 153. 
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these historically marginalised groups was something of a slow and ultimately 
protracted process (Walklate 2011, p. 131; Bienen 1980; Lerman 1980; Rice 2012; 
Gross 1990; Posadas 2017; Crites 1987; Spencer 1987; Daly and Chesney-Lind 
1988, p. 522; Osborne 1984).  
However, the influence of Irish feminism upon the political landscape of 
Ireland has engendered changes that have helped to re-integrate the victim of crime. 
Irish feminists have impressed themselves in much the same way as one of the 
movements most famous daughters Bernadette Devlin did, who in “…dar[ing] to 
struggle [also] dared to win” (cited in Sigillito 2007, p. 253). Their sacrifice also 
had a considerable impact upon Irish society.  
As the hard-fought campaigns for the liberalisation of divorce, 
contraception and abortion, the promulgation of laws that safeguarded spousal 
abuse victims, the overturning of the ban on married women participating in the 
public sector, and the election of Ireland’s first female president all became 
monuments to Ireland’s progress on issues of equality and gender. They also had 
an influential role in combating gender-based discrimination and securing civil 
liberties for female victims of crime, through Non-Governmental Organisations 
like Cherish, Ruhama and The Sexual Violence Centre Cork, with these 
organisations providing a platform for Irish feminists to flag the kinds of issues that 
were affecting victims of crime throughout the country. Although feminism 
intellectualised itself in Ireland in the eighties, and almost became the preserve of 
its intelligentsia in the nineties, it still managed to engender consequential reforms, 
even as its radicalism diminished. Despite the institutionalisation of Irish feminism, 
the impact that it had upon victims was significant, as its activism and 
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consciousness-raising helped put the public spotlight firmly back onto the Irish 
victim of crime. Indeed, this trend has only accelerated in recent years due to some 
of the latest technological developments in the communicative fields such as social 
media and the internet, as well as the new, much more open interactions that these 
kinds of technical advancements have engendered within Irish society (Connelly 
2002, p. 188, p. 89, p. 83, 2003, p. 83; Ring 2017, p. 89; Galligan 1980, p. 112, 
p.52; Morgan 1984, p. 346; McKay 2005). 
CONCLUSION  
This chapter illustrated the role that feminism and victimology played in 
helping to bring about the re-emergence of crime victims as a modern socio-
cultural phenomenon within Ireland. These ideologies did this by advancing the 
study of victims; by making victim issues topical and by raising awareness about 
them in a way that was conducive to the kinds of social reforms that have brought 
about a step change in the approach of Irish society to victims. Indeed, it was these 
ideological perspectives that significantly altered the public’s perception of victims 
of crime in Ireland. Feminist and victimological thought can therefore 
consequently be said to have played an integral role in helping to engender victim 
centred legal advancements within Ireland, by first highlighting how marginalised 
victim narratives were within the professional and lay fields of inquiry and then by 
eventually moving on to utilise the material force of feminist and victimological 
ideology in order to promote the Irish’s Post-World War Two legal transition from 
the procedural exclusion of victims to their ultimate juridical re-inclusion. 
Although a number of contemporaneous factors helped to bring this about, these 
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points are discussed in the next chapter of this thesis, so as to make it easier to 
distinguish between the material force of these ideologies and the more practical 
drivers of change that are much simpler to delineate in terms of their application 
and scope. 
This thesis chapter sought to contextualise the transition from victim 
exclusion to inclusion. It did this by introducing and explaining both the frames of 
thought and cognitive mapping that acted as a driving force for the inclusionary 
impetus that impressed itself during the twentieth century. The next chapter of this 
thesis will now move on to examine how these changing paradigms of thought were 
brought to bear. Particularly in light of those practical drivers of change which 
transformed the criminological constellation within Ireland at the time. By taking 
such an approach it is hoped that both the power of ideology, as well as that of 
grassroots activism can be both separately discussed at some length. This is 
necessary due to the progress each development brought to the table when it came 
to the inclusionary movement that re-introduced the victim in Ireland. So, without 
further ado the author will now move on to examine the various major drivers of 
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THE DOMESTIC DRIVERS OF CHANGE THAT RE-ESTABLISHED 
THE IRISH VICTIM 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The conundrum sought to be addressed in this chapter is what were the 
various practical alterations which transpired in the twentieth century which 
brought about the shift from victim exclusion to victim inclusion. As well as how 
did each one exert a unique impact on this transition. This chapter will thereby 
evidence the way in which the victim went from marginal actor to socio-cultural 
icon. By assessing grassroots sociological changes in Irish society, the chapter is 
not only able to evidence the congealing of the notion that the victim deserved 
better from the organs of the state, but also the manner by which this was affected. 
It answers these queries by showing how changes in Irish society were also 
influenced by both the media and wider political context. This evidences how they 
jointly brought about a situation in which various gatekeepers within criminal 
justice all had a vested interest in the re-incorporation of the victim of crime.  
The decades that followed the 1950s were dynamic periods of change in the 
history of Irish crime, which involved qualitative and quantitative alterations in 
both the reported prevalence and nature of criminality in Ireland. This affected the 




way in which Irish crime occurred, and how the Irish public perceived it. These 
transitions began to re-orientate the victim of crime back into their previously more 
central position. Yet few, if any, have outlined how exactly the role of the Irish 
victim changed. This chapter’s core argument will be that there were several factors 
that all emerged in the decades after World War II that helped bring this about in 
an Irish context. The following chapter does this by first outlining how the rates of 
reported crime in Ireland significantly altered after the Second World War. This 
involves a summary of the stable crime picture of the 1940s and 1950s, and an 
examination of the qualitative and quantitative changes that began to alter this 
picture in the 1960s. It will then address how activism, from the 1970s onwards, 
helped change the public’s popular perception of crime. An examination of the 
crime depictions of the 1980s, as well as how this impacted upon the popular 
awareness of crime follows this. The chapter will then examine how victimisation 
surveys clarified the impact of Irish crime, as well as how the emergence of 
historical abuse in the 1990s facilitated reforms and a step change in the public’s 
awareness of victimhood. Chapter 5 concludes by outlining how crime 
politicisation in the 1990s complemented all these factors to help bring about the 
re-emergence of the victim as a pivotal stakeholder within Irish criminal justice. 
5.2 REPORTED CRIME RATES –  FROM STABILITY TO DISORDER  
5.2.1 The Low Crime Society of the 1940s and 1950s 
There is a distinct lack of criminological commentary about the relatively 
low rates of reported crime in Ireland during the 1940s and 1950s, in large part due 
to the comparative lack of recorded criminality that existed during these periods. 




However, it is important to not confuse the depressed crime rate with a stable crime 
rate, as although the crime rate was low, there is evidence of fluctuation. For 
example, the graphs presented in this chapter indicate that recorded indictable 
offences appeared to double in 1942. While the prosecution of non-indictable 
offences more than doubled between 1940 and 1950.   
This could also be somewhat explained due to the issues with Gardai data 
that will be also explored shortly. It also suggests that the actual, or dark number, 
of crime might have inclined more steadily or have been a bit higher than the 
official statistics indicate. Since these are dependent on Gardai recording and 
prosecution, this could explain such dramatic alterations over short periods. These 
variations would arguably therefore be the result of Gardai variation in recording 
and prosecution, as opposed to wildly dramatic fluctuations in actual crime.1  
 
1 “Using police statistics we have show Ireland has a lower crime rate than, for example, England 
and Wales. But comparisons of the results of victim surveys show a different picture. These suggest 
that the rate of burglary and car theft is in fact greater in Ireland than in England and Wales. From 
this it follows that we need to treat crime statistics…with great caution and…supplement them with 
more regular victim surveys.” McCullagh, C. (1986) ‘Crime in Ireland Facts, Figures & 
Interpretations’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 75(297), 11–20, p.14.  “… the Garda report is 
inevitably incomplete…examination…reveals some unusual patterns…Ireland stands out for the 
proportion of property crime that the Gardai judge they have solved…[t]he detection rate…may be 
higher in Ireland because the Garda Síochána is more efficient and effective…[o]r it may be that 
reported offences are handled differently…it is not clear to what extent the high rate of detection 
reflects differential reporting and recording rather than investigative excellence… official measures 
of crime in Ireland must be treated with due caution.” O’Donnell, I. (2003) ‘Sex Crime in Ireland: 
Extent and Trends’, Judicial Studies Institute Journal, 3(1), 89-106, p. 46. 




This can be seen in figures one to four below. These demonstrate that for 
both serious and less serious crime the figure for the entire country does not surpass 
18,000, even at its highest point, during the entirety of this period. Indeed, in both 
of these cases the crime rate itself starts at an incredibly low one, of just over 8,000 
offences in 1940. In fact, for some crimes, such as burglary, this official figure is 
as low as two hundred and fifty on the worst year on record at that time. Non-
violent property offences also only roughly doubled from an incredibly low point 
of just over 6,000 incidents in 1940 to a still rather meagre 12,000 by 1960.  
It must always be remembered, that these are the rates for the entire country, 
and, as such, they would be historically low, which can be gleaned from comparing 
them with those of the past.  Indeed, there is a considerable disparity in terms of 
recorded crime between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. With the 
mid-nineteenth century being the period of much greater recorded criminality. In 
fact, the graphs below strongly evidence how the rates of recorded crime in Ireland 
stagnate in the mid-twentieth century. In fact, this lack of crime signifies a historic 
trough in terms of recorded crime within the Republic of Ireland (Gurr 1981, pp. 
338-339, 1989; Eisner 2003, p. 106 Gatrelll 1980; Gurr, Grabosky and Hula 1977).  
  






Figure 1 and Figure 2 (O'Donnell et al. 2005;2 Gardai Siochana Annual Reports 1922-2005) 
 
2 O’Donnell, I., O’Sullivan, E. and Healy, D. (2005) Crime and Punishment in Ireland 1922-2003: 
A Statistical Sourcebook, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. The source of this data is 
official, and taken from the annual crime rate reports of the Gardai. Therefore, it should also be 
treated with the same degree of caution as a result of the issues with official data that this chapter 
has already highlighted and should be seen to complement rather than supplement this official data.  




A reduction in expenditure on criminal justice in Ireland during the 1940s 
and 1950s is reflective of this low-crime society. The closure of prisons, for 
example, continued unabated, and, by the mid-twentieth century, only a handful 
remained, and even then, each one of them only housed about 500 inmates on 
average. In truth, the level of recorded crime was such a rarity that the government 
even curtailed the presence of the Gardaí. This meant the shedding of 500 of its 
members, and the closure of 61 Garda stations (O’Sullivan and O’Donnell 2003, 
p. 34, p. 44; Osborough 1985; Brewer et al. 1988 p. 88; Connolly, 2002).   
  
 





Figures 3 and 4 (O'Donnell et al. 2005; Gardai Siochana Annual Reports 1922-2005) 
 





Figure 5 and Figure 6 (O'Donnell et al. 2005; Gardai Siochana Annual Reports 1922-2005) 
       




       
Figure 7 and Figure 8 (O'Donnell et al. 2005; Gardai Siochana Annual Reports 1922-2005) 
To comprehend the lack of crime in Ireland during the 1940s and 1950s, 
one needs to recognise that the Irish police recorded 2,692 unlawful killings outside 
of Dublin during the mid-nineteenth century, which sharply contrasts with the 260 
offences of a similar nature that took place in the entire country, during the mid-
twentieth century. Indeed, the frequency of recorded crime was roughly ten times 
higher in the mid-nineteenth century than it was during a similar comparable period 
in the mid-twentieth century. These changes are noteworthy, even when one 
accounts for changes over time with regards to the Irish population, since these 
recorded crime troughs are far too dramatic to be the simple product of a depressed 
population. Indeed, socio-economic isolation, and the wholesale migration of large 
segments of Ireland’s, traditionally deviant, youth would arguably be far more 
important material factors in this regard (O'Donnell 2002, pp. 2-3).    




         
         
Figure 9 and Figure 10 (O'Donnell et al. 2005) (Gardai Siochana Annual Reports 1922-2005) 
The preceding paragraphs have shown, from both the previous trend graphs 
and academic commentary, that Ireland had a remarkably low level of recorded 
crime during the 1940s and 1950s, and therefore had quite a stable social order. In 




fact, the country recorded one of its lowest recorded crime rates in its entire history. 
However, this tranquillity was about to be transformed by a surge in the number of 
recorded criminal offences. These first emerged in and around the mid-to-late 
1960s, and eventually led to an alteration in the qualitative and quantitative nature 
of recorded crime in the country. These changes would therefore make victims of 
crime much more relevant, and eventually reoriented them back into their formerly 
central role within the procedures of the Irish criminal justice system itself. 
5.2.2 The Post-1960s Quantitative Increase in Reported Crime 
Although determining changes in recorded crime rates after the 1950s 
presents certain challenges, data trends are illustrative. The issues and complexities 
involved with relying on Irish data have been very well documented. These 
probably explain obvious disparities. Particularly the one between the low level of 
recorded serious offences in 1942, which from Figure 11 was roughly 19,000, and 
the higher prosecution (and presumably detection) of less serious crime, which 
Figure 2 places in and around 82,000. If we extrapolate upon some of the excellent 
points in relation to the reliance on official Irish data made by both McCullagh3 
 
3 “What we have said about crime…is based on Garda Statistics but there are problems with these. 
The major one is that of unrecorded…crime…researchers found…there were almost twice the 
number of burglaries as are recorded in Garda Statistics…the major reason for the discrepancy is 
not the failure of victims to notify the police. Almost 90 per cent of victims of burglary said they 
reported…[t]he problem seems to be in how the Gardai respond to and record such reports.” 
McCullagh, C. (1986) ‘Crime in Ireland Facts, Figures & Interpretations’, Studies: An Irish 
Quarterly Review, 75(297), 11–20, p.13. 




and O’Donnell,4 we can see that just because there were comparably far fewer 
serious crimes recorded that is not to say that less serious crimes were occurring. 
This would be particularly evident in the area of sexual crime, which later research 
in this chapter confirms was obviously significant in the past. The disparity could 
be explained by the fact that these crimes usually have a high degree of non-
reporting, and especially at these particular times due to the context of the period.  
In addition, even in those rare instances where abuse was reported, the 
comparably low numbers could be the result of the way in which these reports were 
recorded and acted upon. Indeed, serious issues with Gardai statistics, such as the 
counting rule were in operation at this time. This counted crime by the victim, as 
opposed to the offence, and thereby overlooked recidivism. This would therefore 
explain how the Gardai were more preoccupied with less serious crime. As it could 
be readily reported, acted upon, and easier to deal with and bring to conclusion.  
 
4 “…the range of sexual conduct that offends against the criminal law and comes to the attention of 
An Garda Síochána and the courts…is a subset of all illegal sexual activity. Much sex crime goes 
unreported to the authorities or, if reported, does not result in proceedings.” O’Donnell, I. (2003) 
‘Sex Crime in Ireland: Extent and Trends’, Judicial Studies Institute Journal, 3(1), 89-106, p. 89 
“…Garda figures relate only to the minority of cases that are reported to them and deemed suitable 
to record… they provide at best a partial glimpse of the extent of criminal sexual activity.…Garda 
figures are not a total count of offences of rape…made known to them. The tally is depressed by a 
…‘counting rules’… a child who is repeatedly raped by her father will count, for the purposes of 
the Garda statistics, as a single rape.” O’Donnell, I. (2003) ‘Sex Crime in Ireland: Extent and 
Trends’, Judicial Studies Institute Journal, 3(1), 89-106, p. 95. 




The amount of crime that is recorded by the Gardaí within their Annual 
Reports allows us to analyse these data trends. Although these are helpful, they also 
require mass victimisation surveys, which will be discussed later, to provide a 
much more complete picture of the actual transition regarding Irish criminality 
within this particular period. However, these shortcomings are quite 
understandable and really tend to not diminish the validity of these trends as ‘social 
facts’ (O'Donnell and O'Sullivan, 2003; Black 1970; Parsons, 2016 p. 15, p. 17; 
Kilcommins et al. 2004 p. 103, 116, p. 93; Watson 2000; Breen and Rottman 1985; 
O’Connell and Whelan 1994; Maguire 2002; O’Connell 2000; Rottman 1980, p. 
12; Durkheim 1895a, pp. 50-9). 
               
 




               
 
 Figure 11 and Figure 12 (Young et al. 2001)5 (Gardai Siochana Annual Reports 1922-2005)  
To help further understand these changes it is also worth noting that the 
Annual Reports of the Gardaí differentiate between indictable and non-indictable 
crime. This further elucidates the changing nature of recorded crime within Ireland. 
As we can see, there was an increase in recorded crime rates after the 1940s and 
1950s. This appears to begin during the 1960s. Although indictable and non-
indictable offences remain low up until that point, these categories continued to 
increase during the 1970s and 1980s (O'Donnell and O'Sullivan 2001, pp. 9-10, p. 
13, 2003; Parsons 2016, p. 18; NCC 2009, p. 20; McCullagh 1996, p. 3; Brewer et 
al. 1996; Kilcommins et al. 2004, p. 90, p. 115; O’Donnell 2005, p. 110).  
 
5 Young, P., O'Donnell, I., Clare, E. (2001) Crime In Ireland, Stationery Office: Dublin. As with 
the previous major piece of research in this area, the source of this data is official, and taken from 
the annual crime rate reports of the Gardai. However, again, as a result of this, it should also be 
treated with the same degree of caution. As official data, as a result of the issues with official data 
that this chapter highlights, should be seen to complement rather than suplement other statistics. 




The Gardaí also separate recorded offences into three major categories, 
which further support the argument that recorded crime increased in the decades 
after the 1950s. This is because the data for all of these major subcategories of 
crime broadly mirror the trajectory of the recorded rates of crime for indictable and 
non-indictable crime. In fact, each crime subcategory did not really begin to rise 
until the 1960s, with each subcategory soaring after this point, indicating a parallel 
increase in the level of recorded crime (O’Donnell 2005, p. 108; Kilcommins et al. 
2004, p. 107; Gurr 1981, pp. 298-299; McCullagh 1986, p.12). 
 





               
        Figures 13, 14 and 15 (Gardai Siochana Annual Reports 1922-2005) 





                     Figure 16 (Gardai Siochana Annual Reports 1922-2005)    
 





Fig 17 and Figure 18 (Young et al. 2001) 
Garda data also indicates that there was a surge in the number of recorded 
sexual offences within Ireland during the latter half of the twentieth century. The 
graph below demonstrates this. This trend is disconcerting, as academics contend 
that the prevalence of sexual offending is often much higher than recorded figures 
indicate, since victims of sexual crimes often shy away from reporting these kinds 
of offences. In fact, One in Four, a Non-Governmental Organisation that deals with 
child abuse victims, notes that only about 15 per cent of its service users eventually 
report their sexual abuse to the Gardaí (Ring 2017, p.93; One in Four 2015, p. 15). 
Therefore, although the Gardaí did note an increase, the alteration that actually 
transpired during this particular time could have been even greater (Kilcommins et 
al. 2004, p. 122; Bacik et al. 1998; O’Donnell 2005, p. 115; Ring 2009).  




               
   
Figure 19 (Young et al. 2001) 
 
This data trend also suggests a rise in recorded murder and manslaughter 
offences as well as the use of lethal violence after the 1960s. This is evident from 
the figures below. These graphs indicate that this began after the 1960s, with each 
subcategory peaking in the latter portion of the twentieth century. The graphs also 
evidence the swift growth in these areas (Kilcommins et al. 2004, p. 116; Eisner 
2001; Thome 2001; O’Donnell 1999; 2001, 2002a, p. 69, pp. 71-72; 2002). 
 






                                                  Figure 20 and 21 (Young et al. 2001) 
 




                   
                                            Figure 22 (Kilcommins et al. 2004) 
The number of larceny victims reporting to Gardaí in the decades after the 
Second World War also began to grow during the 1960s. In fact, the number of 
recorded crimes against property skyrocketed, breaking the crime picture of the 
1950s. This meant that theft now accounted for more than 95 per cent of all of the 
serious crime the Gardaí recorded. This turned larceny into a subject of major 
importance, which brought about much greater personal expenditure on security 
(Rottman 1980, p.1, p. 3, p. 4; O'Donnell and O'Sullivan 2001, p. 18). 
These increases in recorded crime are more understandable when one 
considers social disorganisation theory, the idea that social transitions loosen 
societal bonds, and thereby engender crime. We can see this in the eroding of the 
social norms of the 1950s by the counterculture of the 1960s, which arguably led 
to an increase in recorded crime. The theory even manages to account for the 
influence of brisk economic growth within Ireland after the Second World War, 
giving the idea further credence. Social disorganisation also fits due to the 
rejuvenation projects of the 1970s, which dislodged large segments of the working-




class residents that had resided within the country’s metropolitan areas (Rottman 
1980, pp. 5-6, p. 27, p. 30; Kennedy and Dowling 1975, pp. 3-8).    
A rise in the diversity and quantity of commodities also exasperated the 
outcomes of this loosening of social control by catalysing an increase in proprietary 
offences. In fact, the 1960s saw luxury items flood into Irish markets, with a five-
fold increase in car ownership evidencing this change. Therefore, the undermining 
of social norms, as well as an improvement in the circulation and selection of 
commodities, undoubtedly created new ‘opportunities for crime’, which now 
tended to find expression in the country’s higher rate of recorded rate of theft 
(Mansfield et al. 1974; Rottman 1980, p. 23, p. 31; Cohen and Felson 1979).   
              




            
Figure 23 and 24 (Young et al. 2001) 
 
The rising rates of recorded crime in the 1960s also coincided with an 
increase in commercialisation, which clearly had something of a pernicious 
influence. This most likely transpired because of an emerging ‘consumer culture’, 
as well as an increase in discretionary spending, which helped to bring about 
situations that tended to engender a much greater level of recorded crime. Recorded 
crime, from the 1960s onwards, can therefore be seen as the ‘dark side of progress’ 
as Ireland’s increasingly urban and industrial economy now presented far greater 
opportunities for victimisation than it did in the past. This occurred because 
economic liberalisation and commercial expansion brought about situations that 
were more conducive to criminality (Parsons 2016, pp. 19-20; Brewer et al. 1997, 
p. 47; McCullagh 1986, pp. 14-15; Rottman 1980, p. 15, p. 19; Clinard 1978, p. 1).     




Neo-liberalism, and relative deprivation, particularly during the latter half 
of the twentieth century, consequently played an important role in helping to bring 
about this growth in the recorded crime rate. Its hallmarks of social-economic 
marginalisation, unemployment, social immobility, gangs and drugs all became 
prominent within Irish society, exacerbating the recorded rate of crime. Drug 
gangs, for example, had a particularly malignant influence. In the years before the 
1990s less than a handful of “gangland” murders transpired, however almost ten 
took place in 1996 alone. These circumstances also augmented crime figures by 
elevating the number of victims coming to the attention of the Gardaí. Unfortunate 
situations like these, coupled with Ireland’s socio-economic disparities, explain 
why a sliver of society committed a swathe of misconduct. McCullagh (1996) 
illustrates this with his concept of ‘dual marginalisation’, the idea that although 
neo-liberalism grew the economy, its accentuation of inequality aggravated the rate 
of recorded crime (Kilcommins et al. 2004, pp. 28-33, p. 129; Melossi 2008, p. 3; 
Garland 2001; O’Mahoney 2000, p. 3, p. 6, p. 5, p. 11; O'Mahony 1997, 2000, p. 
9; Bacik et al. 1998; Dooley 1995, p. 16, 2001, p. 17; Baker 1998, p. 2; Wolfgang 
et al. 1972; O'Donnell and O'Sullivan 2001, pp. 51-52; Brewer et al. 1997).   
These quantitative increases in recorded crime accentuated the number of 
victims of crime that were now presenting to the Gardaí. This made illegality and 
the Irish State’s response to it more important. The emergence of this situation 
meant that the Irish victim of crime now warranted even greater examination by 
the more central stakeholders within Irish criminal justice. The elevated rates of 
recorded crime, that this chapter has just previously outlined, also complemented 
this shift in emphasis, as studies now seemed to indicate that rates were normalising 




(Rottman 1980, pp. 144-149; Rabitte 2012, p. 3; Garland 1996, p. 446, 2001, p. 
121, p. 122; Garland and Sparks 2006, p. 16; Goodey 2005, p. 35). 
 Another key aspect in relation to the altered crime rate during the post 1960s 
era was the manner by which these rates came to be subjectivized by the public.6 
The growth in the crime rate in and after the 1960s was therefore pivotal in the 
precipitation of policy change at this particular point in time. This can be seen in 
the increase in Gardai numbers, from a low base number.7 In fact, some have even 
argued that the approach of the Gardai took a turn for the worse in the post 1960s 
era. As it indeed entered a new more crime control based phase of development 
due to the increased allegations of police brutality by independent observers.8  
 
6 “Irish Marketing Surveys…argued that ‘public opinion…has swung firmly in favour of a tough 
crack-down…’ (Irish Independent, 1993: 1)…an Irish Times Market Research bureau poll reported 
that ‘ [m]ost people fear crime is getting worse and are unhappy with what’s being done’ (Irish 
Times, 1997)…O’Connell and Whelan (1996) reported that people believed that all crimes were on 
the increase but believed that more serious, violent and extreme offences were increasing more 
quickly...” O'Connell, M. (1999) 'Is Irish Public Opinion towards Crime Distorted by Media Bias?' 
European Journal of Communication, 14(2), 191–212, p. 191-192. 
7 “…the size of the force expanded rapidly. In 1969, it was about 6,500 strong, while by 1981 it had 
increased to 10,000 members, and by 1984 to 11,200…” Mulcahy, A. (2002) ‘The impact of the 
Northern ‘Troubles’ on criminal justice in the Irish Republic’, In P. O’Mahony ed., Criminal justice 
in Ireland, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 275–96, p. 286. 
8  “An Amnesty International mission to Ireland in 1977 also expressed concern about police 
treatment of suspects…these allegations raised questions of whether the conflict had fundamentally 
changed the orientation of policing in the Republic (Walsh 1999).” Mulcahy, A. (2002) ‘The impact 




There also seemed to be an official tolerance, or at the least a reluctance, to 
criticise or take substantial measures to restrict heavy handed tactics. 9  These 
decades were also characterised by increased penal warehousing, as the numbers 
of Irish offenders languishing behind bars for drugs offences, or related crimes, 
mushroomed.10 Indeed public opinion also arguably had influence in this regard. 
This is evident in Dublin in the 1980s, where there was a vociferous critique of the 
official handling of the surge in drugs related criminality in its poorer regions.11  
There is considerable evidence in Dail Debates of how politicians latched 
onto the concerns of the public in terms of child abuse and drugs related offences 
in order to advocate for penal populist measures. Penal populist political rhetoric 
 
of the Northern ‘Troubles’ on criminal justice in the Irish Republic’, In P. O’Mahony ed., Criminal 
justice in Ireland, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 275–96, p. 288 
9 “…one…Minister for Justice…berated those who would…[‘]…criticise the Garda…it is obscene 
that…the Minister responsible should be the first to lead the charge…[‘]” Mulcahy, A. (2002) ‘The 
impact of the Northern ‘Troubles’ on criminal justice in the Irish Republic’, In P. O’Mahony ed., 
Criminal justice in Ireland, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 275–96, p. 289. 
10  “The Irish government's decision to allocate Portlaoise…to paramilitary prisoners… 
exacerbated…overcrowding…linked with the…drug problem in Ireland.” Mulcahy, A. (2002) ‘The 
impact of the Northern ‘Troubles’ on criminal justice in the Irish Republic’, In P. O’Mahony ed., 
Criminal justice in Ireland, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 275–96, p. 291. 
11  “As crime rates increased unchecked until the 1980s issues surrounding crime…assumed 
unparalleled significance…public attention focused on the rise of drug-related crime…Dublin… 
witnessed a rapid rise in drug-related offences…accompanied by vocal public criticism…” 
O'Connell, M. (1999) 'Is Irish Public Opinion towards Crime Distorted by Media Bias?' European 
Journal of Communication, 14(2), 191–212, p. 281-282. 




was arguably more desirable than ever due to the frustration many communities 
felt with drug related offences, as well as the emerging spectre of child abuse.12 
Indeed the overall crime picture became darker when historical abuse and sex 
crimes began to become a publicised aspect of news coverage. This was something 
that exacerbated the public’s perception that crime was out of hand.  
However, the frequency with which RTE News reported sexual crime was 
higher than official data, and tended to over report particularly egregious offences. 
This reporting was able to whip us a degree of hysteria in the 1990s that crime 
needed to be “deal with”. The draconian approach however was almost as if certain 
quarters wished to overcompensate for the lack of action of the past. 13  This 
manipulation is also seen in the newspaper reports prevalent in the post 1960s era.  
 
12 "…this generation throughout Ireland have the right to be born and raised in an environment free 
from criminal violence and abuse" O'Kennedy (1996) Seanad Debates, 146, c. 88, 31 January. 
“These murderers and criminals do not recognise…civil rights. Why should we recognise 
theirs?…People who are caught selling drugs…should be taken out of circulation." Briscoe (1996) 
Dail Debates, 488, c. 554-555, 4th July. Kilcommins, S. and Vaughan, B. (2004) 'A Perpetual State 
of Emergency: Subverting the Rule of Law in Ireland', Cambrian Law Review, 35, 55-80, p. 74-75. 
13  “RTÉ News gives more coverage to rape than any other type of crime, with sexual assault the 
second most frequent … [m]urder with sexual assault accounts for…more than 6% of the RTÉ news 
stories…[i]n relation to child victims…RTÉ News have ‘Authority figures’ as the most frequent 
relationship…(…90.0%)…stories about child abuse are twice as frequent as stories about sexual 
crimes against adults, although the Garda statistics report that the opposite is true…[s]exual crime 
against children is over-reported in the media...” Breen, M. J. (2007) ‘Through the Looking Glass: 
How the Mass Media Represent, Reflect and Refract Sexual Crime in Ireland’, Irish 
Communication Review, 10(1), 5-22, p. 3, p. 19. 




These tended to be elastic with the truth and deployed sensationalist 
headlines to engage their readership. The articles they promoted tended to infer that 
a new surge in crime was about to happen or that there was more crime in parts of 
society than hitherto anticipated. These were therefore framed in such a way as to 
engender the idea that crime was something that should deeply perturb the public.14 
It is clear from all of this that the media, as well as politicians were helping crime 
to become politicised. Although this was the case, the issue was quite a slow burn 
for the Irish public, which eventually, as we shall see later on in this chapter, 
erupted to such an extent in the late 1990s that wars on crime became not only 
tolerable, but passionately demanded  by certain quarters of the political class.15  
This also supports the contention, expanded on later in this chapter, that the 
media’s crime depictions allowed a general feeling of unease about criminality to 
 
14 “There were 222 (10.1 percent) articles… focused on one particular type of offence but the report 
was not detailing a specific incidence …[t]ypical of the first kind was the report that stolen cigarettes 
were expected to soon flood the markets (‘Stolen Cigs on market’) or warning people in particular 
areas to be alert to an upsurge in robberies…(‘Villains Target Sick and poor…). Typical of the 
second kind of ‘explosion in crime’ theme were articles with headlines like ‘Sex pests Make Life 
Hell for Our nurses’, or the tip-of-the-iceberg argument, which listed offences found to be far more 
prevalent than previously expected…‘Bosses Fiddle System for millions’, or ‘Child Snatch Cases 
Rocket Says Unit’.” O'Connell, M. (1999) 'Is Irish Public Opinion towards Crime Distorted by 
Media Bias?' European Journal of Communication, 14(2), 191–212, p. 204. 
15  “John O’Donoghue…proclaimed…[‘]The task of the next government will be…to 
confront...crime…[it]… must wage war on crime[‘] …” O’Donnell, I. and O’Sullivan, E. (2003) 
‘The politics of intolerance—Irish style’, British Journal of Criminology, 43(3), p 49. 




percolate throughout Irish society.16 However, in the post 1960s decades the actual 
groundwork for this politicisation of crime was effectively laid. Particularly in 
terms of the increasing politicisation of both discourse and policy on crime. An 
trend that was largely initiated by the sensationalist portrayals of the mass media.17 
The quantitative alteration in crime after the 1960s, as well as the way in 
which this was subjectively perceived by the public, made Irish society one in 
which people began to view crime as being much more prevalent. This meant that 
criminality, as well as its impact now needed addressing, which was another key 
factor in the re-emergence of the Irish crime victim. This change in emphasis also 
 
16 “…[the] frequency of extreme stories, increased newsworthiness of extreme stories, preference 
for vulnerable vicitms…and pessimistic coverage…are the main ways…a misrepresentative picture 
of crime appears in the press.” O’Connell, M. (1999) ‘Is Irish Public Opinion towards Crime 
Distorted by Media Bias?’ European Journal of Communication, 14(2), 191–212 , p. 205. 
17 “…the change in policy in the mid-1980s by the Irish media…resulted in a gradual shifting …so 
that the groundwork for the hard-line conservative consensus against crime was put in place by the 
mid-1990s…the explanation…that sensational media…lead to an…extreme public perception… 
finds support in the available data.” O’Connell, M. (1999) ‘Is Irish Public Opinion towards Crime 
Distorted by Media Bias?’ European Journal of Communication, 14(2), 191–212, p. 208. “… a 
dangerous culture has grown…whereby more and more rights are assigned to wrongdoers…[a]ny 
person who peddles drugs should be sentenced to hard labour. I would not be sorry if the death 
penalty were reintroduced for convicted drug barons... I have little time for the champions of civil 
liberties…as far as this issue is concerned…" Connaughton, P. (1996) Dail Debates, 1996, vol 463, 
c. 318-322, 14 March. Kilcommins, S. and Vaughan, B. (2004) 'A Perpetual State of Emergency: 
Subverting the Rule of Law in Ireland', Cambrian Law Review, 35, 55-80, p. 74-75. 




broadly coincided with qualitative changes in the nature of Irish crime. These 
presented as ‘evental’ moments, which also helped to reintegrate victims of crime. 
5.3 THE EVENTAL MOMENTS THAT QUALITATIVELY CHANGED CRIME  
5.3.1 Watershed Moments in Irish Criminal History 
Qualitative changes in the nature of Irish criminality also tended to transpire 
around the same time that the quantitative alterations that this chapter has just 
previously outlined occurred. These manifested themselves as ‘evental moments’. 
The qualitative changes that this chapter discusses illustrate how these crime 
‘events’ raised awareness about Irish criminality, as well as its impact. This chapter 
does this in order to illustrate how these qualitative alterations were a key part of 
the advancement of the inclusionary movement that eventually led to the re-
emergence of the victim of crime within Irish criminal justice (Badiou and Tarby 
2013; Žižek 2014; Butler and Cunningham 2010, p. 432; Kilcommins et al. 2004). 
An evental moment is the moment in which an Event takes place. The 
concept of the Event was first introduced by Badiou18 but is read through Žižek for 
the purposes of this thesis due to the greater accessibility of this body of work. 
Badiou’s work is mainly in French and as such has not caught on rapidly within 
the Anglophone world. Žižek on the other hand is a popular proponent of the theory 
and has widely popularised it within the Anglo-American world.  
 
18 Badiou, A. (2005) Being and Event, trans. Feltham, O. New York: Continuum. Badiou, A. and 
Trong, N., (2012) In Praise of Love, trans. Bush, P., Serpent's Tail: London. 




Žižek uses example such as the work of Kafka and the subjective response 
to falling in love to demonstrate the nature of the Event in more accessible terms.19 
An Event is thus an occurrence which is so beyond the realms of conventional 
ordinary life that it is seen or perceived by people as retroactively producing its 
own causes. In this way they alter the previous status quo and create a new one. 
These are difficult to predict as they are very contingent as they depend on both the 
exercise of free will by participants and them also coming to perceive an occurrence 
as an Event. Since they must in a sense accept it as being such a phenomenon.  
The value of viewing the Events of 1996 in this way, as opposed to seeing 
them as pivotal moments or tipping point20 is that the author is better able to convey 
the contingency of the Events in question. Viewing what took place in 1996 as 
tipping points introduces determinacy into the equation, as it sees 1996 as an 
inevitable end point based on the state of affairs pre-1996.  However, by adopting 
the concept of the Event, the author can convey how there were arguably no neat 
linear lines of causation between the causes of 1996 and its occurrence. This, it is 
contended, helps better capture the unprecedented nature of these occurrences. As 
they tend to be dependent on criminal conduct and the reaction of the Irish people.  
In fact, such incidents are reliant on actors resolving tensions in a certain 
way. They also require a response from the authorities, and society. Even a certain 
media reaction is necessary, along with the political mobilisation that follows it, 
 
19 Žižek, S. (2014) Event, Penguin Books: London. 
20 Gladwell, M. (2000) The Tipping Point : How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, Boston: 
Little, Brown & Co. 




for 1996 to be decisive in Irish legal history. All of this consequently shattered the 
criminological co-ordinates of Irish life up until that point, and transformed not 
only the way society perceived criminality, but officially responded to it. A change 
that has seen both of these areas effectively become much more victim oriented.21 
One of the major qualitative ‘evental’ moments that changed the views of 
the Irish public on crime were a spate of notorious murders that transpired during 
the 1990s. The killings of Patrick Daly, Tommy Casey and Joyce Quinn in 1996 
helped to alter public perceptions, because these crimes confirmed that criminality 
was no longer the preserve of Irish cities, which was something that struck at the 
very heart of the idea that Ireland was a ‘safe country’.22 The murders of Jerry 
McCabe and Veronica Guerin also followed these events, and both occurred within 
the space of a fortnight. Indeed, the impact of both cannot be underestimated as 
before they occurred, less than 5 per cent of those polled felt crime was an issue, 
but once they transpired this had mushroomed to just over 40 per cent. 23  
 
21 Žižek, S. (2014) Event, Penguin Books: London. 
22 “As McCullagh (1999) has described, concern about lawlessness had begun to grow in January 
1996 due to three rural killings: Patrick Daly, a farmer, was found at the bottom of a well; Tommy 
Casey, a farmer, was killed in his home by intruders; Joyce Quinn, a shop keeper, was reported 
missing and found dead two days later. These deaths generated a disproportionate response… 
because they showed that crime was not just a problem for impoverished urban areas—killing had 
come to the countryside, the repository of 'real' Ireland” O’Donnell, I. and O’Sullivan, E. (2003) 
The politics of intolerance—Irish style. British Journal of Criminology, 43(3), 253–66, p. 47 
23 “Matters came to a head in the summer. On 7 June 1996 a Garda detective (Jerry McCabe) was 
shot dead during an attempted robbery of a post office van in Adare Co. Limerick. Two weeks later 




Not only had the perceptions of the public changed, which was a 
considerable alteration, but the State appeared to treat the situation as a game 
changing moment. Where there had been near passivity, this was now replaced 
with engagement. It appeared to dramatically shift the political mood in a much 
more crime control, but also victim cognisant, direction. When one considers the 
lack of concern about crime from the public and the state prior to these events, 
which one must remember were isolated and something of a rarity when a broader 
view of Irish criminal history is taken, the shift in emphasis is remarkable.  
The events of 1996 would be unprecedented, and, as such, are a classic 
example in the Irish context of both a moral panic, and decisive Evental moment. 
However, the status of the murders of 1996 as an Evental moment is of much more 
importance for our purposes. In fact, it would tend to considerably help in 
evidencing the argument of this chapter that the domestic crime situation altered at 
this time towards a more victim centred justice model. This contention can be made 
as the murders and state response in 1996 were all unanticipated outcomes that are 
not entirely explainable by reference to direct evolutions or neat linear causes. 
 
an investigative journalist (Veronica Guerin) was murdered as she drove home from a Dublin court 
…[s]he had written extensively about Dublin criminals…and an assassin had been hired to put an 
end to her exposés. These killings were defining moments in the debate about law and order in 
Ireland. They were the the catalyst for a hardening in political attitudes… Crime control became a 
national priority and for a time it was almost as if a state of national emergency had been declared.” 
O’Donnell, I. and O’Sullivan, E. (2003) The politics of intolerance—Irish style. British Journal of 
Criminology, 43(3), 253–66, p. 48. 




 The response to them is also indicative of their status as an Event. As they 
forever changed not only the way the state approached the question of crime and 
the public’s perception of it, but even how crime is studied as a phenomenon in 
Ireland. It could be said that, when assessing crime as a social and criminological 
reality, that one could separate it, as well as its response, into two different 
criminological realities, one pre-1996 and one post-1996. This ties in with this 
thesis in the sense that it is contended that the criminological reality after 1996 was 
one that was more inclusive of victims, as well as their interests, than the one that 
had preceded it24  (NCC 2009, pp. 20-21; O’Donnell 2007; Badiou and Tarby 2013; 
Žižek 2014; Kilcommins et al. 2004, p. 92, p. 137; McCullagh 1999).  
The Troubles were another string of decisive ‘evental’ moments that helped 
to change Irish attitudes towards criminality, as the conflict, which pitted popular 
insurrection against paramilitary reaction brought about a stream of atrocities. It 
lasted for nearly twenty years, wounded 30,000, and left thousands dead. However, 
these figures cannot really convey the reality of the horrors that actually took place. 
When the fighting started, there were less than fifteen deaths, but by 1972, this 
 
24 “This was a textbook case of 'moral panic'. Public anger and anxiety were inflamed…and a raft 
of legal and policy changes were set in motion to clamp down on 'organized' crime. Serious 
questions were raised about the state’s ability to police itself, about the extent to which there was a 
control deficit. The calculated killing of a journalist who wrote regularly about Dublin’s underworld 
indicated that crime gangs felt they could operate with complete impunity. This was a very worrying 
scenario for many people and generated the conditions where a harsh response to perceived 
lawlessness became acceptable.” O’Donnell, I. and O’Sullivan, E. (2003) The politics of 
intolerance—Irish style. British Journal of Criminology, 43(3), 253–66, p. 48. 




number had soared to almost 500, with nearly three quarters of the fatalities during 
certain periods being non-combatants. This violence, which the media went to great 
lengths to portray, consequently had a considerable, almost formative, impact upon 
the Irish publics’ perceptions of criminality and victimhood (Kelly 2015, p. 26; 
Edwards and McGrattan 2010, p. xvii; Alexander and O’Day 1991, pp. 1-3, pp. 
123-124; Badiou and Tarby 2013; Žižek 2014; Pockgrass 1987) 
One of the most terrible events of the Troubles was the Omagh bombing, 
which killed 30 people, hurt ten times that number and accentuated the country’s 
already keen awareness of criminality. In fact, its impact has arguably etched the 
idea of the victim into the minds of Irish people. This was at least partly due to the 
highly tragic nature of the crime. As it was considerably exacerbated by the fact 
that a series of mistakes, both official and unofficial, in the handling of the situation 
made it more deadly than it would have been without these unfortunate errors.25 In 
 
25  “Sometime early that morning, a 500 pound car bomb was parked in the towns market 
square…[at] [a]round 2:30 P.M. a call was placed to Omagh’s police force warning them of the 
bomb. The police believed [due to incorrect information being given to them from the IRA warning 
that] it was near the towns’s courthouse, a building at the opposite end of the main street…[p]olice 
rushed to clear the area, tragically directing people toward the market. Shortly after 3:00P.M., the 
car bomb exploded…[i]n December 2001, Nuala O’Loan, the ombudsman for Northern Ireland’s 
new security force, issued a report severely criticizing the conduct of the…(RUC)…The report 
maintains that a highly regarded police informant warned his Special Branch handlers that a 
bombing was being planned somewhere in Northern Ireland for August 15. It further alleges that a 
warning was received by the RUC that a mortar attack on police headquarters in Omagh was also 
planned for that date. The report implies that if these two pieces of information had been given to 




fact, an iconic family photo, taken moments before the bomb exploded, came to 
play a central role in the popular recollection of this ‘event’ in Ireland (Kelly 2015, 
p. 29; Blaney 2009, p. 415).  
All of these ‘evental’ moments were instrumental in qualitatively altering 
how the Irish public viewed crime, making its’ perception of it much more victim-
centred. These occurrences became ‘Events’ in the philosophical sense of the 
term,26 because they were, by in large, accepted as such by the wider public as such. 
At the same time, they were so beyond the realms of possibility that they shattered 
the very co-ordinates of Irish civic and political life. Consider, for example, the 
government’s reaction to the events of 1996. Indeed, The Proceeds of Crime Act, 
1996 and The Criminal Assets Bureau Act, 1996 now implemented, through their 
wide powers to deprive criminals of their ill-gotten gains, what Veronica Guerin 
had spent, and indeed given her life trying to bring about. These qualitative changes 
in the nature of Irish crime therefore played a pivotal role in permitting the Irish 
citizenry to comprehend the changing face of criminality within Ireland, which 
privileged, and promoted victim standpoints, which were no longer side lined. This 
action was therefore instrumental in helping to bring about victim-centred activism, 
since it used this kind of momentum in order to help engender the legal 
 
local police, the tragedy might have been averted.” Martin, G. The SAGE Encyclopedia of 
Terrorism, 2nd edn, London: SAGE, p. 445. 
26 As previously explained and espoused by Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek in Badiou, A. (2005) 
Being and Event, trans. Feltham, O. Continuum: New York and Žižek, S. (2014) Event, Penguin 
Books: London. 




reintegration of victims of crime (Badiou and Tarby 2013; Žižek 2014; Walsh 
1999, p. 113; Kilcommins et al. 2004). 
5.4  THE EVOLUTION OF VICTIM ADVOCACY IN IRELAND  
5.4.1 The Emergence of the Victim’s Voice in the Public Sphere 
These qualitative and quantitative changes in the nature of Irish crime 
meant victims of crime became a topic of interest in the 1970s, sparking an activist 
movement that brought them back to the fore of public debate. The driver of all 
this was a widespread interest in victims, with several NGOs establishing 
themselves to assist and advocate on their behalf, allowing their activists to 
champion and support victims of crime in their struggle to recentralise themselves 
within the frames of Irish criminal justice (Kilcommins et al. 2018, pp. 35-38 
Friedman 1985, p. 790, p. 794; Burke 1991; Fitzgerald 1995; Weed 2005, p. 97; 
McCarthy et al. 1988; Mathews, 1994, Weed 1995; Christie 1986, 2010, p. 117; 
Pemberton 2009, p. 4; Goodey 2005; Farrell et al. 2002, p. 9; Scheingold et al. 
1994; McGovern 2002, p. 399; Baumeister 1997; Maguire and Shapland 1990; 
Pemberton 2009, p. 4, p. 8, p. 10; Maguire 1991; Daly and Stubbs 2007; Hoyle 
2007). 
Yet, victim activism had several obstacles to surmount; as Irish Law often 
incorporated frames that tended to marginalise them. One of the worst examples of 
this was the marital rape exception, which meant that the law did not actually deem 
married men capable of raping their spouses. Indeed, the contention that this 
structural privileging of masculinity by the law unfairly prejudiced certain classes 
of crime victim is now widely accepted, since academics have come to recognize 




that the ‘exclusionary’ presuppositions of Irish criminal justice previously 
undermined how the law in Ireland perceived victims. Indeed, research evidences 
that “[female victims]…consistently report that they are not taken seriously when 
they come into contact with the legal system” (Spain et al. 2014, p. 4) which 
evidences the ultimate impact of this on victims (Kilcommins et al. 2018, p. 34, 
p.125; Robin 1977, p. 136 ; McMullan 1993, p. 86; Jerrard 1992, p. 340; Blackstone 
1765, p. 442; Anderson 2016, p. 178; Healy 2004, p. 157; Leahy 2008, pp. 2203-
12, 2013, pp. 102-7; Grana 2010, p. 39; Giacopassi and Wilkinson 1985, p. 368). 
Several victim activists, from about the 1970s onwards, consequently 
sought to undermine these exclusionary perspectives, and better the lot of the Irish 
crime victim. The victim activist movement in Ireland campaigned on several 
issues, but paid particularly close attention to the mistreatment of women and 
children. This was because activists perceived these offences as having profoundly 
negative and unjust outcomes. In fact, victim activists founded Women’s Aid in 
1974, and organised The Women Against Violence rallies of 1978. These kinds of 
activists were also able to found the country’s first ‘victim refuge’ in 1974, by 
occupying an uninhabited residence. The consequence of all of this victim activism 
was the raising of the public’s awareness about victims of both sexual and domestic 
violence. This kind of activism was therefore pivotal to the advancement of victims 
of crime and the highlighting of the impact of victimisation within Ireland  
(Kilcommins et al. 2018, p. 50; Finnegan 2001; Smith 2004, p. 210; Clear 2000; 
Daly 1995; Pemberton 2009, p. 10; Dobash and Dobash 2004; Pemberton 2009, p. 
10; Hoyle 2007; Bourke and McBride 2016, p. 485; Ferriter 2012b, p.356; Bourke 




et al. 2002; O’Donnell 2003, p. 76; McGee et al. 2002, p. 128;  Safe Ireland 2013; 
ILLE 2001, p. 24; Berger 1977; Hilberman 1976).  
Major parallel grassroots movements, that similarly sought to utilize all of 
this popular momentum also began in 1977, and attempted to improve the role and 
position of crime victims by establishing Rape Crisis Centres across the country, 
which raised the profile of victims even further within the minds of the Irish public. 
It was in this way that these activists helped to change public perceptions of crime 
victims. The 1970s saw the establishment of the first one of these spaces within 
Ireland, with the first Rape Crisis Centre in the country opening its doors in 1977. 
These institutions provided peer-support ‘hotlines’, information and victim-centred 
literature. Victim activists, who were typically of the feminist persuasion, also 
frequently utilised these kinds of forums to help spread their victim-centred 
message, and have thereby helped to refocus attention back onto victims of crime. 
These developments have therefore allowed activists to establish a victim-centred 
culture within Ireland, which has defined what victims will now no longer tolerate 
(O’Connor 1980, p. 76; Maguire 1991, p. 370; Kilcommins and Moffatt 2018, p. 
382; Daly 1994, p. 779; Galligan 1998, p. 57, p. 112; Ring 2017, p. 89; Hall and 
Lloyd 1993, p. 101; Hill 2010, p. 885; McKay 2005, p. 111; Gornick, Burt, and 
Pittman 1983; Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1983; O'Mahony 2002, p. 149; 
Weldon 2002, p. 141; Crotty and Schmitt 2014, p. 113; Friedman 1985, p. 791; 
Bourke and McBride 2016, p. 485; Connolly 2002, p. 141; Kelly 1988; Loney-
Howes 2015, p. 3; Weed  2005, p. 101; Jasper 1998). 
Several other activist groups, such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving, were 
established in the 1980s. These helped to bring about reforms that increased the 




legal sanctions for driving under the influence and also campaigned to lower speed 
limits. Although this caused a lot of controversy, they reoriented concern back onto 
the victim of crime by making them a powerful force within Irish society. In fact, 
these activists effectively deployed ‘atrocity tales’, which helped the group to 
capitalise upon the value of the victim perspective. These bodies were similar to 
other activist organisations, but were also unique in their approach, as they came 
to typify grassroots ‘self-activism’ in Ireland (Butler 2002, p. 93; Kilcommins et 
al. 2018; Dorius and McCarthy 2011, p. 455; Rock 1988a; Weed 1990, pp. 460-
461; Reinarman 1988; Weed 1987, 1990, p. 459, 1991; Schmidt 2013; Hamilton 
2000; McCarthy et al. 1987; Gusfield 1975; Snow et al. 1986). 
Indeed, this Irish activism provided the successful formula for future victim 
activists. These activists made similar gains by building upon previous campaigns 
and adopting their techniques. The adoption of these strategies allowed for the 
emergence of new NGO’s in the late 1980s. Bodies like GLEN (Gay and Lesbian 
Equality Network) established themselves in 1988, and played a decisive role in 
the promulgation of The Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, 1989. Although 
early victim activists exposed the extent to which victimisation was gender-based, 
more recent activists have replicated this kind of activism by highlighting the 
pervasiveness of offences against minority sexualities and gender identities during 
the 1980s and 1990s. NGO’s like LOT, (Lesbians Organising Together) and TENI, 
(Transgender Equality Network Ireland) were founded by such activists in 1991 
and 2006 respectively. These two organisations continued this trend of victim 
inclusive activism by highlighting the prevalence of victimisation within their own 
respective communities (Jenness and Broad 1994, p. 404, p. 408, p. 410, p. 411; 




Wintemute and Andenæs 2004, p. 595; O'Halloran 2016; GLEN 1995, pp. 78-80, 
pp. 88-95; Robson 1995, pp. 47-59; MacKinnon 1987; Island and Letellier 1991; 
McAuliffe and Tiernan 2009, p. 1; Dukelow and Considine 2017, p. 365). 
 In fact, victim activism nearly always placed significant emphasis upon 
legal reform, which brought about material changes that have helped victims of 
crime to cope with the impact of criminality. Victim activists also argued that legal 
professionals should handle victims with greater care, and keep them up to date 
better. Despite framing these demands in the language of rights, activists 
maintained that ‘victim rights’ were inadequate if they lacked proper 
implementation. From this perspective, the bettering of the lot of crime victims was 
not merely about imparting abstract, but ultimately unenforceable rights, but also 
involved compelling criminal justice stakeholders to implement and uphold those 
rights that do exist. This popular championing of victim provision popularised 
ideas that have helped to bring about victim-centred reform in Ireland. This 
occurred because victim activism allowed victim campaigners to reach a consensus 
about the fact that victims of crime were in fact in need of assistance. This 
progressive activism allowed the victim movement to transform the victim of crime 
into a powerful ‘political symbol’, something which was fundamentally decisive in 
the campaign of victim activists who sought to transform the law, as it helped 
promote changes that have made Irish legality much more victim centred (Maguire 
1991; Kilcommins et al. 2004, pp. 144-153, 2018; Weed 2005, p. 98; Elias 1993; 
Pemberton 2009, p. 14; Henderson 1985, p. 949; Friedman 1985, p. 794). 
Such widespread organisation of victim activism led to victim centred legal 
reforms within Ireland. Take, for example, the Law Reform Commission’s 1988 




Report on Rape, which recommended the re-definition of consent, a radical step at 
that time, which Irish legislators eventually enshrined into law. Section 5(2) of the 
Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 also contains evidence of victim-
centred reform (Leahy 2018), in that, in the case of rape, the rule that a judge had 
to remind a jury about the hazards of finding guilt on the basis of false witness 
testimony was repealed. The victim-centred response to the Lavinia Kerwick 
incident also provides further evidence of this trend, with popular discontent in that 
instance leading to the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. Indeed, even The Sexual 
Offenders Act, 2001 has partially re-incorporated the Irish crime victim (Daly 
1989, 1990, 1994, p. 780; Jenness and Broad 1994, p. 404; Sheffield 1987, p. 185; 
Bacik 1998, p. 40; McCormack 1997, p. 57; p. 73; LRC 1988, p. 9; Hayden 2003, 
p. 72). 
The internet has also recently become a pivotal space for victim activism, 
particularly amongst discursively marginalised groups. This is because what was 
often previously pejoratively referred to as “slacktivism”, or internet based social 
activism, has widened in both its application and scope. Victims frequently utilise 
the internet to share their difficulties, seek help or redress and even retribution for 
the harms that they might have suffered. The fact that victims of crime now utilise 
the internet in this way in order to share their trauma highlights how “…trauma is 
[itself] [thus] becoming a commonplace of the contemporary world…” (cited in 
Ring 2017, p. 91). It also shows, to a certain extent, how the gaze of the Law is 
constrained, as victims of crime often turn to the internet in order to highlight their 
victimisation in ways that allow these kinds of alleged victims, as well as their 
supporters, to publicly legitimise their own subjectivities, as was clearly evidenced 




by the #MeToo, #IBeleiveHer and #ThisIsNotConsent social media campaigns 
(Kilcommins et al. 2018; Loney-Howes 2015, p. 4; Fenton 2008; Travers 2003; 
Castells 2007; Glenn 2015; Powell 2015; Rapp et al. 2010; Salter 2013). 
Internet activism has other benefits, as studies of blogs well illustrate, as 
online ‘safe spaces’ can often allow for the recounting of personal narratives that 
are frequently dispossessed of their official authenticity in the courts, and thus 
permit activists to openly discuss their victimisations, which has galvanised 
grassroots victim activism within Ireland. However, obstacles also exist in this 
regard, as “real world” prejudice is frequently ingrained online, as demonstrated 
by some of the rather high-profile regressive overreactions to the #MeToo, 
#IBelieveHer and #ThisIsNotConsent campaigns. Yet the prevalence of these kinds 
of responses has weakened in recent times due to the increasing levels of internet 
access among marginalised groups. The internet has therefore given a huge number 
of people, from many different backgrounds and ideologies, a forum within which 
to debate policy. Although not all activists get the same visibility, examinations of 
such activism indicate that these forums do indeed free up spaces within which 
victim activism and its perspectives can influence policy (Kilcommins 2018; 
Loney-Howes 2015, p. 5; Rentschler 2014; Gajjala 2010; Friedman 2005; Khalil 
2014; Sami and Zeineb 2012; Travers 2003; Fraser 1990; Shaw 2012).   
The evolution of victim activism in Ireland has endeavoured to elevate the 
status of victims and victimhood, and has played a key role in the resurgence of 
victim centred reform. It has done this by aiding the transition from a view that the 
defence of an accused from governmental overreach was paramount, to an 
understanding that victims are also entitled to entitlements of their own. Victim 




activism had therefore widely popularised the notion that the legal system could do 
more for victims, by combating the domination of crime by professionalised 
interests. This activism therefore destabilised the ‘phantom[ised] objectivity’ of the 
‘reified’ frames of victim exclusion. However, it also tended to create the risk that 
the legal system could ultimately become more oppressive, since reactionaries can 
often use the re-emergence of victims as a pretence for their own penal populist 
measures, which they can then utilise to erode civil liberties (Kilcommins et al. 
2004, 2018; Pemberton 2009, p. 3; Strang 2002; O’Malley 1996, p. 26; Albrecht 
1999, p. 95; Kilcommins and Moffett 2016, p. 381; Bottomore 2006, pp. 463-465; 
Lukács 1971; Christie 2010, pp. 117-118; O’Flaherty 2002, p. 375; Fennell 2001, 
p. 54; McCullagh 2014; Fattah 1986; Kirchhoff 1991; Sherman and Strang 2007). 
Even though various factors inspired victim activism, its proponents made 
Irish Law much more inclusive of victims of crime. However, victim activism had 
to pass through several different stages of development within Ireland in order to 
reach this particular point. In its early years, it was primarily local, but with the 
advent of digitalization and internet websites in the 1990s; online-based victim 
activism gave the movement an exciting new global dimension. This increasing 
contestation of narratives, and the raising of consciousness, helped promote the 
cause of the victim of crime in Ireland. Victim activism therefore helped make the 
Irish victim of crime a much more pivotal stakeholder within Irish criminal justice. 




5.5  MEDIA REPORTING  
5.5.1 Graphic and Pervasive Portrayals of Crime 
Another key driver of victim re-inclusion was the reporting of crime, which 
now became much more graphic and pervasive in the decades after the end of the 
Second World War. The Irish situation in this regard broadly mirrors the trend seen 
in the US, though it was not nearly as dramatic or punitive.27 There are parallels 
however, such as the Kearney and Kerwick cases, that indicate how the media were 
a pivotal element in driving victim advocacy. This can be seen in its impact, not 
only in terms of public approval but state responses. Indeed, such advocacy was 
effective at altering perceptions and making reformative progress. As activist use 
of the media to highlight victims for the public placed the political class in the 
precarious position of being publicly pressured into taking some cogent action.28  
 
27 “The media landscape in Ireland is now part of a modern, Western trend…[t]he increasingly 
robust Irish tabloid market has faced criticism for its aggressive reporting of criminal trials and its 
fetishisation of victims…[t]he prioritisation of the victim would also appear to have a broader 
resonance among the Irish media…there is some evidence…in the greater newsworthiness of crimes 
with a vulnerable victim…[and]…[t]he preference for vulnerable victims (O’Connell 1999) often 
finds expression in the preference for female victims...” Black, L. (2016) ‘Media, Public Attitudes 
and Crime’ in D. Healy, et al. eds., The Routledge Handbook of Irish Criminology, London: Taylor 
& Francis, Tabloids and victims. 
28 “Whilst campaigning for the repeal of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981, the Dublin Rape Crisis 
Centre used the media as a way to get their messages across… participants had their mouths gagged, 
[which] guaranteed dramatic photographs. The Dublin Rape Crisis Centre utilised the media to get 
the public talking about rape and violence against women and to put pressure on the Government… 




In fact, the media’s creation of a crime focused ‘political climate’ was one 
of the major forces behind the increasing public demand for the restoration of the 
crime victim. As the US has shown, an increasingly charged media and public 
discourse can be hugely beneficial for the victim of crime, and this certainly 
seemed to be the case in the instances that were just alluded to in an Irish context.29 
This mainly transpired because the media was successful in fanning the flames of 
anxiety surrounding criminality, which allowed it to refocus public attention back 
onto Irish victimisation. In this way there was a collective media induced sensation 
amongst the public during the late twentieth century in several countries, including 
Ireland, that criminality was something that was now “getting out of hand”.  
As a consequence, due to the perception that the criminal justice system 
was not able to contend with the task of reducing crime, the public became 
increasingly amenable to the idea that a new approach was required to stem the 
 
[t]he platforms which the media provided for victims to voice their opinions appeared to be 
significant in the formation of new victim policies. The case of Lavinia Kerwick can be seen to 
have had a direct impact on… the drafting of the Criminal Justice Act 1993…[t]he Siobhan Kearney 
case…[saw a] family, unable to deliver the victim impact statement in court, deliver[ed] their 
statement to the mass media congregated outside the court… a month after the case concluded that 
Mr. Ahern announced the Justice for Victims Initiative.” Rice, J. (2012) ‘Support for Victims of 
Crime: Reality or Rhetoric?’ unpublished M.A. dissertation, Dublin: DIT, p. 32. 
29  “…victim advocacy is rooted in, and dependent on, an overheated and fear-ridden political 
climate.” Scheingold, S., Olson, T. and Pershing, J. (1994) ‘Sexual Violence, Victim Advocacy, 
and Republican Criminology: Washington State's Community Protection Act’, Law & Society 
Review, 28(4), 729-763, p. 760. 




tide. This in large part fuelled the desire for a greater emphasis on “fighting crime”, 
both in terms of augmented infrastructure and personnel. At the same time, crime 
became more personified as the previous examples of the Kerwick and Kearney 
cases illustrate. A new darker perception of criminality took hold, which had 
repercussions for the victim’s movement. After this point it tended to move from 
grassroots activism to a desire to collaborate with the state to directly influence 
criminal justice policy. 30 It did this by actively assisting with the media’s extensive 
and graphic coverage of crime, something that became a pivotal factor in the 
refocusing of emphasis and attention back onto the crime victim (Kilcommins et 
al. 2004, p. 132; O’Connell 1999; O’Connell et al. 1998; Garland 2001, p. 10).   
The 1980s saw the reporting of Irish crime begin to become much more 
common as well as graphic in its portrayals within the Irish media. This new style 
of reporting tended to engender the sentiment amongst the Irish public that 
consumed this media that crime had considerably worsened.31  Although crime 
 
30 “…law-and-order politics…were a reaction, in part, to…perceived failure…[a]s the criminal 
justice system appeared increasingly unable to do anything about reducing crime, the public’s 
reaction…abetted and amplified by media sensationalism, was that more justice system resources 
(more police, more prisons) were required to fight crime…crime became personified: particular 
stories… entered the public's consciousness…the responses deemed appropriate…[were]…a shift 
from a largely voluntaristic and autonomous victim-advocacy movement to one that increasingly 
relied on state supports...” Daly, K. (1994) ‘Men's Violence, Victim Advocacy, and Feminist 
Redress: Comment’, Law and Society Review, 28(4), 777-786, p.781.  
31 “…In the Republic of Ireland, the commercialisation of crime led to fundamental changes in news 
reporting. One media group, Independent Newspapers, which exercises considerable influence in 




statistics seem to support the notion that crime had worsened, it was the relentless 
and the vivid representations of violent crime in the media which framed and to a 
certain degree  accentuated the public’s appreciation of certain crimes as opposed 
to other types of criminality. This can be seen in research which evidences that the 
public perception of the severity of street crime far outstripped suite crime and 
indeed was also influenced by factors other than the official crime rate.32  
Indeed it appears that not only is the public’s belief of crime severity 
detached from data on the subject but it is also severed from personal experience.33 
Instead it appears personal factors, as well as media consumption, appear to be 
much stronger indicators of an Irish persons perception of the prevalence of 
 
the market…formed a strategy in the early 1980s to place crime at the centre of news content… the 
Evening Herald ushered in a new era of reporting which conveyed a steady diet of crime news 
…directed towards a younger, professional, urban market ..” Black, L. (2016) ‘Media, Public 
Attitudes and Crime’ in D. Healy, et al. eds., The Routledge Handbook of Irish Criminology, 
London: Taylor & Francis,  Crime Sells. 
32 “The lowest perceived increases are in the areas of fraud…[t]he type of offences which the public 
perceives as increasing most rapidly is in the area of violence…drug dealing and sexual offences. 
This…suggests that factors other than ‘objective’increases, i.e. according to the official rates…may 
play a part in determining the public perception of such issues.”  O’Connell, M. and Whelan, A.  
(1996) The public perception of crime prevalence, newspaper readership and “Mean World” 
attitudes, Legal and Criminological Psychology, 3(1) 179–195, p. 183. 
33 “…no relationship existed between official statistics…and the public estimate…estimate of crime 
prevalence did not interact in any significant way with personal experience of crime…” O’Connell, 
M. and Whelan, A.  (1996) The public perception of crime prevalence, newspaper readership and 
“Mean World” attitudes, Legal and Criminological Psychology, 3(1) 179–195, p. 191. 




crime.34 This supports the overall contention of this chapter that the media was 
another societal aspect that had a degree of influence over the public’s crime 
perception. One which feeds into an appreciation of the victim’s perspective.35  
In this way research indicates that the media seemed to play a key role in 
the creation of ‘mean world attitudes’. These result in overestimations of the 
prevalence and severity of crime among the populace, especially in those who 
consume considerable amounts of media or especially manipulative media.36 Such 
an observation tends to support the contention that is was the media’s distorting 
influence on how the public perceived crime that had an impact on their increased 
concern with it. This concern would then help motivate the action that they 
 
34 “…three variables interacted significantly with the prevalence score…age and sex were…not that 
surprising … newspaper choice appears to have the strongest association...” O’Connell, M. and 
Whelan, A.  (1996) The public perception of crime prevalence, newspaper readership and “Mean 
World” attitudes, Legal and Criminological Psychology, 3(1) 179–195, p. 191-192 
35 “… a legitimate concern of a section of society would be portrayed as a massive problem for all. 
The level of crime... would itself be exaggerated and the threat would be generalised. . . to generate 
and generalise fear.” Kerrigan, G. & Shaw, H. (1985) Crime hysteria. Magiff,18 April, 19. 
36 “…all the findings provides support for Gerbner’s model of…‘mean world’ attitudes towards 
crime…[o]ne component of the fear of crime is the perception of crime prevalence…it is mainly 
influenced by the mass media…its negatively biased account…produces…an overestimation of the 
amount and seriousness of crime…for all media users but particularly those who are heavy users or 
consume…a particularly distorting type of medium.” O’Connell, M. and Whelan, A.  (1996) The 
public perception of crime prevalence, newspaper readership and “Mean World” attitudes, Legal 
and Criminological Psychology, 3(1) 179–195, p. 193. 




advocated for in order to address the subject, some of which involved the 
introduction of much more victim centred reforms into Irish criminal justice.  
With the high-profile killings of the 1990s and their subsequent 
sensationalised reporting this trend only continued to grow. In fact, these arguably 
exacerbated the anxiety the populace already had regarding crime, and in certain 
instances, again under popular pressure, prompted the state to take steps to address 
criminality in the state. With such action being calculated in an attempt to deter 
criminals and protect victims.37 Indeed particularly infamous incidents, which also 
involved an attack on the media to an extent, like the Guerin assassination led to 
fierce publicity. This was something that raised public awareness further and 
prompting more state action on the issue in Ireland (O’Connell 2002; O’Donnell 
and O’Sullivan 2003; Kerrigan and Shaw 1985; McCullagh 1996; Browne 2016; 
NCC 2009, p. 21, p. 23; Mooney 2001; O’Reilly 1998). 
 
37 “In the mid 1990’s, a number of high profile killings occurred…[t]hese killings also served to 
trigger widespread media coverage about crime and the effects of crime…it was during this time 
that the media coverage of crime became more widespread and intense…[t]his led some to suggest 
that the media’s portrayal of crime encouraged a fear of crime… a study investigating the Irish 
media’s portrayal of crime found that the Irish public’s perceptions of crime was not linked to 
official crime statistics but was instead associated with age, sex and newspaper readership 
(O’Connell and Whelan, 1996). Hence, this media coverage served to reflect and reinforce the 
public’s concern about criminal activities and promoted the Government to focus on criminal 
justice…” Butler, M. and Cunningham, P. (2010) ‘Fear of Crime in the Republic of Ireland: 
Understanding its Origins and Consequences’ in Shoham, S.G., Knepper, P. and Kett, M., eds., 
International Handbook of Victimology, Florida: Taylor and Francis, 429-457, p. 433-434. 




Another key component of the graphic portrayal of crime was the evocative 
cinematic pieces that helped to reconstruct some of the more infamous 
victimisations of the epoch. Several of these even employed some of the actual 
victims of the crimes portrayed, which allowed the Irish public to gain an even 
greater insight into the personal standpoint of victims. It was in this way that films 
like Omagh (2004) emphasised the emotional significance of pictorial 
representation. These kinds of films used the crimes they conveyed to demonstrate 
the pain victims of crime feel, and how they managed to use their privileged 
knowledge and status as victims to challenge some of the exclusionary perceptions 
of victims (Livinstone 2005, p.12; Blaney 2009, p. 417,424; Žižek 2003, p. 22). 
This pervasive crime coverage undoubtedly influenced the public, since the 
media have a considerable influence over whether Irish people perceive crime as 
an important political issue. In fact, numerous studies have shown that this is the 
case, as Irish journalism has played, and continues to play, a pivotal role in helping 
to mould the perspectives of the public with regards to criminality. This is 
particularly true when one considers the impact of the media upon whether the 
public happen to perceive crime as a personally threatening issue (Kilcommins et 
al. 2004, p. 140; Ericson 1991, p. 220; Antunes and Hurley 1977; Sherizen 1978; 
Ditton and Duffy 1983; Doyle 2002, p. 145; Black 2016; McCullagh 2007; 
Burroughs 2014, p. 166; Van Dijk, 1987, 1988; O'Mahony 2000, p. 16, p. 17, p. 
19; Chomsky 1989; Herman and Chomsky 2002; O’Connell 2002, p.114, p. 245; 
Rabbitte 2012, p. 9; O’Connell and Whelan 1996; O'Donnell and O'Sullivan 2001, 
p. 2, p. 74; Breen and Devereux 2003; Hall et al. 1978; Elias 1978; Bourdieu 1984). 




This new emphasis upon criminality shifted the spotlight onto crime victims 
through extensive media coverage on shows like the Six One News, Prime Time 
and, more recently, Crimecall, which all now began to realise that crime had 
currency, and could therefore boost television ratings and revenue. The fact that 
several books, articles, and even a full-length motion picture commoditised the 
tragic death of Veronica Guerin is a testament to the pervasiveness of this 
realisation. These tragedies also created ‘moral panics’, like the one in 1996, which 
occurred because the media was now beginning to use dedicated ‘crime 
correspondents’ to comprehensively highlight criminal offences. The media 
coverage of particular crimes is important to this chapter’s analysis. As there are 
consequences of these kinds of media portrayals that help to evidence the argument 
of this thesis. Namely, that the victim became more re-established within the public 
consciousness, which stimulated their increased criminal justice re-centralisation.  
These trends express themselves in ‘moral panics’ and increased fear of 
crime. However, such tendencies also had implications for the manner by which 
the victim came to be viewed. Indeed, the Irish public became more empathetic and 
concerned about victims. A change which ended up helping to propel them back 
into a more central justice position. 38  (Butler and Cunningham 2010, p. 433; 
 
38 “David Garland’s (2001) ‘culture of control’ thesis suggested that in late-modernity as crime 
became a quotidian reality, the ‘crime complex’ created an embedded sense of fear, inflamed by 
political rhetoric and media saturation, which manifested a sense of perpetual crisis…[t]he media 
has also been accused of fuelling moral panics…periods of intense concern about an issue, 
facilitated by alarmist media reporting, wherein social problems are ‘defined and shaped’ (Cohen 
1972: 7)… [a] moral panic occurs when a threat emerges, branded by Cohen as a ‘folk devil’, which 




Kilcommins et al. 2004; O’Donnell 2007; NCC 2009, p. 21; Mooney 2001; 
O’Reilly 1998; Williams 2003; Cohen 1972, p. 45). 
The media therefore ensured that offences such as the murders of Jerry 
McCabe and Veronica Guerin in 1996 signalled a watershed moment for the Irish 
public, who began to see these instances as symptomatic of an ‘Irish crime 
problem’. These kinds of graphic high-profile criminal offences therefore became 
incidents that not only influenced those who were directly involved, but also tended 
to have an impact upon the wider community in Ireland as well. The media 
therefore made these events the cornerstone of its new narrative, which it labelled 
the ‘Irish crime problem’ and was often able to convey, through the selective 
dissemination of professional and personal testimony, how they believed that the 
Irish State ought to remedy the issue. This allowed a situation to develop in which 
“wars on crime” were not only tolerable, but passionately demanded by a 
considerable proportion of the Irish public (O’Connell and Whelan 1996; 
McCullagh 1996; Innes 2003, p. 51, p. 52, p. 54; Clancy 1995; Cohen, 1985; 
O'Donnell and O'Sullivan 2001, p. 3; Kilcommins et al.  2004, pp. 137-138).   
The mass media portrayal of victimisation and the perceived inability of the 
criminal justice system to prevent it instigated several victim-centred media 
campaigns, which flagged the prevalence of narcotics and sexual abuse within Irish 
 
is then portrayed by the media in a limited way and in a manner which exaggerates the threat...”  
Black, L. (2016) ‘Media, Public Attitudes and Crime’ in D. Healy, et al. eds., The Routledge 
Handbook of Irish Criminology, London: Taylor & Francis, Consequences of Crime in the Media. 
 




society. These had real impact in Ireland, meaning that the portrayals of the Irish 
media not only informed, but actively contributed towards the ‘manufacturing of 
[public] consent’, in such a way as to engender victim reform. The tendency of the 
media to use public anxiety in order to promote activism is clearly discernible from 
its capacity to reform the law, as can be seen with the Criminal Law (Rape) 
(Amendment) Act, 1990 and the Criminal Justice Act, 1993.  
The Criminal Justice Act 1993 introduced several novel changes in relation 
to the victim’s legal position and rights under Irish law. These provided for a 
system by which a victim could petition the DPP to appeal a perceived inadequate 
sentence. This was significant as the DPP was not traditionally petitionable in this 
way.  There was also the creation of compensation orders for victims. These could 
provide compensation to be given to victims by the offender instead of, or in 
addition to, ta crime’s penalty. Victim impact statements were also introduced, and 
could be given by victims to a judge before they stipulated the appropriate penalty 
to convey a crime’s impact. It was the first piece of legislation to allow a victim to 
tender such a statement in court and consequently gave them a procedural role 
within the justice process where they could have a voice within the process.39  
These changes were all important for victims as they were the first major 
 
39 “… victims of crime have been afforded greater recognition by the criminal justice system…the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993…was… enacted in response to several controversial sexual offence 
cases, [it] made various changes to the law in relation to the victims of crime, such as the review of 
unduly lenient sentences, compensation orders for victims of crime and provision for Victim Impact 
Statements (VIS) to be taken into consideration by the trial court before imposing sentence” Coffey, 
G. ( 2006) ‘The Victim of Crime and the Criminal Justice Process’ ICLJ, 16(3), 15-22, p 15. 




incorporation of their rights into solid domestic law. They also helped engender 
their procedural re-centralisation by giving them a place and rights of their own.  
The Criminal justice Act 1993 was in large part implemented by the 
government of the day in response to the vociferous criticism that it received due 
to the lenient sentences that were imposed by the judiciary in both the Kilkenny 
Incest Rape cases and Lavinia Kerwick case.40 In the Kilkenny Incest case a severe 
case of familial abuse over a long period only resulted in a seven year sentence, the 
statutory limit at the time. While Lavina Kerwick’s abuser received a nine-year 
suspended sentence for rape. These highly publicised instances brought home the 
reality of the victim exclusive manner in which penalties in criminal justice were 
previously calculated, which led to a very public backlash against these methods.  
The media is frequently the medium through which victims could tell their 
stories of injustice and thereby stimulate victim centred reforms. In fact, although 
both instances were influential, the latter is arguably a more pertinent example of 
media led reform. Mainly due to the level of publicity generated and actively 
encouraged by the victim and their supporters. Lavina Kerwick waived her 
anonymity and engaged with the media in order to convey her message that the 
 
40 “…In the case of Lavinia Kerwick who was raped by her boyfriend, Flood J. imposed a suspended 
sentence of 9 years imprisonment. The victim forfeited her anonymity by going public so as to 
describe the impact of the crime on her life. This is to be contrasted with the Kilkenny Incest case 
which involved a girl who was sexually assaulted and raped by her father from 1976 to 1991, where 
a 7 year term of imprisonment was imposed which was the maximum at the time. Cases such as 
these illustrate the inequity of sentencing disparity in the criminal justice process.” Coffey, G. 
(2006) ‘The Victim of Crime and the Criminal Justice Process’ ICLJ, 16(3), 15-22, p 15. 




criminal justice system was overlooking victims during sentencing. This message 
supported similar contentions that the Rape Crisis Centre was making, raising 
awareness further among the public an prompting a visible campaign of grassroots 
activism across the country. This initiated a legislative response, with a Bill being 
introduced thereafter which became the victim progressive Criminal Justice Act of 
1993. An Act which helped secure gains for victims in the area of sentencing.41  
However, the ability of the media to instigate reform through ‘moral panic’, 
is probably best evidenced by the legislative response of the summer of 1996. 
Indeed, after the tragic and widely publicized events of 1996, the government 
recalled parliament, established several emergency task forces and went so far as 
to pass numerous pieces of emergency legislation. This largely occurred due to a 
surge in media reporting, as well as its considerable influence upon elected 
officials, who were all too aware of the negative optics of inaction. Ireland therefore 
received a raft of new legislation as a result, like The Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 
and The Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act, 1996. The media’s influence in 
 
41 “…the media often provide the victim or their families with a platform from which to bring about 
criminal justice reforms. In this way the media also provides a way for a lobby group to get their 
message across on a wider scale…Lavinia Kerwick, a rape victim gave up her anonymity in 1992 
giving interviews to radio, television and newspapers. Her case intertwined with the campaigning 
efforts of the Dublin Rape Crisis Centre…[t]here were lobby groups in Kilkenny and women 
protesting outside the Four Courts…[a]s a result of Ms. Kerwick’s case and the widespread media 
attention…which went along with it, a Bill was introduced to the Oireachtas which eventually 
became the Criminal Justice Act 1993.” Rice, J. (2012) ‘Support for Victims of Crime: Reality or 
Rhetoric?’ unpublished M.A. dissertation, Dublin: DIT, p. 10. 




this regard even allowed it to turn public attention toward victims of crime, and, in 
particular, the negative impact that the elevated crime rate was having upon them. 
This was particularly true on shows like Crimecall, which dramatically 
reconstructed crimes with CCTV footage and professional actors, which allowed 
the programme to blend the perspectives of real victims into its own brand of shock 
and awe programming (Keating 2012; Erikson 1991, p. 234; Spitzer 1987; 
O'Donnell and O'Sullivan 2001; Innes 2003, p. 52; Giddens 1991; Kilcommins et 
al. 2004, p. 137, 2018 p. 47; O’Donnell 2005, p. 107; Cohen 1972, p. 45; Walsh 
1999, p. 113; Owen 1997b; Black 2016, pp. 403-404; Hamilton 2005, 2007 p. 102; 
O’Mahony 1996, 2000 p. 19; Fennell 1993; Breen 2000, p. 333). 
The media were consequently a pivotal catalyst in the return of the victim 
to their central position within Irish criminal justice, since its graphic and widely 
publicized portrayals of criminality were an affront to the security and sentiment 
of the Irish middle-class, who now demanded action. The kinds of depictions of 
crime that the mass media disseminated in Ireland also allowed a general feeling 
of unease about criminality to percolate throughout Irish society. This created a 
public consensus amongst the Irish populace that criminality within Ireland was a 
serious societal problem, which politicians needed to address. However, the 
reforms that successive governments initiated in response to this had a profound 
impact upon society, as political representatives collectively endeavoured to pass 
legislation that was “tough on crime”. Indeed, the portrayals that the Irish media 
produced had a significant impact upon victims, as it shifted attention back onto 
crime and its impact. The Irish media were therefore able to bring all of this about 
by refocusing public attention onto high-profile victims, which could thereby 




engender the view that Irish criminality had worsened. This led to demands that 
both the law and society should offer a greater standard of inclusivity for the 
ordinary victim of crime in Ireland, as well as a thirst for a far greater understanding 
of victims, which directly led to the eventual conducting of research that now 
focused upon victimisation in Ireland. 
5.6  MASS VICTIMIZATION SURVEYS  
5.6.1 Data Suggests an Increase in the Reporting of Victimisation 
The mass victimisation survey was an interesting phenomenon that first 
emerged in the 1980s which assisted with the re-emergence of the Irish crime 
victim. Although they initially tended to focus upon certain types of victims, they 
eventually moved on to assess the role of the victim of crime within the Irish 
criminal justice system. Although they had ‘drawbacks and limitations’, they 
helped demystify victimisation, with these kinds of surveys playing a pivotal role 
in the modern quest to better ascertain the scope of unreported crime and victim 
standpoints (Kelleher et al. 1995; McGee et al. 2002; Pemberton 2009, p. 13; 
Hanley et al. 2009; Cooper 2008; McGrath 2009; Edwards et al. 2012; Kilcommins 
et al. 2018, pp. 32-33; Kilcommins et al. 2010; Aromaa 2012, pp. 87-88).  
 Yet, domestic victimisation surveys were slow to take off in Ireland, as a 
lack of a strong criminological community, as well as the lukewarm attitude of the 
political establishment towards quantitative research within this area hindered its 
initial progress. In fact, the former Minister for Justice Padraig Flynn epitomised 
the general political sentiment that the gathering of this kind of data was not a top 
government priority. It was also notable that very few within higher education in 




the country actively sought to pursue these kinds of research topics, and the 
endeavours of the State to promote these investigations were often inadequate. 
Another major barrier that prevented a more nuanced understanding of victims of 
crime was the lack of a national victim database within Ireland (Kilcommins et al. 
2004, p. 72, 2018 p. 29, Flynn 1992; O’Donoghue 1999; Cotter 2005, p. 295).  
Yet, despite all of these hurdles, domestic victimisation studies began in 
1984 (Breen and Rottman 1984). These evolved into the Dublin Crime Survey in 
1994, (O’Connell and Whelan 1994) with the Quarterly National Household 
survey, beginning to gather data in 1999 (CSO 1999). This trend continued into the 
early twenty-first century, with the 2003, 2006, and 2010 surveys. There was also 
a profoundly important ESRI victimisation survey in relation to domestic abuse. 
This was very effective at highlighting the prevalence of such issues within Irish 
society as well as how they might be addressed.42 The Gardaí also ran public 
 
42 “…15 per cent of women (or about one in seven) and six per cent of men (or one in 16) have 
experienced severely abusive behaviour of a physical, sexual or emotional nature from a 
partner…[o]ne woman in 11 has experienced severe physical abuse in a relationship, one in 12 has 
experienced sexual abuse and one in 13 has experienced severe emotional abuse. One man in 25 
has experienced severe physical abuse, one in 90 has experienced sexual abuse in a relationship and 
one in 37 has experienced severe emotional abuse…while the risk to women is higher, domestic 
abuse…affects a significant number of men…213,000 women and 88,000 men in Ireland have been 
severely abused by a partner at some point in their lives.” Watson, D. and Parsons, S. (2005) 
Domestic Abuse of Women and Men in Ireland: report on the national study of domestic abuse, 
Dublin: National Crime Council, p. 24.  
 




attitude surveys in 2002, to help gauge victim perceptions of law enforcement. Irish 
law enforcement also conducted victimisation surveys within the Gardaí Research 
Unit’s Public Attitudes Survey, which has noted that victims of crime had a 
generally positive view of the Gardaí. However, this had declined. While the 
Central Statistics Office Crime and Victimisation Survey similarly recorded that 
victim perceptions of the Gardaí were fair, it also went on to note that this was an 
area that was in need of improvement. Academics have noted that this depreciation 
in public trust is probably the result of the popularisation of recent unflattering 
revelations (Morris Tribunal 2008) as well as the fact that certain sections of Irish 
society have begun to lose their confidence in the efficacy of the Gardaí 
(Kilcommins et al. 2018, p. 32, p. 48; Conway 2010; Parsons 2016, p. 25; Mulcahy 
and O’Mahony 2005, p. 5; Bohan and Yorke 1987, p. 72; O’Donnell 2005, p. 127).   
Once Irish victimisation surveys eventually gained traction in the 1980s, 
(Breen and Rottman 1984; O’Connell and Whelan 1994; Watson 2000) they began 
turning popular attention towards victims of crime. In fact, they gained 
considerable standing as a data resource despite the presence of certain challenges 
in an Irish context, such as the fact that some surveys did not include sexual 
offences and also usually tended to structurally exclude the homeless, which was 
unfortunate, as both of these contexts are ones in which the non-reporting of crime 
is pervasive. Yet these surveys continued to grow despite this, due to the recorded 
increases in crime, and a greater awareness of victim issues (Kilcommins and 
Moffett 2016; McCullagh 1986, pp. 13-14; Kilcommins et al. 2004, p. 103, 2018 
p. 32; Kelleher et al. 2002; Wolhuter et al. 2009, p. 3; Goodey 2000, p. 15).  




In fact, the domestic victimisation survey (Breen and Rottman 1985; 
O’Connell and Whelan 1994; Watson 2000) was central in helping to flag the 
experiences of Irish victimhood by unearthing previously unfathomable 
information. They did this by assisting with the clarification of some of the realities 
of victimisation, by suggesting that elevated rates of recorded crime in Ireland were 
just one aspect of a much more problematic issue. In fact, domestic victimisation 
surveys within Ireland soon began to tender evidence of this. The Women’s Aid 
survey of 1995 (Kelleher et al. 1995) indicated that official figures did not capture 
the prevalence of domestic abuse. The fact that certain crimes were more prevalent 
than the official records indicated also suggested that there was a demonstrable 
need to complement Garda data with victimisation data, which researchers could 
now glean from an analysis of Irish victimisation surveys. This eventually helped 
to build a much better portrait of the impact of Irish criminality (Kilcommins and 
Moffett 2016, p. 382; McCullagh 1986, pp. 13-14 Kilcommins et al. 2018, p. 32). 
Victimisation surveys were therefore a criminological breakthrough, as 
they helped garner new criminological insights, such as the traits of the “average” 
victim. The “average” victim was urban, and most likely from the capital, since 
these people were more than ten times more likely to be victimised than those who 
lived rurally. They tended to be affluent, since the self-employed were much more 
likely to be a victimised than blue-collar workers, and young. Victimisation 
surveys also highlighted the fact that gender and age also tended to pose 
significantly ‘risk[s] of victimisation’, which was highest amongst males in their 
twenties, however this tended to drop off in males once they reached their thirties 
(Kilcommins and Moffett 2016, p. 382; Wolfgang 1958; McCullagh 1986, p. 14). 




Some national victimisation surveys were even able to flag issues that were 
problematic for victims. These included anxieties surrounding illegality; (Butler 
and Cunnigham 2010, pp. 429-60) coercion; (Hourigan 2011) secondary 
victimisation; (Ring 2017, p. 93; One in Four 2015; Kelleher and O’Connor 1999; 
Reigel 2011, p. 200) case failures; (Leane et al. 2001; Hanly et al. 2009; Leahy 
2014; Bartlett and Mears 2011; Hamilton 2011) inaccessibility; (Bacik et al. 1998; 
Cooper 2008; Leahy 2013) postponements; (Hanly et al. 2009) inadequate 
safeguards (Spain et al. 2014) as well as information; (Watson 2000) 
adversarialism; (Keenan 2014; Kilcommins and Donnelly 2014) sentencing; 
(Kilcommins et al. 2004; Schweppe et al. 2014) the handling of complaints; 
(Guerin 2014, pp. 335-336) unprofessional conduct; (Kilcommins et al. 2013)  
inadequate funding (Grozdanova and de Londras 2014) and assistance (Bacik et al. 
2007; Mulkerrins 2003; Deane 2007; Bacik et al. 2007, pp. 10-11; Spain et al. 
2014). It also evidenced how differently abled victims of crime often went 
unnoticed within the Irish criminal justice system; as they frequently created 
difficulties for certain evidential aspects of the adversarial trial, which also tended 
to overlook the perspectives of these differently abled victims (Kilcommins et al. 
2013, 2018; Edwards et al. 2012, p. 100; Kilcommins and Moffett 2016, p. 382). 
The systemic non-reporting of offences was arguably one of the most 
serious issues that domestic victimisation surveys flagged. This is because Irish 
victimisation surveys exposed the prevalence of unreported victimisation. In fact, 
research in the 1990s placed the rate of non-reporting at nearly one fifth of 




victimisation in the capital,43 with this becoming the case shortly thereafter.44 The 
Quarterly National Household survey of 2010 (CSO 2010) discovered that a 
quarter of burglaries, as well as over a third of aggravated larcenies and nearly half 
of all assaults and property defacement did not even reach the Gardaí. The SAVI 
Report (McGee et al. 2002, pp. 128-132), which considered sexual offences, also 
concluded that the reported rates of such crime were troubling, and this observation 
also tended to complement previous surveys that had similarly discovered that only 
one in every hundred adults reported the molestation that they suffered when they 
were a child to the Gardaí (Kilcommins and Moffett 2016, p. 382;).    
 Victimisation surveys were also able to emphasise different types of 
victimisation, and highlight its impact within different contexts. These surveys 
therefore allowed for a ‘more nuanced’ examination of victim subjectivity. They 
consequently allowed for greater insights into the way in which victimisation 
affected minorities, as well as how the highly individualised nature of certain 
criminal offences that were typically motivated by extreme prejudice can 
compound the impact of such crime upon its victims, by exposing the fact that this 
kind of victimisation of minorities can increase their alarm, despair, and unease. 
Some recent victimisation surveys in this area have even shown that a significant 
 
43  O’Connell M. and Whelan A. (1994) ‘Crime Victimisation in Dublin’, Irish Criminal Law 
Journal, 4 (1), 85-112, p. 85. 
44 Kirwan G. and O’Connell M. (2001) ‘Crime Victimisation in Dublin Revisited’, Irish Criminal 
Law Journal, 11(2), 10-13, p. 10.  
 




percentage of Irish people suffer these kinds of offences. In fact, these kinds of 
crimes are unfortunately rather common in countries like Ireland, but are now 
becoming more combatable since people have started to take greater notice of them 
(Green et al. 2001; Levin and McDevitt 2002; Tomsen 1996; Jenness and Broad, 
1997; Walters and Hoyle, 2011 p. 8; Chakraborti and Garland 2009, p. 129; Sibbitt 
1997; Mason 2005; Bowling, 1998; Sarma 2004, p. 59, pp. 62-63; Garnets, Herek 
and Levy 1992; Hershberger and D'Augelli 1995; Franklin 2000; Iganski, 2008 
Herek et al. 1997; McDevitt et al. 2001; GLEN 1995; Schweppe et al. 2014).  
Victimisation surveys were therefore imperative to the gaining of a better 
understanding of rates of self-reported victimisation within Ireland. They also 
helped clarify how many victims were actually reporting their victimisations to the 
Gardaí, how prevalent certain victimisations were amongst the population, how 
victimisation affected different cohorts of victims, and how the police were 
perceived by victims of crime, which inevitably aided the trend towards their re-
inclusion. Although a lack of governmental assistance unfortunately hindered the 
growth of these kinds of studies, they did eventually commence in 1984. These 
surveys consequently helped to explain how the elevated rate of recorded crime 
was just one aspect of a much more prevalent and serious victimisation issue. These 
surveys also helped to build a much more accurate portrait of the crime victim, and 
the issues that they had with the administration of justice. Most importantly, it gave 
the public a far greater insight into the personal subjectivity of crime victims, which 
clarified the disproportionate impact that criminality could have upon them. This 
helped to bring about the realisation that victims prefer, and could benefit from, a 
much more fulfilling role within the Irish criminal justice system, and one that mass 




victimisation surveys have clearly helped to engender within Ireland through all of 
the novel discoveries that this chapter has previously outlined. In fact, this new 
emphasis upon victims refocused attention back onto areas that the Irish criminal 
justice system had hitherto side lined, such as child abuse, a topic that had largely 
gone unchallenged within Ireland for most of the early twentieth century. 
5.7 VICTIMS OF CHILD ABUSE  
5.7.1 The Victim in the Consciousness of the Irish People 
The abuse of children within Ireland only really entered mainstream 
twentieth century discourse in the 1990s. We can discover this by examining the 
fact that of all of the children that the NSPCC assisted, from 1889 to 1955, less 
than 1 per cent of incidents concerned the molestation of a minor.45 This did not 
occur because molestation was rare, but rather because abuse was not nearly as 
well recognised, or policed, as it subsequently became. Further evidence for this is 
discernible from that fact that in the early decades of the twentieth century, Gardaí 
received information in less than a fifth of abuse cases46 whilst considerable abuse 
was being committed. In fact, the Irish public actually perceived Ireland as a “safe 
 
45 Dublin Branch NSPCC Reports 1889-1955, London: NSPCC archives.  
46 “A little under a quarter of those severely affected by abuse told the Gardaí. These findings are 
in keeping with other research…that indicates that those who experienced abuse in a relationship 
are more likely to confide in a friend or family member than to seek help from the Criminal Justice 
System or agencies working in the area of domestic violence.” Watson, D. and Parsons, S. (2005) 
Domestic Abuse of Women and Men in Ireland: report on the national study of domestic abuse, 
Dublin: National Crime Council, p 75. 




country”, where “that sort of thing” did not happen, at least not amongst the more 
“respectable” members of society (Keenan 2001, p. 224; Moane 2000, p. 339; 
Masson 1984; Coldrey 1996, p. 370; Hendrick 1994, p. 242; Lalor 2001, p. 16; 
Ferguson 1996, 1997; Keating 2004, pp. 161-162; O’Sullivan 2002, p. 189).   
Yet, since an alliance between the Church and the State in Ireland did in 
fact allow such abuse to persist, and, as the Church used its privileged position to 
exploit those that the State had entrusted into its care, it was also in the interests of 
the State to use its power to shield the Church from reproach, in order to save itself 
from popular condemnation. This situation was also able to persist because the 
Church had previously held such a dominant place within Irish society. The State 
also had the means to stifle criticism, forcing widespread self-censorship within the 
media. Ironically, due to the hegemonic ideological dominance that both the 
Church and State exerted over society, both of these institutions could actually 
dictate and enforce strict moral standards upon the Irish public, whilst 
simultaneously allowing opportunistic sexual predators to abuse sections of the 
most vulnerable segments of society with near impunity (Keating 2004, p. 173; 
Eagleton 2007; Gramsci 2011; Smith 2004, p. 210; Clear 2000; Daly 1995; Whyte 
1980; Inglis 1998; Keating 2004, pp. 164-165; Woodman 1985, pp. 202-203). 
Yet, by the 1990s, a rapid decline in the Church’s influence, and the 
meteoric rise of the media, shifted the power dynamics that were previously at play 
in the opposite direction. This broke the previous culture of silence that had hitherto 
surrounded these kinds of incidents, as the media coverage of the Church’s 
structural attempts to hide its abuse shed new light on its transgressions. These 
revelations opened the floodgates, and, as a result, even more victims of abuse 




began to come forward with their stories (Ring 2012, 2013, 2017 p. 90). This was 
mainly a result of the long-term impact of the liberalisation of Ireland, which 
socially and politically opened up the country to foreign influence. Indeed, when 
the socio-cultural isolationism that was imposed by Éamon de Valera was lifted by 
Seán Lemass, a rapid change in Irish culture transpired, which led to the emergence 
of various different subcultures, and a widespread evolution in societal mores.  
These changes also afforded the media with a much greater latitude 
regarding what they wished to publish. The most notorious examples of what they 
helped to unearth was arguably the abuse perpetuated in The Brendan Smyth47 and 
Madonna House48 affairs. Although the Church had hitherto successfully evaded 
this kind of high-profile exposure, once the public perceived it as having sullied its 
illusion of moral perfection, it soon became the object of hostility, which journalists 
could now lambast. These changes consequently accelerated the Church’s decline 
in the 1990s, during a period of ‘compressed secularisation’, (Cochran and 
Waldmeir 2015, p. 49) which considerably weakened the ideological supremacy of 
the religious institution in Ireland. This decline of the Church’s power is discernible 
from research into the subject, which evidence how the numbers of mass attendants 
plummeted by about 33 per cent, effectively crippling its previous hegemonic 
dominance (Keenan 2001, p. 224, 2011, 2016 p. 527; Cochran and Waldmeir 2015, 
 
47 Moore, C. (1995) Betrayal of trust: The Father Brendan Smyth affair and the Catholic church, 
Marino: Dublin. 
48 Department of Health (1996), Report on the inquiry into the operation of Madonna House, 
Government Publications Office: Dublin. 




pp. 49-51; Ring 2017, p. 89; Donnelly and Inglis 2010, p. 1, p. 8, p. 14; Keating 
2004, p. 169; Horgan 1997; Tovey and Share 2003, p. 492; Moore 1995; 
Kilcommins et al. 2018; Holt and Devaney 2016, p. 81; Lalor 2001, p. 11).    
The decline of the Church in Ireland began to become even more noticeable 
once revelations began to emerge in the media regarding how it had used its non-
transparent structures to “cover-up” the clerical abuse of minors in this country. 
These revelations generated extraordinary interest within Ireland, whilst also 
irreparably harming the image of the Church within the eyes of the Irish public. 
There were three major reports that documented the institutional abuses of the 
Catholic Church in Ireland. The Ferns Report of 2005, which indicated that 100 
potential incidents of child abuse had occurred. The Murphy Report of 2009, which 
showed that Church officials had obstructed the investigation of these kinds of 
allegations, and the Ryan Report (Ryan 2009), which catalogued persistent abuse 
within Church bodies (Ring 2017, p. 90). The notable surges in the understanding 
of child sexual exploitation during the 1990s also seemed to support the idea that 
these prominently publicised transgressions appeared to aid the Irish public’s 
awareness of these kinds of issues, as they tended to raise consciousness about the 
whole issue of child abuse within the public sphere of mainstream Irish society.  
However, as most clerical abuse victims were too terrified to report, and 
those that that did often did not get adequate responses since the people that they 
informed often failed to address their grievances, it was not merely the abuse of the 
Church that shocked Irish sensibilities, but also the lengths to which allegedly 
respectable pillars of society, and society itself, went to hide the truth (Carroll 1992, 
p. 3; Moane 2000, p. 341; Ferguson 2000; Raftery and O' Sullivan 1999; 




McAlinden 2006, p. 350; Gallagher 1998; Waterhouse 2000; Lalor 2001, pp. 14-
15, p. 18; Russo 2012, p. 1; Ferguson 1995b; Sullivan and Beech 2002, p. 161; 
Berry 1992; McAliden 2006, p. 350; Barter 1999; Bourke and McBride 2016, p. 
177; Kilcommins et al. 2018, p. 46; Keenan 2016, pp. 529-31). Indeed, the people 
of Ireland have come to recognize the wider implications of all of this, with a recent 
poll highlighting that nearly 3 out of every 4 people feel Irish society should 
shoulder ‘some responsibility’ for the historical abuse of children. The realisation 
that the stifling of victim perspectives was ‘part of the trauma’ of being such a 
victim is an important one, as “…if there is a fate worse than being a trauma victim, 
it is that of not being recognized as such by one’s community” (Ring 2017, p. 96; 
Holohan 2011; Stauffer 2015; Cohen 2001). This is a particularly poignant point 
when bearing in mind some of the contemporary tactics of contestation and denial 
that the Irish State bureaucracy has frequently deployed when addressing the 
subject of its role in the historical abuse of children within the country. In fact, it 
has attempted to whitewash our public space of a proper monument to the memory 
of the survivors of industrial schools, coerce victims of abuse into silence within 
bureaucratic frameworks and bury the testimonials of those who do participate in 
these frames for the best part of a century. These actions have also been pursued 
against a backdrop in which the State bureaucracy has taken a profoundly 
confrontational and muscular stance in opposition to those victims who have 
attempted to obtain some redress for the suffering they were made to endure as 
children within the Irish educational system, something which one well known 
victim has gone so far as to liken to abuse (Ring 2017, p. 97; O’Keeffe 2015). 




However, despite the longstanding regressive actions of the State 
bureaucracy in certain contexts, newly liberated ‘ways of knowing’ and hitherto 
silenced voices have begun to emerge and inform people that child abusers were 
usually from the immediate circle of their victims, and that such crimes could often 
be committed by a close family member. This has allowed the media to expose 
some of most deeply ingrained taboos within Irish society, not only within the 
public sphere of the Church, but now, within the hitherto private realm of the home. 
It also effectively finally helped to bring about a fundamentally undermining of the 
old authoritarian patriarchal administration of familial relations, which was 
perceived as significantly contributing to, and often exacerbating the abuse of 
minors by the Church, as well as by familial relations. The details of prominent 
abuse cases such as the Kilkenny Incest Case49 and the Kelly Fitzgerald50 and 
McColgan51 cases were watershed moments in the awareness of the Irish public 
regarding domestic abuse. The Kilkenny Incest Case, for example, concerned a 
minor being beaten and molested for more than a decade, in an instance that opened 
the eyes of the Irish people to the brutality of such abuse. The Kelly Fitzgerald 
case, on the other hand, involved the guardians of a child demonstrating criminal 
neglect, whilst The McColgan incident saw a parent beat and molest their daughter 
 
49 McGuinness, C. (1993) Report of the Kilkenny incest investigation, Dublin: Stationary Office. 
Keenan, O. (1996) Kelly: A child is dead. Interim report of the Joint Committee on 
the Family, Dublin: Houses of the Oireachtas 
50 Keenan, O. (1996) Kelly: A child is dead. Interim report of the Joint Committee on 
the Family, Dublin: Houses of the Oireachtas.  
51 McKay, S. (2004) Sophia’s Story, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. 




for a 16-year period. These cases emphasised the realities of abuse in Ireland, and 
made it easier for victims, who had not suffered at the hands of the clergy, but who 
had undergone mistreatment within their own home, to finally come forward 
(Harris 2007; Pickstone 2001; Lalor 2001, p. vii, p. ix, p. 8, p. 12; McGuiness 1993; 
Ferguson 1994, p. 386, 1997 p. 35; Holt and Devaney 2016; Kilcommins et al. 
2018; Geoghegan-Quinn 1996; Keenan et al. 1996, pp. 189-191;).    
Although the prevalence of historical abuse shocked Irish people, the 
increased recognition of the issue brought about victim-centred responses. This 
allowed the public to take greater stock of the chequered history of Ireland in the 
area of victim provision, with state arms altering their procedures and laws in order 
to reflect this. The media, no longer constrained by the Church, drove forward with 
its activism, which culminated in official responses such as the Child Care Act, 
1991, the National Children’s Strategy and Social Services Inspectorate. The 
Sexual Assault Treatment Unit at the Rotunda Hospital also began to shift its 
emphasis onto younger victims, mainly due to the growing numbers of minors that 
were presenting within their facilities. The Department of Health also produced its 
seminal policies and procedures guidelines on how best to respond to child abuse, 
which it updated throughout the 1990s52. Inquiries were similarly set up to address 
 
52 “There was considerable emphasis on the need for social work to operate collaboratively with 
other services, and a protocol on joint notification and investigation between Health Boards and 
Gardaí was published by the Department of Health [in Department of Health (1995) Notification of 
Suspected Cases of Child Abuse between Health Boards and Gardai Dublin: Stationery Office] and 
later elaborated upon in [Department of Health and Children (1999) Children First: National 
Guidelines for the Protection and Welfare of Children, Dublin: Stationery Office.]” Buckley, H. 




historical abuse allegations that garnered significant public attention. The Irish 
government established these victim-centred frames in order to better 
accommodate victims of crime. Although these endeavours were promising, many 
lacked sufficient forethought, but, having said that, they did raise greater awareness 
about a topic that the Irish public had ignored for far too long (Keenan 2001, pp. 
202-203, p. 223; Ring 2017, p. 563; O’Mahony 2002, p. 179; McElwee 2001, p. 
52; Lalor 2001, p. 17; McGrath 1997; May-Chahal and Herczog 2003, p. 136). 
Whilst abuse allegations might have merely received a cursory examination 
from the authorities of the past, a transformation regarding its recognition and 
enforcement occurred in decades after the 1990s, as a new victim-centred ‘culture 
of openness and accountability’ (O'Mahony 2000, p. 20) lessened the stigma of 
undergoing abuse. The emergence of these two phenomena also forced the 
populace to contest its illusions of an idyllic past, which, in reality, had never really 
existed. Although an increased awareness of the impact of abuse prompted this, the 
main driving force behind it was the arguably greater discursive freedom 
surrounding the topics of child abuse and the victimisation of children. The 
Marketing Research. Bureau of Ireland, for example, conducted a study on the 
issue in 1987 and found that, in Dublin, roughly 5 per cent of men, and 7 per cent 
 
and Burns K. (2015) ‘Child welfare and protection in Ireland: déjà vu all over again’, In Christie, 
A., Featherstone, B., Quin, S. and Walsh, T. eds., Social work in Ireland: changes and continuities, 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 56.  




of women admitted to being sexually molested during their youth.53 By 1993, this 
figure had risen to 15 per cent of women and 9 per cent of men, demonstrating a 
far greater awareness of this particular issue, as well as a real communicative 
openness that now evidenced how the topic of abuse and victimhood had entered 
into the psyche of the Irish people. The consequence of all of this domestic 
consciousness raising was that victims were now more inclined to report these 
kinds of offences. This interacted with the greater numbers of people coming 
forward to ensure that the trial and sentencing of child abusers became much more 
commonplace (Lalor 1999, 2001, pp. 7-8, pp. 20-21; Kilcommins et al. 2004, p. 
12, p. 121; Moane 2000, p. 339; Herman 1992; Marshall et al. 1990; Pilkington 
and Lenaghan 1998; Coldrey 1996, p. 371, p. 376; McElwee 2001, p. 32; Raftery 
and O’Sullivan 1999; Ferguson 1996; Leon 2000).  
Even though the revelations surrounding the extent to which child abuse 
had occurred in Ireland undoubtedly traumatised Irish society, it also dissolved 
some of the illusions that had previously existed about victimisation, and the notion 
that Ireland was a place where “that kind of thing didn’t happen”. The exploitation 
of minors astonished people into an understanding that “ordinary” people could 
commit and suffer molestation, which departed from the previously dominant idea 
that such behaviour was only engaged in by certain classes; engendering an 
 
53 These percentages of a 500 person sample aged 18-44 from the Dubln area “…admitted to having 
been sexually abused as a child within the terms set out in the definition.” MRBI. (1987). Child 
sexual abuse in Dublin: Pilot survey report, Dublin: Market Research Bureau of Ireland Ltd, p. 5.  
 




understanding that victimisation could affect anyone. Before these events occurred, 
people simply ignored the distressing reality that child exploitation was prevalent 
within Irish society. However, as these realities became better known, the naïveté 
of the people of Ireland diminished. This process was assisted, and indeed 
accelerated, by the portrayals of neglect within cinematic pieces like Angela’s 
Ashes (1996) and the documentaries of child sexual exploitation in States of Fear 
(1999), Suffer the Little Children (1999), Dear Daughter (1996) and Suing the 
Pope (2002) which were all crucial in helping to demonstrate the horrors of the 
past. In so doing, they were able to force the public to concede that, although the 
State had done much for victims of crime in certain areas, further reform and 
consultation was needed in order to help prevent these events from reoccurring in 
the future. Nowadays, the issue of historical child abuse frequently appears within 
not only the courts but also in nearly every conceivable media platform, and the 
reporting of these kinds of incidents often revolves around how these victims of 
crime are often now empowered to “give up their anonymity” in order to “name 
and shame” their abuser. This alteration of the way in which the Irish public 
addresses the abuse of children therefore represents a major gain for the visibility, 
inclusivity and comprehension of the Irish crime victim in this country (McElwee 
2001, p. 27, p. 32; McKeown and Gilligan 1991, Keenan 2001, p. 2000, Lalor 2001, 
p. 1; Ring 2017, p. 89; Heylin 2016; Keena 2016). 
Ireland, especially after the 1990s, undoubtedly demonstrated a real cultural 
shift regarding the reporting and perception of child abuse in the country, which 
dramatically engendered the re-integration of the Irish victim. In fact, before this 
point, the Irish public felt that child abuse did not even exist in the country. This 




was mainly because the Church and the State had allowed opportunistic predators 
to secretly engage in it, meaning that the crime often went unpunished. Yet the 
liberalisation of public mores, as well as the press, bought about a decline in the 
influence of the Church and the media’s coverage of its failures brought the realities 
of child abuse to people’s doors, making victimisation a much more topical subject 
for the Irish public. It also allowed Irish society, to become far more self-critical of 
its own role in helping to create this state of affairs, which led to the undermining 
of the previous patriarchal familial norm, which not only previously helped to allow 
the secret commission of abuse in the public sphere but also within the realm of the 
Irish family home. These events sparked an increase in the numbers of victims 
coming forward with evidence and testimony, which led to an even greater number 
of prosecutions in this area. In fact, all of these changes have helped to contribute 
toward a new culture of openness, which has prompted a surge in reporting, and a 
contestation of those narratives that had hitherto silenced victims of crime. The 
welfare of victims therefore became a topic of major importance, representing a 
considerable advance for victims of crime, which has also brought about reforms 
that have stimulated the reintegration of the Irish crime victim. This cultural shift 
in the attitudes of the public towards the victims of these kinds of crimes has also 
helped to produce masters of crime politicisation, who now realised that they could 
use the criminality that was becoming more prominent in society to motivate a 
public that was now becoming increasingly perturbed by social disorder to support 
their politics of reaction. This prompted several successful manipulations of 
popular anxiety in order to politicise penal policy in the late twentieth century. 




5.7.2 The Politicisation of Law and Order in Ireland and The Consequent 
Increase in the Victim’s Socio-Political Capital  
The politicisation of crime first emerged in the United States during the 
1964 and 1968 elections,54 and eventually evolved into a permanent fixture of the 
American political landscape. The best embodiment of this was the utilisation of 
the Berkeley student occupation by Reagan to fuel his campaign to become 
Governor of California - a campaign which eventually propelled him to the White 
House. In the UK, the results of this were rather similar, with the issue impressing 
itself in the 1980s. However, in this context, Thatcher was able to use the power of 
the British police to break the defiance of Unions, as well as the Labour Party, 
which shifted the political consensus in Britain to the right for decades to come. 
Indeed, it was these new geopolitical trends which eventually helped pave the way 
for the politicisation of crime in Ireland (Friedman 2002, p. 205; Gest 2001, p. 5; 
Schwartz 1993, p. 329; Lee 2007, p. 100; Hodgkinson and Schabas 2004, p. 196; 
Rutherford and Green 2000, p. 19; Anthony and Cunneen 2008, p. 279; Pearson 
 
54 ‘Law and order’ first became politicized in the US in the 1960s. Barry Goldwater had blazed the 
law and order trail in his abortive but prophetic presidential bid in 1964. In the hands of the political 
right, the demand for law and order condensed a number of specific meanings: above all that law 
could and should produce order, but failed to do so because of weak enforcement. In this view, the 
unequivocal purpose of law was crime control, but…excessive due process restraints… frustrated 
effective enforcement…Law and order was a successful campaigning slogan for Richard Nixon in 
his 1968 election victory, becoming a codeword for race, culture and generational backlash.” 
Reiner, R. (2007) Law and order: An Honest Citizen’s Guide to Crime and Control, Cambridge: 
Polity, Ch 5. 




1987, p. 13; Peele 1988, p. 168; Reiner et al. 2003, p. 25; Downes and Morgan 
2002; Kilcommins et al. 2018, p. 45; Lee 2007, p. 100; Garland 1997, p. 202). 
Although the recorded numbers of crime victims within Ireland peaked in 
and around the 1980s, few in the country felt that the issue of crime carried much 
weight at that time. Yet, the Irish political class was slowly beginning to discover 
the power of such a discourse, and eventually found their voice. However, even 
though penal populist rhetoric continued to grow, the Irish public remained more 
or less ambivalent about criminality up until the late 1990s. Yet, by that time, about 
half of the public felt crime was important, with almost ninety per cent of people 
feeling let down by government policy (O’Donnell and O’Sullivan 2001, p. 73; 
Beckett 1997, p. 4; Kilcommins et al. 2004, pp. 132-136; O’Donnell 2005, p. 105).  
Even though crime might not have politicised as quickly in Ireland as it did 
in the UK, Irish politicians eventually used it in the 1990s to garner ‘political 
capital’. Although the early 1990s saw some thoughtful attempts at combating 
criminality, the debate altered when Fianna Fáil replaced Fine Gael as the party of 
Law and Order in Ireland. John O' Donoghue masterminded this rebranding. He 
did this in large part by depicting Ireland as under siege. Indeed, his party, Fianna 
Fáil, spearheaded the post-1996 politicisation of Law and Order, with O’Donoghue 
operating as its driving force. This was achieved by contrasting Fianna Fáil’s tough 
talk with what he portrayed as the government’s “light touch” (Kilcommins et al. 
2004, pp. 140-141; O’Donnell and O’Sullivan 2001, pp. 30-33; O’Mahony 1996).55 
 
55 “In the 12 months between the McCabe and Guerin killings and the general election of June 1997, 
Fianna Fail…redefined itself as the party of law and order, a mantle… traditionally been claimed 




This was a surprising turn of events, as Fine Gael would historically have been the 
party that was much tougher on crime. However, Fianna Fail, noticing 
complacency, capitalised on it by positioning itself further to the right on this issue. 
John O’Donoghue recast his party as “tough on crime”, which was also something 
that was more of an issue in the aftermath of 1996. The change was then cemented 
when Fianna Fail were returned to government and therefore able to implement 
much of the stringent measures that they had called for within their 1997 Manifesto.  
Yet, at the same time, Fine Gael did not undercut, or indeed even seek to 
follow the entrenched position of Fianna Fail. In fact, they focused more on 
measured policies opposed to the whole notion of “getting tough on crime”. This 
has altered slightly in more recent years. Since Fine Gael have somewhat closed 
the gap. However, for our purposes, and at this point in time, post-1996, the 
distinction between the two parties on the issue could not have been more marked.56  
 
by Fine Gael...[t]he architect of this redefinition was John O’Donoghue…who painted a disturbing 
picture of a country under threat…[d]uring the 1997 general election campaign, law and order were 
key issues…Fianna Fail undertook to ‘give the streets of this country back to the Irish people’. Since 
its return to power in 1997 and again in 2002, the party has enthusiastically delivered… John 
O’Donoghue…made law and order into a central part of political life by accentuating the differences 
between Fianna Fail’s hard-line policies and what he portrayed as the indifference of the other 
political parties...” O’Donnell, I. (2005) ‘Crime and Justice in the Republic of Ireland’, European 
Journal of Criminology, 2(1), 99-131, pp. 106-107.  
56 “…the other main political party…(Fine Gael) has not attempted to out-tough the government 
since its return to the opposition benches. Its recent policy documents have focused on crime 
prevention, restorative justice, the soaring costs of criminal justice and the dubious value of the 




Fianna Fáil persistently pursued this line of argument, launching their 
‘Leading the Fight Against Crime’ paper in 1997. This not only politicised crime, 
but also politicized how best to combat it. It did this by blatantly endorsing ‘broken 
window’ policies such as ‘penal warehousing’ and ‘zero tolerance’ policing as 
viable penal solutions. It also similarly politicised the victim by making the 
implementation of the Victim’s Charter of 1996 a key part of its crime strategy and, 
by interlinking this with its other policy commitments. At the same time, it inferred 
that those who did not adopt a similar position were “soft on crime”.57  
This politicisation of the victim became a key aspect of the party’s shift in 
criminal justice policy. The alteration is evident in its 1997 Election Manifesto. 
This re-emphasises the point that victims are a pivotal aspect of the zero-tolerance 
approach they sought to implement. It also highlighted that a key aspect of its tough 
on crime stance was its staunch commitment to implementing the 1996 Victims 
Charter. Here we see the politicisation of the victim at its zenith, as the party 
equated penal severity as being intrinsically linked with greater victim provision.  
Although many might presume this, it is not accurate, and ignores 
progressive alternatives. The party also claim that their initial promotion of the 
Victim Charter of 1996 evidences how they as a party are tougher on crime than 
the government. It also appears to suggest that they are more competent in their 
 
current prison building programme (… Fine Gael 1998).” O’Donnell, I. and O’Sullivan, E. (2003) 
The politics of intolerance—Irish style. British Journal of Criminology, 43(3), 253–66, p. 56. 
57 Fianna Fáil (1997) Leading the Fight Against Crime: A Fianna Fáil Position Paper on Justice, 
Dublin: Fianna Fáil, Crime. 




understanding of the provision victims need. However, the text of the manifesto 
with its non sequiturs and oversimplifications would strongly suggest otherwise.58   
Indeed, the idea of ‘zero tolerance policing’ was a foreign import from the 
United States, with the Commissioner of the NYPD in 1994, William Bratton, 
having used it to come down hard on deviance under the assumption that minor 
crimes came to engender greater ones. Although Bratton achieved his target of 
almost halving street crime in 3 years, questions remain as to whether he deserved 
the credit for this, as the fall in crime apparently began before his tenure even 
began. The implementation of zero tolerance policing within New York also had a 
tendency to legitimise and aggravate police violence in the more deprived areas of 
the city (O’Donnell and O’Sullivan 2001, p. 35, pp. 38-39, pp. 40-4; Bratton and 
Knobler 1998 Kelling and Coles 1996; Young 1999, p. 125; Bowling 1999; 
Grabosky 1999; Parenti 1999, p. 69; Walsh 1998; Gooding-Williams 1993)  
The 1997 election was the turning point for the politicisation of Irish crime, 
with Fianna Fáil’s successful politicisation of Law and Order beginning a trend that 
permitted the championing of ideas that preyed upon, and exploited, the anxieties 
surrounding crime that the media had inflamed. Fianna Fáil was therefore able to 
 
58 “Zero tolerance - no crime, and no victim of crime, is unimportant…it is important that the 
government's attitude to crime is clear-cut…there are no insignificant crimes today…there are no 
unimportant victims which is why we will fully implement the charter for the victims of crime 
which we published in 1996.” “In our first year in government, Fianna Fáil will develop 
a white paper on crime. All relevant official agencies…will be consulted. We will also involve 
community…groups…inviting submissions on the nature of crime…and on how it could be 
managed.” Fianna Fáil (1997) General Election Manifesto, Dublin: Fianna Fáil, Crime.  




differentiate themselves from the government by pledging to use the new punitive 
culture, that they themselves had created, to stamp out minor illegalities, with the 
view to circumventing those of a more serious kind. This would therefore require 
more police, harsher sentences and even greater rates of incarceration. Fianna Fáil 
even cloaked these measures in political rhetoric in order to make them more 
palatable to the Irish public. Yet these politicised ‘crime control’ measures 
ultimately spoke to an Irish electorate that was now, mainly thanks to the media, 
much more aware of the impact of criminality. Once in power, Fianna Fáil 
implemented their ‘zero tolerance’ approach by increasing the numbers of Gardaí.  
These increased by 931 in the period from 1997 to 2002. However, 
O’Donoghue had sought to increase it by 1,200 by the end of 2002, with an eventual 
target of 2,000 extra Gardai by 2007. O’Donoghue was demoted to another 
ministry in 2002 before he could personally implement further increases. His target 
of an increase of 2,000 by 2007 was realised, with the addition of 2,787 Gardai in 
that year. Indeed, by 2010 the force had reached a high point of 14,377. This 
represented an increase of 3,409 from 1997. This meant O’Donoghue’s previous 
target of 2,000 officers was not only realised, but considerably surpassed during 
the lifetime of the three successive Fianna Fail governments that were returned to 
power after the 1997 campaign.59 They also enlisted the help of Bratton’s assistant, 
 
59  An Garda Siochana, Garda Strenghts (1993-2019) Dublin: An Garda Siochana available: 
https://www.garda.ie/en/about-us/our-departments/human-resources-and-people-
development/garda-hr-directorate/garda-strengths-1993-2019.pdf [accessed 10 Aug 2020]. 
“However, Mr O'Donoghue told the Pat Kenny Show he was confident his plan would be realised. 




John Timoney, a former NYPD officer, to counsel them on how best to reform the 
Gardaí. The ‘zero tolerance’ approach of Fianna Fáil therefore allowed them to use 
crime to create a punitive political culture in Ireland, which moved criminal justice 
policy further towards the ‘crime control’ end of the spectrum than was hitherto 
common.  
Yet Fianna Fáil’s campaign did not engage with crime trends, just ‘sound-
bite politics’, which, although powerful enough to sway the electorate, did not put 
forward an effective long-term strategy for reducing crime. Since ‘media 
sensationalism’ portrayed the criminal justice frames of the previous 
administration as ineffectual, the electorate was highly receptive to Fianna Fáil’s 
message, and demanded these new measures. Novel legislative instruments 
therefore expanded police discretion, punitive sentencing and prison populations. 
This trend can be clearly seen in the nature of the legislative instruments that Fianna 
Fáil passed while in majority government, and their impact upon criminal justice. 
 These included The Criminal Law Act, 1997, The Criminal Justice 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1997, The Criminal Justice Act, 1999 and The Sex 
 
‘I believe it is possible. Before the last election in 1997, I promised that we would bring the force 
to its highest level in the history of the State from 10,800 to 12,000. That will be achieved this year. 
Obviously it is more difficult to ensure that we will bring the force up by a further 2,000 but I have 
plans to do that, and the way in which I intend to do that is by providing for an increase in the 
number of gardaí who will be recruited every year…’” Irish Times (2002) ‘Promise of 2,000 extra 
gardai can be realised – Minister,’ The Irish Times, 8, May, available: 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/promise-of-2-000-extra-gardai-can-be-realised-minister-
1.1056458 [accessed 10 Aug 2020].   




Offenders Act, 2001. Their return was also characterised by huge increases in 
spending of combating crime, the much more vigorous pursuit of offences that had 
been hitherto steadily declining in the State and a concerted prison building 
campaign.60 Several aspects of these legislative interventions were rather punitive. 
Section 4 and 6 of the Criminal Law Act 1997 considerably expanded upon police 
discretion by allowing arrests without a warrant as well as the entry and search of 
any building (including a dwelling) in order to conduct an arrest. This expansion 
of police discretion was complemented by The Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, 1997 which considerably extended periods of remand in custody 
under Section 4. While Section 5 of The Criminal Justice Act, 1999 also saw an 
increase in punitive sentencing through the greater use of mandatory sentencing. 
This mandated for a ‘one strike’ rule for drug trafficking above the value of 13,000 
 
60 “After its return to government the Fianna Fáil commitment to ‘zero tolerance’ never wavered… 
in 1997 the Garda budget was IR £479m. The allocation for 2000 was IR £672m—an increase of 
42 per cent…[t]he overall Department of Justice…budget increased from IR £698m under the last 
administration to IR £1 billion in 2000—a 43 per cent increase…action against beggars would be 
an example 'zero tolerance' in practice… the [LRC’s] ‘Report on Vagrancy’…stated that the annual 
number prosecutions for begging had fallen considerably…to 303 in the 1970s (LRC 1985:61…). 
…Between 1990 and 1996 proceedings against beggars were initiated on an average of 128 
occasions…[a]fter 1997…proceedings rapidly increased…[t]he average number of prosecutions 
each year between 1997 and 1999 was 508…[t]he other essential element of the ‘law and order’ 
package was a massive prison building programme. In 1955 there were 386 prisoners in 
Ireland…[b]y 1995 this had increased to 2,121…[b]etween 1995 and 2000 the number of persons 
in custody increased by 39 per cent…”  O’Donnell, I. and O’Sullivan, E. (2003) ‘The politics of 
intolerance—Irish style’, British Journal of Criminology, 43 (3), p 52, 54. 




euro. A change which, given the nature of the drugs market in Ireland ensured 
lengthy prison sentences for anyone guilty of this kind of offence. Indeed, it appears 
that this particular legislative provision was designed to have such an impact.61  
There was also the introduction of severe sentencing for sex offender in the form 
of sex offender orders under Part 3 and post release supervision under part 5 of The 
Sex Offenders Act, 2001. These increased court powers to constrain offender 
movement and observation of their actions under the aegis of public safety.62  
This was complemented by a tougher implementation of novel legislative 
measures which, due to their open language, risked oppressive deployment. This 
has increasingly been the case in more recent times. Particularly in the wake of 
1996, as this legislation was weaponised for blatant and discriminatory use against 
undesirables. The legislative net that might ensnare these targets can therefore 
encompass those who might actually be undermining public order as well as those 
 
61 “Up until the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 1999, there were relatively few mandatory 
sentences in Ireland…The 1999 Act amended the law to create a presumptive sentence of ten years 
for possession of drugs with a value of over approximately 13,000 [euro]…introducing a ‘one 
strike’ presumptive sentence.” Hamilton, C (2011) ‘Organised criminals as ‘Agents of Obligation’: 
The case of Ireland’, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 17(4), 253–266, p. 260. 
62 “…the Sex Offenders Act 2001…makes provision for convicted sex offenders to notify…Gardai 
… of their movements…[t]hose who are sentenced to a period of more than two years’…will be 
required to provide this information for the duration of their lifetime. The 2001 Act also introduced 
a post-release supervision order whereby the Probation Service is charged with monitoring the 
offender…” Hamilton, C (2011) ‘Organised criminals as ‘Agents of Obligation’: The case of 
Ireland’, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 17(4), 253–266, pp. 256-257.  




perceived by the Gardai to be doing so by their actions. This trend of using the open 
language of legislation to crack down on certain crimes can also be seen in the state 
response to those who are, or adjudged to be, engaging in domestic prostitution.63  
In fact, all of this was implemented and built upon despite several experts 
critiquing such an approach, and indeed even after their contentions that such 
measures were excessive. These critiques pointed out that these actions represented 
such a curtailment of civil liberties that they could be seen as oppressive. Several 
areas, like non-incrimination, bail and detention were all flagged as problematic. 
In fact, leading commentators pinpointed this as a decisive turn away from a 
principled due process model of justice, towards a situation in which proving guilt 
became more coercive, and the state had a freer hand when maintaining guilt.64  
 
63 “The Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 criminalizes intoxication in a public place (s. 4); 
disorderly conduct in a public place (s. 5); threatening or abusive insulting behaviour (s. 6); and 
failing to comply with the direction of a Garda (s.8). According to Carey (1998: 49) this has created 
the potential for…‘...the rule of discretion, arbitrariness, stereotype and uncertainty’. …since 1997, 
there has been a marked…increase in the number of proceedings taken against those… perceived 
as offending against public order. There were three times as many cases 1999 as in 1995. 
Soliciting…prostitution, and loitering with intention of prostitution (as defined by ss 7 and 8 of the 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993) are other classic cases…again a worrying trend 
emerges…[t]he average number of prosecutions in the two years prior to the 1997 general election 
was 60, compared with 650 in the following two years.” O’Donnell, I. and O’Sullivan, E. (2003) 
‘The politics of intolerance—Irish style’, British Journal of Criminology, 43(3), p 52. 
64 “While much of the innovation of recent years had been an attempt to strengthen the arm of the 
law it could, from the civil liberties perspective, be seen as repressive…[t]his is especially true in 
regard to changes, like the curtailment of the right to silence, preventative refusal of bail to suspects 




Several negative consequences in this regard flowed from the moral panic 
of the 1996 era. A panic that was caused in large part by the way in which the media 
and public compelled the state to “get tough on crime”. Chief among them was 
how the recourse to extraordinary criminal justice measures had now been 
normalised to deal with drugs related offending. Worse still, this shift in policy was 
rapidly implemented without a measured evaluation of the treat that these criminal 
posed, whether recourse to extraordinary measures was appropriate for such a 
situation and what were the actual repercussions for our commitment to due process 
in the state, and by extension the rule of law, if we were to adopt such provisions.65  
Although crime rates declined,66 this, in very similar way to the American 
experience, transpired prior to the implementation of these policies. So as a 
 
and the extension of police powers of detention, all of which impact on due process...” O'Malley, 
P. (2002) Criminal Justice in Ireland, Dublin: IPA, P. 9. “The heavy emphasis on due process 
values…has been replaced by a model in which…the State can coerce a much greater degree of co-
operation from the suspect…in the investigation of his or her own guilt..” Walsh, D. (2002) 
Criminal Procedure, Dublin: Round Hall, Sweet and Maxwell, p. xii. 
65  “The intense outrage produced by such crimes …has resulted in a “national emergency”… the 
state has been tempted to turn to its long history of extraordinary provisions to combat…“folk devil” 
criminals…in the absence of any considered debate about the actual threats …the suitability of 
extraordinary provisions…or the impact on due process values in general reminiscent of Schmitt’s 
scorn for protracted discussion.” Kilcommins, S. and Vaughan, B. (2004) 'A Perpetual State of 
Emergency: Subverting the Rule of Law in Ireland', Cambrian Law Review, 35, 55-80, p. 74. 
66  “…the indictable crime rate doubled between 1960 and 1970 and again between 1970 and 
1980…[i]t peaked in 1983 and this marked the beginning of a period of decline. Between 1983 and 
1987 the crime rate fell by 18 per cent. The early 1990s were a time of slow growth and between 




consequence they could not have been responsible. The approach also introduced 
considerable penal confusion into Irish punishment. A confusion which was 
incredibly damaging to penal stability within the country and indeed betrayed a 
distinct lack of penal insight on behalf of the State itself in this area (O’Donnell 
and O’Sullivan 2001, pp. 2-6, pp. 36-37, pp. 42-43, p. 45, p. 75; O’Malley 1999, 
2000, p. pxiii; Cohen 1974; Bland and Read 2000; Byrne et al. 1983; GOI 1997). 
The long-term impact of the 1997 election was that a political consensus 
emerged with regards to addressing the issue of the victim, between Fianna Fáil 
and Fine Gael, and indeed ever other major political party, by the 2007 election. In 
fact, each one of the major parties seemed to be trying to outbid each other in terms 
of promises that they would make for the improvement of the conditions of victims. 
Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Labour, The Greens and even Sinn Féin each made key 
campaign pledges, evidencing that although the means by which the position of the 
victim was to be improved varied, the general political consensus was that  there 
should be better provision made for them. 67  
 
1995 and 1999, there was a sharp downward trend…” O’Sullivan, E. and O’Donnell, I. (2003) 
‘Imprisonment and the crime rate in Ireland’, Economic and Social Review, 34(1), 33–64, p. 44. 
67  “…the 2007 Election Manifestos of all political parties made promises directly beneficial to the 
victims….Fianna Fáil proposed…both a Victim’s Council …and a statutory Victim Support 
Agency; [Fianna Fáil (2007) Now, The Next Steps – Fianna Fáil Election Manifesto 2007, Dublin: 
Fianna Fáil  p. 102.] the Progressive Democrats made a commitment to double the funding currently 
available for victim support work; [Progressive Democrats (2007) From Good to Great: Continuing 
Ireland’s Radical Transformation – General Election Manifesto 2007, Dublin: Progressive 
Democrats, p. 30] Fine Gael [Fine Gael (2007) General Election Manifesto 2007 Dublin:Fine Gael, 




This thereby ensured that no matter what government that was returned to 
the Dail criminal justice policy on the subject of victims would broadly continue to 
move in a victim-oriented direction. It could be argued that the long-term impact 
of the politicisation of the victim, as a part of the politicisation of crime more 
broadly, in fact had much more impact over the political discourse on victims even 
in terms of cogent reforms. As although the politicised rhetoric and tough on crime 
reforms waned, 68  the victim, as a consequence of their politicisation, heavily 
benefited. This was mainly due to the shift in criminal justice policy within this 
 
p. 61] and Labour [The Labour Party (2007) The Fair Society – Labour Manifesto 2007, Dublin: 
The Labour Party, p. 55.] both promised the implementation of a new Victims’ Rights Charter…; 
the Green Party guaranteed that victims would be afforded the same access to legal representation 
…as the accused; [The Green Party, Manifesto 2007, Dublin: The Green Party, p. 18] whilst Sinn 
Féin planned…a system of consistent victim liaison…[Sinn Féin, General Election Manifesto 2007, 
Dublin: Sinn Féin p. 58].” McGrath, A. (2009a) 'In whose service? The Use and Abuse of 
Victims' rights in. Ireland', Judicial Studies Institute Journal, 9(1), 78–96, p. 79-80. 
68  “… the victim has assumed a significant role… impact statements were introduced…[o]ther 
changes…around the time of the 1997 general election but do no seem to have left an indelible 
mark. A shift in the emotional tone…has not endured…in a government-sponsored referendum in 
June 2001, 62 per cent of the population voted in favour of deleting all remaining references to the 
death penalty from Bunreacht na hEireann…[p]roponents of capital punishment were 
conspicuously silent…Fianna Fáil used crime as a ‘wedge’ issue…in the aftermath of … June 1996 
… However… The ‘perpetual sense of crisis’…epitomizing the situation in…United States since 
the 1970s appears to have been transient in Ireland.” O’Donnell, I. and O’Sullivan, E. (2003) The 
politics of intolerance—Irish style. British Journal of Criminology, 43(3), 253–66, p. 57. 




area. Namely from victim exclusion to one in which it actually became politically 
unsustainable to not support the introduction of greater provision for victims.69  
Such a situation also allowed the political establishment to use victims of 
crime to justify the kinds of penal populist policy decisions that they ultimately 
wanted to make. Take the governmental re-emphasis upon the crime victim, which 
helped to engender the penal perspective of individualisation, by individualising 
the impact of criminality. Although this was an ideological transition, that involved 
shifting the lens through which we perceive the victim from a social one to the level 
of the individual, it had practical implications.70 One such implication of this move 
from a broader, more social view of the victim, to one more narrowly concerned 
with the individual can be seen in the introduction of the victim impact statement.71  
 
69 “Victims… have now become the ubiquitous theme of criminal justice discourse in Ireland…it is 
remarkable just how swiftly the political majority have embraced this victims’ movement…”. 
McGrath, A. (2009a) 'In whose service? The Use and Abuse of Victims' rights in. Ireland' Judicial 
Studies Institute Journal 9(1): 78–96, p. 79-80, p. 78. 
70 "… the axis of individualisation has rotated away from a plot centered upon the perfectability and 
needs of the offender to one more closely connected with the symbolically significant interests of 
the victim…” Kilcommins, S., O’Donnell, I., O’Sullivan, E. and B. Vaughan (2004) Crime, 
Punishment and the Search for Order in Ireland, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. p. 143, 
71 “…legislation which mandated rights of victim participation or input into sentencing…commonly 
known as a victim impact statement…has been summarized…as a shift from individualization of 
the offender to individualization of the victim…” Erez, E. and Rogers, L. (1999) ‘Victim Impact 
Statements and Sentencing Outcomes and Processes: The Perspectives of Legal Professionals’, 
39(2) British Journal of Criminology, 216-238, p. 217. 




No longer would crimes be conveyed through abstracted statistics. It was 
now to be framed in a more visible, palpable manner. This shift was also powerfully 
underscored by the mass media. For its intimate portrayals of victims, or their 
representatives, reading personalised statements brought the realities and 
perspectives of the victim into the home of the viewer that witnessed them.72  
Although this was largely an organic, yet highly ideologically motivated 
transformation, one of its major material consequences came to be the further legal 
reintegration of the Irish crime victim. The victim-centred impact of crime 
politicisation were therefore profound, as it made the Irish victim of crime a rather 
more visible, and considerably more recognisable stakeholder within the Irish 
criminal justice process (Kilcommins et al. 2004, p. 78, p. 145, p. 255; Reiner et 
al. 2003, p. 31; O’Donnell and O’Sullivan 2001, p. 75, p. 81; Fine Gael 1998; 
Melossi 2008; MacLaran and Kelly 2014; Pycroft and Clift 2013, p. 69; Garland 
1990, p. 20, 2001, p. 39). 
 A new breed of politician therefore emerged in Ireland after 1997, one that 
could run successful campaigns on the back of combating crime and safeguarding 
victims – and although this saw the political class of the day manipulate victims 
for their own benefit, it did have a considerable inclusionary advantage for victims 
 
72  “…In contemporary penality this situation is reversed. The processes of individualization now 
increasingly centre upon the victim…[v]ictim impact statements are introduced to court in order to 
individualize the impact of the crime, to show how the offence affected this particular victim, in all 
her particularity, in all her human specificity.”  Garland, D. (2001) The Culture of Control: Crime 
and Social Order in Contemporary Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 179. 




of crime. Fianna Fáil’s undermining of Fine Gael, by crowning itself the new Law 
and Order party, effectively turned victimisation into a partisan issue, with John 
O’Donoghue spearheading this move towards the policies of crime control in 1997. 
Indeed, the electoral policies of Fianna Fáil for the 1997 election saw the party 
attempt to get much tougher on crime. Its manifesto included many of the hallmarks 
of crime politicisation, like broken windows theory, penal warehousing as well as 
the implementation of zero tolerance policing. Since all of this had essentially 
become the core of Fianna Fáil’s justice policy for the 1997 election, its success 
now provided them with an excellent opportunity that they could not refuse to 
implement what they promised.  
The consequence of all this was that a new consensus began to emerge that 
made victims of crime, as possessors of considerable, and largely untapped, socio-
political capital, considerably politically useful agents that the political class could 
now utilise. Politicians therefore started capitalizing upon the socio-political capital 
that victims of crime possessed in order to advocate and support the penal populist 
policies the public desired. Although this development was gradual in Ireland, it 
did emerge in the 1990s, as politicians began to realise the currency of crime. This 
reorientation of concern shifted the emphasis back onto victims of crime. The trend, 
which Fianna Fáil began, created a consensus about victims, with most, if not all 
of the parties in the Irish political spectrum moving toward the re-integration of 
them, and the consequent advancement of victim reform. Having discussed all of 
the aspects that were set out in the introduction all these elements will now be 
synthesised in the following conclusion in order to re-emphasise the argument of 
this chapter.  





A number of factors led to the re-emergence of the Irish crime victim. The 
first of these was the fact that the 1950s crime situation, with its socially regulative 
bonds, and depressed crime rate, dramatically altered in the 1960s. The economic 
liberalisation and consumerism of the 1960s caused these alterations, by weakening 
the bonds that had hitherto regulated Irish society. Therefore, it was not surprising 
that social disorganisation stimulated crime. These increases obviously affected an 
increase in the numbers of victims reporting crime, making them much more 
important. Qualitative changes also complemented quantitative ones, with crime 
‘events’ contributing to a shift in the public’s perception of crime. Notorious 
murders played a key role here, as did the Troubles, which helped to popularise 
victim perspectives. People also began to understand that the altered nature of Irish 
crime now meant that any member of the public could now potentially become a 
victim. This allowed the public to empathise with victims, sparking victim 
activism. In fact, it was this activism that eventually established the successful 
frames that helped to bring about a considerable raising of public awareness about 
victims of crime. The portrayals of victims within the media during the 1980s 
exacerbated this awareness into anxiety, making the public even more concerned 
about victimisation, and giving the victim far greater socio-political capital. The 
emergence of victimisation surveys also demonstrated that victimisation was 
prevalent, and its impact profound, leading to calls for victim re-integration. 
Revelations in the 1990s regarding the prevalence of historical abuse in the country 
strengthened these opinions, and mainstreamed the topic of victimisation. This 




made victims of crime even more prominent within public discourse, which in turn 
helped to make them even more politically valuable. The politicisation of crime in 
the 1997 election finally allowed Irish politicians to tap into all of this latent capital. 
Politicians did this by using victims to achieve their partisan goals, which would 
have seemed excessive without the fig leaf of victim inclusion. Yet despite the 
cynicism and opportunism that these governmental responses necessarily entailed, 
they did help to establish safeguards and also considerably assisted with the 
improvement of the overall standing of victims, which brought about changes that 
led to the re-emergence of the victim of crime. This shift essentially involved 
several stakeholders all taking control of the victim issue at the same time. 
Although they all had different motivations for doing so, they worked together to 
re-centralise victims of crime. All of their cooperation bettered the lot of victims 
by helping them to recapture some of their centrality within Irish criminal justice. 
This chapter has attempted to illustrate how cogent altered circumstances 
brought about a situation in which gatekeepers within criminal justice were 
amenable to the procedural re-incorporation of the victim in Ireland. The next 
chapter will move on to examine how this alteration from exclusion to inclusion 
was implemented and what was the legal theory underpinning such a transition. To 
do this it will discuss the emergence of the victim rights concept in Ireland and how 
this became more impactful with the passage of time. As the chapter charts the 
transition from soft law international provision to hard domestically applicable law. 
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PART 3 LEGAL REFORMATIVE EVOLUTION 
CHARTING THE IRISH VICITM’S JURIDICAL RE-INTEGRATION – 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE VICITM AS A RIGHTS BEARER IN 
IRELAND  
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter addresses the legalistic method through which victims were 
re-introduced back into Irish criminal justice. In seeking to answer this it outlines 
the juridical evolution of the victim rights concept in Ireland. This evidences both 
the manner by which victims were procedurally re-included through rights 
guarantees but also the influence of the judicial conversations about such rights. It 
also examines not only our domestic debate but the influence of European courts, 
which are discussed as this helped shape the domestic development of this area. 
Such an influence was in large part due to the contemporary significance of these 
interpretive conversations upon the Irish judiciary. In doing so the contours of the 
victim’s re-introduction in Ireland can be broadly outlined and their judicial 
evolution charted before delving into the statutory reforms that solidified this trend. 
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The emergence of the trend that would provide a new context for the legal 
recognition of the victim began to exert an influence in Ireland during the 1980s. 
This reflected the broad acceptance, which first began at an international level, of 
victim rights - the idea that victims had entitlements by virtue of their victimhood. 
Although this movement largely began in a globalised way, the Irish domestic 
context was influenced by these reforms, as they encouraged members of the Irish 
judiciary to consider certain aspects of them in an Irish context. This was beneficial 
for victims, as the decision arguably helped shape the debate that moved them from 
a more or less marginal figure, to one who could now make demands of the justice 
system and its stakeholders. It was therefore the law, and particularly the 
development of the victim rights concept, that were factors in the victim of crime’s 
re-inclusion back into the overall framework of the Irish criminal justice system.  
However, this alteration, from soft international norm to hard domestic 
right was not uncontentious, as it involved a re-calibration of the previously 
dominant State-Accused model of doing justice to accommodate the rights that 
victims would now receive. This was due to the conceptual distinction between 
“service rights” and “procedural rights”. 1  This evidences how some rights 
 
1  A dichotomy primarily reformulated in Ashworth, A. (1993) ‘Victim impact statements and 
sentencing’, Criminal Law Review, 498-509 and Ashworth, A. (2000) Victims’ rights, defendants’ 
rights and criminal procedure, In Crawford A. and Goodey J., eds., Integrating a Victim Perspective 
within Criminal Justice: International Debates Aldershot: Ashgate,185–204. 
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conferrals are more centred on affording victims better services,2 and are largely 
uncontentious, as they tend to not substantially impact upon due process rights. 
These would likely revolve around, in the Irish experience, the provision of 
information by police or allowing the victim to have a person of confidence that 
could accompany them throughout the process for moral support.3  
Procedural rights, such as victim impact statements 4  or discretionary 
screens are more controversial. Since they, although clearly beneficial to the 
victim, have a potentially prejudicial impact upon due process.5 Particularly the 
privilege to be presumed innocent, as certain provisions can and have, in the 
 
2 “…states…tend to…[use]… ‘strategies of adaptation’ … to redefine success in…terms of…being 
responsive to…victims…” Edwards, I. (2004) ‘An Ambiguous Participant: The Crime Victim and 
Criminal Justice Decision-Making’, 44(6), British Journal of Criminology, p. 969. 
3“… most controversial issues…have been questions of participation…” Edwards, I. (2004) ‘An 
Ambiguous Participant: The Crime Victim and Criminal Justice Decision-Making’, 44(6), British 
Journal of Criminology, p. 967-968. 
4 This is problematic due to potential “…excessive allegations… from the relative security of VIS” 
Ashworth, A. (1993) ‘Victim impact statements and sentencing’, Criminal Law Review, p. 507. 
5 “…the ‘sovereign state’ strategy…stresses enhanced control…[it]… involved…‘tough on crime’ 
measures…and invoke…the victim.” Edwards, I. (2004) ‘An Ambiguous Participant: The Crime 
Victim and Criminal Justice Decision-Making’, 44(6), British Journal of Criminology, p. 969. 
However, “…VIS make an important contribution to proportionality… [t]he concern that victims 
…subject offenders to unfounded allegations has…not materilaised…” Erez, E. (1999) ‘Who’s 
afraid of the big bad victim? Victim Impact Statements as victim empowerment and enhancement 
of justice’, Criminal Law Review, 49(26), p. 548. 
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American context, eroded due process rights in this regard.6 This has happened 
either procedurally, by whittling away the reasonable doubt guarantee or in the eyes 
of the jury, through tacit inferences of guilt.7  The implementation of victim rights 
therefore involved compromises on the part of legal machinery of the Irish State. 
In order to fairly accommodate these new entitlements in such a way as they would 
respect due process guarantees for defendants, the Irish State made compromises. 
It now had to allow a group that it had hitherto hardly recognised to now hold its 
criminal justice bodies to a higher standard. At the same time, it had to ensure that 
its organs of justice, could fairly re-accommodate these rights. Particularly in light 
of the potential for such a transition to prejudice an accused’s procedural rights. 
As a result of the rights guarantees afforded to the suspect, conceptual ideas 
like the equality or arms are vitally important to any analysis of the shifting 
dynamics of the Irish criminal justice. Particularly in light of the concerns often 
 
6 “…unsubstantiated justifications…taken out of context…buttress what is essentially a political 
stand against victim integration…” “The social science evidence clearly suggest that we have no 
reason to fear…vicitms in the criminal justice process.” Erez, E. (1999) ‘Who’s afraid of the big 
bad victim? Victim Impact Statements as victim empowerment and enhancement of justice’, 
Criminal Law Review, 49(26), p. 555-556 
7  “The emergence of victims…resulted in large part from concern…at…the privileged legal 
position of the defendant. In the [US]… a considerable overlap [exists] between those calling for 
improvements in the position of victims and those demanding curbs on defendants’ rights…victim 
reforms…have been essentially punitive…serving to counter…the protections…afforded to 
defendants…the extension of rights to victims has been coterminous with a diminution in the 
defendant’s right[s]…” Edwards, I. (2004) ‘An Ambiguous Participant: The Crime Victim and 
Criminal Justice Decision-Making’, 44(6), British Journal of Criminology, p. 970. 
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expressed with regards to the potential of the victim to circumscribe suspect rights. 
At the same time the constitutionally guaranteed rights of an accused all serve as a 
reservoir from which to extend similar rights to victims.8  
These guarantees, even in light of the inclusion of victim rights have not 
undermined due process rights or the equality of arms between State and accused. 
Indeed, there is an argument to be made that the inclusion of victim rights,9 are 
reconcilable with the due process privileges of the accused.10 This is true when 
examining protections in relation to evidence gathering in Ireland, which are some 
 
8  “…the Irish Constitution, contains…Art 38.1…fair trial; Art 38.5…trial by jury…Art 
40.4.1…liberty…Constitutional status has also been conferred upon…the presumption of 
innocence; the right to silence…and, the right to proportionality in sentencing.” Daly, Y.M. and 
Jackson, J. (2016) 'The Criminal Justice Process: From Questioning to Trial', In D. Healy, et al., 
eds., The Routledge Handbook Of Irish Criminology, London: Taylor & Francis, p.7. “…Article 40 
…provides: “3.1° The State guarantees…to defend…personal rights…”…the…guarantee…in 
Art.40.3.1° extends to rights not specified…[i]n AD v Ireland, [ [1994] 1 I.R. 369.] Carroll J., held 
…“bodily integrity” had been violated…Carroll J. opined, “…the crime…violated her bodily 
integrity.”[ [1994] 1 I.R. 371.] Coffey, G. (2018) ‘Accommodating Victims of Crime: A Survey of 
the Legislative and Juridicial Landscape’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 28 (4), p. 106.  
9 “…governments have introduced reforms…to benefit victims but that these reforms have been 
either inappropriate…or ineffectual…’” Edwards, I. (2004) ‘An Ambiguous Participant: The Crime 
Victim and Criminal Justice Decision-Making’, 44 (6), British Journal of Criminology, p. 971.  
10  “…the presumption probably has the strongest association with Article 38.1 of the 
Constitution…”  Hamilton, C. (2011) ‘The Presumption of Innocence in Irish Criminal Law: Recent 
Trends and Possible Explanations’, Irish Journal of Legal Studies, 2(1), p. 7. 
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of the strongest guarantees in the common law world. As these guarantees show no 
obvious signs of capitulating.  
These have also been supplemented, by the domestically applicable 
guarantees afforded to suspects by the ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR. In fact, 
the ECtHR has been more progressive than most domestic European courts in 
defending such entitlements.11 Having said that, there have been criminal justice 
changes, particularly in the area of policing that have somewhat departed from due 
process. Although some of these did coincide with the implementation of aspects 
of crime control, these were divorced from victim rights, not a result of them. In 
fact, victim provision often merely served to make these changes more palatable. 
 Moreover, most major changes to the rights of suspects were crafted in 
such a way as to not offend against the ECHR or due process as well as the equality 
 
11  “One of the strongest protections for suspect rights…is the strict approach…towards the 
exclusion of…evidence…(People (AG) v O’Brien [[1965] IR 142.)] …[T]his…has been expressly 
adopted… In People (DPP) v Kenny, Finlay CJ stated that ‘the detection of crime…no matter how 
important…cannot…outweigh the unambiguously expressed constitutional obligation to…defend 
and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen” [[1990] 2 IR 110, at 134]”. “….a number of state 
violations of Art. 6 ECHR…have been found…right to silence (e.g. Heaney and McGuinness v 
Ireland [(2001) 33 EHRR 334.]) …The [ECHR] Act 2003…requires…the State… perform its 
functions in a Convention compliant manner…[T]he impact of the Act…has, however, been 
minimal…the courts have insisted that constitutional matters should be considered first…(Carmody 
v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [[2010] 1 IR 635.])”. Daly, Y.M. and Jackson, J. 
(2016) 'The Criminal Justice Process: From Questioning to Trial', In D. Healy, et al. eds., The 
Routledge Handbook Of Irish Criminology, London: Taylor & Francis, p.8.   
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of arms.12 Having said that, elements of crime control have crept in, mainly as a 
consequence of legislative action. Although the political situation has not 
deteriorated to such a level that the legislature and the executive have blatantly 
violated suspect rights. Particularly in relation to the presumption of innocence 
guarantee. A right which has potential to be infringed by victim inclusion.13  
Yet the judiciary has often being proactive in first blocking infringements 
to the rights of the accused, and then, even in those limited circumstances where 
these are expressly dictated by the legislature, the judiciary often secures a 
proportionate base level of rights for suspects. This ensured that although there has 
 
12 “…under s. 30…Gardaí began to employ the anti-subversive legislation in cases which lacked 
any element of a subversive nature…(e.g. People (DPP) v Towson [[1978] ILRM 122.]; State 
(Bowes) v Fitzpatrick [[1978] ILRM 195.]; and State (Trimbole) v Governor of Mountjoy Prison 
[[1985] IR 550.]), but…[the] exception…was adopted… legislation introduced a more general 
power of arrest for detention (Criminal Justice Act 1984 s 4) and allowed for extensive periods of 
potential detention…(Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996 s 2;…”“…personal 
statement…reforms…have not…impacted on defendants…” “…appeals to the Supreme 
Court…following an acquittal…are …made more palatable perhaps by their professed provision 
for the interests of victims.” “…(Criminal Justice Act 2006 s 16)…has again been normalised…(see 
DPP v O’Brien [[2011] 1 IR 273.])” Daly, Y.M. and Jackson, J. (2016) 'The Criminal Justice 
Process: From Questioning to Trial', In D. Healy, et al. eds., The Routledge Handbook Of Irish 
Criminology, London: Taylor & Francis, pp. 16-17, 22-23 25-26, 24-25 
13 “…the recent decision…not to pursue a constitutional amendment facilitating… strict liability 
offences…speaks to the continued potency of…a paradigm of criminal law with the presumption 
of innocence at its core.” Hamilton, C. (2011) ‘The Presumption of Innocence in Irish Criminal 
Law: Recent Trends and Possible Explanations’, Irish Journal of Legal Studies, 2(1): 3-21, p. 21. 
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been a shift towards crime control, arguably made more amenable through fig leaf 
of victim provision, the judiciary have been quite robust in their maintenance that 
those curtailments of suspect rights are nearly always proportionate. Indeed, such 
stability has maintained the equality of arms and due process of the Irish criminal 
justice system when the system as a whole is given a fair assessment.14 
This chapter contends that the endeavours of international and domestic 
legal actors helped shape the domestic context for the Irish judiciary to innovate 
and ultimately extend these rights to Irish victims of crime, which helped the Irish 
State with its task of re-integrating them back into Irish criminal justice. It therefore 
seeks to demonstrate how the emergence of these entitlements in Ireland was the 
catalyst behind the re-emergence of the victim as a stakeholder and rights bearer. 
The author supports these assertions by first examining the new domestic context 
that the establishment of the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the 
 
14 “… Packer (1968)…suggested that the due process model…would find its validation in the 
judiciary…the courts would not allow pre-trial detention for questioning…until the…OASA 
1939… (see Dunne v Clinton [[1930] IR 366.]; People (DPP) v O’Loughlin [[1979] IR 85.]; People 
(DPP) v Walsh [[1980] IR 294]). However, once legislative measures were put in place, the courts 
did not interfere…DPP v Gormley; DPP v White, [[2014] 1 ILRM 377.]…[evidenced] in a shift of 
constitutional emphasis…[that] seems to be a reflection of…a judicial view that due process 
protections should follow that crime control-oriented realignment.” “…It may seem somewhat 
paradoxical that this shift has taken place alongside greater recognition of the need to have regard 
to ‘due process’ …[I]n its application of these rights, however, the judiciary has sought to ensure 
that the legitimate aims of crime control can be pursued proportionately.” Daly, Y.M. and Jackson, 
J. (2016) 'The Criminal Justice Process: From Questioning to Trial', In D. Healy, et al. eds., The 
Routledge Handbook Of Irish Criminology, London: Taylor & Francis, pp. 26-27, p. 31. 
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European Union helped shape the debate surrounding the recognition of such rights 
in Ireland. The chapter then moves on to outline the contextual influence upon 
Ireland that some of the major legal provisions that each one of these organs helped 
to advance. This involves charting the development of international victim rights 
norms from the United Nations backed Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice 
for Victims in 1985, as well as the Council of Europe’s Recommendation 8 in 2006, 
right up to the more recent landmark European Union Victim Rights Framework 
Decision of 2001 and its ground breaking 2012 Directive on the subject of victim 
rights. These ground a discussion of the victim rights that the Council of Europe 
helped to domestically engender through the decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights, which were taken during and after the 1990s. An explanation of 
how the United Nations encouraged the domestic development of these rights 
through its reform of the rules that govern the International Criminal Court in the 
late 1990s, as well as the various tribunals that it backed in the early twenty-first 
century also helps to complement this particular section. The author ends this 
treatise by evaluating the contextual influence of the reforms on the Irish judiciary's 
eventual decision to practically implement the victim rights concept in Ireland, by 
outlining some of the more decisive and contemporary pronouncements that they 
have given on the subject of the rights victims possess. 
6.2 SUPRANATIONAL INSTRUMENTS PROVIDE VICTIMS WITH 
ENTITLEMENTS  
All of the human rights bodies that the last part of this thesis mentioned 
helped frame the domestic debate concerning advancement of victim rights 
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provisions, with each one being of ideological assistance to the providing of the 
cognitive mapping needed for the concretisation of victim rights from an abstract 
concept to a more concrete international norm that Irish victims became able to 
familiarise themselves with and eventually invoke under domestic law in  Ireland. 
Changes that ultimately resulted in a significant gain in terms of the evolution of 
domestically applicable victim rights. The following chapter will therefore seek to 
demonstrate how the kinds of rights documents that each one of these bodies 
promoted helped to advance victim rights to become more prominent within Irish 
Law. To do this, it will outline the domestic significance within Ireland of some of 
the more consequential international provisions that the United Nations, the 
Council of Europe and the European Union forwarded and popularised. 
One of the most consequential victim rights developments 15 to influence 
the debate in Ireland on the matter during the latter half of the twentieth century 
was the United Nations’ enumeration of these entitlements within International 
 
15 Initially, in the years before the Second World War “[t]he concept of a ‘victim’, as a legally 
meaningful status, ha[d] been even slow[er] to take root in international humanitarian law…these 
interests have traditionally been protected and enforced on a classic interstate basis…within the 
classical framework of international law, it was for states to protect the interests of their nationals… 
following the Second World War individuals became the holders of limited rights…with the 
concept of a ‘victim’, in the sense of a private individual with a recognized status under international 
law by virtue of having suffered injury or harm in consequence of a violation of international rules, 
[was] largely unknown to the international legal order.”  McCarthy, C. (2012) ‘Victim Redress and 
International Criminal Justice: Competing Paradigms, or Compatible Forms of Justice?’, Journal 
of International Criminal Justice, 10 (2), 351-372, p.  356. 
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Law document 16  These documents contained victim rights provisions that 
explicitly set out the entitlements that victims of crimes ought to have.17 This was 
influential because the Irish State chose to agree to bind itself to the rights 
entitlements that were contained within these United Nations backed legal 
provisions. This approach by the State therefore helped to promote the idea that 
victims of crime within Ireland might eventually domestically receive such rights.  
The 1985 United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuses of Power was another international legal provision 
which helped frame the debate regarding the recognition of victim rights within 
Ireland. In fact, the General Assembly advanced it at that particular time in order 
to help recognise the harm that victims of crime often suffer because of their 
endeavours to secure a conviction against the individuals that victimise them. The 
 
16 Althogh there is still considerable work to still be done as “[w]hile the 2006 Basic Principles and 
Guidelines are indeed a triumph for victims, the quest for reparation has not yet ended. The 
realisation of victims’ rights requires the establishment of implementation mechanisms and 
governmental will to take the Principles from being mere words on a page and put them into 
practice. The international legal system is far from being victim-oriented.” Bassiouni, M. (2006) 
‘International Recognition of Victims' Rights’, Human Rights Law Review, 6(2), 203-279, p. 279. 
17 “The fairly new phenomenon of emphasizing victims’ roles could be indicative of a paradigm 
shift in transitional justice…[p]lacing victims of injustice on centre stage has happened for a number 
of reasons that, in a broader sense, originate in a changing understanding of the Holocaust…[t]he 
Holocaust increasingly serves as an analogy to conceptualize human rights abuses. Its metaphorical 
meaning has turned the historic event into a transcendental and universalized moral symbol that 
stands for radical evil…” Ludi, R. (2006) ‘The Vectors of Postwar Victim Reparations: Relief, 
Redress and Memory Politics’, Journal of Contemporary History, 41(3), 421-450, 425. 
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Irish State’s acceptance of this document was significant, as it was the first major 
contemporary International Law provision to articulate the rights that victims of 
crime ought to possess at a domestic level. This meant that the Declaration helped 
victims of crime in Ireland in their attempt to attain the rights that were contained 
within this landmark provision. Although it was an International Law provision, 
and therefore technically not hard law within Ireland, it set out many of the 
international norms that eventually came to govern how exactly governments ought 
to vindicate the privileges that victims of crime are entitled to within their own 
domestic criminal justice systems.18 It also resolved several outstanding issues that 
existed in relation to the domestic applicability of these rights, by outlining how 
State authorities and bodies needed to go about implementing them 
organisationally.   
The articulation of the victim rights that the Irish State ought to safeguard 
at this domestic level, which were contained in the 1985 United Nations 
Declaration, therefore helped to engender a move towards the legal re-inclusion of 
 
18 Therefore, it could be said to be an example of a successfully civilizing campaign by the United 
nations in this area of victim rights, which is a pivotal aspect of the overall human rights project.  
“The metaphor of the victim is the giant engine that drives the human rights movement. Without 
the victim there is no savage or saviour, and the entire human rights enterprise collapses…[i]n fact, 
the human rights regme was designed to respond to both the potential and actual victim, and to 
create legal, political, social, and cultural arrangements to defang the state…[o]n the international 
level the United Nations pursues civilizing campaigns that ostensibly seek to prevent conditions 
that create human victims…” Mutua, M. (2001) Savages, Victims, and Saviours: The Metaphor of 
Human Rights, 42(1), Harv. Int'l L. J., 201–246, p. 225. 
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victims and their rights in Ireland. In fact, the victim rights standards that the Irish 
State was encourage to implement under the provisions of the 1985 U.N. 
Declaration (U.N. 1985 Articles 4-17) evidenced the increasing tendency towards 
the juridification of such inclusion through the medium of rights. The Declaration 
itself grouped these rights aspirations under the headings of access to justice and 
fair treatment, restitution, compensation and assistance.19 The minutiae of the text 
even stipulated that victims should be given the right to representation, 
recompense, acknowledgment, help in coping with the impact of a crime, updates 
regarding the development of a prosecution and access to relevant materials, from 
both governmental and non-governmental bodies (Kilcommins et al. 2016, p. 24, 
2018, p. 40 Schabas 2001, p. 150; Moolman 1997, p. 278; Fenwick 1997, p. 317; 
Kirchengast 2013, p. 591; Doak 2003, p. 6, p. 7; Tamarit et al. 2010, p. 286; Vetere 
and David 2005).20 
 
19  “The 1985 Basic Principles of Justice…were the first international instrument to articulate 
victims’ right to access justice and obtain reparation for their injuries” “…the 1985 Basic Principles 
of Justice provide a legal foundation for asserting that a State has a duty to provide a victim with 
reparations. The 1985 Basic Principles of Justice provide that: ‘[W]hen compensation is not fully 
available from the offender or other sources, States should endeavor to provide financial 
compensation to: (a) victims who have sustained significant bodily injury or impairment of physical 
or mental health as a result of a serious crime; (b) the family, in particular dependants of persons 
who have died or become physically or mentally incapacitated as a result of such victimization.’” 
Bassiouni, M. (2006) ‘International Recognition of Victims' Rights’, Human Rights Law Review, 
6(2), 203-279, p. 247, 225. 
20 “… the UN General Assembly adopted…Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims 
of Crime and Abuse of Power…acknowledges that the rights of victims have not been adequately 
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The victim rights provisions of the Council of Europe were another pivotal 
factor in the domestic re-integration of victims of crime and their rights 
entitlements in  Ireland. Its acknowledgement of the need to re-centralise victims 
of crime within criminal justice is clearly evident in its production of conventions 
like the European Convention regarding the Compensation of Victims of Violent 
Crimes. This acknowledged that offender rights were quickly becoming 
unsustainable without victim rights. Despite the aspirational nature of this Council 
of Europe provision, it tended to raise awareness about victim rights and promote 
the domestic implementation of a base level of victim compensation in Ireland 
(Moore-Walsh 2013, p.234; Kilcommins et al. 2018, p. 42; Costa 2015, p.77).21 
 
recognized. According to the Declaration, its aim is “to assist Governments and the international 
community in their efforts to secure justice and assistance for victims of crime and victims of abuse 
of power.” The Declaration provides victims with the right to be treated with respect and 
recognition. It recognizes that victims sometimes need support in order to deal with the impact of 
crime...” Wemmers, J. (2012) ‘Victims’ rights are human rights: The importance of recognizing 
victims as persons’, Temida, 15(2), 71-83, p. 75. “The Victims' Declaration includes provisions on 
victim restitution from the offender, victim compensation from the state, assistance toward 
recovery, and creates standards on victims’ access to justice and fair treatment …” Aldana-Pindell, 
R. (2004) ‘An emerging universality of justiciable victims’ rights in the criminal process to curtail 
impunity for state-sponsored crimes’, Human Rights Quarterly, 26(3), 605-686, p. 618. 
21  “…the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes 1983… 
mandates that compensation be paid to victims who have sustained serious bodily injury directly 
attributable to an intentional violent crime, or to the dependants of the persons who have died as a 
result of such crime, when compensation is not fully available from other sources…[t]he European 
Compensation Convention does not mandate any particular compensation scheme; rather it focuses 
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The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe also had an important 
impact upon the bolstering of these victim rights entitlements in Ireland. This 
occurred when it ratified Recommendation 8 in 2006 (COE 2006), which advanced 
these privileges by shifting the onus of protection onto the Irish State. This ensured 
that Ireland took steps to prevent victimisation, and to address victim provision by 
creating frameworks that require it to keep victims of crime informed of their 
rights. Art 2.1 also stipulated that Ireland should seek to safeguard these privileges 
from domestic infringement within its domestic criminal justice system (Moore-
Walsh 2013, p. 234; Kilcommins et al. 2016, p. 26, p. 241, 2018, pp. 41-42). 
However, arguably the most influential factor in the domestic re-emergence 
of these rights in Ireland within the recent past was the advancement of victim 
centred legal instruments by the European Union. The European Union’s 
promotion of these provisions profoundly affected the legal re-integration of the 
Irish crime victim, since these European Union instruments helped to shape the 
juridical position of victims within Ireland through their encouragement of the Irish 
State to domestically codify the rights entitlements that they vested. This changing 
 
on establishing minimum provisions…Article 3 provides that: ‘Compensation shall be paid by the 
State on whose territory the crime was committed: (a) to nationals of the States party to the 
convention; (b) to nationals of all member States of the Council of Europe who are permanent 
residents in the State on whose territory the crime was committed. Thus, a State Party can deny 
compensation to a victim who is either a non-resident or a citizen of a State that is not a member of 
the Council of Europe…[s]tates may limit compensation in situations where a minimum threshold 
of damage is not met or based on the applicant’s financial situation.’”  Bassiouni, M. (2006) 
‘International Recognition of Victims' Rights’, Human Rights Law Review, 6(2), 203-279, p 224.   
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of European Union norms in the area of victim rights has had an influence upon 
Irish Law, since the insulation of Ireland from the harmonising impact of these 
kinds of provisions became increasingly difficult due to the acceleration of 
globalisation, which first began to powerfully emerge in the 1980s. This trend 
continued more or less uninterrupted well into, and after, the new millennia, 
meaning that the European Union allowed victims of crime to exert a greater 
influence upon the criminal justice frames that existed in Ireland. In fact, European 
Union targets became more ambitious with every success,22 blazing a trail of from 
compensation harmonisation right up to the victim’s eventual right to participation 
and protection during prosecutions (Kilcommins et al. 2016, p. 25; Roberts and 
Hunter 2012, p. 1; Jackson 2005; Twining 2000, p. 228).  
The European Union has also considerably to helped bring about other 
important rights alterations over a relatively short space of time.23 This was initially 
 
22 Indeed, in this context “…we are now compelled to observe that there has been a remarkable 
change over the past few decades. First, the victim is accorded an increasingly important role in 
criminal proceedings; secondly, the aim of repairing the damage sustained is occupying an 
increasingly fundamental position…this development appears to be in direct correlation with the 
evolution of human rights.” Tulkens, F. (2011) ‘The paradoxical relationship between criminal law 
and human rights’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 9(3), 577-595, p. 595. 
23  “Recently, there has been significant progress in the recognition of crimes as violations of 
victims’ rights in the European Union. In a proposed Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of the European Union (2011) introducing minimum standards for victims of crime, 
crimes are explicitly considered “an offence against society as well as a violation of the individual 
rights of victims” (Art. 5, emphasis added). This is a huge step forward. In the 2001 Council 
Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings, which the minimum 
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promoted through its Framework Decisions, which required Ireland to bolster the 
entitlements that victims of crime possess in Ireland. The Framework Decision on 
the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings (EU 2001/220/JHA) is an 
illustration of this point. It gave victims of crime in Ireland the right to be 
acknowledged and participate within domestic criminal justice, as well as the right 
to receive information, translation, legal aid and reimbursement for their expenses 
when they happen to domestically participate within Irish legal proceedings. The 
Framework Decision also recognised the inherent right of victims of crime to 
domestically receive proper safeguards, compensation for their losses and 
appropriate prosecutorial venues from the Irish State. The provision was also 
beneficial for people who happened to be visiting Ireland when they were 
victimised, as well as tourists from Ireland who suffered a crime in another 
European Union Member State, as Articles 12 and 13 endeavoured to 
accommodate these kinds of victims of crime through their greater promotion of 
inter-jurisdictional partnership between the various different Member States of the 
European Union (COE 2001). 
 The tendency of the European Union to seek to assist victims of crime 
within particular contexts is also evident in the pair of framework decisions that 
 
standards will replace, crime was not explicitly defined as a violation of the victims’ rights…[t]he 
proposed Directive aims to ensure that the specific needs of victims are taken into account during 
criminal proceedings, regardless of the nature of the offence or where it took place within the 
European Union (EU).”  Wemmers, J. (2012) ‘Victims’ rights are human rights: The importance of 
recognizing victims as persons’, Temida, 15 (2), 71-83, p. 79. 
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followed these developments. These were the Framework Decision on Preventing 
and Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings and Protecting Victims (EU 
2002/29/JHA) and the Framework Decision on Combatting the Sexual Abuse and 
Sexual Exploitation of Children and Child Pornography (EU 2004/68/JHA). The 
two provisions effectively operated by placing new domestic rights obligations 
upon the Irish State. These mainly related to the protection and accommodation of 
specific victims of crime within the Irish criminal justice system (Ryan and 
Hamilton 2016, pp. 468-9; Kilcommins et al. 2016, p. 330, 2018, p. 243).  
The European Union moved on from these successes to create victim rights 
Directives that the Irish State had to transpose within its domestic laws. The first 
major European Union Directive in the area of victim rights concerned the victim’s 
right to compensation. The European Union created the directive, named Council 
Directive 2004/80/EC, following the Madrid bombings in order to address the 
compensatory rights of victims. What prompted it was the issue of how best to 
ensure that those victims who moved between Member State jurisdictions were 
adequately compensated for the losses that they had suffered as a result of a crime 
that they had undergone. The European Union advanced the Directive because 
concerns existed that the victim of one European Union Member State could 
receive different levels of treatment depending upon the Member State in which 
they happened to be resident in when they happened to suffer their crime. European 
Union officials reasoned that if the victim rights provisions in this area only applied 
to those victims of crime who moved between Member States the outcome would 
be that only they would be able to receive the protection that the Directive sought 
to afford. It also paradoxically meant that these classes of victim would also 
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effectively have more rights than those victims of crime who were domestically 
resident in their own European Union Member State when they happened to 
undergo their victimisation. Therefore, Council Directive 2004/80/EC improved 
these entitlements across all European Union Member States, and promoted victim 
rights based upon augmented inter-jurisdictional partnership between Member 
States of the European Union (Kilcommins et al. 2016, pp. 330, 2018, pp. 42-43; 
Duffy 2008, p. 9; Rock 2004a, p. 513;).   
These developments effectively meant that Council Directive 2004/80/EC 
harmonised the compensatory rights of victims within the European Union and 
therefore cemented the domestically evocable rights that they could now possess 
in Ireland. It did this by guaranteeing them the right to apply for recompense if they 
happened to suffer a criminal offence abroad, with this being accessible regardless 
of the European Union Member State in which their victimisation happened to 
occur. The provisions of the Directive also complemented other European Union 
provisions on compensation in this area, such as The Regulation on Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters. This allowed 
victims of crime to bring civil claims against criminals within the venue that 
originally addressed their crime, and even allowed them to pursue compensation 
from offenders within any European Union Member State. 
The European Union also strengthened the victim of crime’s domestic legal 
status in Ireland with Directive 2011/92/EU on Child Sexual Exploitation. This is 
yet another example of how the European Union used these kinds of rights to 
augment the standing of the victim within the domestic Irish legal sphere. Directive 
2011/92/EU furthered reform in this area by addressing the misuse of children and 
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the distribution of inappropriate images of them. It therefore superseded the 
previous Council Framework in the area, Decision 2004/8/JHA. This led to the 
creation of more contemporary, domestically applicable rights for victims of crime, 
which helped safeguard Irish children in our increasingly digital age. Directive 
2011/92/EU achieved this by engendering the creation of domestic measures to 
deter criminals from using technology to facilitate their abuse, thereby protecting 
actual and potential victims of molestation in contexts in which the risks of this 
occurring were increasing. It also stipulated that these safeguards not only 
domestically exist within Ireland, but also extended out between it and every other 
European Union Member State, effectively creating a European Union wide zone 
of protection for minors (Kilcommins et al. 2016, p. 26; Costa 2015, p. 77). 
Yet the most consequential Directive in the area of domestic victim rights-
based inclusion was arguably Directive 2012/29/EU on the rights, support and 
protection of victims of crime, which vested Irish victims of crime with substantive 
entitlements. The Directive was impactful because it stipulated that the Irish State 
had to incorporate the rights it outlined into the domestic legal system of Ireland. 
This meant that it effectively sought to create an Irish baseline in terms of the 
provision of these entitlements. It also tended to vindicate the idea that victims of 
crime that were residing within the European Union would now receive more rights 
from supranational organisations such as the European Union. This lent credence 
to a widespread notion, which has become increasing popular within contemporary 
academic circles, that such reform was imperative to the improvement of the victim 
of crime’s domestic position, as well as how their rights entitlements in the areas 
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of security and compensation would now convert them into a much more central 
criminal justice stakeholder (Coffey 2018; Doak 2008; Raitt 2013, p. 730 p. 739). 
Directive 2012/29/EU began life in the spring of 2011. The Commission of 
the European Union advanced it in order to augment the rights that victims of crime 
could avail of in the areas of assistance and protection. Due to the landmark 
provisions that it contained; a concretisation of these rights was realised across 
several European Union Member States soon after its passing. Such an outcome 
was possible as many European Union Member States were able to almost 
immediately transpose the rights entitlements that were contained within Directive 
2012/29/EU directly into the legal framework of their own domestic law.  
Even though Ireland had until 2015 to incorporate the rights entitlements 
that were contained within Directive 2012/29/EU into its own domestic laws, and 
although it was unable to meet this deadline, it did eventually transpose many of 
the victim rights that were contained within Directive 2012/29/EU. The Irish 
legislature achieved this with the passing of the Criminal Justice (Victims of 
Crime) Act, 2017. Although this transposition was advantageous for victims, as it 
conferred important rights to information, support, protection and criminal justice 
participation, it was not an identical transposition, as the Criminal Justice (Victims 
of Crime) Act, 2017 did not completely mirror some of the rights entitlements that 
were contained within the body of Directive 2012/29/EU. Article 8 of the Directive 
gave a much wider ambit to the bodies which refer victims to relevant support 
services than its transposed Article 9 provision of the domestic Act of 2017 
provided for, which saw a circumscription of the Directive’s more encompassing 
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victim rights entitlements in Article 8  to ‘…information, advice, support, referral, 
and emotional and psychological support…’ (Leahy and Spain 2017, pp. 538-538).  
Despite these limitations, the domestic legislation that transposed Directive 
2012/29/EU ensured that victims of crime obtained a much firmer footing within 
Irish Law. In fact, Directive 2012/29/EU considerably advanced the re-inclusion of 
victims by engendering progress within the quality and quantity of rights that they 
could now avail of under Irish Law. The major progress that the Criminal Justice 
(Victims of Crime) Act, 2017 represented is therefore a direct result of this 
European Union driven rights Directive. The Directive also consequently served as 
a clarion call for the Irish judiciary to concretise the rights entitlements that victims 
of crime had within their own judgments (Coffey 2018; O’Flaherty 2016, p. 128, 
p. 117; Kilcommins et al. 2016, p. 26, 2018, pp. 71-72; Raitt 2013, p. 730, p. 740).          
The preceding paragraphs demonstrate the impact that supranational right 
instruments have had upon the domestic rights guarantees of Irish victims. This 
helps to illustrate just how the rights-based provisions that the United Nations, the 
Council of Europe and the European Union all helped to promote the engendering 
of the legal re-emergence of victim rights, which led to the victim’s domestic re-
inclusion within Irish criminal justice. The judicial interpretations of the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Statute of Rome by the European Court of 
Human Rights and International Criminal Court also began to complement this 
trend in the 1990s, which considerably assisted with the victim of crime’s eventual 
regaining of some of their lost centrality within the procedures of Irish criminal 
justice. It is to these judgments that we will now turn our attention. 
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6.3 INTERNATIONAL LAW COURTS ALLOCATE PRIVILEGES TO VICTIMS  
One of the most crucial evolutions in the defence of domestic victim rights 
was the development of the international human rights court. It is an institution 
which can trace its lineage right back to the iconic trials at Nuremberg. Yet its 
emergence was not an uncontentious one, as several nations, including Ireland, 
initially objected to the Nuremberg Court, as they felt that it would embody the 
“victor’s justice”, the subsequent prosecution of what a victorious power had 
retroactively deemed to be a criminal offence. However, the following paragraphs 
posit that the creation of the supranational human rights court, which was able to 
uphold the rights of victims of crime under International Law, was fundamentally 
pivotal to the ultimate establishment of such rights entitlements in Ireland. 
The European Court of Human Rights was highly influential in this regard, 
as one of its most important organising principles was the protection of human 
rights, the evolution of which has had a positive impact upon the area of 
domestically applicable victim rights. The evolution of human rights has had this 
influence upon the emergence of victim rights in Ireland because the victim rights 
that the European Court of Human Rights has discovered has also placed an 
obligation upon Ireland to domestically safeguard these entitlements. The 
European Court of Human Rights achieved this through the encouragement of 
European Union Member States to create offences, promote crime prevention and 
afford recompense, as well as concessions, to victims. The European Court of 
Human Rights has also enforced these requirements on all its Members, by 
permitting each of the victim rights it discovered to be domestically enforceable 
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(Vaughan and Kilcommins 2007, p. 443; Leben 1999; De Than 2003, p.166, p. 
170). 
Although the European Convention on Human Rights did not explicitly 
mention these rights, the victim cognisant re-interpretation that the European Court 
of Human Rights has given to it, which roughly began to exert its influence during 
the 1990s, has vested victims of crime with these entitlements. Indeed, the 
European Court of Human Rights has argued that victims of crime are guaranteed 
certain rights entitlements within the body of the European Convention of Human 
Rights itself. It achieved this outcome through its effective reinterpretation of 
Articles 2, 3, 6 and 8 of The European Convention on Human Rights. This was the 
result of a long line of European Court of Human Rights case law, which includes, 
but is by no means limited to X and Y -v- The Netherlands [1985] 8 EHRR 2350, 
Osman -v- The United Kingdom [1998] EHRLR 228, Doorson -v-Netherlands 
(1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 330 and MC -v- Bulgaria [2003] ECHR 3927/98 (Kilcommins 
et al. 2016, pp. 27-28; Healy et al. 2016; Doak 2003). 
The Doorson v Netherlands (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 330 case was particularly 
significant in this regard, as it saw the European Court of Human Rights “…read 
victims’ rights into the fair trial rights [that are] found in the European Convention 
on Human Rights” (Starmer 2014, p. 785). The Doorson case was therefore a 
pivotal aspect of the growth of victim rights in Ireland, as it saw the European Court 
of Human Rights begin to perceive these rights entitlements as falling within the 
crucial Article 6 ‘fair trial’ guarantee of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. This was an important development, as before this point the European 
Union had not developed these rights enough to warrant their explicit reference 
CHARTING THE IRISH VICTIM’S JURIDICAL RE-INTEGRATION – THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE VICTIM AS A RIGHTS BEARER IN IRELAND 
394 
 
within the text of the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court 
of Human Rights also did not revoke a victim’s right to anonymous testimony in 
Doorson, if Member States maintained appropriate safeguards in such instances 
(Healy et al. 2016, p. 380; Raitt 2013, pp. 733-734; De Than 2003, p. 169). 
The European Court of Human Rights has also stipulated that victims of 
crime must also have their identities protected during trials to safeguard their rights 
under Article 6, as illustrated by Y -v- Slovenia 41107/10, ECHR, 2015.24 There a 
courtroom interaction between a suspect and victim resulted in a victim receiving 
compensation due to the Slovenian State’s neglect of their rights, as the European 
Court of Human Rights had determined that its relevant trial procedures were 
inappropriately inclusive of a victim’s right to privacy under Article 6. The SN v 
 
24 “The Court noted the need to ensure a fair balance is struck between the interests of the defendant 
and the victim…and recognized that criminal proceedings…are often conceived of as an ordeal by 
the victim, in particular when the case involves a minor. Although the Court reiterated that the 
interests of a fair trial required the defence to be given the opportunity to cross-examine the 
applicant, it emphasized that the manner in which the applicant was questioned must strike a fair 
balance between her personal integrity and the defendant’s rights. The applicant’s questioning at 
the trial had stretched over four hearings held over seven months and, at two of those hearings, the 
defendant personaly cross-examined the applicant with questions which, in the Court’s view...were 
aimed at denigrating her character…the Court confirmed that domestic authorities are required to 
ensure that all participants in the proceedings treat vicimts and other witnesses with dignity…[t]he 
Court concluded that the applicant’s experience had substantially exceeded the level of discomfort 
inherent in giving evidence as a victim of alleged sexual assaults and could not be justified by the 
requirements of a fair trial.” Rainey, B., Wicks, E. and Ovey, C. (2017) The European Convention 
on Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 408. 
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Sweden (2002) 39 E.H.R.R. 13 ECtHR decision also confirmed that Art 6 could 
incorporate a victim’s right to adequate protections during criminal prosecutions.25 
This has meant that victims of crime cannot be compelled to appear for the benefit 
of an accused, and could also provide their testimony digitally, where the judge of 
the relevant domestic court felt this was compatible with the domestically 
applicable rights that were typically afforded to counsel for the defence during the 
course of a conventional prosecution in that particular Member State (O’Flaherty 
2016, p. 117; Raitt 2013, p. 744; Doak 2003, p.12; Ellison 2003; Hall 2010, p. 3). 
Since the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has had such an 
influence upon the legal reincorporation of victim rights under Irish Law, it is worth 
briefly examining how the domestic application of such jurisprudence was so 
beneficial to victims of crime within Ireland. 26  Cases like Paul and Audrey 
 
25 “In SN v Sweden …a victim of sexual assault gave evidence via video recording, forming almost 
the sole evidence upon which the defendant was convicted. The ECtHR held that, out of recognition 
of the vulnerability of sexual assault victims, and the realization that the trial is likely to cause 
further trauma, a victim’s right to their private life must be considered in determining whether the 
defendant indeed received a fair trial. However, any special arrangments adopted to help protect the 
victim must not stop the defendant from being able to contest the evidence. The ECtHR ruled that 
art. 6(3)(d) had not been violated due to the defendant’s counsel consenting to the victim being 
interviewed by police without the defence present…” Kirchengast, T. (2010) The Criminal Trial in 
Law and Discourse, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 32. 
26  “… X and Y v Netherlands… suggest that rules which hinder a fair prosecution may be 
incompatible with the Convention…automatic exclusion of evidence obtained in consequence of 
any mistake that infringes any constitutional right of an accused, may be incompatible with Ireland's 
obligations to provide…a fair disposal of criminal charges” “… Criminal trials are about the rights 
CHARTING THE IRISH VICTIM’S JURIDICAL RE-INTEGRATION – THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE VICTIM AS A RIGHTS BEARER IN IRELAND 
396 
 
Edwards -v- The United Kingdom,27 Judgment of 14 March 2002, Application No. 
46477/99, para. 84 and Kelly and others -v- The United Kingdom, Judgment of 4 
May 2001, Application No. 30054/96, para. 9 are illustrative here.28 These indicate 
that one of the key sources of victim rights within the European Convention on 
Human Rights is Article 13, which concerns their entitlement to have a wrong 
addressed, while Article 1 obliges Member States to ensure that these rights 
entitlements receive adequate State protection. Another high-profile case that 
illustrates this was Osman -v- United Kingdom [1998] EHRLR 228. This laid down 
 
and obligations of…the accused and the victim … X. and Y. make it clear that the victim…can have 
interests which should be weighed in the balance as well of those of the accused.” Charleton J  in 
The People (DPP) -v- Cash 106 [2007] IEHC 108 para 45, 50. “To seek to extrapolate …certain 
rights to examine a witness, at a pre-trial, but post-charge stage…as in S.N. v. Sweden … does not 
flow...” “… the [ECHR] recognises the requirement for particular measures… in respect of …young 
witnesses…while recognising clearly that the rights of a person charged… may not be unduly 
restricted. “ Macken J. in DPP v O'Brien  [2011] 1 IR 273 at para 40, 41. “…it is an inherent 
obligation of governments to ensure their protection from ill-treatment...through…special 
measures...” O’Keeffe v Ireland (2013) application no 35810/09 (28 January 2013) p. 27, 34.  
27 “Death of a mentally ill prisoner at the hands of his cell mate…UK…failed…under Article 2 to 
protect the lives of persons in its custody and had carried out an ineffective investigation...” Von 
Staden, A. (2018) Strategies of Compliance with the European Court of Human Rights: Rational 
Choice Within Normative Constraints, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania Press, p. 216.  
28 “In Kelly and Others v The United Kingdom…; ‘the essential purpse of such investigation is to 
secure… laws which protect the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents…[ the UK 
was implicated in an SAS assassination of unarmed IRA members]…accountability for the 
deaths…’.” Mowbray, A. (2002) ‘Duties of Investigation under the European Convention on 
Human Rights’, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 51(2), pp. 437-448, p. 438.  
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the authority that certain contexts require Member States to implement effective 
policies that safeguard people who are, or are likely to be, imperilled by the illegal 
conduct of others.29  
The European Court of Human Rights has built upon these developments 
in more recent years by discovering several other victim entitlements within the 
body of the European Convention on Human Rights that have also become 
domestically enforceable within Ireland. These include the victim’s right to have a 
relevant offence properly tried, as per Hajduove -v- Slovakia (2011) 53 EHRR 8.30 
Victims were also adjudged by the Court in Opuz -v- Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28 
to be entitled to have both the assessment and official responses of the State, to 
 
29 “…the Court has gradually required States not only to respect but also to protect human life… 
[yet]… it was only in 1998…when the duty to prevent violations of the right to life received a more 
comprehensive conceptual underpinning…the case concerned a teacher who severely wounded a 
16-year-old student…and killed the boy’s father…the police had not taken any measure[s] to protect 
the victim [who was clearly in a dangerous situation]. Osman therefore [successfully] alleged a 
breach of the State’s duty to prevent a violation of his and his father’s right to life.” Ebert, F.C., and 
Sijniensky, R.I. (2015) ‘Preventing Violations of the Right to Life in the European and the Inter-
American Human Rights Systems: From the Osman Test to a Coherent Doctrine on Risk 
Prevention?’, Human Rights Law Review, 15 (2), 343–368, p.346. 
30  “In Hajduova v Slovakia, in noting the particular vulnerability of such victims, the Court held 
that the domestic authorities ‘should have exercised an even greater degree of vigilance…’ 
…vulnerability is in such cases determined ex-post facto…[t]he Court, however, has not been 
consistent…failing to note the vulnerability of the victim of domestic violence in A v Croatia.” 
Sjöholm, M. (2017) Gender-Sensitive Norm Interpretation by Regional Human Rights Law 
Systems, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 175. 
CHARTING THE IRISH VICTIM’S JURIDICAL RE-INTEGRATION – THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE VICTIM AS A RIGHTS BEARER IN IRELAND 
398 
 
both an alleged, as well as proven criminal act, by several different organs of that 
State, including the police, prosecutors and the judiciary, conducted by an impartial 
State actor. It was also found that the integrity of this evaluative function of the 
State was fundamentally undermined, and the human rights of the victim therefore 
infringed, where this adjudicative State entity was sufficiently non-responsive to 
the plight of certain victims and non-representative of their plurality. 31  The 
European Court of Human Rights has also decided that Article 13 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights vests victims with the right to recourse where their 
entitlements under the Convention are unfairly prejudiced. Member States can also 
infringe rights if they do not adequately incorporate victims within their own 
 
31  “The decision recognizes that domestic violence against women is a systemic problem… 
Although individual acts of violence within the private sphere can be attributed to specific persons, 
violence against women is generally perpetuated through male domination of judicial and law 
enforcement institutions.” Abdel-Monem, T. (2009) ‘Opuz v. Turkey: Europe's Landmark 
Judgment on Violence Against Women’, Human Rights Brief, 17(1), 29-33, p. 23. “… the applicant, 
a victim of domestic violence, alleged that the injuries and anguish she had suffered as a result of 
the violence inflicted upon her by her husband had amounted to torture within the meaning of 
Article 3…consistently failing to take any action to protect her from his violence in response to her 
repeated requests for help, the state had made her feel debased, hopeless and vulnerable. The Court 
agreed…[t]he court thus considered…the applicant and therefore other victims of domestic violence 
could fall within the group of ‘vulnerable individuals’ entitled to state protection…” Gill, A. and 
Antitha, S. (2012) Forced Marriage: Introducing a Social Justice and Human Rights Perspective, 
London: Zed Books, Ch 3. 
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domestic legal frameworks, as held in M.C. -v- Bulgaria no. 39272/98, ECHR, 
2003-XII.32  
The European Court of Human Rights also held in that particular case that 
the European Convention on Human Rights entitled victims of crime to have 
“…reports of crime taken seriously and fully investigated”; whilst they were also 
adjudged by the European Court of Human Rights to have the right to “the effective 
implementation of court [protection] orders” in A -v- Croatia (2015) 60 EHRR 1633 
(O’Flaherty, 2016 pp. 115-117). The European Court of Human Rights has also 
found that victims of crime are entitled to have their complaints assessed in a timely 
 
32 “… M.C…recognises that the investigation and prosecution of rape raise human rights issues 
…addresses the nature of the violation of rights entailed in rape and the extent of the responsibility 
of states to protect citizens…[and] posits new strategic possibilities for feminist groups seeking to 
invoke law to combat sexual violence.” Conaghan, J. (2005) ‘Extending the Reach of Human Rights 
to Encompass Victims of Rape: M.C. V. Bulgaria’, Feminist Legal Studies, 13 (1), 145–157, p.153. 
33 “The extensive positive obligations imposed upon Contracting States to protect physical integrity 
have also been evident…in A v Croatia the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 to protect 
the applicant from domestic violence were in issue. The Court confirmed that under Article 8 States 
have ‘a duty to protect the physical and moral integrity of an individual….’ …they are to maintain 
and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by 
private individuals…it was not sufficient that the national courts had imposed measures…because 
these measures had not been enforced. The Court noted that the aim of … deterring the 
offender…could not be achieved without the sanctions imposed being enforced. Therefore the State 
had failed to satisfy its positive obligation[s].” Rainey, B., Wicks, E. and Ovey, C. (2017) The 
European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 407.  
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fashion in Kalucza -v-  Hungary (2012) (57693/1). 34  Indeed, the individual 
conducting this investigation must not have been involved in the alleged 
misconduct, as per Perevedentsevy -v- Russia (2016) 62 EHRR 16.35  Another 
limited trial entitlement for victims of crime is their right to ‘Independent Legal 
Representation’, which is grounded within the privacy guarantee of Article 8. This 
becomes relevant when assessing the release of victim details, or a request to 
evaluate their conduct during a criminal prosecution (Hanly et al. 2009; O’Flaherty 
2016, pp. 129-130; Raitt 2013, p. 733, p. 746).  
It is also worth clarifying a point alluded to previously in this regard when 
considering the case law in this area and its wider impact and implications. This is 
namely the fact that any procedures that are used in such a way as to aim at better 
 
34 “…in Kalucza v. Hungary (2011), the ECtHR held that neither…property rights nor mutual 
violence is a valid excuse for the failure to adopt a restraining order [in a situation of domestic 
violence]. A woman’s human rights [as a victim of domestic violence] to life and to physical and 
mental integrity cannot be superseded by the perpetrator’s rights...” Vaigė, L. (2013) ‘The Concept 
of Domestic Violence in Lithuania and the Aspect of Gender from the Perspective of International 
Law’, Socialinių mokslų studijos, 5 (1), p. 255–274, p. 270. 
35 “Therefore, any force used against members of the military must be absolutely necessary and the 
state is obliged to take reasonable steps to address known real and immediate threats to life. In 
Perevedentsevy  v Russia (2014), which dealt with the hazing of conscripts in the Russian army, the 
ECtHR ruled that:…conscripts are within the exclusive control of the authorities of the 
State…and…the authorities are under a duty to protect them…the primary duty of the State is to 
put in place rules … aimed at the effecitve protection of conscripts against the dangers inherent in 
military life …” Russell, H. (2017) The Use of Force and Article 2 of the ECHR in light of European 
Conflicts, London: Bloomsbury, p. 80.  
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accommodating victims of crime must be compatible with the due process 
entitlements of the defendant. This is clear from the case of Bocos-Cuesta v The 
Netherlands (2005) e.h.r.r. 54789/00. In which victim accommodations in terms of 
deviation from standard criminal procedure were found to be curtailed by the due 
process rights that the accused possesses.36 The ECtHR has therefore tended to 
uphold due process values by finding breaches of Art 6 where concessions to 
victims are found inappropriate, as was the case in Van Mechelen and Ors v The 
Netherlands (1998) 25 EHRR 657. These cases therefore demonstrate that ECtHR 
case law in this area deploys an expansive conception of Art 6 as a guarantee for 
the securing of a fair trial for the accused, victim and all trial actors.37 
 
36  “Bocos-Cuesta v The Netherlands (2005) e.h.r.r. 54789/00 also demonstrates the ECtHRs 
disposition to substantive victim rights…the applicant alleged that he did not receive a fair trial 
under art. 6 §§ 1 and 3(d) of the ECHR. Here, statements provided by four youths were tendered. 
The accused was not given the opportunity to question the statements…[w]hen present as a 
vulnerable participant, the ECtHR is therefore willing to consider alternative processes to support 
the needs of the victim. However, the court is mindful that any departure from normative criminal 
process is limited…to maintain the rights of the accused...” Kirchengast, T. (2016) ‘Enforceable 
Rights for Victims of Crime in Adversarial Justice’, Journal of Victimology, 3 (1) , 11-42, p. 25. 
37 “Van Mechelen and Ors v The Netherlands (1998) 25 EHRR 657 similarly raised the issue of the 
permissible limits of departing from normative trial standards…the applicants were convicted 
following tenure of anonymous statements made by the police.The investigating judge admitted the 
statements on the basis that the anonymous witnesses could be questioned by defence lawyers by 
audio link.The ECtHR ruled that this was an unusual departure from trial processes, and that art. 6 
had been breached because the defence could not observe the police as they gave anonymous 
evidence, nor properly test the reliability of such evidence.The ECtHR is guided by the processes 
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The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is therefore 
rather demonstrative when it comes to considering the impact of international 
victim rights norms upon the manner by which Member State countries such as 
Ireland have begun to recognise victim entitlements at a domestic level. The 
previous examination of the European Court of Human Rights’ case law clearly 
illustrates that the development of victim rights within the European Court of 
Human Rights was very much a gradual process. This was because it shows how 
the European Court of Human Rights slowly expanded upon its catalogue of victim 
rights with every relevant case that it tried, with each one embodying a decisive 
rejection of the more formalistic view of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which would have prevented this from happening. This approach has not 
only challenged the victim exclusive status quo in Member States such as Ireland, 
but it also established a positive victim rights standard that has ensured that these 
kinds of European Court of Human Rights entitlements would be given far greater 
domestic recognition within the procedures of the Irish criminal justice system 
(Healy et al. 2016, p. 380; Kilcommins et al. 2016, p. 337, 2018, pp. 69-71; DeThan 
2003; Doak 2009, pp.165-166; Roberts 2012, pp. 163-194; Ochoa 2013, p. 2).   
 
that establish the legitimacy of the trial taken as a whole…over any substantive law that prescribes 
any particular departure from its form.The jurisprudence of the ECtHR thus tends toward an 
interpretation of art 6. as maintaining fair trial rights for all participants in the criminal trial process.” 
Kirchengast, T. (2016) ‘Enforceable Rights for Victims of Crime in Adversarial Justice’, Journal 
of Victimology, 3 (1), 11-42, p. 25-26.  
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The case law of the European Court of Human Rights was important for 
victims of crime in Ireland. As the Oireachtas has codified the rights that the 
European Court of Human Rights conferred upon victims into domestic Irish Law. 
The European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence also became part of the Irish 
legal system. This effectively occurred once Ireland had legislatively incorporated 
the European Convention on Human Rights into Irish law in 2003, through the 
passing by the legislature of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003.  
Progress was something of a protracted process at first, and it should be 
noted that the legal standing of the ECHR in Ireland is of persuasive, as opposed 
to authoritative value.38 The strength of this persuasive value has also varied over 
time, with an initial judicial reluctance to incorporate this jurisprudence being 
overcome and giving way to greater enthusiasm in more recent times.39 While it is 
 
38 “…the Irish courts were equally unreceptive to attempts by litigants to rely on the Convention's 
provisions…[t]he case law of the [ECtHR] is not regarded as binding…[See O'B v O'S [1984] I.R. 
316 (in which the Court refused to follow a decision of the European Court of Human Rights…] … 
judicial hostility to…the Convention in domestic litigation abated … Irish courts have slowly begun 
to pay heed to the Convention and the case law of the Court of Human Rights in interpreting Irish 
law.” Egan, S. (2003) ‘The European convention on human rights act 2003: A missed opportunity 
for domestic human rights litigation’, Dublin University Law Journal, 25(1), 230-248, p. 233. 
39 “…the Courts have been prepared to allow the Convention to be raised…[i]n O'Leary v A.G. 
[1991] I.L.R.M. 454…Costello J. looked at how the presumption of innocence had been construed 
under the Convention…[i]n Desmond v Glackin [1992] I.L.R.M. 490, the jurisprudence of the 
[ECtHR] was taken into account as persuasive authority... in the last 10 years, the attitude has 
softened…to the point that it has gradually become almost acceptable to cite Convention case law 
in an Irish court when raising an issue of constitutional interpretation… examples… 
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important to not overstate the influence of these evolutions on domestic Irish law - 
certain areas could arguably be seen to be bolstered by the incorporation of the 
ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.  The influence of the ECHR, as well 
as the (re)interpretations the ECtHR has tendered, was also somewhat curtailed due 
to the nature of the legal incorporation of the ECHR within domestic Irish law.40 
This legal incorporation was interpretative – so, although the courts and 
certain state bodies are obliged to interpret Irish law, and carry out their business 
in a way that is compatible and cognisant of the ECHR, where there is a direct 
incompatibility, domestic Irish law prevails. Although a declaration of 
incompatibility can be issued, this is of dubious legal authority and cold comfort 
for litigants such a victims who are seeking to domestically invoke the ECHR.41  
 
[include]…Heaney v Ireland [1994] 3 I.R. 593 [and] Murphy v Independent Radio and Television 
Commission [1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 467 (HC), [1998] 2 I.L.R.M. 360 (SC)…” Egan, S. (2003) ‘The 
European convention on human rights act 2003: A missed opportunity for domestic human rights 
litigation’, Dublin University Law Journal, 25(1), 230-248, p. 233. 
40 “…it is important not to exaggerate the importance of incorporation for domestic human rights 
litigation…the fact that a litigant was unable to rely on the Convention itself directly did place him 
or her…at a disadvantage…[especially] in the sphere of private and family life.” Egan, S. (2003) 
‘The European convention on human rights act 2003: A missed opportunity for domestic human 
rights litigation’, Dublin University Law Journal, 25(1), 230-248, p. 234. 
41 “The method of incorporation ultimately chosen by the Government in the ECHR Act 2003 is 
decidedly “interpretative”…Section 2 provides that any statutory provision or rule of law shall be 
interpreted, in so far as is possible…in a manner that is compatible with the Convention … Section 
5 of the Act provides that where an existing statute is found to be incompatible with the Convention, 
the High Court or Supreme Court on appeal, may issue a declaration…this … [‘]shall not affect the 
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This criticism can be strengthened when one considers that the ECtHR is 
also quite deferential to domestic law. It often provides it with a generous 
interpretation in the form of a margin of appreciation of invariable differences.42  
When taking all these limitations together it is clear a potentially more 
radical incorporative alternative was possible. This has also hindered the 
implications of ECtHR case law. Therefore, when considering the method of 
interpretation of the ECHR in Ireland, in conjunction with the lack of impetus that 
can often exist regarding the enforcement of flagrant breaches, the practical nature 
of the ECHR and ECtHR was diluted. This has occurred without, significantly 
detracting from its persuasive value for the interpretations of the Irish judiciary.43  
Having said all of that, the benefits of all of this for Irish victims were 
twofold. Firstly, the change significantly aided the recognition of victim rights in 
 
validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the statutory provision or rule of law…” Egan, S. 
(2003) ‘The European convention on human rights act 2003: A missed opportunity for domestic 
human rights litigation’, Dublin University Law Journal, 25(1), 230-248, p. 239 
42 ‘…the Court recognises that the State is allowed a certain margin of discretion… the Strasbourg 
court is routinely accused of over-reliance on the concept…and of deferring all too readily to the 
opinions of the Contracting States as regards the necessity of interfering with individual rights.” 
Egan, S. (2003) ‘The European convention on human rights act 2003: A missed opportunity for 
domestic human rights litigation’, Dublin University Law Journal, 25(1), 230-248, p. 244. 
43 “Crucially, the Act does not allow the courts to give a remedy in cases where it makes a concrete 
finding of incompatibilit…the hands of the court are tied, and it is up to the Government to decide 
whether the incompatibility should be rectified by way of amending legislation…” Egan, S. (2003) 
‘The European convention on human rights act 2003: A missed opportunity for domestic human 
rights litigation’, Dublin University Law Journal, 25(1), 230-248, p. 245. 
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Ireland by providing Irish judges with yet another body of human rights 
jurisprudence they could now draw from to support their decisions. It also meant 
that a victim in Ireland could invoke the victim rights the ECtHR acknowledged as 
part of the ECHR. This was achievable due to the impact of European Convention 
on Human Rights Act, 2003 which gave these rights domestic applicability (Coffey 
2018; Vaughan and Kilcommins 2007, p. 439; Kilcommins et al. 2016, p. 338, 
2018, p. 70; McCrudden 2000; McDermott 2005, 2004).  
The domestic incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
as well as the way in which the European Court of Human Rights has come to 
interpret it were influential factors in the legal re-inclusion of the Irish crime victim 
within the domestic Law of Ireland. The aforementioned European Convention on 
Human Rights Act, 2003 required the Irish judiciary to not only remain cognisant 
of the Convention, but also consider all of the domestic regulations that came 
before them in such a way that they do not clash with its provisions. This has also 
meant that the highest arbiters of Irish Law, the Supreme Court of Ireland, began 
to increasingly rely upon the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.  
 In fact, Hogan J., writing over 10 years ago, predicted that the 
interpretations that the European Court of Human Rights would give to the 
European Convention on Human Rights would greatly influence the ultimate 
development of human rights in this country (Hogan 2004). The domestic decisions 
of the Irish judiciary have come to reflect this, as they began to make reference to 
the rights value judgements contained within the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights. This judicial consensus within Ireland has therefore 
permitted the European Court of Human Rights to promote the rights entitlements 
CHARTING THE IRISH VICTIM’S JURIDICAL RE-INTEGRATION – THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE VICTIM AS A RIGHTS BEARER IN IRELAND 
407 
 
of victims of crime that the European Court of Human Rights has discovered 
through its effective reinterpretation of certain articles of the European Convention 
on Human Rights within the domestic courts structure of Ireland.44  
The increasing influence of the ECtHR on the pronouncements of Irish 
State organs in the area of victims is discernible from a number of cases on the 
subject, as well as their wider reformative impact. The introduction of the victim 
into the consciousness of the judiciary and wider law, as well as the issues that this 
raises, is clearly evident in cases such as The People (DPP) -v- Cash 106 [2007] 
IEHC 108.45 This was a victim progressive judgment, whilst at the same time 
potentially raising issues in relation to the important evidential safeguards of the 
 
44 “When deciding issues relating to evidence, the Irish courts apply the relevant provisions of the 
[ECHR] as interpreted by the [ECtHR]. Although the ECHR was incorporated into Irish law in 
2003…the ECHR takes its place within the Irish system at a statutory level…in some areas of the 
law of evidence, the Irish Constitution is more protective of the rights of the accused, a factor which 
further underscores the Convention’s secondary role.” Heffernan 
, L. and Ní Raifeartaigh, U. (2014) Evidence in Criminal Trials, Dublin: Bloomsbury Professional, 
Introduction. 
45 “Both the High Court and the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule is applicable only to 
evidence sought to be presented in a criminal trial, and has no role in relation to evidence used to 
ground a reasonable suspicion for an arrest…the learned judge rejected the contention that the 
exclusionary rule was applicable…he took the opportunity to express his negative view of that rule 
in quite forceful terms…” Daly, Y.M. (2011) ‘Exclusion of evidence: DPP (Walsh) v Cash’, The 
International Journal Of Evidence & Proof, 15 (1), 62–69, p. 66. 
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accused.46  These are important in relation to the admissibility of evidence, as 
although one can now consider victim rights part of the equation, that equation of 
procedural fairness and evidential admissibility also incorporates the rights to the 
accused. Rights which are constitutionally guaranteed, and now further bolstered 
by the ECHR.47 Cash may have been approved by the Supreme Court and advanced 
the cause of victim inclusion. However, the issue of the admissibility of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence, one of importance to the securing of the due 
process rights of the accused, was not properly dealt with by the court at the time.48  
It would be wrong to view Cash in isolation, or to see it as a unprecedented 
departure from common law tradition. As a analogous case in England and Wales 
 
46 “The Supreme Court followed the views of Charleton J in relation to the inapplicability of the 
exclusionary rule on the facts of Cash….[d]espite not substantively addressing…the exclusionary 
rule…Cash is of much significance…[w]hile aiming…to avoid the thorny issue of exclusion, the 
court may have caused more harm than good.” Daly, Y.M. (2011) ‘Exclusion of evidence: DPP 
(Walsh) v Cash’, The International Journal Of Evidence & Proof, 15 (1), 62–69, p. 66. 
47 “…the admissibility of evidence is governed by the constitutional imperative that the accused be 
afforded a trial in due course of law…the trial judge has an overarching discretion to exclude 
evidence that may prejudice the fairness of the trial. The courts must also ensure the compatibility 
of evidentiary decisions with the fair trial guarantee contained in Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.” Heffernan, L. and Ní Raifeartaigh, U. (2014) Evidence in Criminal 
Trials, Dublin: Bloomsbury Professional, Admissibility and Weight. 
48 “…there is an important distinction between unconstitutionally obtained evidence and evidence 
which would not be acceptable in the courts for other reasons; a distinction which the Supreme 
Court failed to note..” Daly, Y.M. (2011) ‘Exclusion of evidence: DPP (Walsh) v Cash’, The 
International Journal Of Evidence & Proof, 15 (1), 62–69, p. 67. 
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struck a similar note, placing the victim front and centre.49 However, there are 
significant areas of departure, and this different approach could be said to have 
certain potential implications. Indeed, analysis of the case shows the approach 
taken across the Irish Sea could be more cognisant of due process rights and 
therefore afford greater protection to the accused and their human rights.50  
That is not to say that no consideration has been given to the influence of 
due process and the way the victim and accused must now be accommodated. In 
fact, on the contrary, there is detailed case law which evidences how the courts 
 
49 “A very similar case to Cash arose in England and Wales in 2001 and…the House of Lords did 
not suggest that the rules on exclusion were inapplicable. The Attorney General’s Reference (No. 3 
of 1999) [2001] 2 AC 91; [2001] 1 All ER 577, involved the retention of a DNA sample…[a]s in 
Cash, the wrongly retained sample was matched with a scene of crime sample and gave rise to the 
arrest…and the taking of a subsequent sample of hair for the purpose of extracting a DNA profile.” 
Daly, Y.M. (2011b.) ‘Judicial oversight of policing: Investigations, evidence and the exclusionary 
rule’, Crime, Law, and Societal Change, 55(1), p. 19. 
50 “Lord Steyn stated…‘[i]t must be borne in mind that respect for the privacy of defendants is not 
the only value at stake…[i]n a criminal case this requires the court to consider a triangulation of 
interests…taking into account the position of the accused, the victim…and the public.. the case is 
not identical to Cash…it has to be considered highly unusual that the Irish courts have adopted a 
stance in Cash which provides less protection for rights in the criminal process…than that adopted 
in England and Wales. At least the decision of the House of Lords allows the possibility that…the 
triangulation of interests might rest in favour of the exclusion of specific evidence. The Irish 
decision places any consideration of such matters out of the hands of the courts.” Daly, Y.M. 
(2011b.) ‘Judicial oversight of policing: Investigations, evidence and the exclusionary rule’, Crime, 
Law, and Societal Change, 55(1), p. 20. 
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have tackled these concerns. In DPP v O’Brien [2011] 1 IR 273 the court 
considered whether recorded pre-trial recorded undermined the due process rights 
of the accused, and therefore the integrity of their conviction for sexually abusing 
their two young daughters. Although the court did not find any fundamental right 
had been infringed it interestingly provided an extensive examination of the 
contention of the applicant that Art 6 of the ECHR, as described obiter in SN v 
Sweden (2004) 39 EHRR 13, supported a right to the accused’s pre-trial cross-
examination of a victim.51 The court however felt this could not be inferred due to 
the significant disparities between the Swedish and Irish legal systems. As well as 
their view that there was no general entitlement of the accused to a pre-trial cross-
 
51  “In DPP v O’Brien, [[2011] 1 IR 273]] the applicant sought leave to appeal against his 
conviction…evidence at trial had included a video-taped statement given by one of the daughters 
during a pre-trial interview…[t]he applicant challenged the compatibility of s 16 with fair trial 
guarantees…the Court…held that there was no constitutional basis on which this argument could 
be sustained. However, it explored in greater detail a contention grounded in the Convention to the 
effect that the applicant ought to have been permitted to cross-examine the witness during the course 
of the interviews…in particular on dicta in SN v Sweden [39 EHRR 13] in which the [ECtHR] 
emphasised the significance of the fact that an opportunity to cross-examine had been provided at 
the pre-trial witness interview…[T]he Court…however, took the view that the purported reliance 
on this case was undermined by profound differences between the Swedish and Irish systems… the 
court could see no basis for extrapolating from the Strasbourg case law a general principle 
supporting the right to cross-examine at the pre-trial investigative stage…[T]he [‘]key element and 
characteristic[‘] of the Strasbourg case law was the provision of an opportunity to examine the 
witness at some stage …” Heffernan, L. and Ní Raifeartaigh, U. (2014) Evidence in Criminal Trials, 
Dublin: Bloomsbury Professional, [5.46-5.47]. 
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examination of a victim. The right entitlement that they had was simply to have an 
opportunity to examine the victim complainant at some point during the process.  
Cash was also an Irish case which drew attention to the decision in X and 
Y -v- The Netherlands 107 (1986) 8 EHRR 235.52 The Cash case contained an 
explicit recognition of the European Convention of Human Rights’ obligations of 
Ireland, which were laid out by the European Court of Human Rights in X and Y. 
This case stipulated that those countries that were subject to the rulings of the 
ECtHR were required to safeguard victims of crime during their own domestic 
criminal prosecutions. Although cases like Cash still afford a considerable degree 
of latitude with regards to the domestic interpretation of such rights to Member 
States of the Council of Europe, the impact of European Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence is apparent, as it quickly became a dominant frame of reference 
amongst the Irish Bench when it came to the judicial approach to the topic of victim 
 
52 “…in X and Y v. Netherlands,
 
a 16-year old mentally handicapped girl was sexually assaulted by 
an adult male of sound mind. Due to a loophole in Dutch law, he could not be prosecuted. This was 
because, under Dutch law, only the victim of the crime could register a criminal complaint…the 
European Court found that the absence of an effective criminal procedure was a violation by the 
Netherlands of its duty to secure respect for the victim’s private life under Article 8. The Court 
stated that Article 8: ...does not merely compel the State to abstain from...interference: in addition 
to this…may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private and family life. 
These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private 
life...” McDermott, P.A. (2005) The Impact Of The Human Rights Act 2003 On Criminal Law, 
IJSJ, 5(2), 99- 123, pp. 109-110. 
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rights (McDermott and Murphy 2008, pp. 1-2; Kilcommins et al. 2018, p. 68, p. 
41; Egan 2003, p. 232; Greene 2016, p. 130,127; Dzehtsiarou 2011, 2015).  
There are also pivotal cases from the ECtHR which were integral in 
providing the impetus needed for domestic legislative victim reform in Ireland.53 
This can be seen in the aftermath of O’Keeffe v Ireland, which tackled Ireland's 
notorious historical neglect of victims in its education sector. Not only does this 
case powerfully illustrate the influence of the ECtHR to evidence a breach of the 
positive obligations owed to victims but it also demonstrates the Courts ability to 
shock a State out of inaction. In this case the State tendered an official admission 
 
53  “…The O’Keeffe case [O’Keeffe v Ireland, Application No 35810/09, 28 January 2013. ] 
highlights the usefulness of resorting to…the ECtHR in order to hold the State responsible…the 
Irish government has committed to adopting legislation and several other measures in the area of 
child protection…its ensuing action plan has been marked by tensions between…slow-acting 
authorities and a critical public opinion (with the main victim…Ms O’Keeffe, at its forefront) whose 
…active lobbying have…maintained the pressure…[t]he ECtHR found Ireland in breach of Art 3 
on the prohibition of degrading treatment and…Art 13 on the right to an effective remedy in the 
case of Louise O’Keeffe who had been abused as a child by her teacher at a primary national school. 
The…abuse of children…is a recurring issue which has, for a long time, cast a dark shadow…[t]he 
current plan includes the issuance and updating of guidelines on the reporting of child abuse and 
the following up on litigation against the State on child sexual abuse by the State Claims Agency.”  
Paris, M. (2015) ‘The European Convention on Human Rights: Implementation Mechanisms and 
Compliance’, In Egan, S. eds., International Human Rights: Perspectives from Ireland, Dublin: 
Bloomsbury Professional, Ch 6. 
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of wrongdoing and a guarantee to take real measures in the area of statute to fulfil 
its obligations in order to prevent against the future victimisation of children.  
Despite some inertia in the implementation of this, the case provided a 
springboard for victim activists, as well as the relevant victim to pursue the 
government. Much of this built upon, the success of the case, where the ECtHR 
held a breach of Article 3, the guarantee prohibiting degrading treatment, as well 
as Article 13, which secures the entitlement to an effective remedy. These Articles 
were breached as Louise O’Keeffe was molested by a primary school teacher, 
whilst also being deprived of a proper justice avenue. This kind of occurrence was 
neither rare nor unprecedented, something the ECtHR took a dim view of when 
adjudging whether the State had failed in its duty to vindicate the rights of victims.  
The impact of the Court’s decision in O’Keeffe involved policies and 
procedures being developed and refined to tackle child molestation by attempting 
to encourage the bringing of such instances to the attention of authorities. This was 
complemented by the promotion of civil lawsuits against the Irish State by the State 
Claims Agency to address child molestation. Even in those instances where there 
is State reluctance, the impact of the Court can be felt. This is evident as the body 
has proven itself an effective catalyst for the promotion of the rights of victims. 
The evolution of victim rights within the European Court of Human Rights 
consequently affected Ireland’s legal recognition of not only the rights entitlements 
of victims, but also of the victim of crime more generally. The fact that the Irish 
State was such a relatively quick and magnanimous acceptor of the European Court 
of Human Rights’ ambit and function has also considerably assisted with this trend. 
The European Court of Human Rights was also proactive in the area of victim 
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rights harmonisation, which ensured that it was able to increasingly bring the 
domestic laws of Ireland into line with wider human rights norms. These changes 
were substantial, and if Ireland continues to remain a member of Council of Europe, 
and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, 
the catalogue of right guarantees that the Irish victim of crime possess could be 
encouraged to expand even further, meaning that there is a possibility for even 
greater growth in this area (Coffey 2018). This is a potential outcome because when 
the European Court of Human Rights decides that the European Convention on 
Human Rights contains a hitherto unrecognised human right entitlement; it can 
become a right a victim may be  entitled to invoke.  This has empowered judicial 
bodies, such as the European Court of Human Rights, to play an influential role in 
the adjudication of not only what rights victims ought to convey within the 
territories of the Member States of the Council of Europe, but also whether a 
Council of Europe Member State has domestically infringed these rights. This rule 
even extends to those provisions which represent the democratic will of a particular 
Council of Europe Member State, as legislated for by their respective legislative 
assemblies (Kilcommins et al. 2016, pp. 337-338, 2018 pp. 40-43; de Tocqueville 
1969, p. 287; Dworkin 1977, p. 204, 1998 p. 356; Raz 1994, p. 260; Waldron 1993, 
p. 27; Watson 1974; Greene 2016, p. 132).  
However, despite this curtailment of unbridled democracy, the application 
of these rules has been quite positive for the entitlements and juridical position of 
victims within Irish criminal justice, because the European Court of Human Rights 
has become an eloquent and strong advocate of human rights, as well as the rights 
that they have helped to confer upon victims of crime. In fact, the European Court 
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of Human Rights’ promotion of the human rights of victims eventually led to a 
situation in which some of the solidarity that exists amongst most Member States 
of the Council of Europe is predicated upon the European Convention on Human 
Rights, as well as its core values, meaning such rights are not encouraged to be the 
prerogative of one State. Indeed, one of the first proponents of the now popular 
idea that the victim of crime is a person who has had their human rights infringed 
(Coffey 2018) was Robert Elias (1985a), who popularised this with his idea of a 
‘victimology of human rights’ (Wemmers 2012, p. 78).  
He felt victimologists ought to extend their concept of victimhood to 
include not only those who have suffered a victimisation, but to those who have 
had their human rights infringed as a result of a crime. These pleas were not made 
in vain, as the European Court of Human Rights has helped Irish politicians and 
judicial members to perceive victim rights as an important and consequential 
subcategory of human rights, rather than an abstraction (Donnelly 2003; Vaughan 
and Kilcommins 2007, p. 456; Wemmers 2012, p. 79, p. 73; Slaughter 2004, p. 28; 
Wallace 2000, pp. 377–8; Beck and Grande 2007, p. 71; Arendt 1973, p. 275).  
As the preceding paragraphs clearly evidence, the promotion of victim 
rights by the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union have 
all helped with both the recognition and advancement of not only the issue of 
victims, but also the rights that they have been provided with. Although these 
changes largely began at a socio-cultural level during the 1960s, they primarily 
transpired in a legal sense due to factors that began to impress themselves in the 
1980s. New initiatives, such as the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles 
of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuses of Power, which were, although soft 
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law provisions, also represented the first major iteration of the entitlements that 
States owe on a domestic level to victims of crime, and have therefore helped to 
considerably advance the standing of victims of crime on the international stage.  
These gains have ossified into harder, more domestically applicable law 
with the emergence of the victim rights jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, and, more recently, with the reformed procedure of the 
International Criminal Court, as well as the domestic tribunals that this has helped 
to engender. Finally, the legal instruments of the European Union, and in particular 
the Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings in 
2001 and Directive 2012/29/EU on the rights, support and protection of victims of 
crime in 2012, which ultimately replaced it, ensured that victim rights were further 
codified within the domestic legal systems of European Union Member States. 
These changes have further strengthened the position of victims of crime within 
the procedure of Irish criminal justice, and have made the topic of victimhood 
integral to the discourse that has come to surround contemporary law reform in this 
area, both within academic circles, and among the general non-academic populace. 
These legal reforms have therefore combined in order to bring about an 
acknowledgment in Ireland of victim rights during prosecutions. The impact of this 
concretisation upon victim rights at a domestic level is not only perceptible from 
the recent legislative trends that the next chapter of this thesis will discuss; they are 
also discernible from the case law of the Irish judiciary on the subject of victim 
rights. This has occurred because these judgments drew attention to the fact that 
the victim was no longer a passive participant, but had become an independent 
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stakeholder in their own right, and a key rights bearer, who had an interest in the 
prosecution of those offences that are of direct relevance and interest to them.  
The international legal transitions that this chapter has previously outlined 
have helped the courts in Ireland to perceive victims of crime and their rights with 
in an entirely new light. This has assisted them with the task of adjudicating the 
new grey areas of how the Irish State was to implement these rights into its criminal 
justice frames, and how this could be done without prejudicing the obligations that 
were already owed to both the prosecution and defence. It is these decisions that 
the next few paragraphs of this thesis will evaluate. This chapter does this in order 
to show how the Irish judiciary were able to overcome these difficulties, which 
enabled them to incorporate the rights that victims of crime were entitled to within 
parameters that were both fair and equitable to both the State and the accused. 
6.4 THE IRISH JUDICIARY RECOGNISE THE VICTIM AS A RIGHTS 
HOLDER  
The emergence of the new global constellation that the previous sections of 
this chapter have outlined became quite conducive to the eventual decision of the 
Irish judiciary to begin to recognise victim rights as hard domestic law within their 
courts, a trend that has accelerated in the early decades of the early twenty-first 
century. However, the judiciary had to address the inevitable friction between the 
interests of old and new judicial actors, but were however able to do this in a fair 
and equitable manner (Duffy 2009; Deane 2007; Gillane 2007). In order to 
illustrate how the judiciary achieved this outcome, the following paragraphs will 
discuss recent Irish jurisprudence on the subject in order to demonstrate how they 
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overcame these difficulties. Although these decisions remain the sole product of 
their ingenuity, the positive influence of international norms can also be gleaned 
from their continued reference to recent human rights developments within the area 
of criminal justice. European Human Rights Law therefore became an influential 
part of the web of legal authority that the Irish judiciary eventually drew upon in 
order to support the domestic repositioning of the victim in Ireland. This 
strengthening of their domestic position not only occurred within the important 
spheres of criminal justice and the law, but also within the popular imagination - 
with judicial pronouncements, particularly those concerning the victim of crime’s 
rights to compensation, often provoking intense debate and leading to discussions 
regarding the criminal justice entitlements that the State ought to convey to them 
(Coffey 2018; Reidy 2006; Rogan 2006; Jacoby 2014, p. 513; Doak 2005, p. 302, 
p. 315; Bardouille 2001).  
The influence of advancements in European human rights norms upon the 
increasingly victim rights-based decisions of the Irish judiciary is perceptible from 
a close textual analysis of some of their most recent judgments. A notable example 
is the case of Casey -v- the DPP, Ireland and the AG [2015] IEHC 824. This 
concerned an application to try to prevent a trial because of the alleged vagueness 
of the term “drunk”. The applicant contended that this purported ambiguity made 
it such that their legal counsel could not properly advise them regarding the 
minutiae of the kind of prosecution that they were going to have to face. This 
application was dismissed as speculative, as the applicant’s contentions were 
deemed by the court to be purely hypothetical (2015, para 3, para 24). However, 
Humphreys J. did however take the opportunity to note that the Irish legal 
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landscape had indeed altered due to the domestic re-integration of victim rights, 
stating that “…the criminal trial is a mechanism to vindicate the legal, 
constitutional, EU and ECHR rights of a victim of crime” (2015, para. 10; cited in 
Kilcommins et al. 2018, p. 53). The learned judge also went on to highlight the 
influence of the European Convention of Human Rights and European Union in 
this regard, since they were both catalysts that have helped to bring about this shift 
in emphasis by augmenting the rights that the law now conveys to crime victims. 
Another recent decision, this time in the case of Nulty -v- Director of Public 
Prosecutions [2015] IEHC 758 also contained another judicial exposition of victim 
rights by the Irish judiciary. In that case the applicant requested an order so as to 
prevent their prosecution based on what they claimed was a prejudicial failure to 
preserve videotape evidence from a purported crime scene. They sought this order 
in order to try to prevent the Director of Public Prosecutions from pursuing a 
burglary and theft charge in relation to a substantial sum of money that the 
applicant had allegedly stole from a safe that was located in a Dublin bar. 
Humphreys J., in rejecting this requested order, based a substantial part of his 
judgment on “...the positive legal obligations of the State to victims...”, (2015, para 
21). In fact, he felt this precluded the barring of a trial based upon the potential that 
An Gardaí Síochána could have obtained exculpatory evidence from those sections 
of CCTV footage that they had not gathered during their search. This led him to 
conclude that “... [t]o allow a criminal trial to be de-railed unnecessarily... creates 
the potential for such delay or interference with the criminal process as to bring the 
performance of this obligation to victims into question” (2015, para 33). 
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The case of Nash -v- Director of Public Prosecutions [2015] IESC 32 is 
another example of how victim rights have evolved into hard domestic law within 
Ireland because of the pronouncements of the Irish Bench. It related to the violent 
murders in 1997 of Sylvia Sheils and Mary Callinan within a psychiatric hospital. 
The Irish State did not charge the appellant with their murders until 2009, mainly 
due to delays that were partly caused by the confessions of another suspect, Dean 
Lyons. However, the appellant in Nash attempted to prevent their imminent 
prosecution by arguing that the aforementioned delay unfairly prejudiced their trial. 
Clark J., in denying the appeal, noted that there was now “… an increasing 
recognition...of the rights of victims.” He did this before going on to state that 
“[t]he entitlement of a victim of crime to at least have the evidence which suggests 
that a particular accused may be guilty analysed at a trial and a proper verdict 
delivered should not be underestimated” (2015, para 2.3). Charlton J. concurred 
and also similarly added to all this that “…[v]ictims have an entitlement...to a fair 
investigation of the wrong done to them” (2015, para 14).  
These pronouncements evidence the greater recognition of victim rights 
within Irish Law. They also serve as an official endorsement of the crime victim, 
and their new stakeholder position within Ireland. McGrath J. reiterated this, as 
well as the rights that the law now owes to victims, in M.H. -v- Director of Public 
Prosecutions [2018] IEHC 560. In that case, the appellant sought an order to 
prevent the Director of Public Prosecutions from pursuing four indecent assault 
charges against him. The Director of Public Prosecutions brought these charges in 
relation to the acts that M.H. had allegedly committed in the early 1970s, against a 
victim who was aged between 9 and 11 at that particular time. McGrath J. 
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considered the relevant jurisprudence on delay and highlighted the Director of 
Public Prosecutions’ submission that, due to recent developments in international 
victim rights, “...the court must take into account all rights [,] including [the] 
potential rights of a complainant [victim]...” when considering whether or not it 
should bar such a prosecution. He also went on to note that the “... court must [also] 
have regard to the position of victims” within the criminal justice system (2018, 
para 28, para 31; Kilcommins et al. 2018, pp. 53-54). 
As the preceding exposition of jurisprudence clearly demonstrates, the 
rights of crime victims have hardened and become stronger under domestic Irish 
Law. The impact of this within an Irish context are noticeable, as the victim has 
moved from a more or less marginal legal figure, which was typically only 
recognisable within the ambit of the ‘public interest’, or relied upon as a mere 
witness, to an identifiable individual, whom the law now deems as important 
enough to vest with identifiable rights. These new entitlements also invariably 
imply new obligations, transforming the victim from a bit player into a pivotal 
stakeholder who can now demand action from the organs and agents of Irish 
criminal justice. This concretisation of victim rights from soft persuasive 
international norm into hard binding domestic law in Ireland has shifted victims of 
crime from the periphery of criminal justice to its virtual epicentre. To conclude, 
the author will now attempt to merge several of the previous strands of thought that 
this treatise has made together, in order to help evidence how all of the 
aforementioned points were of imperative importance to the demonstration of the 
way in which the calcification of victim rights assisted with the legal re-inclusion 
of the victim of crime in Ireland. This involves re-iterating how the international 
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victim rights reforms that international bodies, instruments and courts have all 
advanced helped with the domestic re-emergence of victim rights in Ireland. It also 
entails clarifying how the impact of this victim rights trend upon Irish criminal 
justice is apparent in the way in which the domestic Irish courts have tended to 
draw upon these kinds of authorities in order to help advance their own unique 
vision of how victim entitlements were going to domestically take shape in this 
country. The following conclusion does this in order to reaffirm this chapter’s core 
idea, that all of these victim rights reforms helped engender the domestic re-
emergence of the victim of crime in Irish criminal justice (O’Malley 2016; Carney 
2007; Norton 2007). 
CONCLUSION  
This chapter examined how the rights of crime victims evolved in Ireland 
and considered the consequences of this upon the victim of crime’s status within 
Irish criminal justice. It began by outlining how global human rights organisations 
assisted with the promotion of the subject of crime victims, as well as the rights 
that they ought to receive at an international level. The United Nations, the 
European Union and the Council of Europe also encouraged Ireland to accept the 
rights that they advanced. This highlighted the issue of victims in Ireland and led 
to the adoption of the rights provisions that these bodies created in this country.  
The rights contained within documents such as the 1985 Declaration of 
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuses of Power were not 
only influential through their highlighting of the issue of victims, they were also 
persuasive. They had such an impact because many of its provisions ultimately 
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became enforceable under Irish Law, increasing the entitlements that victims of 
crime could domestically avail of in Ireland. The jurisprudence of international 
human rights courts such as the European Court of Human Rights in the 
1990scomplemented these developments in International Victim Rights Law. The 
beneficial outcome of these bodies was that they played a pivotal role in helping to 
ascertain what kinds of rights the Member States of the Council of Europe owed to 
victims of crime. These courts were then able to enforce these rights obligations 
upon those Member States who were party to these organisations, whilst breathing 
new life into the area of victim re-inclusion by ensuring that the provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights did not overlook victim entitlements.  
All these alterations consequently influenced Irish Law, and, over time, the 
Irish Bench eventually began to acknowledge that the domestic law in Ireland with 
regards to victim rights had indeed changed. They therefore set about trying to 
gauge the extent and impact of this within their judicial pronouncements. They did 
this in order to both cement the rights that Irish victims of crime had, and to try to 
ensure that the interests of the State and the suspects that it prosecuted were not 
unfairly prejudiced as a result of this transition. This recognition of victim rights 
by the Irish judiciary not only cemented these entitlements under Irish law, but also 
re-centralised victims of crime within the framework of Irish criminal justice. 
This solidification of victim rights transformed their position within Irish 
criminal justice. They went from a marginalised entity, which had hitherto only 
played the role of a witness, and rarely received much consideration from the 
police, judiciary or lawyers, to a vital one who now deserved much more attention. 
The change affected not only the aforementioned participants; but also permeated 
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nearly every aspect of Irish criminal justice. This led its institutions to begin to take 
more notice of a new stakeholder that could now make legitimate demands of it. 
Yet the emergence and domestic concretisation of victim rights was not the 
only way in which victim re-inclusion transpired. Legislative changes also helped 
to promote the legal re-centralisation of victims of crime in Ireland. The legislature 
achieved these gains through the passing of a plethora of statutory reform, which 
assisted with victim protection and catered for the better re-integration of victims 
of crime within the procedures of Irish criminal justice. These alterations also 
helped to transform victims of crime from passive dependants into procedurally 
active participants, before, during and after a criminal prosecution. With this in 
mind this thesis will now seek to outline some of these changes in further detail. 
This chapter set out to examine how the concept of victim rights in Ireland has 
come to evolve and take on a greater significance within contemporary Irish 
jurisprudence. As well as the important role that this particular change has played 
in the procedural re-integration of the Irish victim. Having done this, and 
considered the legal advances that have taken place in this regard at a conceptual 
and case law based level, the next chapter of this thesis will now move on to address 
the more contemporary advances that have taken place in the arena of victim rights. 
This will focus on their profoundly influential impact upon procedural inclusion. 
Since the move from soft international law to hard domestic right has been outlined, 
it is now appropriate to gauge, in a more systematic way, the detail of these legal 
transitions. Especially those statutory ones that have been so impactful for victims. 
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THE LEGAL RE-INCORPORATION OF THE CRIME VICTIM 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
Chapter seven tackles the kind of legal alterations which have impacted 
upon the procedural re-incorporation of the victim in Ireland. It does this by 
outlining most of the major legal changes that have occurred in this area. In so 
doing this thesis hopes to illustrate how the victim re-emerged as a stakeholder of 
consequence within contemporary Irish criminal justice. It also seeks to evidence 
the breadth and depth of this transition by examining a range of arenas in which 
greater consequence is taken of the victim. All of which supports the contention 
that the victim is now going to play a more pivotal role within our legal system. In 
addition, the challenges in this area, especially those in relation to due process have 
also been considered. This is done to evidence how this new evolution has not been 
usurped by penal populism and resulted in the inappropriate dilution of other 
stakeholder rights within the process, such as the criminal offender or suspect. 
From about the 1990s onwards, legal reforms have helped to bring about 
changes within Irish criminal justice that have benefited the re-inclusion of victims 
in Ireland. These have engendered a move from the legal exclusion of victims to 
their re-inclusion, which resulted in the legal protection and re-centrality of victims 
within the Irish criminal justice framework. This chapter contends that Irish Law 
reform was instrumental in helping to bring all of this about. The chapter is broken 




into five sections in order to address some of the most consequential of these 
changes, the first deals with how the updated criminal calendar that the Irish 
legislature occasioned benefited victims of crime. The second discusses the 
advantages that pre-trial alterations had upon crime victims, by assessing the 
impact of recent juridical changes upon the standing of the victim of crime within 
the preliminary stages of Irish criminal justice. After this, it will study trial 
procedure reforms within Ireland, and its influence upon the Irish victim’s 
procedural position. The fourth section reflects upon post-trial changes, and their 
ability to help victims cope with their victimisations, whilst the fifth contemplates 
contemporary law reform within the sphere of Irish civil law, and the benefits that 
this has had for victims of crime within Ireland. 
At this stage it is important to highlight and deal with the difference 
between procedural and service rights.1 Each category of right is imbued with 
different obligations and significances for victims, as well as due process 
implications for the accused. If we are to look at the rise of these rights there are 
two extremes of victim accommodation. These involve the US and England and 
 
1  “The rights of victims…fall…into two categories…‘service’ and 'procedural.' The former 
ameliorate the criminal process for the victim and draw her into it by providing various services, 
but do not afford her a means of making an impact on the proces itself. The latter…are clearly the 
more contentious and give rise to some significant issues of principle…[i]t will be readily apparent 
that affording victims procedural rights…creates a change in their position within the criminal 
justice system…said to herald a move back towards the position which victims originally occupied 
within the system.” Fenwick, H. (1997) ‘Procedural 'Rights' of Victims of Crime: Public or Private 
Ordering of the Criminal Justice Process?’, Modern Law Review, 60(3), 317-333, p. 318. 




Wales,2 with the US embodying a more procedural approach, whilst England and 
Wales are a more service based one. Although elements of each approach are 
discernible in Ireland, the jurisdiction is closer to the English and Welsh 
experience. Even though this has arguably been the case in the Irish experience, 
this is not to say that there have not been controversial polices adopted in this 
context.3  
Despite the fear that procedural rights might undermine the due process 
rights of the individual, there is a rational that supports the notion that if structures 
are put in place victim inclusion as a resource can be both fair and beneficial.4 
However, there are objections to this perspective, these boil down to the argument 
 
2  “Service rights…provide victims with…rights to information…Procedural rights…provide 
victims with…opportunities to provide information…”“…the victims’ movements…emerged in 
very different contexts…the [US]…was driven by a law and order initiative…a strong 
lobby…focused on…‘recalibration’…in England and Wales, the larger social context was…penal 
reform…formed…by professionals…their approach…[was]…less adversarial...” Manikis, M. 
(2019) ‘Contrasting the Emergence of the Victims’ Movements in the United States and England 
and Wales’, Societies, 9 (35), 1-18, p.  2, 15. 
3 “…[VIS] can be…one of the most…controversial, developments…” Rice, J. (2012) ‘Support for 
Victims of Crime: Reality or Rhetoric?’ unpublished M.A. dissertation, Dublin: DIT, p. 11. 
4 “Bottoms (2010) argues in favour of increased procedural rights…that…the court must receive 
information so as to maximise the understanding before sentencing. The argument here is that it is 
the duty of the court to understand …[i]n line with this Erez (1999) argues that with the correct 
protections the overall experience of providing input can be positive…helping victims to cope with 
the experience of victimisation and the criminal justice process.” Rice, J. (2012) ‘Support for 
Victims of Crime: Reality or Rhetoric?’ unpublished M.A. dissertation, Dublin: DIT, p. 12. 




that the procedural incorporation of the victim undermines the integrity of a 
criminal trial. This is something which threatens the due process rights of the 
accused, and leads to disproportionate sentencing and human rights violations.5 Yet 
while some procedural victim participation impacts due process rights, such as the 
penal populist way victims can influence sentencing in the US, some do not.  
In Ireland, the juvenile and adult justice systems are different. Although 
victims are now procedurally incorporated key safeguards are in place. These are 
strong for child offenders, and robust for their adult counterparts. This web of 
safeguards is formed from the Constitution, ECHR and ECtHR case law. These all 
ensure vulnerable groups like child victims and offenders are incorporated in such 
a way that does not undermine their rights. This situation also subsists for adult 
victims and offenders, and although some might criticise the pace of legal reform 
in these cases the end point is a rather high bar.6 
 
5 “… Coffey (2006) lays out a number of reasons against the greater inclusion of the victim…[f]irst, 
the criminal justice system is founded on the notion of impartiality…the judiciary and the jury must 
be unbiased in order to ensure a fair trial of the accused…Coen (2006) argues that the introduction 
of the victim impact statement is symbolic of a substitution of emotionalism in the place of 
impartiality… Coffey (2006) argues that the impact of crime on victims will differ depending on 
their various levels of toughness…Ashworth (1993)…questions whether it is right that one offender 
receives a more severe sentence because his/her victim suffered serious after - effects…” Rice, J. 
(2012) ‘Support for Victims of Crime: Reality or Rhetoric?’ unpublished M.A. dissertation, Dublin: 
DIT, pp. 12-13.   
6 “Central to the control of the youth justice system in Ireland is ensuring adherence to ‘due process’ 
rights, protected internationally by the ECHR and domestically by the Irish Constitution. In the 
event that this is breached…negative consequences for the defendant, will be determined by the 




One should also bear in mind that there has been considerable academic 
debate on the impact of victim rights on the due process rights entitlements of the 
accused. Especially in relation to whether it can in fact be said that there are certain 
victim procedural rights that impact due process rights and some that do not. This 
is an important discussion. Particularly in light of the constitutionalisation of the 
State’s duty to protect various interests of the defendant within criminal justice. 
Strong constitutional guarantees outline key entitlements regarding due 
process and the accused’s security. These include Article 38.1, which secures the 
right to a trial by jury. This right has also been supplemented by several others not 
outlined within the constitution, but ones deemed fundamental to securing due 
process. Although the idea of interpreting rights into the constitution has largely 
fallen out of favour with the courts, they continue to reinterpret the rights 
safeguards that act as a protection for the accused within their wider context. One 
 
Superior Courts by virtue of judicial review…‘Due process’ is also essential for the issue of a fair 
trial and…in T & V v UK [(2000) 30 EHRR 121.] the ECtHR required adaptations to the procedure 
in criminal trials for children so that they could effectively participate…[i]n the [US], the trend 
towards a justice model for juveniles was easily transformed into…a more punitive system. There 
is some criticism of Ireland’s judiciary’s slow response from a progressive approach to a substantive 
approach to rights in all areas of law during the last thirty years – though it is acknowledged that 
the record on procedural rights is excellent, 
and that judges can only make substantive rights judgments if lawyers are prepared to take the cases 
in the courts.” O’Connor (2019) ‘Reflections on the Justice and Welfare Debate for Children in the 
Irish Criminal Justice System’, IJSJ, 1(3), 19-40, p. 28. 




which encompasses not only the criminally accused of but also potential victims.7 
The case law in this area clearly sets out several extensive due process rights 
safeguards for the accused person. These can be said to cement a right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty, remain silent, legal representation, 
authentic confession, to have improperly gained evidence against them excluded 
and to have the severity of their sentence commensurate with their offence.8  
The text of Article 38.1 sets out how an individual is entitled to due process 
rights when prosecuted. The incorporation of such rights in the constitution is 
important, as they help secure a scenario in which those accused of crime can deny 
any involvement and are not obliged to comply with the trial. They are often indeed 
 
7 “… the Irish Constitution, contains several express rights…Constitutional status has also been 
conferred upon…rights not expressly stated… unenumerated rights…were recognised in criminal 
cases and…some…leading decisions ‘...were motivated by a concern for the rights of 
suspects…’…O’Malley (2009:2) suggests…allowing due process values to be developed…[in this 
way allows] ‘…rights …evolve in accordance with emerging concepts of justice…’.” Daly, Y.M. 
and Jackson, J. (2016) 'The Criminal Justice Process: From Questioning to Trial', In D. Healy, et al. 
eds., The Routledge Handbook Of Irish Criminology, London: Taylor & Francis, p.7. 
8 “…the presumption of innocence, [O’Leary v The Attorney General [1993] 1 IR 102 at 107] the 
rights to silence in police custody, [Heaney v Ireland [1996] IR 580.] the right of access to a lawyer, 
[People (DPP) v Healy [1990] 2 IR 73….the voluntariness of confessions, [Re National Irish Bank 
[1999] 3 IR 145.] the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, [People (DPP) v Kenny 
[1990] 2 IR 110] and the right to proportionality in punishment. [People (DPP) v WC [1994] ILRM 
321; People (DPP) v M [1994] 3 IR 306.]” Kilcommins, S. (2016) ‘Crime control, the security state 
and constitutional justice in Ireland: discounting liberal legalism and deontological principles’, The 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 20(4), 326-342, p. 330. 




encouraged to do just that. This applies to every trial, even those involving 
egregious sexual offences, where the offender can remain passive and the victim is 
often pressed for information to ascertain the veracity of the charges pursued.9 
Article 38.1 has itself been given an expansive interpretation by the courts 
to secure the due process integrity of the justice system. It has seen the defence of 
an entitlement to furnish evidence, as well as mandating the exclusion of evidence 
to secure an accused’s entitlements. There has also been a recognition that accused 
rights can even take precedence over procedural rules of evidence. 10  The 
interpretation the courts give to Article 38.1 has in fact had an impact on the kind 
of evidenced permissible in court. Article 38.1 mandates the exclusion of 
prejudicial evidence and illegally procured confessions. Article 38.1 can also be 
 
9 “Article 38.1…“No person shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due course of law.” 
Substantive and procedural due process rights of the defendant…are explicitly guaranteed 
constitutional rights. Defendants have a right to deny the charges against them…[t]here are few 
incentives for defendants to assume responsibility…and many reasons to remain passive…[t]his 
has resonance in the prosecution of sexual offenders where the victim might be compelled to relive 
the trauma of the offence ...” Coffey, G. (2018) ‘Accommodating Victims of Crime: A Survey of 
the Legislative and Juridicial Landscape’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 28 (4),104-117, p. 107.  
10 “…The courts have recognised in broad terms the accused's constitutional right to “give or call 
evidence in his defence,” State (Healy) v Donoghue [1976] I.R. 325 at 336 and have indicated that 
…an evidentiary privilege must yield to the accused’s right. In other contexts, the courts have 
acknowled the primacy of constitutional provisions over non-constitutional evidentiary rules  
Eastern Health Board v M.K. [1999] 2 I.R. 99.” Heffernan, L. and Imwinkelried, E.J. (2005) ‘The 
Accused's Constitutional Right to Introduce Critical, Demonstrably Reliable Exculpatory 
Evidence’, Irish Jurist, 40, 111 – 137, p. 111. 




impactful where used by the courts to invoke the constitution to strike down 
convictions based on faulty evidence to secure the accused’s due process rights.11 
Indeed, this trend has been further influenced by the greater use of forensic 
materials. The due process guarantees of Article 38.1, which secure procedural 
fairness, has, on account of the fact that this involves an accused’s entitlement to 
interrogate material, expanded to place a duty on the police to secure evidence. 
This procedural safeguard has been flagged as significant.12 Article 38.1 has also, 
 
11 “…the courts have cited Art.38.1…for excluding prejudicial evidence[People (DPP) v Marley 
[1985] I.L.R.M]… [King v Attorney General [1981] I.R. 233; DPP v Keogh [1998] 1 I.L.R.M 72 ] 
or a confession obtained…by unlawful means.[ Re National Irish Bank [1999] 3 I.R. 145, per Finlay 
C.J. at 186-187 l…People (DPP) v Diver [2005] 3 I.R. 270]…the Court…has relied …on the 
constitutional guarantee…as a basis for overturning convictions secured on…incomplete 
prosecution evidence. [People (DPP) v O'Donovan [2005] 1 I.R. 385 (visual identification 
evidence); Director of Public Prosecutions v Murphy [2005] 3 I.R. 270 (criminal record evidence); 
People (DPP) v M.K. , unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, July 19, 2005 (corroboration 
warning); People (DPP) v Allen [2003] 4 I.R. 295 (DNA evidence].” Heffernan, L. and 
Imwinkelried, E.J. (2005) ‘The Accused's Constitutional Right to Introduce Critical, Demonstrably 
Reliable Exculpatory Evidence’, Irish Jurist, 40, 111 – 137, p. 117. 
12 “The courts have recognised…fair procedures in Art.38.1 embraces an accused's right to inspect 
such evidence which…presupposes an obligation on the part of the gardai to…to seek out and 
preserve…fingerprints, [Murphy v DPP [1989] I.L.R.M. 71…Bowes v DPP [2003] 2 I.R. 25; 
McFarlane v DPP, i.e.s.c 11] CCTV footage [Braddish v DPP [2002] 1 I.L.R.M. 151; Dunne v 
DPP [2002] 2 I.R. 305; Scully v DPP [2005] 1 I.R. 242.] or road traffic debris.[ McGrath v DPP 
[2003 ] 2 I.R. 25.] The importance of the right…was highlighted by the decision…to overturn the 
conviction of Colm Murphy for offences connected with the Omagh bombing. A key factor…was 
the defence's expert evidence demonstrating that garda notes of interviews conducted with Murphy 




led to the judicial interpretation of a strong constitutionally based protection of the 
accused’s presumption of innocence. This can lead to a conviction being declared 
unsafe and overturned, as the courts have perceived this right as integral to overall 
due process, and to not do so would render the process constitutionally suspect.13  
Article 38.1 was similarly decisive in the court’s assessment of the 
constitutional validity of criminalising the pre-trial silence of an accused. Although 
the courts found this constitutional much debate surrounded the differing 
interpretations forwarded as to the provision which inferred a right to silence. 
Despite mention of such a right being absent from the constitution some felt Article 
38.1 was the fount, whilst others believed that other articles were more relevant. 
Despite the upholding of an abridgment to the right to silence, the courts 
subsequently decided the implications of such a perspective were to be curtailed.14  
 
during custodial detention had been doctored.”  Heffernan, L. and Imwinkelried, E.J. (2005) ‘The 
Accused's Constitutional Right to Introduce Critical, Demonstrably Reliable Exculpatory 
Evidence’, Irish Jurist, 40, 111 – 137, p. 120. 
13 “As Costello J. wrote in O'Leary v Attorney General: “The Constitution...contains no express 
reference to the presumption [of innocence], but it does provide in Article 38 that no person shall 
be tried on any criminal charge save in due course of law…it has been for so long a fundamental 
postulate of every criminal trial in this country that the accused is presumed to be innocent…a 
criminal trial held otherwise…would…be one which was not held in due course of law…any statute 
which permitted such a trial so to be held would be unconstitutional.[ [1991] 2 1.L.R.M. 454 at 4]” 
Heffernan, L. and Imwinkelried, E.J. (2005) ‘The Accused's Constitutional Right to Introduce 
Critical, Demonstrably Reliable Exculpatory Evidence’, Irish Jurist, 40, 111 – 137, p. 136. 
14 “An offence based on pre-trial silence…s 52 was challenged before both the Irish courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights…[i]ts constitutionality was upheld domestically…the courts 




This was done by instructing that the introduction of such evidential 
material, where there was the potential for severe punishment, necessitated 
examination of Article 38.1 to safeguard an accused’s due process rights. Such an 
examination would also have to involve assessing the voluntariness of the 
evidence. Even though this would be considered in each particular case, such an 
approach has meant that there is a bar on compelled statements. The efficacy of the 
provision contained in s.52 of the OASA of 1939, which had the potential to 
criminalise an accused’s right to silence, was thereby restrained by judicial action. 
However, although Article 38.1 was instrumental to secure the due process right to 
silence, that is not to say that this right cannot be abridged in certain situations. 
Moving on to consider the courts’ approach to Article 40 and how that 
helped to protect the due process rights of the accused we can see CC v Ireland and 
Others [2006] 4 IR 1 as being demonstrative in this regard. Here an adult teenager 
was accused of statutory rape against a minor who he claimed had falsely lied to 
 
expressed differing views on the constitutional locus of the right to silence…the High Court viewed 
it as an important element of the right to a fair trial (Art 38.1)…The Irish Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of s 52…it later undermined the practical benefits of provisions of that nature…by 
holding that the admissibility of any statement obtained from a suspect on pain of penal sanction 
was governed by the Art 38.1 fair trial requirements and the central test applied in relation to such 
admissibility was voluntariness…compelled statements will rarely pass a test of voluntariness and 
will therefore generally be excluded…the value of offences based on pre-trial silence for the 
purposes of securing convictions was ultimately undermined by the Irish Supreme Court...” Daly, 
Y.M. and Jackson, J. (2016) 'The Criminal Justice Process: From Questioning to Trial', In D. Healy, 
et al. eds., The Routledge Handbook Of Irish Criminology, London: Taylor & Francis, p.7. 




him about her actual age. Yet this was largely immaterial since the relevant piece 
of legislation at the time did not permit a defence of lack of mens rea.15 This 
departure from traditional criminal law principle found its basis in the idea that this 
would act as a deterrent against potential offenders and the victims in this context.  
The Supreme Court felt that the rule was a criminalisation of those without 
a guilty mindset, which was held to be unacceptable. This was considered to be the 
case as such a criminalisation would harm an accused and by extension deny them 
their inherent humanity.  The court therefore felt that permitting this to occur was 
an official abrogation of the State’s duty to vindicate the entitlements of an accused. 
This was considered to flow as a necessary consequence of Article 40 and thus 
required a finding that the offending section was unconstitutional. This principled 
 
15 “…a 19 year old, was charged…contrary to s 1(1) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1935. 
He admitted having consensual intercourse with a girl…but said that she had told him that she was 
16 years of age…[t]he offence under Section 1(1)…afforded no defence once the actus reus…was 
established. This …was traditionally justified in…that the legislation was designed to ‘protect 
young girls…[t]he Supreme Court agreed…that the provision expressly criminalized the mentally 
blameless…Hardiman J noted:…to criminalize…a person who is mentally innocent is indeed to 
inflict a grave injury …’…‘... this…constitutes a failure…to respect, defend and indicate the rights 
of liberty and to good name of the person…contrary to…Article 40 …Section 1(1) …was declared 
to be inconsistent with…the Constitution…the legislature was forced to rush through the Criminal 
Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2006 which continues to make it an offence to engage in a sexual act 
with a child but now provides a defence for the accused…that he honestly believed that the child 
was over the relevant age…” Kilcommins, S. (2016) ‘Crime control, the security state and 
constitutional justice in Ireland: discounting liberal legalism and deontological principles’, The 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 20(4), 326-342, pp. 336-337. 




stance had impact, as the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2006 was swiftly 
passed through the Oireachtas to maintain the offence of statutory rape. However, 
it would now contain a proviso which permitted a defence of honest belief. 
The practical import of the court’s subsequent interpretations of Articles 
40.1 and 40.3, and its implications for the due process entitlements of accused 
persons can also be gleaned from case law. Indeed, with regards to Article 40.1. 
the courts have taken an expansive interpretation without much restriction. The 
equality guarantee contained within Article 40.1 has been interpreted as providing 
the accused with entitlements to equity of treatment regarding the fundamentally 
important area of extradition. Other cases like Ó Beoláin v Fahy [[2001] 2 IR 279.] 
have upheld the fundamental right of the accused to access relevant laws in their 
own language. Particularly if that language is subject to constitutional protection.16  
 
16 “…there is a general requirement of equality in extradition applications without discussing how 
the human personality doctrine was relevant… [McMahon v Leavy [1984] IR 525.]…[Director of 
Public Prosecutions (Stratford) v O’Neill [1998] 2 IR 383 (…no mention of human personality 
doctrine) …Grealis v DPP [2000] 1 ILRM 358 (no mention of doctrine … Murphy v GM [2001] 4 
IR 113 (…considered under Article 40.1 without reference to doctrine).] … Ó Beoláin v Fahy 
[[2001] 2 IR 279.] concerned a claim that the State had unconstitutionally failed to provide Irish 
translations of the rules of court and road traffic legislation necessary to conduct one’s own case 
through Irish. Hardiman J held that the failure of the State to make such provision was a denial of 
equality…without any discussion as to how any “essential attributes of the human personality” were 
involved… cases dealing with equality issues that arise during the conduct of a trial have failed to 
mention the human personality doctrine…a trial judge cannot allow an accused person to become 
the object of discrimination. [The People (AG) v O’Driscoll (1972) 1 Frewen 351.] 
Equally…“equality in court” has been enunciated without any discussion of the doctrine. [In The 




Where this is not provided by the State this is seen as a breach of Article 
40.1 and the due process rights of the accused to equal treatment. This was 
adjudged to be the case even in those instances where the important restrictive 
doctrine of human personality was not engaged with by the court. This has also 
been stipulated where there is discrimination against an accused, who is entitled to 
be considered at trial in light of the principle of ‘equality in court’. The implications 
of such a defence of the Article 40.1 equality guarantee cannot be overestimated. 
In fact, the judiciary have stated in previous cases that they would be extremely 
active in the use of the due process right to quash convictions where there is some 
demonstrable discrimination against those processed by the justice system.17 
In relation to the court’s interpretation of Article 40.3. of the constitution, 
and the positive impact this has had for the rights of the accused the case of People 
(DPP) v Kenny [1990] 2 i.r. 110 articulated a principled judicial approach. This can 
be seen from how the court emphasised that the curtailment of criminality, despite 
its imperatives, must not take precedence over the duty of the courts, as contained 
 
State (Keegan) v Stardust Victims Compensation Tribunal [1986] IR 642.] In all these cases, there 
is no explanation of how the relevant “context” does not…condemn the claim to failure – it is not 
even mentioned.” Foley, B. (2006) 'Interpretative and deference based models of judicial 
restraint in the Irish Constitution' Hibernian Law Journal’, 6 (Winter), 65-93, p.89. 
17 “In The People (Attorney General) v. O’Driscoll (1972) Frewen 351] the Court said that it would 
have no hesitation in invoking Article 40.1 to overturn a prior ruling if it could be shown that the 
Court discriminated against two defendants on ethnic grounds.” Cahillane, L. Ó Conaill, S.  (2017) 
Constitutional Law: Ireland, Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands: Kluwer International Publishing, 
para 204. 




in the constitution, to safeguard accused rights. The judiciary have contemplated 
the ideas of procedural balance in the overall decision about how best to administer 
justice, and whether to bar unconstitutional evidence. Yet the courts have 
evidenced that by far the most important issue for them, is actually how best to 
secure the rights entitlements of the constitution. A stance which ensured that the 
due process rights of the accused are upheld as a cornerstone of the justice system.18  
Art 40.3 has also been interpreted in a robust fashion by the judiciary in 
order to secure the integrity of confessions. Indeed, they secured the due process 
rights of the accused by excluding constitutionally suspect confessions. Where an 
accused gives a confession whilst illegally detained the constitution and the due 
process rights come into play in a significant manner. In instances where a holding 
charge is deployed, in addition to exceeding the requisite time in which a suspect 
can be detained, even the integrity of a murder conviction must be examined. In 
such a case the exclusion of evidence is a question for the presiding judge. They 
 
18  “…in Kenny, Finlay C.J. held that: “[T]he…conviction of guilty persons…cannot ... outweigh 
the unambiguously expressed constitutional obligation ‘as far as practicable to defend and vindicate 
the personal rights of the citizen’ ” Thus, the balance to be achieved in a criminal trial has been 
considered by the most superior of our courts and the need for such balance is not ignored or the 
interests of victims disregarded in the decision to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence. 
Rather, it has been decided that the protection of constitutional rights is always the highest 
concern...” [[1990] 2 I.R. 110, at 134; [1990] I.L.R.M. 569, at 579 quoting Art.40.3.1 of the Irish 
Constitution.] Daly, YM (2009) ‘Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence in Ireland: Protectionism, 
Deterrence and the Winds of Change’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 19(2), 40-50, p. 50. 




take into account not only the context and victim, but also the strong due process 
entitlements of the accused to liberty, which lean in favour of exclusion.19  
Therefore, Article 40.3 is invoked by the judiciary in those contexts where 
it is considering the procedural fairness of a criminal trial and feels there are higher 
values at stake which require vindication. The right is also one which can be of 
great assistance to the accused. It is also an expansive entitlement and can 
incorporate the victim into the calculus of where justice lies in a case. Depending 
of where the justice of the case lies for the judiciary the right can either lead to the 
inclusion or exclusion of incriminating evidence. The right entitlement is therefore 
a double-edged sword for the accused, and can either make their conviction more 
or less likely, depending on the case and the way the judiciary interpret the law.20  
 
19 “…People (DPP) v Shaw [ [1982] I.R. 1.] [is] the…landmark decision on…confessions…The 
initial basis for the appellant's arrest had been his possession of a stolen car, but the true motivation 
was his suspected involvement in the disappearance of two young women, one of whom had already 
been found dead. The gardai deliberately detained the appellant beyond the limits of lawful custody 
in the hope of obtaining information that would help them locate the second woman alive…the 
incriminating statements which the appellant made…were used to convict…[h]e appealed…on the 
ground that the statements were involuntary because they had been unlawfully obtained…Shaw 
involved the balancing of competing constitutional rights, the appellant's right to 
liberty…vindicated by the exclusion of his confession, versus the victim's right to life…” Heffernan, 
L. and Imwinkelried, E.J. (2005) ‘The Accused's Constitutional Right to Introduce Critical, 
Demonstrably Reliable Exculpatory Evidence’, Irish Jurist, 40, 111 – 137, p. 113. 
20  “… People (DPP) v James TP [(Court of Criminal Appeal (Walsh, Costello and Barron JJ.), 
unreported, July 27, 1988.)] is another case in point. The applicant was convicted…of sexual 
offences against his daughter. At trial, the applicant's wife had been permitted to testify…the 




Much of the discourse surrounding whether victim rights necessitate a 
dilution of an accused’s due process rights has centred on the most controversial 
participatory right victims granted, the victim impact statement. Indeed, some feel 
the nature of these statements tend to be unpredictable. As they can potentially 
make an offender liable for the impact of a crime, they had no way of anticipating. 
This is perceived as an unfair and unwarranted interference upon sentencing.21 A 
dim view of this endeavour is also inculcated, as such phenomena is perceived by 
some commentators to be a utilisation of ‘victims in the service of severity’22  
The argument that is tendered is that the incorporation of victims, 
particularly in a procedural rights manner, goes hand in hand with more severe 
 
applicant contended that his wife was incompetent as a witness and that the trial judge had…erred 
in accepting her testimony…Walsh J…acknowledged the common law authority disqualifying the 
accused's spouse as a witness…he concluded that there were paramount constitutional 
considerations: “Art. 41 of the Constitution…makes it clear…that every member of the 
family…has… rights also guaranteed by the Constitution. One of these is …Art. 40, s. 3…where 
the State undertakes to vindicate the personal rights of the person[s]… in the case of any injustice 
... “Heffernan, L. and Imwinkelried, E.J. (2005) ‘The Accused's Constitutional Right to Introduce 
Critical, Demonstrably Reliable Exculpatory Evidence’, Irish Jurist, 40 (1), p111 – 137, p.114. 
21 “Also, unforeseen consequences…or effects on particularly vulnerable victims should not be 
considered in sentencing (Ashworth, 1993).” Erez, E. and L. Roeger, (1995) ‘The effect of victim 
impact statements on sentencing patterns and outcomes: The Australian experience’, Journal of 
Criminal Justice, 23(4), 363–375, p. 366. 
22 Ashworth, A. (2000) ‘Victims Rights, Defendants Rights and Criminal Procedure’ In Crawford, 
A. and Goodey, J. (eds.), Integrating A Victim Perspective Within Criminal Justice, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 185- 204, p. 186. 




sentencing.23 One of the examples cited in this regard is the VIS, which is seen to 
exacerbate sentences. This is considered to then undermine due process through a 
process of “victim prostitution”. A process which has crime control as its end goal. 
The due process and crime control models are seen as evolving in a new way. One 
in which victim rights, not crime control, is the predominant threat to due process.24  
Others contest that despite the grassroots desire to be incorporated on the 
part of victims it is the State that should be the ultimate arbiter of this, and this 
entity ought not to compel participation. 25  Some also reject balancing rights 
between the defendant and victim, sometimes used to justify victim participation. 
Taking the example of legal representation, it has been asserted that although due 
process mandates a right in the case of the accused, due to the threat posed by the 
 
23 “Ashworth echoes concerns…that…[VIS] … may cause…sentence severity…[u]sing vicitms to 
accomplish…harsher sentences, according to Ashworth, amounts to [‘]victim prostitution[‘].” Erez, 
E. (1999) ‘Who’s afraid of the big bad victim? Victim Impact Statements as victim empowerment 
and enhancement of justice’, Criminal Law Review, 49(26), 545–556, pp. 545-546. 
24 “Some…argued that…Packer’s distinction between ‘crime control’ and ‘due process’…is no 
longer sufficient … Roach…argued that the real tension…has been between due process and 
victims’ rights, where the latter have been essentially punitive measures, legitimating repressive 
crime-control…governments have promoted and justified several preventive detention reforms by 
reference to…victims...” Edwards, I. (2004) ‘An Ambiguous Participant: The Crime Victim and 
Criminal Justice Decision-Making’, 44(6), British Journal of Criminology, 967-982, p. 970. 
25 “Further…it is the State’s responsibility to manage the decision-making…there should not be 
burdens or expectations…placed on all victims, regardless of their individual preferences.” 
McDonald, E. (2011) ‘The Views of Complainants and the Provision of Information, Support and 
Legal Advice: How Much Should A Prosecutor do?,’ Canterbury Law Review, 17, 66-87, p. 67. 




State, this is not the case with regards to the victim. These scholars assert that 
victim representation is argued to be unnecessary as the victim is not potentially 
prejudiced within criminal proceedings. However, it could also be argued that such 
an assertion does not hold in every situation. Particularly in a case where a victim 
might be in such a position of vulnerability that their interests might be infringed.26 
The tensions that exist in this area are evident when considering legal 
representation for victims. This is an area where there has been some movement in 
recent times. Legal representation in cases of sex crime victims can also be 
permissible where there is a hearing to determine the use of evidence pertaining to 
the past sexual history of a victim complainant. Such a situation was brought about 
by Section 34 of the Sex Offenders Act 2001. Certain sex crime victims can utilise 
legal representation in the other limited circumstances in which there is an attempt 
to submit their sexual history into evidence.27 These legislative concessions to 
 
26 “We cannot justify granting participation rights to victims simply because they are rights enjoyed 
by defendants; the justification for granting certain rights to defendants might be inapplicable to 
victims…legal representation for the defendant is crucial to ensure that he receives a fair trial, and 
is not subject to the unrestrained power and resources of the state…legal representation for a victim 
cannot be justified on these grounds, as the victim is not in a position of inequality vis-à-vis the 
state.” Edwards, I. (2004) ‘An Ambiguous Participant: The Crime Victim and Criminal Justice 
Decision-Making’, 44(6), British Journal of Criminology, 967-982, p. 972. 
27 “…separate legal representation for sexual offence complainants where an application is made to 
admit previous sexual history [Section 34 Sex Offenders Act 2001] “Victims of certain sexual 
offences are also entitled to legal representation if it is proposed that evidence of their sexual history 
will be adduced during the trial.[Section 4A of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981 as amended by 
Section 5 ss. 2 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) (Amendment) Act 2007]” Kilcommins, S., 




victims regarding independent legal representation are given in those instances in 
which attempts are made to disclose counselling records under subpoena.28  
Although these tendencies are novel, they are very reflective of the legal 
transition in the direction of vesting more entitlements to victims to independent 
legal representation. As will be seen later on in this chapter in the section on legal 
aid for victims, in many instances such representation is freely accessible via legal 
aid. This is vitally important to ensure poorer victims are not prejudiced. In light 
of all of this, commentators conclude that such independent legal representation 
presents an opportunity to contribute towards the fulfilment of participation 
requirements. As it can empower victims to see themselves as obtaining insight, a 
say in proceedings, recognition and some degree of sway over how they transpire. 
 Yet such advancements could be a double-edged sword, not only for the 
victim but the accused. In fact, it is peculiar that even after such advances a 
significant amount of victim requests in this context are not acceded to in court. 
Such a state of affairs is problematic, and appears to indicate that its impact has 
 
Leahy S., Moore, K. and Spain, E. (2018) The Victim in the Irish Criminal Justice Process, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 66-68. 
28 “More recently, the Republic of Ireland extended the provision of ILR to sexual assault victims 
where applications for the release of victims’ counselling records are subpoenaed [Section 39 of the 
Criminal Justice (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 amended Section 19 of the Criminal Evidence Act 
1992 and thereby inserted Section 19A into the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992.]” Iliadis, M., Fitz-
Gibbon, K. & Walklate, S. (2019) ‘Improving justice responses for victims of intimate partner 
violence: examining the merits of the provision of independent legal representation’, International 
Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, Nov, 1-10, p. 6. 




been minor. This state of affairs supports the assertion that such statutory reform 
cannot be seen as being perfect in its safeguarding of victim entitlements.29 
  Any assessment of independent legal representation for vulnerable 
categories of victims ought to assess the examination of such measures by the joint 
research of the Dublin Rape Crisis Centre and Trinity Law School. The research 
considered the perspectives of victims of rape of the justice system from initial 
contact to its ultimate stages. A major problem the research highlighted involved 
the amount of unhappiness victim complainants felt. The main root of this revolved 
around the fact that there was no procedure which might give them a chance to 
engage with the prosecutor. This has been somewhat addressed by the Victims 
Charter which encourages this to be facilitated. At the same time those victims with 
legal representation demonstrated an elevated contentment with the process.  
 
29 “…adversarial jurisdictions have moved contentiously towards granting victims representation 
rights…Ireland allows sexual offence complainants to access state-funded legal counsel to oppose 
a defendant’s application for the introduction of their sexual history evidence…Iliadis (2019) found 
that this form of ILR has strong potential to contribute positively to victims’ procedural justice 
needs…enabling victims to feel an attainment of information, voice, validation, and control. 
However, her study…revealed that a high volume of defence applications to adduce victims’ sexual 
history were being granted even with the ILR in place, suggesting that there is minimal preclusion 
of victims’ sexual history …Iliadis (2019) therefore argues that this legislation is not infallible in 
protecting victims’ privacy, rights and interests…” Iliadis, M., Fitz-Gibbon, K. & Walklate, 
S. (2019) 'Improving justice responses for victims of intimate partner violence: examining the 
merits of the provision of independent legal representation', International Journal of Comparative 
and Applied Criminal Justice, Nov, 1-10, p. 6. 




Indeed, victims rated their legal representation as being the individual they 
were most contented with, and felt that they were most sympathetic. In fact, a link 
was established between the contentment of victims in these regards and the 
amount of attention they received from prosecutorial agents. Indeed, the 
contentment they felt was largely commensurate with the level of interaction that 
their own legal representative was able to afford to them during the process.30 
Apart from victim satisfaction and by-in there is another consideration, the 
vindication of victim rights. This area has been examined in more recent times in 
light of some of the developments that have taken place in the field of victim rights. 
It is worth bearing in mind that except in certain limited circumstances the victim 
does not have a right to independent legal representation in Ireland. Indeed, victims 
still have no clear position to occupy at trial. At trial might not know the manner 
 
30  “In evaluating the appropriateness of introducing legal representation…it is instructive to 
consider…a qualitative and quantitative study conducted by The Dublin Rape Crisis Centre and the 
School of Law, Trinity…(1998)…[o]ne of the main issues identified by the study was the level of 
dissatisfaction experienced by complainants…(1998:108)…however, complainants who had had 
legal representation indicated a much higher level of satisfaction with the legal process… 
(1998:109)….‘participants were by far the most satisfied with the treatment received from their 
own legal representative’…participants … rated their legal representative as very sympathetic…[i]n 
relation to participants’ perceptions of the fairness of the legal process…the Dublin Study reported 
that perceived fairness was ‘significantly associated with participants’ satisfaction with the contact 
time that they had with the state prosecutor, and with their satisfaction with treatment they received 
from their legal representative' (The Dublin Rape Crisis Centre & the School of Law, Trinity 
College Dublin 1998:142-143)” Cossins, A., (2004) ‘Is There a Case for the Legal Representation 
of Children in Sexual Assault Trials’, Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 16 (2) 160-182, p. 166. 




by which the judiciary are spoken to, and the way legal interrogation is carried out 
in court. All of this can tend to inculcate a sense of perceived isolation during 
proceedings. In fact, the inconsiderate, rigorous and humiliating interrogation is 
distressing for victims, and can constitute a repeat victimisation of the victim.  
All this supports the contention that without independent legal 
representation the safeguarding of the entitlements of victims is unachievable. 
Indeed, no trial actor adequately vindicates the desires of victims, particularly in 
those instances in which material is adduced at court which might be of an intimate 
or delicate kind. Prosecutions of domestic violence are outside of the remit of the 
statutory safeguards extended for victims of certain sex crimes. However, the 
situation could still be considerably intimate in substance. Despite the limited 
concessions for certain classes of vulnerable victim in most other instances no 
person interrupts a victim interrogation due to unseemly cross-examination, apart 
from perhaps the judiciary. As a consequence, most victims can receive 
traumatising interrogation without a dedicated person to safeguard their interests.31 
 
31 “With the exception of victims of sexual offences…the victim is not represented court…[t]he 
victim has nobody to advise…how the proceedings work and what to expect. This may be the 
victim's first time in court; he or she may be unaware of the roles of the various players in a court-
room. It may even come as a surprise to a victim that there is no specified seating for crime victims. 
He or she may be unsure of how to address the judge or what to expect of the questions asked by 
counsel. He or she may feel completely alone in the process…insensitive, intensive or embarrassing 
questioning can be traumatising, therefore secondarily victimising the victim…absent 
representation, it is impossible for the rights of a crime victim to be adequately protected during 
proceedings…[t]here is nobody acting on behalf of the victim to request the judge to restrict media 




Having said all that the extension of such representation looks unlikely in 
future, in light of the controversy achieving even the limited reforms that were 
gained involved. The Irish legal system is in large part predicated upon 
adversarialism. Therefore, proposals that might engender the legal representation 
of victims even in serious instances are highly contentious. Several accusations 
were made against the current reforms. Namely, that such persons could coach 
victims, shift proceedings to benefit the state, encourage antagonism between the 
representation of the state and victim, make proceedings unnecessarily nebulous 
and cause jury estrangement, which could lead to “unjustified acquittals”32  
These kinds of dilemmas were not only flagged by NGOs and Universities, 
the Law Reform Commission has examined the issues with such reforms and their 
assessments are worth considering when outlining their wider impact. The ability 
 
coverage…where evidence may be of a private and sensitive nature. This is particularly so in 
domestic violence cases which do not garner the protections that sexual offences do…[t]here is 
nobody to intervene during cross-examination if the victim is being inappropriately questioned by 
defence counsel, unless the judge decides to do so. The victim may be subjected to irrelevant and 
distressing questions, without anyone in the court being obliged to protect his or her rights.” 
O'Flaherty, L.Q. (2016) ‘An Argument for Advocates for Victims of Crime, in Light of Ireland's 
Obligations under Directive 2012/29/EU’, Hibernian Law Journal, 15(1), 114-129, p. 124. 
32  “…in the adversarial context of Ireland's criminal justice system, the idea…has been 
controversial. Criticisms have included the belief that legal representation would result in the 
coaching of complainants, tilt the trial process in favour of the prosecution, lead to conflicts between 
the prosecution and the complainant's lawyer, and would complicate the trial and alienate the 
jury…” Cossins, A., (2004) ‘Is There a Case for the Legal Representation of Children in Sexual 
Assault Trials’, Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 16 (2) 160-182, p. 165.  




of reforms in this area to make progressive change was studied in 1987. A time in 
which there were some of the first steps in the area, with concessions for limited 
categories of sex crime victims. Indeed, the consideration of such proposals was 
somewhat damning, as the Law Reform Commission did not support such reform 
as a consequence of its worries that they might be viewed as “coaching” of victims 
in the manner by which they ought to answer queries put to them during trial.33 
Yet despite these reservations, worries regarding the inequity of 
proceedings for victims of sex crimes motivated the move in favour of greater 
cognisance, as well as participation, of victims in this area. This led to a situation 
that was rather removed from their previous passive role of bolstering the case. 
Further consternation resulted in 2001 from the establishment of circumscribed 
independent legal representation rights for sex crime victims. Since the change 
established victim involvement and permitted a significant degree of victim 
participation in proceedings it was a rather novel one in common law jurisdictions.  
The measures under Section 34 of the Sex Offenders Act 2001 added 
Section 4A to the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981 and consequently permitted 
certain sex crime victims to utilise free legal aid for legal representation. Yet this 
 
33 “The potential for ILR to address these concerns has been flagged…in Ireland when initial 
proposals for ILR for sexual assault victims were put forward … in 1987. Initially, the ILRC (1987, 
p. 70) rejected this proposal due to a concern that legal representatives could be seen as “coaching” 
victims by advising them on how to respond to questions.” Iliadis, M., Fitz-Gibbon, K. & Walklate, 
S. (2019) ‘Improving justice responses for victims of intimate partner violence: examining the 
merits of the provision of independent legal representation’, International Journal of Comparative 
and Applied Criminal Justice, Nov, 1-10, p. 7.  




assistance was only to help them contest an accused’s attempt at adducing their 
sexual history to aid their defence. Such an entitlement is consequential, 
particularly considering the framing of the common law that has tended to hitherto 
preclude victims. Such a change permits the recognition and incorporation of the 
concerns of victims within proceedings, an acknowledgement of the “triangulation 
of interests” that now exists between the suspect, prosecution and complainant.34 
Some of these first assessments by the Law Reform Commission of the 
reforms in this area resulted from feminist activism as well as the Joint Oireachtas 
Committee of 1987. These associations campaigned in favour of an augmented 
acknowledgement of the entitlements of such victims within procedural justice. 
These were motivated, in large part, as a result of the perceived problems in 
 
34 “Concerns over procedural (in)justice for sexual assault victims have underpinned Ireland’s shift 
towards increased…involvement of victims in the legal process…[i]n 2001, Ireland contentiously 
introduced a limited form of…(ILR) for sexual assault victims pre-trial…this reform is distinct 
within adversarial systems in allowing a unique level of victim input. Section 34 of the Sex 
Offenders Act 2001…inserted a new section (4A) into the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981 which 
allows sexual assault victims to access state-funded legal representation to oppose a defendant’s 
application to introduce a victim’s sexual history evidence in court. This is a significant right in 
light of the parameters of adversarial legal systems, which have traditionally excluded victims. It 
also enables victim interests to be acknowledged…recognising ‘a triangulation of interests’ among 
the accused, state and victim (Lord Steyn cited in Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1999) 
[2001] 2 AC 91: 118). The ILR thus arguably helps to address some of the main criticisms pertaining 
to the prosecution process for sexual assault victims...” Iliadis, M. (2019) ‘Victim representation 
for sexual history evidence in Ireland: A step towards or away from meeting victims’ procedural 
justice needs?’, Criminology & Criminal Justice, 0 (0), 1-17, p. 2. 




accommodating the competing concerns of the triangulation of interests. Their 
disapproval tended to zone in on victim trial interrogation, since the state frequently 
did not oppose avenues of inquiry such as the intimate past of the complainant.  
The Joint Oireachtas Committee endeavoured at rectifying these dilemmas 
by advancing the idea that certain sex crime victims ought to receive independent 
legal representation. Yet this was sought at each and every stage of a trial. Such 
representation could then have the right to interject at trial to safeguard the interests 
of victims in those instances in which they felt it was warranted. The Joint 
Oireachtas Committee contended a rape suspect is permitted to request free legal 
representation, yet their victim cannot even seek any legal advice from the state.  
In fact, the first time a victim usually meets the DPP is at trial. They 
contended that such a state of affairs was inappropriate and that rape victims ought 
to be able to speak with prosecution lawyers in advance of trial. Indeed, the DPP 
would be well equipped to explain trial convention, like anticipatable questions that 
the defence might advance. The thinking here was that since the prosecution’s legal 
representation never formally speaks on behalf of the victim there is nothing 
untoward with providing victims, particularly during prosecutions for serious sex 
crimes, with independent legal representation to secure their rights and interests.35 
 
35 “In Ireland, initial proposals…were put forward by rape crisis centres, women’s organizations 
and members of the Joint Oireachtas Committee in 1987. These groups lobbied for increased 
recognition of sexual assault victims’ rights…in light of major criticisms related to the conflicting 
interests….and the ill-treatment of sexual assault victims within…criminal justice…(…(ILRC), 
1988). These…were focused…on the cross-examination of victims, during which it was common 
for prosecutors to refrain from objecting to certain lines of questioning… related to the victim’s 




 Yet such thinking was not adopted by the Law Reform Commission, as 
they were of the view that such reforms might be “constitutionally suspect”. Since 
they could mean certain sex crime prosecutions would proceed on a different basis 
than other. The body was also of the view that this kind of profound alteration was 
likely to alter the equilibrium of prosecutions. Indeed, such reform was perceived 
by it as untowardly benefiting the state by giving the victim receiving “dual 
representation” even though, the state serves the public, as opposed to the victim. 
The LRC argued, that permitting such a situation was “hostile to the 
interests of the accused”. In fact, they saw it as threatening their constitutional 
entitlements to due process. Despite the body not supporting the motion that sex 
crime victims obtain independent legal representation for the duration of 
proceedings, they did receive a similar diluted motion. Namely, that victims should 
 
…sexual history…it was proposed…that sexual assault victims be granted ILR 
throughout…proceedings…to protect the victim’s interests…(ILRC, 1987, 1988)…the Joint 
Oireachtas Committee (cited in the ILRC, 1987: 69) argued that:…The complainant however is 
denied access to discussion or consultation with the legal representatives…it is normal for a 
complainant to meet the State prosecutor…on the day of the hearing. This…is 
unacceptable…[s]tate counsel … does not[...]officially represent a complainant 
and[...]complainants…of serious sexual assault…should be granted free legal representation. 
This…was initially rejected by the [LRC] on the basis that it would be ‘constitutionally 
suspect’…for sexual offences [to be pursued on] ‘fundamentally different principles…(ILRC, 
1987)…the ILRC believed that such a radical change would tilt the balance…in favour of the 
prosecution as it would result in dual representation for the victim….” Iliadis, M. (2019) ‘Victim 
representation for sexual history evidence in Ireland: A step towards or away from meeting victims’ 
procedural justice needs?’, Criminology & Criminal Justice, 0 (0), 1-17, p. 3. 




have ILR in a situation in which an accused’s counsel attempts to apply to the court 
so as to interrogate the complainant regarding their previous intimate behaviour. 36  
Yet even this still did not find favour with the LRC. They felt such a 
measure was a profound alteration in policy. One that was most likely to have 
significant repercussions. It also felt that there was little chance of such measures 
affecting the court’s decision. Indeed, the court is obliged to safeguard against any 
participant being improperly interrogated, and, as such, fails to require a legal 
representative to constantly impress that upon them. They also felt a litany of 
repercussions could flow from this motion if implemented, and that if a partial 
permission of ILR for victims were allowed little would deter further extension.  
There were also worries expressed that such counsel could coach victims, 
giving them pointers regarding how to best approach queries which would enable 
them to quash or fan particular areas of their testimony. Indeed, coaching of this 
 
36 “… the ILRC (1987: 69) claimed that permitting dual representation would be ‘hostile to the 
interests of the accused’…[a]lthough the ILRC (1987) rejected the proposal…a modified version 
of this proposal was put forward to the Commission by the Joint Oireachtas Committee that a victim 
be entitled to ILR where a defence application is made to the judge for leave to cross-examine the 
victim on their prior sexual history. However, this…was also rejected by the ILRC (1987: 69) on 
the grounds that:…a substantial change in criminal procedure, which would[...]probably have far-
reaching consequences…would be unlikely to make any difference to the judge’s ruling…judges 
have a duty to protect all witnesses from unfair cross-examination by counsel [...] they do not need 
counsel…to remind them of it.” Iliadis, M. (2019) ‘Victim representation for sexual history 
evidence in Ireland: A step towards or away from meeting victims’ procedural justice 
needs?’, Criminology & Criminal Justice, 0 (0), 1-17, p. 4. 




kind was perceived as detrimental to the administration of the system and the 
tenants that underpinned common law hearings. Worries were also articulated 
regarding the financing of such representation. As it was posited by the body that 
there would have to be an allotment system based on necessity like legal aid. This 
was something that they contended would put certain victims at a disadvantage.37 
Indeed, it is worth bearing in mind that the key question, as the LRC 
highlighted, is one of implementation. Taking the points it raised into 
consideration, it is also important to realise that whatever measures are 
implemented concerning ILR, the chances of them having a positive impact are 
bound together with due process, as well as concern for victims. Where these are 
recognised, then such reform can be effective, at least with regards to the victim. 
Similarly, although the introduction of limited rights in this context might not seem 
 
37 The ILRC (1987: 69) cited other potential consequences…[i]f representation of witnesses in rape 
cases were allowed, it would be difficult to refuse it in other cases. Cross-examination about 
previous sexual behaviour[...]is not the only kind of cross-examination about past conduct which 
may cause distress…[c]oncerns also arose about the possibility of legal representatives ‘coaching’ 
victims…on how to answer questions…or downplay or highlight certain aspects of their evidence 
(ILRC, 1987: 70). The ILRC (1987) stated that such ‘coaching’ would not only distort the course 
of justice but also undermine the principles upon which the adversarial criminal trial is based…it 
raised concerns about funding…suggesting that it would need to include means testing… 
that…could place some victims in a more vulnerable position…” Iliadis, M. (2019) ‘Victim 
representation for sexual history evidence in Ireland: A step towards or away from meeting victims’ 
procedural justice needs?’, Criminology & Criminal Justice, 0 (0), 1-17, p. 4. 




very dramatic, the decision, as various commentators have highlighted, essentially 
set the criminal justice system on a path towards greater overall victim recognition. 
 It would be fair to say that headline cases concerning victim interests are 
somewhat removed from the actual requirements of serious sex crime victims. 
Some even assert that the majority of victims would probably be content with a 
justice system that is empathetic, provides material assistance and incorporates 
their participation. Permitting a lawyer to speak with victims briefly before trial 
would not be considered a vindication of victim entitlements by most. Neither 
would be an official contacting a complainant to convey the fact that a prosecution 
is not being brought before they then read about this in the paper shortly thereafter.  
There is a line of thought which asserts that victims of such offences can 
obtain adequate acknowledgement when all state employees acknowledge their 
rights under law in a humane holistic way. In such a situation, the assertion that our 
procedures are equitable might be appropriate. Indeed, in light of recent changes 
this could very well be the case. This progress was dependent on establishment by-
in, as well as the allocation of state funds. Due to reforms of this kind, such as ILR, 
our justice system has now moved from a situation in which the entitlements of 
serious sex crime victims were a question of support and changing mindsets to one 
where victims possess rights under law that embody their greater inclusivity.38 
 
38 “Talk of supreme court action in pursuit of the aims of victims is far removed from the real needs 
of individual rape victims. If basic issues like sympathetic treatment, information and a fair hearing 
could be adequately dealt with most people would be happy. The campaign for victims’ rights will 
not be won on the day that a prosecuting counsel meets a complainer half an hour before a hearing 




In examining ILR, and its implications, in detail we can see how curtailed 
it is. As well as why this should be the case due to the highly pertinent consideration 
of how exactly the constitutional fair trial rights of the accused are to be maintained. 
The curtailed legal representation afforded to victims of sex crimes is not a straight 
forward issue. As mentioned previously, this is allowed under Section 4A of the 
Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981, as amended by s 34 of the Sex Offenders Act 2001. 
Yet the victim’s latitude in this regard is constrained to those instances in which 
the accused attempts to introduce their intimate past as evidence. 
In these instances, the legal representative is only permitted to the victim in 
order to contest that point. At the same time, such a situation excludes the triers of 
fact. It is also barred from occurring if the prosecutorial authorities are the ones 
attempting to adduce the material. Clearly ILR is a rather restricted entitlement.  
 
to explain what will happen…[n]or will victims rights be secure when a Garda phones a victim to 
tell her that charges are being dropped so that she knows about it before she buys her morning paper. 
The position of the victim of rape will only be properly recognised when every member of every 
agency dealing with victims recognises that she is entitled legally, as well as morally, to sympathy, 
information and the protection of her physical, emotional and legal well being. Then we will be 
safely able to say that we do indeed have a fair system. The success of these attempts is contingent 
on their acceptance in the system and on the resources provided for them by government. By 
choosing legal representation as our tool we could be embarking on a journey that would bring us 
to a stage where rape victims rights leave the realm of funding issues and attitudes to become legally 
enforceable rights.” Mac Giolla Ri, E. (1997) ‘Separate Legal Representation For Rape Victims. A 
Fair System’, The Bar Review,2(8), 320-324, p. 324. 




However, in many ways this ought to be the case. Since legal systems such 
as our own have found this kind of reform to pose dilemmas. In fact, widening the 
reform to allow it to be available beyond the scope of contesting hearings 
concerning the adducement of evidence of a victim’s intimate past had been 
contested. Since such a move was perceived by the LRC of being a breach of our 
Basic Law. As they claimed this might violate the fair trial rights of the accused.39 
Therefore, it could be concluded that such constraints, restrictive as they are ought 
to be present in order to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. 
Consider the present statute surrounding the right to legal representation 
governing an attempt by the accused to use Section 3 of the Criminal Law (Rape) 
Act 1981, as amended, to interrogate and/or introduce material concerning a 
victim’s intimate history. This in no way permits counsel for the victim the ability 
 
39 “In 2001 Ireland introduced a limited form of legal representation for complainants in sexual 
cases within an adversarial model. Under s 4A of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981 (as amended 
by s 34 of the Sex Offenders Act 2001), when the defendant wishes to offer sexual history evidence 
about the complainant, the complainant has legal representation available to her for that application 
… the decision is made in the absence of the jury…and not in situations where the prosecution is 
seeking to admit the evidence…[t]he Irish Act therefore enacts a limited version of legal 
representation for complainants in rape cases.  Common law jurisdictions…that have considered 
the possibility of separate legal representation for victims have primarily focussed on… reasons for 
not recommending formal introduction of such a scheme. In Ireland, extension of the scheme 
beyond out-of-court applications for the introduction of sexual history evidence was resisted on the 
grounds that it would be unconstitutional.” McDonald E., (2011) 'The Views of Complainants and 
the Provision of Information, Support and Legal Advice: How much Should a Prosecutor 
Do?', Canterbury Law Review, 17(1), 66-87, p. 82. 




to attend the entire victim’s testimony and/or material regarding “other sexual 
experience” tendered before the court.  There are further issues regarding the lack 
of specific approach to the manner by which parties are informed in this regard. 
Not to mention the basis for the court’s choice as to the admission of such material. 
As both of these points are not sufficiently clarified within statute or procedure.40 
Statutory reform is actually required so that the intention of the accused to 
apply for leave to submit material regarding a victim’s intimate past to the court 
ought to be furnished to the victim in advance of the hearing. This is something 
which would provide victims with reasonable time to react. A notice period of 4 
weeks in this regard would probably be advisable. Since it would deter further 
confusion and alleviate some of the pressure placed upon these traumatised victims. 
Such reform would not be out of step with the current law in this area. 
Indeed, it already stipulates a base line in terms of content regarding what can and 
 
40 “…legislation allows the complainant to be legally represented on the hearing of a defence 
application under s.3 of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981 as amended, for leave to cross-examine 
on and/or adduce evidence of the complainant's other sexual experience…it does not give the legal 
representative any right to be present during the whole of the complainant's evidence, or while any 
other evidence of “other sexual experience” is adduced…the detailed procedure for giving notice 
of a leave application and the criteria upon which the judge must decide whether to grant leave or 
not, are not specified in the legislation, or in rules of court… amendments should be made to ensure 
that the general rule is that notice of a defence intention to make an application to adduce previous 
sexual history evidence…is served on the prosecution and the complainant before trial within a 
specified period. A time limit of 28 days before trial…is suggested to reduce uncertainty and stress 
to complainants.” Counihan, C. (2013) ‘Rape crisis network perspectives on sexual violence and 
the criminal justice system’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 23(4), 115-123, p. 118-119. 




cannot be submitted into evidence. The rules already mandate that an attempt to 
interrogate and/or introduce material concerning a victims’ “previous sexual 
history” must meet certain legislative parameters. Indeed, these were further 
elucidated by the judiciary in recent case law. The DPP v G.K. case established 
such queries ought to “be confined to what is strictly necessary” and avoid the 
inference that its purpose is “character assassination”. There should be previous 
guidance explicitly outlining the types of queries posed and why they are pursued.  
Organisations such as Rape Crisis Network Ireland are critical of the 
present laws. In fact, they have suggested reforms to streamline proceedings and 
improve the experience. They posit that the court ought to be the only authority 
that can provide notice that a Section 3 hearing will be pursued beyond the 
deadlines in place, where this is equitable. Prerequisites to guide the court 
concerning late attempts to cross-examine are deemed worthy of statute to provide 
procedural clarification. In those instances, before the subject matter in this regard 
goes to trial, they also feel that the state ought to convey the stance they will be 
taking in this regard, in addition to the victim’s view on the matter to the presiding 
judge.41   
 
41 “…application for leave to cross-examine and/or adduce evidence of “previous sexual history” 
of the complainant must satisfy the statutory test… elaborated in DPP v G.K [[2007] 2 I.R. 92. ], 
… questions should “be confined to what is strictly necessary” and should exclude any suggestion 
that what is intended is in fact a “character assassination”[ [2007] 2 I.R. 92. pp. 103-104]…notice 
of intention should indicate clearly the categories of questions to be asked, the reasons for asking 
them, and the parameters of the questions…it should only be possible to serve notice of intention 
to make a Section 3 application outside the time limit with the leave of the trial judge, if he/she is 




The body also deems it proper that the accused participate at this point and 
clarify in advance if their side wishes to pursue a hearing under Section 3. The 
overarching thinking behind structuring proceedings in this manner is that it can 
allow for the prompt anticipation of dilemmas, deter postponements as well as 
confusion, whilst engendering shorter, efficacious hearing. While most would be 
in favour of this Rape Crisis Network Ireland controversially recommended that 
reforms be passed to enable the ILR of victims to encompass both legal counsel as 
well as the right to speak on their behalf for the duration of the Section 3 request.  
 
satisfied …[c]riteria for consideration by a trial judge in relation to a late application to cross-
examine should also be prescribed in the legislation. At a pre-trial hearing…the prosecution should 
indicate their position, and the position of the complainant…should also be communicated to the 
court. The defence should also attend and indicate whether it intends to proceed to make the Section 
3 application...early indications will lead to early identification of trial issues…cut down on delays 
and uncertainty, and should lead to shorter, more efficiently run trials…the law should be amended 
to ensure that the role of the separate legal representative includes legal advice and representation 
from the time that notice of intention is served on the complainant, before and during the Section 3 
application itself, along with an entitlement to be present in court throughout the complainant's 
evidence and the hearing of all evidence pursuant to s.3 of the 1981 Act…no amendment to the 
legal aid legislation will be necessary…it would be necessary to amend…s.4A of the Criminal Law 
(Rape) Act 1981, as inserted by s.34 of the Sex Offenders' Act 2001, because as it is now drafted, 
it refers only the complainant's entitlement to be “heard in relation to the application and for this 
purpose, to be legally represented during the hearing of the application””. Counihan, C. (2013) 
‘Rape crisis network perspectives on sexual violence and the criminal justice system’, Irish 
Criminal Law Journal, 23(4), 115-123, p. 119. 




They also feel that they should have the right to attend for the duration of 
the victim’s testimony as well as for the determination of the accused’s application 
under Section 3. Interestingly no change to the statute concerning legal aid, would 
be needed. Yet Section 4A of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981, as amended, 
would, due to the phraseology of the provision itself. Furthermore, there are also 
constitutional considerations. As further expansion may well lead to the perception, 
if not materialisation, of a violation of an accused person’s due process rights.  
In the final analysis, despite the flaws with the provision of ILR for victims, 
as well as the threats its expansion, if not very existence, poses to due process, 
some points are worth iterating to place this transition in its wider context.42 
Allowing ILR for sex crime victims was a major move in favour of bolstering the 
 
42 “…ILR…in Ireland represents a significant shift towards enhancing victims’ rights in adversarial 
criminal justice…allows a unique level of victim participation…enabling victims to access 
government-funded ILR to oppose a defendant’s application for the introduction of their sexual 
history evidence…demonstrates that Ireland has sought to redress the trauma associated with sexual 
assault victims giving evidence, and being cross-examined in particular…as noted by the Stern 
Review (2010: 98)…representation in Ireland is limited, it represents an important recognition that 
there are times…where victims must be allowed to participate…to protect their rights and 
interests…the shortcomings…revolving around the delayed notice of intention, legal 
representative’s limited role and inconsistency in judicial discretion…the extent of the positive 
impacts of this reform for victims… suggest…there appears to be minimal preclusion of victims’ 
sexual history evidence…” Iliadis, M. (2019) ‘Victim representation for sexual history evidence in 
Ireland: A step towards or away from meeting victims’ procedural justice needs?’, Criminology & 
Criminal Justice, 0(0), 1-17, pp. 13-14. 




rights of victims within common law procedures. Such a change permits a novel 
degree of victim incorporation, complemented by state supplied legal assistance.  
In passing such laws our justice system is attempting to delimit the pain that 
involved with sex crime victims testifying and undergoing interrogation in court. 
Even with a curtailed ambit, its inclusion is an acknowledgement of periods in 
proceedings in which victims ought to contribute to proceedings so as to secure 
their entitlements from unfair prejudice. There are several issues with the provision 
of ILR. The protracted notice period, the restricted ambit of the victim’s 
representation as well as the unpredictability introduced by the considerable 
latitude given over to the court in this regard. It is also unclear whether there are 
significant benefits for complainants. Such reforms did not deter the considerable 
amount of successful admissions in this area. This infers that the negative impact 
in this context to the constitutional rights of the accused has been minor. It 
continues to be worrying that even in light of strong arguments in favour of not 
introducing such material the fact that such reforms seem to have had little real 
impact are indicative of the dated thinking which often permits such material. All 
of this tends to encourage the view that the flaw in such reforms may not be their 
explicit content, but, at least, part in the way they are executed and/or perceived. 
Namely through a lens which is too accommodating of antiquated views of women.  
It is similarly important to highlight the transformative consequences that 
may flow from the independent legal representation of victims in Section 34. 
Especially given their capacity to engender greater victim incorporation as well as 
safeguarding victims from the exacerbation of trauma. Yet, its incorporation has 
detrimentally impacted the prevention of disclosure of intimate material. In fact, 




such dilemmas are just as frequent outside of this legal system, and appear resistant 
to reform of a legal nature. These issues with Section 34 tend to corroborate work 
that has highlighted similar gendered prejudice, even after legal reforms.43 
The question then arises as to how exactly these issues might be rectified. 
A controversial proposition would be the expansion of ILR beyond its present 
confines. This would be problematic given the resistance demonstrated to simply 
achieve present gains. Yet, even achieving this, whilst protecting the accused’s due 
process rights, would not wholly remedy the situation. What is arguably needed is 
the contestation of those entrenched procedures which have led to the intimate past 
of female victims often prejudicing assessments of accountability and culpability. 
As it is this which motivates the supremacy, as well as thought behind endeavours 
to introduce material regarding the intimate past of victims into evidence at trial. 
 
43 “…‘despite compelling justifications for restrictions the failed safeguards point to the ‘erroneous 
purposes’ for which [such evidence] is frequently admitted…(McGlynn, 2017: 373), many…stem 
from the ‘resilience of cultural mythologies about women and sexuality’ (Stubbs, 2003: 23)…while 
noting the potentially beneficial impacts of ILR…in terms of fostering victim participation…ILR 
has had a counter effect of retaining sexual history evidence…not unique to Ireland…even amid 
reform…the shortcomings…lend further support to research…critically analys[ing[ women’s 
experiences of procedural injustice following…victim-oriented reforms…(Bronitt, 1998)…one 
solution may involve the need to extend the ILR…responses are also needed to ‘challenge [the] 
deeply embedded practices[...]that result in women’s sexual history and character 
influencing…blame and guilt’ (McGlynn, 2017: 392)…[which] underpin[s] the frequency and 
rationale of applications to adduce sexual history evidence.” Iliadis, M. (2019) ‘Victim 
representation for sexual history evidence in Ireland: A step towards or away from meeting victims’ 
procedural justice needs?’, Criminology & Criminal Justice, 0(0), 1-17, pp. 13-14. 




Yet, some more hard-line positions advocate that the rights of the victim 
cannot be separated from the wider public interest when it comes to justice. 
Although this is contested, it brings fascinating arguments to the fore. How narrow 
or wide can the public interest be defined, do basic human rights undermine the 
entire notion of a public interest and in what way might we rectify incompatibilities 
between to two. Despite that fact that most would assert that it is in the public 
interest that human rights are respected there does not seem to be an ‘meta-
principle’ to definitively resolve these issues.44 Despite the interesting nature of 
these intellectual cul-de-sacs, it could, and has been alleged that such problems 
may well be moot points, as the data on the subject of participational victims’ rights 
in the area of greatest contention, the VIS, contradicts their foundation claims. 
 It, on the contrary, supports the opposite notion that the participation of the 
victim has not led to the undermining of the due process rights of the accused. 
Indeed, the data actually indicates that such informational input tends to lead to 
 
44 “Ashworth (1993; 2000; 2002: 77) argues, that victims’ interests should count for no more than 
those of other citizens when considering in whose interests the criminal justice process is being 
carried out…the issue of victims’ rights and the public interest also raises other difficult questions. 
These include defining the nature of the public interest; whether public interest arguments are 
contrary to the intrinsic nature of fundamental rights; how conflicts between fundamental rights and 
the public interest (or conflicting public interests) might be resolved…while it may be in the public 
interest that fundamental rights are upheld, there is an absence of any meta-principle to guide 
rational choice and so provide for the principled development of human rights norms (Douzinas, 
1996: 128).” Henman, R. (2004) 'Conceptualizing Access to Justice and Victims' Rights in 
International Sentencing', Social and Legal Studies, 13(1), 27–56, p. 33. 




more accurate sentencing. Therefore, despite the protestations of many an 
academic, it could be asserted, that the VIS creates fairness rather than inequity.45 
Before assessing the extent to which the victim has been re-integrated within the 
Irish criminal justice system, it is particularly important to outline and substantiate 
the contention that this chapter makes that the increased protection of victims’ 
interests has not resulted in the erosion of the accused’s due process rights.46  
Although this chapter will outline the legal recognition of victim rights by 
the Irish judiciary, there have been instances in which the courts have assessed the 
interaction between victims and the due process rights entitlements of the accused. 
Indeed, even in those instances where such concerns might have initially been 
 
45 “Research suggests…possible erosion of…rights of defendants…have not materialised…VIS 
make an important contribution to proportionality rather than to severity...” Erez, E. (1999) ‘Who’s 
afraid of the big bad victim? Victim Impact Statements as victim empowerment and enhancement 
of justice’, Criminal Law Review, 49(26), 545–556, pp. 547-548. 
46 “…P.C. v. D.P.P., [ [1999] 2 i.r. 25.] J.O’C. v. D.P.P. [ [2000] 3 I.R. 478] and P.O’C. v. D.P.P. 
[ [2000] 3 i.r. 87]…mandated a temporary assumption of guilt…allowing an inquiry into whether 
“the delay in making [the complaint] was referable to the accused’s own actions.” [[2000] 3 i.r. 478 
at 478.] … in J.O’C. [[2000] 3 i.r. 478] and P.O’C.,[[2000] 3 i.r. 87] these…represented an 
unacceptable interference with the rights of the accused. Hardiman J. opined in J.O’C. that “there 
is…no basis whatever for assuming the truth of the allegations against the defendant…for any 
purpose...” [[2000] 3 i.r. 478 at 517.]…Murray J. in P.O’C. held that an assumption of guilt…is 
“inconsistent with the fundamental rights of a citizen.” [[2000] 3 i.r. 87at 104.]… S.H. v. D.P.P.… 
moved away from the issue…to focus on the overriding issue of the accused’s right to a fair trial.” 
Hamilton, C. (2011) ‘The Presumption of Innocence in Irish Criminal Law: Recent Trends and 
Possible Explanations’, Irish Journal of Legal Studies, 2(1), p. 60. 




overlooked, as they were in the prohibition cases on delay, the self-correcting 
process of the courts has strived to ensure an appropriate accommodation of victim 
rights. This has ensured that they do not infringe upon the rights of the accused.  
There were other threats to the accused’s due process rights due to the re-
introduction of the victim into criminal proceedings. The VIS creates the potential 
for distinct procedural advantages. It creates an official opportunity for the victim 
to play a criminal justice role which can arguably increase public sympathy. The 
chance to articulate the hurt suffered by an offence in such a venue might also serve 
as a cathartic forum for self-expression. It could also give some closure, and, 
operates as a reformative concession to address the historical neglect of victims. 
The risks posed by such an approach are also obvious. These involve the potential 
for arbitrariness, unfairness and punitiveness. In addition to this, there is also the 
risk that the creation of a façade of influence might ultimately be disempowering, 
and could actually create greater disillusionment with our justice system. There are 
also problems involving the incorporation of the emotion of victims, as well as the 
implications that this may have for the objectivity and uniformity of procedure. 
Although the VIS and how it fits within criminal justice is something of a 
neglected topic in an Irish context other countries have grappled with these issues.47 
 
47  “In Ireland, there has been little academic commentary on the use and appropriateness of 
VIS…Ashworth…believes that sentences have become noticeably more severe due to the use of 
VIS. He also questions whether they may be detrimental to procedural and substantive justice. These 
claims have been dismissed by other commentators, with Erez noting that victims see VIS as 
particularly important if they have never had the chance to be involved in the justice process. While 
the increasing recognition of the victim is in one way a positive step, it can prove difficult to 




Academics like Ashworth tend to see the VIS as promoting greater penality, as well 
the undermining of the accused’s due process rights. Erez instead tends to highlight 
how victims tend to view the VIS as somewhat crucial. Despite the advantages, 
there is something of a latent, if not patent, tension between victim inclusion and 
the traditional tenants of our conventional administration of justice. Indeed, those 
that work with victims infer that their participational urge is motivated not by 
retribution but contribution. Their participation is geared more towards their 
vindication, as opposed to the excessive punishment of perceived guilt. Their desire 
to participate helps them feel valued, and is, as such, cathartic in nature. 
The people that arguably know victims best argue that the actual influence 
of VIS on penal severity is negligible. Instead the procedure provides victims with 
a vital forum for their self-expression. Yet it might be contended that this may be 
an overly positive reading of the situation. Since victims do in essence have provide 
their perspective regarding punishment. Others contend that the benefits of the VIS 
are overstated. As it may suggest to victims that they will be influencing the 
 
reconcile the values of the criminal justice system with a focus on victims. Victim support workers 
have suggested that victims do not wish to be involved in the criminal justice process because they 
seek a harsh or long sentence, but because they want to participate in some way in what they 
perceive to be “their day” in court. It is the opinion of victim support workers that the vast majority 
of victims who attend court merely want to be acknowledged and are unconcerned with the 
outcome, other than a guilty verdict. They merely seek vindication…[t]hose working in victim 
support also maintain that the purpose of VIS is not to influence sentencing but to give a much-
needed voice to the victim.” Guiry, R. (2006) ‘Who is the Victim? The Use of Victim Impact 
Statements in Murder and Manslaughter Cases’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 16(3),1-9, p. 2. 




determination of a penalty, and when those who do participate realise their 
participation was not determinative, they may become disillusioned with the 
process which could be more counterproductive than not having a VIS. Erez 
acknowledged this as a potential outcome where hopes are raised and not met.48   
 There are also other issues with regards to the notion of proportionality. As 
a VIS could create a situation whereby differing responses are elicited to offences 
dependent on the reaction of the victim as opposed to its blameworthiness. The VIS 
as such provides information with regards to an offence’s outcome. Yet this might 
arguably have little to do with the actual careful calibration of the sentence by the 
presiding judge. There are some, like Ashwoth that contend that for all the VIS’s 
prominence it arguably does not really benefit the manner by which the process 
treats victims. O’Malley, in their comparative assessment of the operation of the 
VIS highlights these kinds of negative aspects. However, although this is true of 
 
48 “Ashworth does point out…that this is not necessarily the case, since victims are invariably asked 
for their opinion as regards sentencing. It has been suggested that the value of VIS may be somewhat 
illusory because victims may be led to believe that they are contributing to the judicial process of 
sentencing. If victims do not…find that their statements in court have had any effect on sentencing, 
they might become even more disenchanted with the process than if they had never delivered a VIS. 
This point has also been noted by Erez, who acknowledges that raising victims’ expectations will 
inevitably lead to further dissatisfaction if those expectations remain unfulfilled. It would seem 
hypocritical of a criminal justice system to treat two people whose crimes are precisely the same 
differently on the basis of their victim’s response…” Guiry, R. (2006) ‘Who is the Victim? The Use 
of Victim Impact Statements in Murder and Manslaughter Cases’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 16 
(3),1-9, p. 2. 




other countries closer to home Grohovky contests the notion that an impassioned 
plea from victims increases punitivity.49 It is arguably asking much of our judiciary 
to remain unmoved in the face of such raw emotion without assistance. Perceptions 
wildly differ in this regard, as some like Carey suggest that this situation can 
increase sentence proportionality, while others such as O’Malley see it as a threat 
to the idea that a penal sentence should always necessarily correspond to a crime.50 
The sentencing of Wayne O’Donoghue is a notorious reminder of the issues 
that the VIS has presented for due process and proportionality. Although the 
 
49  “Ashworth believes that VIS… do little to improve the genuine respect given to victims. 
O’Malley [O’Malley, T. (1993) ‘Punishment and moral luck: the role of the victim in sentencing 
decisions’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 3(1), 40-60, p.45] has considered…VIS…and has shown 
…inappropriateness…Grohovsky [Grohovsky, J. A. (2000) ‘Giving Voice to Victims—Why the 
Criminal Justice System in England and Wales Should Allow Victims to Speak up for 
Themselves’, The Journal of Criminal Law, 64(4), 416–430, p. 416.] notes… judges hear emotional 
pleas all the time, and suggests that the victim’s account of events will not cause a judge to impose 
an unduly harsh sentence…” Guiry, R. (2006) ‘Who is the Victim? The Use of Victim Impact 
Statements in Murder and Manslaughter Cases’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 16(3),1-9, p. 2. 
50 “O'Malley [O’Malley, T. (1993) ‘Punishment and moral luck: the role of the victim in sentencing 
decisions’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 3(1), 40-60, p. 50] considers the inherent flaw of the 1993 
Act to be its failure to give any guidance on the weight to be attributed to VIS…Carey [Carey, G. 
(2000) ‘Victims, Victimology and Victim Impact Statements’ ICLJ, 10(3), 8-13, p.11] believes that 
VIS contribute significantly to sentence proportionality…in contrast with O'Malley’s belief that 
[it]… is in “grave danger of conflicting with proportionality”. [O’Malley, T. (1993) ‘Punishment 
and moral luck: the role of the victim in sentencing decisions’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 3(1), 
40-60, p. 50]” Guiry, R. (2006) ‘Who is the Victim? The Use of Victim Impact Statements in 
Murder and Manslaughter Cases’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 16(3),1-9, p. 2. 




accused had received a manslaughter conviction, the mother of the victim, Majella 
Holohan, took the opportunity the VIS presented to allude to information that did 
not emerge during O’Donoghue’s trial. Such contentions supported the allegation 
that there was something more sinister at play than a tragic unintentional killing.51  
 Yet these contentions had little impact on the penalty the court imposed. 
Despite this, O’Donoghue’s representation strongly contested the contentions 
made by the victim’s mother and were especially displeased with the fact that such 
details had not been disclosed to them in advance of their announcement in court.  
Carney J informed the mother of the victim in this instance that the sentence that 
was to be imposed was likely to be displeasing to her, as the court was bound to 
penalise only those crimes officially introduced at trial. The ultimate penalty of 
four years penal servitude prompted widespread condemnation in the press. Indeed, 
it rapidly altered the case’s narrative from one of sympathy to enraged indignation. 
The media storm that ensnared O’Donoghue continued for a considerable amount 
of time, and continued to dog them even after their eventual release in 2008.52  
 
51 In the recent trial of Wayne O'Donoghue…another high-profile VIS was delivered. [DPP v 
O'Donoghue, unreported, Central Criminal Court, January 24, 2006. ] O'Donoghue had pleaded 
guilty to the manslaughter…and after a jury trial was acquitted of murder…Majella Holohan… 
made a VIS which she used to discuss certain evidence which had not been presented at trial…Mrs 
Holohan departed from this script to refer to certain forensic evidence which the DPP had not 
used…” Guiry, R. (2006) ‘Who is the Victim? The Use of Victim Impact Statements in Murder and 
Manslaughter Cases’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 16 (3),1-9, pp.7-8. 
52 “Mrs Holohan's unexpected allegations did not affect the sentencing…[c]ounsel for the defendant 
vehemently objected… particularly since they were not included in the VIS shown to the legal 




The statements of Carney J at sentencing are illustrative, as he was carrying 
out his punitive duty for the state, with the state and the accused being the two 
relevant parties, exclusive of the victim. He also clarified that even where a VIS is 
introduced the court is duty bound to abstain from the use of this in such a way as 
to achieve greater punitiveness. This outcome, where the judiciary treat such 
statements in a dispassionate manner is arguably ideal. If it is deployed properly 
little argument against the VIS can really be mounted. Yet difficulties will emerge 
if the VIS does shape the sentence imposed, which is an ever-present threat, simply 
due to the nature of the statement, and the passions and incentives that it creates.53   
 
teams…Carney J.…warned Mrs Holohan that she would be upset by the sentence…four years' 
imprisonment. Media reports…expressed outrage…[t]he media…displayed a remarkable change in 
attitude…[w]here previously O'Donoghue had been the subject of much pity…there was now a 
general outcry…it did affect the public perception of…O'Donoghue, who was vilified…for some 
time after the trial.” Guiry, R. (2006) ‘Who is the Victim? The Use of Victim Impact Statements in 
Murder and Manslaughter Cases’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 16(3),1-9, pp.7-8. 
53 “Carney J. made it quite clear…that he was sentencing O'Donoghue on behalf of the State, and 
that the trial was not a contest between the family of the deceased and the accused, but between the 
State and the accused…he emphasised that although the family of the victim may present a VIS, it 
will never be used so that the court engage in retaliatory sentencing. If…VIS…will be treated 
objectively… there can be no objection…[h]owever, if the VIS is to affect sentencing, a problem 
may arise. There is always a potential for victims to feel vindictive… this can lead to very emotional 
VIS …we must consider if our judiciary can remain unaffected by high degrees of emotion in order 
to hand down a fair sentence...” Guiry, R. (2006) ‘Who is the Victim? The Use of Victim Impact 
Statements in Murder and Manslaughter Cases’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 16(3),1-9, pp.7-8. 




There are other issues with VIS even where judicial objectivity can be 
maintained. The solemnity of the court may be undermined by its often emotionally 
charged rhetoric. At the same time, taking the topic of uniformity of outcome, the 
VIS could, if it does introduce indeterminacy, create a situation where it is hard, if 
not impossible to guarantee that this is eliminated. Having said that, a brief moment 
that falls to the victim does seem like something that can be fairly secured. 
Particularly considering the benefits to the victim. The question is not should the 
victim be incorporated, but rather how ought this be done, as it seems accepted that 
the due process and victim inclusion are by no means irreconcilable in Ireland.54 
Indeed, the O’Donoghue case illustrates how the procedural entitlements of 
victims were incorporated without infringing due process. Carney J was able to 
factor the rights of both the accused and victim into their considerations, without 
allowing the rights of the victim to upset the balance hitherto secured.55 Although 
 
54 “If the…VIS is not to have a major effect on the fate of the accused party, then why prevent the 
family of a victim from making a statement that will help them to deal with what has 
happened?…there is the argument that the courtroom should never be the place for…displays of 
grief. Courts…are…objective places of facts…there is no way to ensure that a VIS will not affect 
sentencing in an unfair manner… [a]llowing a fraction of the time of a trial to the family of a murder 
victim is something the criminal justice system should be able to accomodate. Doing so does not 
take from the time of other individuals…and to the family it can mean everything. Preserving the 
integrity of the system while affording some consideration to the victim need not be mutually 
exclusive goals.” Guiry, R. (2006) ‘Who is the Victim? The Use of Victim Impact Statements in 
Murder and Manslaughter Cases’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 16(3),1-9, pp.7-8. 
55 Daly, Y.M. (2011) 'Victim Participation in the Criminal Process', New Zealand Law Journal, 
247-251. 




Carney J felt the input of the victim was of assistance, several caveats were in place 
to secure balance in this regard. They revolve around the idea that the judiciary 
ought to limit the ambit of the victim, and caution them that if they exceed their 
mandate they could be held in contempt. This can even involve the judge 
articulating that a sentence may be reduced if a VIS is pursued in such a way that 
might impact upon the presumption of innocence of the accused. Although such 
rules might seem unfair, they are essential in order to secure a defendant’s due 
process rights. This is particularly critical in the era of social media and ‘trial by 
media’. Yet it is consequently contended that the curtailment of the accused’s due 
process rights can be largely avoided. Since an accused’s rights are secured by the 
threat of contempt, which curtails the articulations, and in actions, of victims.56  
In addition to this, there is also the potential that the VIS might be a vehicle 
for self-growth, forgiveness and transcendence of the desire for revenge. Yet even 
such an outcome also presents a danger that it could be utilised to unfairly reduce 
penality. In such a situation a victim may encourage the minimisation of 
punishment during sentencing. This undermining of the procedural integrity of the 
system may also violate the rights and/or interests of victims and\or society, as well 
as the due process rights of offenders to proportionate and equivalent justice.  
This is probably best illustrated by People (DPP) v RO’D [2000] 4 i.r. 361. 
Here certain sexual crimes had been admitted to, but the victims, who were closely 
 
56 Daly, Y.M. (2011) 'Victim Participation in the Criminal Process', New Zealand Law Journal, 
247-251.  




related to the accused, argued for leniency. They did this during the sentencing of 
those offences committed against them. Yet the judiciary were clear questions as 
to sentencing were for the judiciary. Indeed, they clarified that although the impact 
of a crime on a victim are considered, these were not deferred to, and both positive 
and negative penal populism were expressly rejected.  
This ensured the due process rights of the accused are always given due 
regard, and not derogated due to the inclusion of victim or articulation of their 
perspective. In the words of Geoghegan J, “[f]rom time to time victims…express 
views as to sentence such as for instance ‘he should be locked up for life’. It has 
never been the practice in this jurisdiction for the victims of an offence to be 
permitted to express views in that sense as to what a proper sentence might be. In 
the opinion of the court, s.5 [of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, introducing VIS] 
makes no change in that regard.” 57 
Another area of concern is the new legal situation with regards to 
disclosure. As Section 39 of The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017 has, 
made it more difficult for the accused to access the psychological history of a 
victim during a criminal trial. There are clearly several obvious advantages to such 
a system whereby a judicial hearing ascertains the proprietary of disclosure. This 
would avoid fishing expeditions into a victims’ past, which might then be used to 
substantiate character assassinations at trial. Such a potentiality might also be 
 
57 People (DPP) v RO’D [2000] 4 i.r. 361 at pp. 364-365. Daly, Y.M. (2011) 'Victim Participation 
in the Criminal Process', New Zealand Law Journal, 247-251. 




exacerbated by the weaponization of some of the antiquated medical narratives 
about femininity and psychic abnormality. Since this might negatively impact upon 
the believability of victims.  It also deters the improper sharing of the sensitive 
personal victim information. Information that may have serious implications if 
disseminated, and could, if shared, constitute a massive infringement of the privacy 
rights of victims. These infringements might, due to their particularly intimate 
nature, also lead to the re-traumatisation of victims.  
The risks in this regard are less obvious, but just as serious. There is a 
potential that the introduction of such a system might impinge upon the important 
right of the accused to access relevant information. By making it more difficult to 
obtain critical, potentially exculpatory, evidence about the psychological condition 
and past of a victim there is a chance that this may lead to a lack of rigor of the in-
trial interrogations of victim narratives. Indeed, there is a chance that this could 
result in the greater use of improper evidence to support criminal allegations. 
 If this were to happen the innocent may well be wrongfully convicted. This 
would mean that such convictions would be secured without adequate due process 
safeguards. Such an uncontested introduction of flawed evidence could potentially 
result in a violation of the accused’s due process rights and innocence presumption. 
They may also result in an unwarranted infringement of their rights and liberty, 
where they are erroneously convicted of an offence. The potential for these 
miscarriages of justice considerably increase where there is a popular desire to 
punish. Particularly in those contexts where public outcry might effectively operate 
in such a way as to engender unsafe convictions based on flimsy evidence.  




There is clearly an imperative to protect a victim’s right to privacy. 
However, certain abridgements of the ability of the accused to obtain such 
information have been introduced where deemed by a court to be inappropriate. 
The first thing to recognise in relation to any restriction on disclosure to the defence 
is that the accused has a due process right to access evidence relevant to their case.58 
This rights is intertwined with the entitlements of the accused to receive the benefits 
of the presumption of innocence, as well as a fair due process trial. Where these 
entitlements are infringed miscarriages of justice often follow. The Wall case 
serves as a reminder of this, and one that should be placed in its unique context. At 
the time several historical abuse allegations were emerging, and yet another 
member of a religious order was found guilty and punished for child molestation.  
Yet this conviction was later overturned. This revision was due to the 
absence of a fair trial. As unsubstantiated personal reflections were adduced as 
evidence and had not been made available to the accused before trial. In fact, there 
was also an absence of disclosure of records of the victim’s psychological past.59 
 
58 “[T]he prosecution are under a duty to disclose to the defence any material which may be relevant 
to the case which could either help the defence or damage the prosecution and that if there is such 
material which is in their possession they are under a constitutional duty to make that available to 
the defence.” McKevitt v Director of Public Prosecutions, Unreported Supreme Court, 18 March 
2003 Keane CJ ex tempore. 
59 “Disclosure may be important in order to protect the defendant’s right to the presumption of 
innocence and the constitutional right to a trial in due course of law. This argument is illustrated by 
the notorious case of Wall in which a former nun was convicted of raping and sexually assaulting a 
12‐year‐old girl…[People v Wall and McCabe [2005] IECCA 140.] Ms Wall received a life 




These pieces of evidence are pivotal in such trials, as the presence of concrete 
determinative information sources are scarce. Access to such materials allow the 
accused a crucial, but limited, ambit within which to interrogate the authenticity of 
the allegations made against them. Mainly through an examination of the manner 
by which a narrative is constructed and whether any irregularities undermine it. 
The appeal case in which the conviction of Nora Wall was overturned deals 
with these issues and highlights the risks that created such injustice. The case was 
pursued with a faulty evidence source from the outset, which should not have been 
done due to the unreliability of the victim. In addition, there were two major non-
disclosures of information to the accused. One in relation to a previous false 
allegation, and another of the victims highly relevant, as well as pertinent, 
psychological past. These breaches of due process and accused rights were further 
compounded by the procedural injustices caused by the improper introduction of 
unsubstantiated information without prior notification to the accused and their legal 
 
sentence…[s]he was subsequently granted a miscarriage of justice certificate…based on a finding 
of prejudice arising from the introduction into evidence, without prior notification to the defence, 
of the complainant’s flashbacks and recovered memories, which was not supported by any scientific 
evidence, and the fact that the prosecution had not disclosed the complainant’s psychiatric history 
to the defence. Thus, in historical child abuse cases, which are often devoid of physical evidence 
and may have only a limited number of witnesses, counselling records present a rare opportunity 
for the defence to challenge the complainant/victim’s credibility by exploring how accounts 
emerged and in examining potential inconsistencies in accounts of abuse.” Ring, S. (2017) ‘Trauma 
and the Construction of Suffering in Irish Historical Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions’, 
International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy, 6 (3), 88-103, p.94.  




representation. This operated in such a way as to compound their effective response 
to the introduction of such material. Each procedural violation was flagged as 
important, re-enforcing the courts view that an injustice had occurred.60 
The case of Nora Wall therefore operates as cautionary tale which 
highlights the dangers of overlooking due process entitlements, and how this can 
not only breach an accused’s right but produce wrongful convictions. It is important 
to recognise that these are not concerns for certain groups or ones separate from 
our own. There is always a danger that each of us may be wrongfully accused. An 
oversimplification that always infects debate on these issues is that ‘the innocent 
have nothing to fear’. This however misunderstands and dilutes the respect 
generally paid to the concept of rights, which are the common ownership of us all.  
 
60 “The prosecution which did take place…involved the tendering of corroborative evidence by a 
witness known to be unreliable…thus…a prosecution that should not have been brought…there had 
been significant non-disclosure in this case, including (a) the information that Regina Walsh had 
made…an allegation of being raped in England and (b) the non-disclosure of Regina Walsh’s very 
proximate and material psychiatric history…the applicant was further prejudiced…by evidence of 
which the defence had no prior notification, namely, that Regina Walsh recalled the alleged episodes 
of rape by reference to ‘flashbacks and/or retrieved memory’. There was no scientific evidence of 
any sort adduced to explain the phenomenon of ‘flashbacks’ and/or ‘retrieved memory’, nor was 
the applicant in any position to meet such a case in the absence of prior notification thereof…this 
court does not find it necessary…to elaborate a hierarchy…which either singly or cumulatively 
amount to a miscarriage of justice. Virtually all of the newly-discovered facts are facts of 
significance which confirm the court in its view that there has been a miscarriage of justice...” 
D.P.P.-v- Nora Wall [2005] IECCA 140, Kearns J. p. 13. 




It is easy to other the accused, but less so when a charge is levelled against 
us or those closest to us. It is therefore worth reemphasising the presumption of 
innocence as a constitutional guarantee in the context of disclosure and how its 
neglect can have a detrimental impact upon the rights and liberty of the accused. 
Although, Article 38.1 is the main fount due to its due process guarantee, it might 
be advisable, in light of cases such as the Nora Wall, to also consider the preamble. 
Those core values, which all constitutional provisions must be read in light of, to 
advance ‘prudence, justice and charity’ as well as the ‘dignity and freedom of the 
individual’ were damaged by the injustice of that case. Yet they are also ones the 
courts have iterated are at the heart of how it treats fair procedure issues such as 
disclosure. It is therefore clear, that despite the risks, the judiciary constantly strive 
to uphold these values in their interpretation, and defence, of due process rights.61 
 
61 Nora Wall…serve[s] as salutary reminders of the importance of procedural rights in avoiding an 
increased violation of individual rights and convictions of the innocent. A related point is that we 
are all at risk of unjust conviction. This requires the explosion of another important myth which acts 
as a barrier to full appreciation of the importance of the presumption of innocence – …that ‘the 
innocent have nothing to fear’, yet these rights belong to all citizens and our appreciation of their 
importance is often stymied by viewing them in this way. Consider a scenario in which a family 
member has been detained by the police. Ashworth…poses the question: “[h]ow would you wish 
them to be treated? Should it be for the police to decide how long and under what conditions they 
should be kept, or should they have rights?” [A. Ashworth, (2002) Human Rights, Serious Crime 
and Criminal Procedure London: Sweet Maxwell, pp. 5-6.]…in an Irish context, it is appropriate 
to consider the broader constitutional framework within which the presumption of innocence is 
located. While the presumption probably has the strongest association with Article 38.1 of the 
Constitution…it should also be considered in the light of the commitment by the state in the 





Another area of concern in this regard is the introduction of bail reform. 
Section 9A of the Bail Act 1997 now allows victims to tender evidence of the 
potential impact that granting bail to an accused might have on their person and/or 
family. This is then taken into account by the court in the assessment of whether 
an accused should be granted bail. It serves a major departure from the previous 
conceptualisation of bail, which had more to do with ensuring a trial proceed. 
However, there is now a recognition that there may well be other relevant concerns. 
The advantages of factoring victims into the question of bail are obvious. 
From a buy-in perspective, allowing victim input might clearly increase procedural 
satisfaction. Since victim protection, as well as avoidance of reprisals and/or repeat 
offending would be a relevant consideration. This is well known due to the 
notoriety of the previous bail situation, which was more geared towards securing 
the accused for trial. Although this is a principled approach, there was a perceived 
overlooking of victim interests during bail applications. This ultimately led to a 
perception that victims were exposed. Therefore, several potential victim support 
advantages are self-evident. However, a number of risks must also be considered. 
 
Preamble to promote the common good “with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity so 
that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured.” This approach was clearly endorsed 
by O’Higgins C.J. in State (Healy) v. Donoghue who invoked the Preamble in support of the courts’ 
view of ‘fair procedures’: “[i]n my view the Preamble makes it clear that rights given by the 
Constitution must be considered in accordance with concepts of prudence, justice and charity. 
[[1976] I.R. 325.]”  Hamilton, C. (2011) ‘The Presumption of Innocence in Irish Criminal Law: 
Recent Trends and Possible Explanations’, Irish Journal of Legal Studies, 2(1), p. 7. 




The risks of section 9A of the Bail Act 1997 are complex and abstract. Its 
incorporation of victims’ contentions as to the potential impact of granting a bail 
application, which involves the admission of hearsay evidence into this 
determination, is problematic. The new conceptualisation differs from its previous 
perception and purported aims. It therefore involves the incorporation of crime 
control values into bail, an area previously dominated by due process thought. This 
slant could result in the dilution of the accused’s due process rights.  
The kinds of due process rights that might be impacted include the 
presumption of innocence. As a system where bail might be refused based on 
potential offending would suspend the presumption of innocence rights of the 
accused. The inference of a presumption of guilt creates the latitude for the scourge 
of preventative detention. Such preventative detention would not be restricted to 
matters where the security of the state is threatened either, but instead would 
become part of the ordinary functioning of the courts. It would therefore represent 
the normalisation of a punitive measure reserved for serious offences like terrorism. 
The presumption of guilt and preventative detention represent departures 
from traditional Irish justice. In fact, section 9A of the Bail Act of 1997 represents 
a trade off in values. As by allowing bail refusal, based on hearsay evidence, 
victims and society might be better protected. However, there is a risk of violations 
of the due process constitutional right to bail, the right to be presumed innocent, as 
well as the reluctance to use preventative detention in relation to ordinary crime. 
When discussing the bail situation in Ireland the first port of call is People 
(Attorney General) v. O'Callaghan [1966] I.R. 501. This ruling of the Supreme 




Court remains good law and applicable to bail assessments. The decision ensures 
the right of the accused to be presumed innocent is relevant to a bail 
determination. The case stipulates that bail’s purpose is to simply ensure the 
accused will attend trial and not flee the application of the law to their case. 
 The case of The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Simon 
McGinley [1998] 2 ILRM 233 is also helpful, as it set out parameters to limit bail 
refusal based on hearsay evidence, whether from the police, as in that case, or the 
victim. It stipulated that those seeking to refuse bail must confirm for the court 
that there is a strong chance the accused, if given bail, will likely commit another 
crime on bail. This supports the contention that hearsay evidence, when adduced 
to block a bail application is admissible, but only in extraordinary cases.62 
The position in the not so distant past was quite proscriptive when it came 
to the denial of bail to the accused. An accused could only be denied it where 
 
62  “During the analyses of bail condition in the Republic of Ireland the Irish case: People v 
O’Callaghan should be taken into account. The Supreme Court decision from 1966 is still valid and 
has the relevant application to current courts cases. In this Case the presumption of innocence rule 
can be found…[a]ccording to this, the main scope of giving bail is to secure the accused person 
presence during the court hearing. An important Irish case after 1997 is The People (Director of 
Public Prosecutions) v. Simon McGinley [[1998] 2 ILRM 233.] The court decision from this 
particular case is with respect to the refusal of bail, because of hearsay evidence provided by Garda 
and based on “Bail act 1997”, Section 2. According to that case, the prosecution needs to prove 
probability of the committing of another offence by the accused person. Nowadays, this case gives 
a significant principle for the admission of hearsay evidence in bail application process, which could 
be accepted only in exceptional circumstances.” Berski, A. (2014) Determinants of the Irish bail 
system before and after 1997, DIT: School of Languages, Law and Social Sciences, p. 5. 




were likely to flee or tamper with evidence, and the likelihood of them 
reoffending on bail was largely irrelevant to this determination. Yet now, it can 
actually be refused where there is a perceived threat that an accused may engage 
in crime on bail.63 This determination of whether there is a threat of reoffending 
also incorporates the standpoint of a victim, as well as their hearsay evidence.  
Such a legislative stance is potentially problematic, as it sharply departs 
from case law which saw bail as purely a determination of the propensity of the 
accused to flee or destroy evidence. Indeed, this determination was largely 
irrelevant of an assessment of the accused’s propensity to reoffend. It also 
appears to depart from the previous conceptualisation that the admission of 
hearsay evidence to support the denial of bail ought to be something of an 
exception rather than the rule.  There are also issues with regards to the latitude 
that such a change might have for the dilution of the presumption of innocence, as 
well as the reluctance in this jurisdiction to engage in preventative detention, at 
least in the normal exercise of the ordinary business of Irish criminal justice.  
This legislative alteration is therefore somewhat risky considering the due 
process rights at stake for the accused. This is best outlined in some of the leading 
case law on the subject. In Hoffman, an approach whereby the propensity of the 
 
63 “Within the ordinary criminal justice system…a suspect could only be refused bail in…Ireland 
on the basis of a risk that he might abscond or interfere with witnesses or evidence; no issue arose 
as to his propensity to commit crime while on bail… [i]f charged, bail may now be denied in the 
Republic because there is a risk that the accused might commit offences while on bail.” Daly, Y.M. 
and Jackson, J. (2016) 'The Criminal Justice Process: From Questioning to Trial', In D. Healy, et al. 
eds., The Routledge Handbook Of Irish Criminology, London: Taylor & Francis, p. 13-14. 




accused to reoffend based on arguably partisan hearsay evidence was seen as 
undermining the presumption of innocence guarantee. The stance was actually 
considered to represent an unwarranted presumption of guilt, in addition to a 
denial of one’s liberty through the refusal of bail and continuation of their 
incarceration. Indeed, it was asserted that a judge taking such a stance would be 
misconstruing the limits of their authority and unfairly exceeding them.64 
The case of The People (Attorney General) v. O'Callaghan [1966] I.R. 
501 also highlights issues posed to due process rights such as the presumption of 
innocence, as well as the historical reluctance of Irish courts to ordinarily permit 
preventative detention. These are challenged by Section 9A of the Bail Act 1997. 
O'Dalaigh C.J. rejected a situation whereby bail might be refused on the basis of 
the criminal acts an accused may commit if their incarceration is not continued as 
anathema to our democratic justice system. They based this on the fact that such 
an approach undermines the prerequisite that a person be deemed blameless 
before their guilt is proven. This stance was adopted as incarceration is a penalty 
where not solely to ensure an accused is available for justice to be administered.65  
 
64 “…a complete disregard for the presumption of innocence enjoyed by the applicant and indeed it 
indicates the very reverse, a presumption of guilt together with the imposition of a custodial 
punishment for the crime alleged, by a denial of bail. An approach such as this to a bail application 
entirely misconceives the judicial function and is an abuse of judicial power.” Hoffman v Director 
of Public Prosecutions and Coughlan Unreported, High Court, 4th March, 2005. O’Neill J. 
65 “The reasoning underlying this submission, is in my opinion, a denial of the whole basis of our 
system of law. It transcends respect for the requirement that a man shall be considered innocent 
until he is found guilty and seeks to punish him in respect of offences neither completed nor 




 Walsh J. was even more scathing in their critique of circumstances in 
which bail could be refused to pursue ‘preventative justice’. They felt this was 
repugnant to the objective of bail as a legal concept and the constitutional right to 
liberty the accused is entitled to possess. It was asserted that incarceration was an 
improper preventative punishment as the accused is innocent before the law. It 
was equally felt it would be wrong to incarcerate them based on a perception that 
the accused might engage in criminality were they not preventively detained.  
A caveat was made for exceptional situations. However, this needed to be 
clearly prescribed in legislation. It also had to be done to maintain the rule of law 
in a serious period of unrest or insurrection. 66 This was justified by the notion 
that the ordinary way of deterring crime is itself the latent threat of prosecution.  
 
attempted. I say 'punish' for deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment unless it can be 
required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon.” The People 
(Attorney General) v. O'Callaghan [1966] I.R. 501 O'Dalaigh C.J. at 508–9. 
66 “This is a form of preventative justice which has no place in our legal system and is quite alien 
to the true purposes of bail...[i]n this country it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal 
liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter 
upon which he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances he should be deprived of his 
liberty upon only the belief that he will commit offences if left at liberty, save in the most 
extraordinary circumstances carefully spelled out by the Oireachtas and then only to secure the 
preservation of public peace and order or the public safety and the preservation of the State in a 
time of national emergency or in some situation akin to that.The accepted method of preventing the 
commission of future offences is the threat of conviction and punishment. Apart from any of the 
fundamental considerations already referred to, even if one were to assume that the accused is guilty 
…that fact does not in any way establish the likelihood of the commission of another offence in the 




The court clear that even if the accused were guilty this guilt could not be 
an effective basis for an assessment as to the probability that they might engage in 
some other criminality before their hearing. They based their reasoning here on 
the fact that even among those individuals with a history of offending anticipating 
those who might engage in criminality on bail before their hearing is mere 
conjecture. To do so establishes a kind of ‘preventative justice’, which considers 
instances of an accused’s past criminality during their previous bail periods.  
These methods still fall foul of the issues regarding the accurate prediction 
of criminality on bail. The court was at pains to point out that incarceration prior 
to guilt is punitive in nature. They were therefore of the opinion that it would not 
be appropriate for a judge to deny bail to register their displeasure at past 
behaviour. This would be the case despite the perceived benefits of incarceration 
or whether repeat offending has taken place. A distinctly due process approach is 
taken in both cases. It almost goes without saying that section 9A of the Bail Act 
1997 departs from this in letter and spirit. The methods and aims of bail in this 
 
relatively short interval before his trial. In the vast majority of cases, even of persons with known 
criminal records, an attempt to predict who is likely to commit an offence while awaiting trial on 
bail can never be more than speculative. It would also be an attempt to impose a system of 
preventative justice to take into account the fact that the accused person committed offences while 
on bail on previous occasions and such a course is open to all the objections which I have already 
referred to…one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a 
substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of 
disapproval of former conduct…or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of 
giving…a lesson.” People (Attorney General) v. O'Callaghan [1966] I.R. 501, Walsh J at 516–7. 




context have been somewhat altered. Although this is done to help victims, one 
cannot help consider the wider implications of this for the accused and society.  
There is a trade-off here in values between crime control prevention and 
due process safeguards. It is a choice between victim preservation and 
preventative detention. However, it would be up to the judiciary, in their future 
interpretations of the limits of these areas to try to ensure that neither the interests 
of victims of the accused are overlooked. In this manner the courts are rather 
effective at ensuring an acceptable ‘base level of rights’. A foundation which 
ensures that, despite the tensions that occur this context, the sanctity of due 
process as well as the accused’s right to fair trial is not entirely undermined. 
It is hoped that the judiciary will place effective constraints in their 
interpretation of the new legislative provisions in this area. 67  These will be 
necessary to secure an effective balance between the rights of the accused and 
victim. This is not an impossible task, as it is one that they have achieved in many 
similar areas. Yet, previous case law, as well as the judicial pronouncements 
 
67 “…the courts guard rights which have constitutional status with particular care and are slow to 
allow any practices to develop which would breach those rights…[h]owever, once legislative 
measures were put in place, the courts did not interfere with them. This has been the general 
experience: where legislation is enacted which interferes with constitutional rights, the courts have 
usually endorsed it, so long as certain base-line protections are in place…[t]his shift in emphasis 
seems to be a reflection of the shift of the centre of gravity of the criminal process…and a judicial 
view that due process protections should follow that crime control-oriented realignment.” Daly, 
Y.M. and Jackson, J. (2016) 'The Criminal Justice Process: From Questioning to Trial', In D. Healy, 
et al. eds., The Routledge Handbook Of Irish Criminology, London: Taylor & Francis, p.26-27. 




contained within them suggest this will be difficult. Although there is always a 
judicial appetite to set boundaries and defend due process, this desire has been 
considerably curtailed by the restrictive construction of legislation in this area. 
These have altered bail as a legal construct, both in terms of its function and 
aims. Even though it might be hoped that the judiciary could effectively negate the 
severity of such reform, this may be an exercise in damage limitation, as opposed 
to avoidance. As the more expansive due process conception and operation of bail 
of the past, may have to give way, in this context, to the inclusion of crime control 
values. While this does not operate as a major curtailment of due process, and also 
provides victim cognisant gains, it is still hoped that, when looked at in hindsight, 
these do not come at too high a price. 
 Whilst having acknowledged these tensions, it is also important to note of 
some of the safeguards in this regard,68 the genesis of which can be traced back to 
the case of People (DPP) v Kenny. The case demonstrated the willingness69 of the 
 
68 [1990] 2 i.r. 110; [1990] Irish Law Reports Monthly 569 “…held that evidence obtained from the 
search carried out pursuant to the defective warrant ought to have been excluded…as the search had 
breached the accused’s constitutional right…whether or not the relevant gardaí knew that 
…[t]he…Court…declined…deterrence…as the controlling rationale for the exclusion of 
unconstitutional…evidence…” Daly, Y.M. (2011b.) ‘Judicial oversight of policing: Investigations, 
evidence and the exclusionary rule’, Crime, Law, and Societal Change, 55(1), pp. 8-10. 
69 “…protectionism was confirmed as the central rationale for…the exclusionary rule in Ireland 
where constitutional rights have been breached…‘[T]he…conviction of guilty 
persons…cannot…outweigh the…constitutional obligation ‘…to defend and vindicate the personal 
rights of the citizen’ [1990] 2 i.r. 110, at 134; [1990] Irish Law Reports Monthly 569 at 579…Finlay 




judiciary to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence from proceedings. Finlay 
CJ felt the judiciary were obliged to try, in interpreting the law, to adopt those 
provisions which best vindicate the due process entitlements of the suspect.70  
The exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence is therefore a due 
process protection which was one of the strongest provisions in this area globally, 
again evidenced in People (DPP) v Laide and Ryan [2005] 1 i.r. 20971. Although 
it was judicially evolved in DPP (Walsh) v Cash [2007] i.e.h.c. 108, [2010] i.e.s.c. 
1.  the decision was motivated by the perceived inflexibility of the rule, rather than 
by any sense of victim motivated penal populist sentiment. 72  Therefore, the 
 
CJ stated…“[E]vidence obtained by invasion of the constitutional personal rights of a citizen must 
be excluded unless a court is satisfied…the…breach…was committed unintentionally…or…there 
are extraordinary excusing circumstances…” [1990] 2 i.r. 110 at 134; [1990] Irish Law Reports 
Monthly 569 at 579” Daly, Y.M. (2011b.) ‘Judicial oversight of policing: Investigations, evidence 
and the exclusionary rule’, Crime, Law, and Societal Change, 55(1), pp. 8-10. 
70  “[A]s between two alternative…principles …the Court has…an obligation to choose the 
principle…likely to provide a… more effective defence and vindication of the right concerned” 
[1990] 2 i.r. 110 at 133; [1990] Irish Law Reports Monthly 569 at 578. 
71 ”...McCracken J…held that although the gardaí considered themselves to be lawfully within the 
appellant’s home…their intentional…actions in entering the home were in fact in breach of the 
appellant’s constitutional right…(due to the invalid search warrant) and therefore the arrest was 
unlawful [2005] 1 i.r. 209 at 234–35…statements made…to gardaí while in unlawful 
detention…ought to have been excluded …” Daly, Y.M. (2011b.) ‘Judicial oversight of policing: 
Investigations, evidence and the exclusionary rule’, Crime, Law, and Societal Change, 55(1), p. 11. 
72  “The strictness and rigidity of the Irish exclusionary rule…has been criticised… the Irish 
Supreme Court…in the case of DPP (Walsh) v Cash [2007]…[had the chance] to address the 




exclusionary rule, even post reform, still continues to vindicate the due process 
rights entitlements of the accused, albeit under a somewhat altered rationale. 
However, this evolution in thinking was somewhat worrying. Since it failed to 
clarify the courts new approach, as well as the concrete consequences that this new 
judicial evolution in relation to the exclusionary rule might have in the long term. 
In fact, very little was done to try to assess its future impact on accused’s rights.73  
Clarification would materialise in DPP v JC. [2015] i.e.s.c. 31. This was a 
landmark one in terms of victim inclusivity, but also in the way in which it dealt 
with how the due process rights of the accused would interact with the legal 
recognition of the victims in Ireland. It did this by addressing the law regarding 
 
exclusionary rule and either to support its ongoing strict application or row back…and allow greater 
discretion to trial judges…” Daly, Y.M. (2011b.) ‘Judicial oversight of policing: Investigations, 
evidence and the exclusionary rule’, Crime, Law, and Societal Change, 55(1), p. 2.  
73“In the High Court Charleton J…rejected…that the exclusionary rule was applicable …he…[felt 
it]…“…does not commend itself to the proper ordering of society…” [2007] i.e.h.c. 108 at para 65. 
[He] considered that the decision… should be based on a balancing of the interests of society as 
against the interests of the accused, taking into account the rights of the victim…the Supreme 
Court…[agreed]…”“…the Supreme Court…provides a very weak basis for the protection of 
suspects…unless a distinction [is] drawn between purposeful breach of rights and unknowing 
breach…alter[ing] the rationale of the exclusionary rule...”“…the…judgment has serious 
implications for…the…accused…if…gardaí were to purposefully breach…constitutional 
rights…the courts would not…exclude and…[i]f it did …the rationale of the Irish exclusionary rule 
would surely be altered…with exclusion being based on garda intention rather than on the protection 
of rights…” Daly, Y.M. (2011b.) ‘Judicial oversight of policing: Investigations, evidence and the 
exclusionary rule’, Crime, Law, and Societal Change, 55(1), p. 14-15 p. 68, 17-18. 




evidential exclusion. The case, although ostensibly about the correctness of 
admitting unconstitutionally obtained evidence was a litmus test of the Kenny 
decision and whether it set good precedent.74 The thrust of the decision was that 
evidence obtained in breach of a suspects constitutional rights, such as those 
governing due process, acquired without wrongdoing, would be permissible. 
However, evidence obtained through obvious wrongdoing, whether negligent or 
reckless, would have to be automatically excluded from trial proceedings. 
 Although the victim was given consideration, their rights were not the 
motivation for this change in approach by the judiciary, who articulated that it was 
motivated by the institutional integrity of the courts. Clark J summary of the new 
position placed considerable emphasis on knowledge. This made it the prerequisite 
 
74  “…[it] overruled Kenny, declaring it…erroneously decided, and established a new exclusionary 
rule…a 4-3 majority decision…which Hardiman J (dissenting) described as…“an alteration of [a] 
fundamental decision which is based on [the] exegesis of the Constitution itself.”” [[2015] IESC 
31. per Hardiman J. at [134].] Daly Y.M. (2015) ‘Overruling the protectionist exclusionary rule: 
DPP v JC.’, The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 19 (4), 270-280, p. 2. “… the Circuit 
Court judge effectively found that there had been no lawful authority in the warrant to allow the 
gardaí to enter JC’s dwelling...because there was no evidence to support any claim that the gardaí 
had entered the dwelling on foot of any other legal power, the accused was in unlawful 
custody…when he made the inculpatory statements, which were therefore inadmissible. Under the 
Kenny rule, this was absolutely the correct outcome…[h]owever…[w]hile it was accepted by…the 
Supreme Court that the trial judge had correctly applied the Kenny rule, the majority accepted… 
Kenny had been erroneously decided and accordingly exclusion of the evidence at JC’s trial…was 
erroneous.” Daly Y.M. (2015) ‘Overruling the protectionist exclusionary rule: DPP v JC.’, The 
International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 19 (4), 270-280, p. 2, 9. 




for the automatic exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Indeed, where 
it was not present there would only be a mere presumption towards exclusion. 
Therefore, total ignorance of the lack of constitutionality of a piece of evidence 
became the benchmark for its automatic exclusion from a criminal trial.75  
Despite obvious concerns for the dilution of the suspect’s due process rights 
what is evident is that such precedent is less about whittling away accused’s rights 
and more a question of altering the way in which constitutionally questionable 
evidence is assessed, and placing this on a more rational, standardised legal basis. 
Even though the full implications of cases such as these will only truly be evident 
 
75 “The…decision of the majority…in DPP v JC was that the Kenny case was erroneously 
decided…[t]he newly-stated rule…allows for evidence obtained in inadvertent breach of 
constitutional rights to be admitted at trial while evidence obtained in knowing, reckless or grossly 
negligent breach must be excluded, except in exceptional circumstances.” “O’Donnell J. noted the 
societal cost…from the exclusion of probative evidence: “the exclusion…extracts a significant price 
in terms of the capacity of the court to perform its primary function…and…in terms of confidence 
in, and respect for, the legal system.”[ [2015] i.e.s.c 31 per O’Donnell J. at 4 ]” “…[i]f a claim is 
raised that evidence was obtained in breach of constitutional rights, the onus is on the prosecution 
to establish either…no unconstitutionality, or…despite any interference with constitutional rights 
the evidence should still be admitted. [[2015] i.e.s.c. 31 per Clarke J. at 7.2] Where evidence is 
obtained in deliberate and conscious violation of constitutional rights…it should be excluded, 
except in exceptional circumstances…[w]here evidence was taken in breach of constitutional rights, 
but this was not deliberate and conscious, there is a presumption in favour of exclusion...” “…[o]nly 
a garda who has no idea that the warrant he holds may be invalid will obtain evidence that can be 
admitted.” Daly Y.M. (2015) ‘Overruling the protectionist exclusionary rule: DPP v JC.’, The 
International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 19 (4), 270-280, p. 11, pp. 12-13, p. 14.  




in the fullness of time, what is clear in their immediate aftermath is that far from a 
penal populist approach, the courts tended to focus more on the importance of 
seeking an appropriate equilibrium between various rights, as well as the 
importance of the due process integrity of the justice system. Indeed, both of these 
were ostensibly threatened by the previous rule in Kenny before it was overturned.76 
The impact and the subsequent interpretation the judiciary have given to JC 
can be seen in the subsequent case of Criminal Assets Bureau v Murphy [2018] 
i.e.s.c 12. This case extended the new exclusionary rule to those who were deprived 
of assets believed to be acquired through illicit means. The court assessed the 
 
76 “…Hardiman J’s dissent…suggested that this new test signified a significant shift… detrimental 
to the protection of individual rights…the reality may not be quite so extreme. Hogan…has 
suggested that: “…the majority in JC did not abandon the exclusionary rule doctrine entirely, but 
simply sought to mitigate its more dramatic, unanticipated results…” “Clarke J noted that…“[t]he 
practical significance of the new direction …will only become apparent when it is applied by trial 
judges...”” “Clarke J concluded that the best approach to this is not to maintain an “almost absolute” 
exclusionary rule, but to define the law…to require trial courts to exercise vigilance…and to enable 
trial judges…to apply a properly defined constitutional balance…[h]e further noted the important 
role of the appellate courts in redressing any imbalance…[ D.P.P. -v- J.C. (2015) i.e.s.c 3. [2015] 
IESC 31 per Clarke J at para 4.25]…O’Donnell J seemed primarily concerned with the 
administration of justice: “…where cogent and compelling evidence of guilt is found but not 
admitted on the basis of trivial technical breach, the administration of justice…may be brought into 
disrepute. The question is at what point does the trial fall short of…due course of law…[w]hen does 
the admission of that evidence itself bring the administration of justice in to disrepute?” [D.P.P. -v- 
J.C. [2015] IESC 31 per O’Donnell J at para 97]. [Daly, Y.M. (2018) ‘"A Revolution in Principle"? 
The Impacy of the New Exclusionary Rule’, Criminal Law and Practice Review, 2, 1-17, p,3, p.5 




evolution of jurisprudence in the area and concluded  that the equilibrium of JC 
was a laudable middle path between past laxity, and the procedural severity of more 
recent times. Indeed, the judiciary have shifted its emphasis as needs dictated.  
Yet a number of important aspects are present throughout the case law in 
this area. These include the ‘integrity of the administration of justice’, the idea that 
the State ought to be held accountable in a Rule of law-based society, and, of 
course, the rights-based due process entitlements of citizens. These ideas were seen 
as sufficient to restrict the State, particularly where constitutionally protected due 
process entitlements are infringed.77  It is these constitutionally guaranteed due 
process rights, as well as the laudable manner by which the Irish judiciary has gone 
 
77 “…in…Criminal Assets Bureau v Murphy… JC was scrutinised most closely…[i]t was held here 
that the principles on which the exclusionary rule of criminal evidence are based can be applied in 
the context of the forfeiture of the alleged proceeds of crime. O’Malley J…determined that in JC 
‘[a] new formulation of the test for the exclusion of evidence was established…not as absolute as 
the rule laid down in Kenny.’ [Criminal Assets Bureau v Murphy [2018] i.e.s.c 12 (Feb 27 2018) 
para 51] O’Malley J stated…“…the exclusionary rule is not a free-standing rule…purely for the 
benefit of defendants…its broader purpose is to protect important constitutional rights and 
values…at different times…individual judges have laid greater or lesser emphasis on particular 
aspects…the common themes are the integrity of the administration of justice, the need to encourage 
agents of the State to comply with the law…and the constitutional obligation to protect and 
vindicate the rights of individuals…[e]ach of them, or a combination…has been seen as sufficient 
to ground a principle that is capable to deny to the State…the benefit of a violation of rights…in 
the course of the exercise of a coercive legal power.” [Criminal Assets Bureau v Murphy [2018] 
IESC 12 (Feb 27 2018) para 121] Daly, Y.M. (2018) ‘"A Revolution in Principle"? The Impacy of 
the New Exclusionary Rule’, Criminal Law and Practice Review, 2, 1-17, p. 18, p. 19. 




about the task of interpreting them that has ensured that the reincorporation of the 
Irish victim and their rights has not come at a cost to the due process rights 
guarantees of the accused. Having hopefully sufficiently addressed this point the 
author now hopes to move on to the issue of how the victim has more recently 
become more practically re-centralised within the Irish Criminal Justice system. 
7.2 THE PROTECTION AND ACCOMMODATION OF VICTIMS  
7.2.1 An Expanded Criminal Calendar  
The post 1990s era has seen an expansion of the concept of illegality to 
cover new areas of social deviance. This extension of the concept of crime has 
operated in such a way as to afford more safeguards to victims. The change can be 
seen in the extension of the Irish State’s prosecutorial powers to some offences that 
are committed by Irish citizens and residents abroad (Ryan 2019);78 the creation of 
offences such as allowing an unsupervised learner driver to operate a motor 
vehicle; 79  forced marriage and coercive control; 80  unlawful hacking, data 
 
78 As per Section 3 ss. (3-5) of the Criminal Law (Extraterritorial Jurisdiction) Act, 2019 
79 Under Section 5 of the Road Traffic (Amendment) Act, 2018, the so-called Clancy Amendment, 
this carries a maximum penalty of a fine of up to €2000 and/or a 6-month prison sentence. 
80As per Section 38 and Section 39 of The Domestic Violence Act, 2018, this carries the maximum 
sentences of 12 and 5 years respectively. 




corruption; 81  sexual activity in the presence of a minor; 82  female genital 
mutilation;83 the failure to report crimes against children, as well as vulnerable 
people; 84  the directing or organisation of begging; 85  the human trafficking of 
adults; 86  intimidation; 87  the facilitation of child abuse 88  and blackmail. 89 
Statements of criminal intent are also illegal,90 and the Oireachtas has similarly 
criminalised child abduction by a stranger, imperilment of personal safety, 
 
81  Under Section 2 and Section 4 of The Criminal Justice (Offences Relating to Information 
Systems) Act, 2017 which both carry a maximum penalty of 5 years’ imprisonment. 
82 As per Section 5 of The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017, this carries a maximum 
sentence of 10 years. 
83  Under Section 2 of the Criminal Justice (Female Genital Mutilation) Act, 2012, this has a 
maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. 
84 As per Section 3 of The Criminal Justice (Withholding of Information on Offences against 
Children and Vulnerable Persons) Act, 2012, both of which carry a 10-year maximum if the crime 
obstructed carries a life sentence. 
85 Under Section 5 of The Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act, 2011, this has a 5-year maximum. 
86 Section 4 of The Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act, 2008 stipulates that the maximum 
penalty of a life sentence can be imposed here. 
87 Under Section 41 of The Criminal Justice Act, 1999, this carries a 10-year maximum sentence. 
88 As per Section 3 of The Child Trafficking and Pornography Act, 1998, this carries a penalty of 
up to life imprisonment. 
89 Under Section 9 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997, which can lead to a 5-
year maximum sentence. 
90 As per Section 5 of The Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997, which can lead to up 
to 10 years’ imprisonment. 




unlawful possession of a syringe and harassment.91 Digital victim shaming also 
looks set to become a new criminal offence,92 as does the abusive contacting of 
individuals in contravention of a no contact order.93 These alterations were not only 
substantive changes to the body of the Irish Criminal Law, they were also stylistic 
ones, as they were by in large reported and presented within the mainstream Irish 
media and governmental channels using the language of victim protection and 
vindication, rather than from the hitherto more widely utilised perspective of 
perfectibility (Quinn-O’Flaherty 2016, pp. 114-29; Kilcommins et at. 2018, p. 68). 
There was also considerable progress made in the protection of sex crime 
victims. The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017 extended the 
criminalisation of the solicitation of prostitution in relation to a trafficked person.94 
It also criminalised the commission of sexual acts with vulnerable groups. It is now 
 
91 Under Section 17, 13, 7 and 10 of The Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997, all of 
which carry a 7-year maximum sentence. 
92 When Section 4 of the Harassment, Harmful Communications and Related Offences Bill, 2017, 
which stipulates a 7-year maximum passes. 
93 If Section 33 of The Domestic Violence (No-contact order) (Amendment) Bill 2019 is passed, 
which would amend Section 33 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2018 and carry a maximum penalty 
of a fine of €1,500 and/or 12-months in prison 
94 Under s. 26, this amended s.5 of the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act, 2008, by inserting 
subsection 2A into it. The maximum penalty for this offence is a fine and/or 5 years’ imprisonment 
under Section 5 ss. (3) of Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act, 2008. 




a crime to engage in a sexual act with a ‘protected person’95 with the knowledge 
that that person is a protected person, or whilst being reckless to that fact.96 It is 
also a criminal offence for anyone to solicit a protected person to engage in such a 
sexual act.97 The knowledge or recklessness requirement of an accused is also 
legally presumable until the relevant suspect can prove otherwise.98 
It might also be worth considering, at this preliminary stage, the impact on 
victim accommodation of some of the non-legal measures that were also introduced 
in recent times. Such as the Victims Charter, the Commission for the Support of 
the Victims of Crime and the Victims Office within the Department of Justice. 
Since each one of these was important in terms of critical service provision. Indeed, 
it is these services which facilitate the legal victims’ rights this chapter outlines. 
The Department of Justice states that the idea behind the Victim’s Charter 
is to help victims obtain advice in relation to non-legal assistance. Examples of this 
include information from governmental and non-governmental organisations. The 
Charter stipulates the manner by which they can be contacted, as well as the help 
 
95 Subsection (7) defines a protected person as one who, due to mental illness or disability, cannot 
consent to an act, either since they cannot comprehend it, assess facts pertinent to the decision of 
whether or not to participate in it or cannot appropriately convey their consent.  
96 Under Section 21 ss. (1) of The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017.   
97 As per Section 21 ss. (2) of The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017.   
98 Under Section 21 ss. (3) of The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017.  The penalties in this 
regard vary from 10 years for a Section 21 subsection (2) offence as laid out in Section 21 ss. (6) of 
The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017 to life in prison for a Section 21 ss. (1) offence 
under Section 21 ss. (4) of The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017.   




each provides. Some may even be able to assist with legal issues like victim rights. 
In addition, the administration of justice is outlined in order to demystify the 
procedure, and set out what victims ought to receive from it during the process. It 
was written by the government taking governmental and NGOs into account. 
NGOs are critical to helping victims in an Irish context, and their help in this regard, 
as well as suggestions when the Charter was being formed were invaluable.99 
Although the Charter was not cemented in legislation, it did outline the 
procedure victims experience when taking part in prosecutions in a progressive 
individualised manner. It set out the rights of victims with regards to service 
provision. Yet due to recent rapid advances, which have involved the codification 
of legislation, even recent iterations of the Charter could benefit from revision to 
 
99 “The purpose of the Victims Charter is to help you find information about services offered by the 
State’s agencies as well as voluntary groups who work with victims of crime. The Charter sets out 
how to get in touch with those services and what support you can expect to receive from them. A 
number of these services can also help you to understand your rights as a victim of crime. The 
Charter also describes the criminal justice system so that you can understand what to expect in your 
interaction with it. The Charter has been drafted by the Department of Justice and Equality in a 
consultative process involving all relevant State agencies as well as non-governmental organisations 
working with and supporting victims.  These NGOs continue to play a vital role by providing 
support services directly to victims of crime, their families and friends. The Department of Justice 
and Equality is deeply grateful to them for their ongoing work and for their input to development 
of the Charter.” Department of Justice (2009) Welcome to the Victims Charter, available: 
https://www.victimscharter.ie [accessed 22 Jul 2020], The Victims Charter. 




ensure information is up to date.100 The 1999 Charter was transformative, as it was 
the first time that major concessions were provided to victim accommodation.  
The Probation Service is expressly mentioned as just one of the various 
bodies that first had these aspiration standards placed upon it by the 1999 Charter. 
As many of these revolved around accommodation and service provision the 1999 
Charter articulated how the Probation Service endeavours to take the particular 
“sensitivities and trauma” of victims into account during the exercise of its duties. 
To this end, it also pledged to ensure criminals were motivated to recognise their 
blameworthiness regarding the consequences of their actions upon victims. It also 
sought to inform victims that they were being taken into account when constructing 
trial reports and would try, where possible, to help victims draft impact reports.101 
 
100 “The non-statutory Victims Charter and Guide to the Criminal Justice System describe the 
criminal justice process from a victim’s perspective. The Charter describes victims’ rights and 
entitlements to the services provided by the various State agencies, including, what victims of crime 
can expect from the respective criminal justice agencies at the various stages of the criminal process. 
The charter may need to be revised considering…implementation of the provisions of the 2017 Act 
….” Coffey, G. (2018) ‘Accommodating Victims of Crime: A Survey of the Legislative and 
Juridicial Landscape’, Irish Criminal Law Journal, 28 (4),104-117, pp. 114-115. 
Williams, Brian (1999). The Victims' Charter: Citizens as Consumers of Criminal Justice Services, 
The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 38 (4), 384 – 396. 
101  “The Probation Service is an agency of the Department of Justice…identified…in the 
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform’s Victims Charter (1999)...The Victims Charter 
states that the Probation Service: ‘Concerns itself with your plight as a victim and attempts to 
consider your sensitivities and trauma in the way that it undertakes its work. Offenders are strongly 
encouraged to take responsibility for the hurt, damage and suffering they may have inflicted on you’ 




The Victims’ Charter was a critical advancement in terms of policy 
implementation for domestic victims. Its first iteration came into being due to 
government efforts during the reformative trend of the 1990s, and was ultimately 
presented as a finalised document in the autumn of 1999. The document was billed 
to mirror a government promise to provide victims with more pride of place within 
the Irish administration of justice. This was the first recorded instance in which the 
justice administration was approached from the stance of a victim in Ireland.  
A 2005 consideration of the document pursued under the auspices of the 
Commission for the Support of Victims of Crime came up with recommendations. 
These were then ultimately pursued in a reformed Victim’s Charter document in 
2010. The new advances endeavoured to augment the material provided to victims 
by the Crime Victims Helpline, police, Courts Service, DPP, Prison, Probation and 
Coroner’s Service, Legal Aid Board, and Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Tribunal. Although the text stipulates the permissions that victims have when 
dealing with these bodies, it does not actually convey binding prerogatives.102 
 
(p. 18). It also advises victims that the Probation Service will consider them when preparing reports 
for court and, when requested, will assist in the preparation of victim impact reports.” Norton, S. 
(2007) The Place of Victims in the Criminal Justice System, Irish Probation Journal,  4(1),  63-74, 
p. 67. Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (1999), Victims Charter and Guide to the 
Criminal Justice System, Dublin: Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. 
102  “The Victims Charter has marked an important policy development for crime victims in 
Ireland…[t]his Charter was produced by the Department of Justice…in September 1999. It reflects 
the “commitment to giving victims of crime a central place in the criminal justice system”. As such 
it amalgamates for the first time “all the elements of the criminal justice system from the victim’s 




This 2010 Victim Charter is indicative of this trend, with promises with 
regards to the provision of video link facilities, which are a key gain for vulnerable 
victims. In fact, where these cannot be provided a trial can actually be moved in 
order to ensure vulnerable victims are still accommodated.103 The police service 
have also pledged several improvements to victim accommodation, particularly 
with regards to updates regarding the progress of prosecutions. There is similarly 
a promise made by the police that no matter who a victims is they will always 
receive their utmost regard from the service in an appropriate manner.104  
 
perspective” (1999: 3). In 2005, a review of the entire Charter was undertaken by the Commission 
for the Support of Victims of Crime and in 2010 a revised Victim’s Charter and Guide to the 
Criminal Justice System was produced. This attempts to increase the information available to 
victims of crime from the Crime Victims Helpline, the Gardaí, the Courts Service, the Director of 
Public Prosecutions, the Prison Service, the Probation Service, the Legal Aid Board, the Coroner’s 
Service and the Criminal Injuries Compensation Tribunal. It sets out the entitlements a victim has 
…but it does not confer legal rights.” Edwards, C., Harold, G. and Kilcommins, S. (2012) Access 
to Justice for People with Disabilities as Victims of Crime in Ireland Cork, Ireland: UCC, p. 45.  
103 “…the Victims Charter reflects such developments…[v]ideo link facilities are available in a 
number of courtrooms…[i]f these facilities are not available…the Court may order the hearing to 
be moved to a courtroom where such facilities are available…” (Department of Justice and Law 
Reform, 2010: 24).”  Edwards, C., Harold, G. and Kilcommins, S. (2012) Access to Justice for 
People with Disabilities as Victims of Crime in Ireland Cork, Ireland: UCC, p. 84-85 
104 “The Gardaí have given a number of commitments…including…the provision of information 
on the progress of a case...”  Edwards, C., Harold, G. and Kilcommins, S. (2012) Access to Justice 
for People with Disabilities as Victims of Crime in Ireland Cork, Ireland: UCC, p. 46. 




The Courts Service have likewise pledged the availability of an interpreter 
for those victims that might not be able to communicate their VIS without one. 
There is some ambiguity concerning how inclusive this is of the hard of hearing, 
who may require a sign language specialist. There are mentions that there is a desire 
to reform this area so where a victim is unable to provide a spoken statement this 
will be facilitated. The VIS would be a prime example of a situation in which 
service provision would be desirable due to its complex nature. Several academics 
have suggested specific support would be welcome in relation to VIS delivery. 
There is also much confusion regarding the provision of registered intermediaries 
for  certain vulnerable subcategories of victim. However, there are scant details on 
what kind of help a victim who finds it difficult to articulate a VIS will receive.105  
 
105 “Under the Victims Charter, the Courts Service commits to providing interpreter support to 
witnesses who do not speak English when the law or court permits a victim impact statement to be 
made. It is unclear whether this provision extends to non-speaking witnesses which includes 
members of the Deaf community who use sign language. The Charter does state, however, that 
current legislation is under review for amendment so that, in instances where a victim cannot speak 
for themselves, their family may do so. There is also the issue of support for the victim to be 
considered in giving the statement. Kilcommins et al (2010: 185) state that “victims require clear 
and standardised guidance on what can be contained within the statement”. Questions abound 
concerning the role of registered intermediaries for disabled victims in this process, and nothing is 
stated about who might support victims with cognitive difficulties and compromised or limited 
powers of expression…” Edwards, C., Harold, G. and Kilcommins, S. (2012) Access to Justice for 
People with Disabilities as Victims of Crime in Ireland Cork, Ireland: UCC, p. 90. 




The reformed Victim Charter of 2010 was created in the Victims of Crime 
Office, within the Department of Justice. Several of the aforementioned pledges by 
the Crime Victims helpline and police, were advanced upon in this revised charter.  
The police now promise to respond rapidly, consider victim statements, transfer 
information to victims to allow them to contact the relevant investigation into their 
statement, and take steps to ensure the victim is kept abreast of case developments. 
Despite such progress, vulnerable classes of victims, particularly disabled ones, 
were somewhat overlooked with scant commentary and inquiry into how they 
might need to be even further accommodated during their interactions with police. 
Other jurisdictions have highlighted the issues that these individuals often come up 
against when attempting to access justice within their administrative processes.106 
There is however a certain recognition of disabled victims within the 
revised Victim Charter of 2010, where vulnerable victims with impediments are 
 
106  “The updated Victims Charter 2010 produced by the Victims of Crime Office under the 
Department of Justice and Law Reform contains commitments from the Crime Victims Helpline 
and the Gardaí…the Gardaí state their commitment to 1) responding quickly to, and investigating, 
a complaint, 2) providing the contact details of the station handling the case as well as a PULSE 
incident number which is referenced to the case, and 3) keeping the victim informed as the case 
proceeds. There has however been little discussion of…victims with disabilities’ experiences of 
reporting and recording crime in Ireland. Literature emanating from the United States, Canada, 
Australia and Britain provides some insights into the experience, including the barriers and 
challenges people with disabilities face in their initial attempts at seeking redress for abuse through 
the criminal justice system.” Edwards, C., Harold, G. and Kilcommins, S. (2012) Access to Justice 
for People with Disabilities as Victims of Crime in Ireland Cork, Ireland: UCC, p. 54. 




explicitly mentioned, if briefly. The Charter includes a pledge from the police that 
where a victim possesses an impediment the police will seek to accommodate those 
additional victim prerequisites that may be necessary. Yet the comparable 
document in England and Wales on the subject is not only hard law, but also 
guarantees a greater level of accommodation for these classes of victim. There is 
also a clear definition of vulnerable victims, in order to help facilitate the provision 
of such support.107 It also speaks of a situation in which a victim wishes to inform 
a judge regarding the impact of an offence on their person. The VIS that they tender 
can be conveyed by themselves personally, or via a person trained in the law who 
will act on their behalf, which is of assistance to impaired crime victims.108 
There are various other limitations in the Victim Charter, and significant 
disparities which exist between the services afforded by the Criminal Injuries 
 
107 “Significantly, there is only one reference to victims with disabilities in the Charter. In the Garda 
section…“if you have any form of disability we will take your special needs or requirements into 
account” (Department of Justice and Law Reform, 2010: 17)…the Code of Practice for Victims of 
Crime in England and Wales… provides an enhanced service for vulnerable victims...” Edwards, 
C., Harold, G. and Kilcommins, S. (2012) Access to Justice for People with Disabilities as Victims 
of Crime in Ireland Cork, Ireland: UCC, p.  45 
108 “In this regard, the Victims Charter (Department of Justice and Law Reform, 2010: 61) states 
that… “Where the victim applies to tell the court about the effect of a sexual or violent crime on 
them, the court must hear that evidence…[t]he statement can be made in person or through a legal 
representative”. Department of Justice and Law Reform (2010) Victims Charter and Guide to the 
Criminal Justice System. Dublin: Victims of Crime Office, Department of Justice and Law 
Reform.” Edwards, C., Harold, G. and Kilcommins, S. (2012) Access to Justice for People with 
Disabilities as Victims of Crime in Ireland Cork, Ireland: UCC, p. 89-90. 




Compensation Tribunal in Ireland and the comparable charter and body in England 
and Wales. In England and Wales there is far greater clarity with regards to the 
time periods within which specific charter measures are expected to be executed. 
The Charter provision in Ireland concerning victim notification about the outcome 
of a prosecution, as well as the compensation they may be entitled to is heavily 
qualified. Yet the comparable body in England and Wales sets out an explicit 
pledge to get back to victims within 20 working days, with set frameworks in place 
to deal with a situation in which a delay of 12 months happens to transpire.  
Other academics have flagged the difference between the promise-based 
Charter in Ireland, and the legislatively guaranteed entitlements given to victims 
by its comparable Code of Practice in Britain. This difference has substantial 
material consequences for victims. As the perception that victims have some 
influence over proceedings can be massively compromised as a result of a lack of 
clarity regarding response timeframes. This issue has consequently been rather 
problematic in the Irish system, with response time being highly flexible and 
context-dependent. 109  There is a strong argument in this regard that this 
 
109 “One of the notable differences between what is set down by the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Tribunal under the Victims Charter in Ireland, and what is promised by the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Authority in England and Wales under The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime… 
is that the latter makes a more explicit commitment to timeframes… the Irish document commits to 
sending a written decision on a case to the victim and “paying any compensation due as quickly as 
possible”(p54)…the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority commits to responding to 
correspondence where necessary within 20 working days…and if a decision letter cannot be sent 
within 12 months of the application for compensation, applicants will be notified of its status at that 




indeterminacy, cemented within the structure of compensation procedure, 
prejudices vulnerable victims. An individual suffering from a disorder could 
undergo a massive re-traumatisation if their vulnerabilities are not accommodated. 
Therefore, there was much progress since the initial iteration of the Victim 
Charter in 1999, which would in many respects be emblematic of the wider 
movement in the area towards the concretisation of victim entitlements. However, 
to call the text, even in its reformed format, a charter may be somewhat misleading. 
It really represents the safeguards in place for victims in such a way as to make this 
information easy to process and access. If conceived as a conduit for informing the 
public it has many benefits. There are crucial pledges that assistance is given 
without incurring expense, and that those individuals that engage with victims are 
appropriately educated. These are not only vital provisions, but critical points to 
get across to the public. Yet there are unfortunately few enough of these measures, 
and they often lack specific detail. In fact, up until recently and it could also be 
argued that this is very much still the case in certain respects, due to the pace of 
change. Indeed, Victim Support’s criticism that it is “outdated” has some merit.  
 
time…Rogan (2006b) highlights the disparity between the non-legally binding Charter in Ireland, 
and the statutory rights afforded to victims by the Home Office’s Code of Practice in the UK…the 
degree of control one feels over the legal process is significantly reduced when timeframes of 
response are not defined…having such uncertainty embedded into the procedural framework of the 
compensation process can be problematic for vulnerable witnesses. Those with mental health 
issues…may endure secondary victimisation … under such circumstances.”  Edwards, C., Harold, 
G. and Kilcommins, S. (2012) Access to Justice for People with Disabilities as Victims of Crime in 
Ireland Cork, Ireland: UCC, p. 92.   




Having said that, there are some charter provisions of particular importance 
to victims. These typically pertain to their interactions with particular service 
bodies. The DPP has undertaken to maintain specific polices which continue to 
better its interaction with victims. In fact, the DPP commits in the charter to 
collaborate with the police to keep victims abreast of the way in which their case 
is advancing, particularly if the harm they suffered was of an aggravating nature. 
The state also now permits conferences with legal experts on behalf of the DPP 
before a prosecution starts, in which a victim can talk about trial procedures.110  
The idea behind this is that these experts can outline these procedures and 
address victim queries. Although these experts are unable to talk about evidentiary 
issues before a trial begins, they do pledge to engage with victims in this regard in 
 
110 “Ireland got its first Victims' Charter in 1999, reflecting this growing international trend to 
document the rights of victims…it really just sets out existing protections for victims in a 
consolidated format. It contains general provisions regarding what victims can expect from the 
criminal justice agencies and the trial process… [i]t guarantees…that victim support will be free of 
charge and that the volunteers will be trained…its provisions are not extensive, and in what is a fast 
growing area, it was perhaps fair for Victim Support to call it “outdated”. The DPP is also committed 
…to certain procedures…[w]hen prosecuting offences in court the Office…will work with the 
Garda Síochána to ensure that victims are kept fully informed of developments in the prosecution 
of perpetrators of offences, especially those of a violent or sexual nature [and] facilitate a pre-trial 
meeting to discuss the case with a counsel and a representative from the…DPP's Office….to explain 
the trial process and answer any questions…[t]he Director's representative will not discuss evidence 
[but the body does] commit…that victims will be treated with the utmost consideration and respect 
and to explaining, wherever possible, the court processes involved.” Rogan, M. (2006b) ‘Victims’ 
rights: theory and practice – Part II’, Irish Law Times (24), 151-155, p. 152. 




a sincere appreciative manner, and will clarify trial procedure as far as is possible. 
In the final analysis however, both the Victim Charters of 1999 and 2010, despite 
their pledges to safeguard crime victims, possessed a fundamental flaw. This was 
the fact that the Charters were both non-legally binding on Ireland. Indeed, the 
European Commission has been rather explicit in its communications with regards 
to the entitlements of victims, despite these suggestions often falling on deaf ears.  
They have however iterated that entitlements need to be binding under 
domestic law to properly safeguard victims. Although there is some merit in having 
aspirational targets, the Commission was very forthcoming in its relatively recent 
assessment of the situation in Ireland. The most significant issue it flagged was the 
fact that charter rights are aspirational by their nature, and therefore non-binding 
on the Irish state and its organs.111 This chapter will now go on to briefly discuss 
two other major contributors within this particular area of service provision, the 
Commission for the Support of the Victims of Crime and the Victims Office. 
The commission for the Support of Victims of Crime operates as an 
impartial organisation within the ambit of the Department of Justice. The 
 
111  “The Victims’ Charter sets out the obligation to protect victims; however, in this regard, the 
European Commission has questioned the non-mandatory nature of the Charter…[i]n relation to 
victims’ rights, the message from the European Commission is clear: legally enforceable rights are 
necessary to protect victims. The paramount issue for the Commission in relation to Ireland’s 
report…concerned the non-mandatory status…”. Irish Council for Civil Liberties (2008) A Better 
Deal: The Human Rights of Victims in the Criminal Justice System, Dublin: Irish Council for Civil 
Liberties, p. 25, 55. 




commission undertakes numerous roles.112 It helps advance procedures regarding 
service provision in conjunction with the Victims of Crime Office. The body also 
pursues various other avenues including: providing monetary assistance to victim 
NGOS, consultations with victims via the Consultative Forum, the strengthening 
of ties with state bodies as well as collaboration with Cosc and the Anti-Human 
Trafficking Unit. The commission also promotes further service improvement, 
supports the Victims of Crime Office and assesses the success of the Charter.  
The Commission for the Support of Victims of Crime first began in March 
2005. It is made up of five members, who are assisted by a secretariat from the 
Department of Justice. Although there is a set period within which these individuals 
are permitted to govern, extensions are allowable where necessary.113 Setting up 
 
112  “The Commission…operates…[t]o assist in the development…of strategies and policies to 
support…improving cohesion and consistency of service and information…financial assistance to 
voluntary bodies…account of the views of victims in the formulation of strategies and policies 
through the Victims of Crime Consultative Forum…develop strong links with Government 
Departments and agencies of the criminal justice system…co-operate with Cosc and the Anti-
Human Trafficking Unit…promote co-operation and co-ordination between the organisations it 
funds and State Agencies and between the funded organisations themselves. To encourage the 
provision of services…in all areas of the country. To keep informed of international developments 
…work in association with the Victims of Crime Office…review the effectiveness of the Victims 
Charter. To promote awareness of the services available to victims of crime. To carry out research 
to support its mission.” Department of Justice (2009) Commission for the Support of Victims of 
Crime, available: http://www.csvc.ie/en/csvc/Pages/About_Us [accessed 22 Jul 2020], About Us. 
113 “The Commission for the Support of Victims of Crime…was established in March 2005…[w]ith 
five members, the Commission is supported by a secretariat which is based in the Department of 




the Commission for the Support of Victims of Crime represented a transition in 
favour of greater acknowledgement of the rights victims require within the 
administration of justice. Yet for all its significant reformative impetus it is difficult 
to tell if vulnerable victims were sufficiently facilitated by these advancements, 
and what kind of impact, they have had on their endeavours to achieve justice.114  
At the same time the Commission for the Support of Victims of Crime 
helped advance various policies which were hugely beneficial to victims. The 
National Crime Victims Helpline was one such progressive endeavour. The 2005 
project received money from the commission so it can conduct its work. It also 
financially aided the creation of the Court Support Service, which assists victims 
prior to, as well as during, trial hearings. Those behind this service are ambitious 
regarding its potential and in recent times have sought to pursue the promotion of 
these services amongst victims that might be “isolated, vulnerable 
and/disadvantaged”, which is most welcome in relation to impaired victims. 
 
Justice…[t]he tenure of the current Commissioners was expected to expire in March 2008; however, 
it is likely that this period will be extended pending the establishment of the proposed Victims 
Support Agency…” Irish Council for Civil Liberties (2008) A Better Deal: The Human Rights of 
Victims in the Criminal Justice System, Dublin: Irish Council for Civil Liberties, p. 49-50. 
114 “…the establishment of the Commission for the Support of Victims of Crime both bear witness 
to a shift towards recognising the rights and needs of victims in the Irish criminal justice system. 
However, we know little about whether people with disabilities have benefited from these 
developments in the context of seeking redress for offences perpetrated against them.” Edwards, 
C., Harold, G. and Kilcommins, S. (2012) Access to Justice for People with Disabilities as Victims 
of Crime in Ireland Cork, Ireland: UCC, p.13.   




This Victim Support at Court body operates as a NGO. Consequently, it 
receives money from the Commission for the Support of Victims of Crime. The 
body is operational within the Central Criminal Court, Circuit Court and District 
Court of disadvantaged regions like Tallaght, where its services can aid those 
victims assisting the DPP. These services serve as an aid in familiarising victims 
with trial venues, and giving them vital support for the duration of the hearing.115 
The Commission for the Support of Victims of Crime has also carried out 
key research, and hugely beneficial reformative work in recent times. A relatively 
recent victim poll it pursued revealed the severity of the non-reporting amongst the 
general public. With just over 20 per cent of those asked confessing to not 
conveying details on crime to the police. The same study flagged how this was 
determined and revolved around the opinions of victims in relation to the efficacy 
 
115 “…the National Crime Victims Helpline, which represents a proactive initiative to support crime 
victims, was launched in 2005. It is funded by the Commission…the Court Support Service provides 
support to witnesses and victims both before and during court proceedings…[i]t has stated in its 
strategic plan for 2011-2014 that it hopes to promote its service among groups who may be ‘isolated, 
vulnerable and/or disadvantaged’…Victim Support at Court is a voluntary organisation, funded by 
the Commission…currently available in the Central Criminal Court, Circuit Court and District 
Court in Tallaght, and provides volunteers who are trained to give support to prosecution witnesses 
and their families in court…both before and during the trial, and includes facilitating a pre-trial visit 
to the courtroom for the witness, as well as providing emotional support on the day(s) of the trial. 
A room is also provided in the Four Courts…for the duration of the trial.” Edwards, C., Harold, G. 
and Kilcommins, S. (2012) Access to Justice for People with Disabilities as Victims of Crime in 
Ireland Cork, Ireland: UCC, p.  47, 85. 




of our justice system, the likelihood that a trial would lead to a conviction and 
whether they thought their contentions would be believed and properly acted upon.  
These studies were also complemented by assessments of the Victims 
Charter. The results of which led to the reformed Victims Charter of 2010.  Indeed, 
considerable gains flowed from all of this in terms of victim accommodation. In 
fact, these gains mainly centred on bettering the materials victims receive from the 
various bodies that assist them, however, such gains were still not hard law.116 
The Commission for the Support of the Victims of Crime receives a yearly 
budget from the Department of Justice, money which is then used to promote those 
programmes which are of benefit to victims. One of its ancillary aims in this regard 
is to advance the overall uniformity of such services, so that every victim receives 
adequate assistance.117A good example of how this operates is the Crime Victims 
 
116  “According to a survey of crime victims conducted for Ireland’s Commission for the Support 
of Victims of Crime, “slightly more than 1 in 5 respondents did not report the crime to the Gardaí” 
(Kilcommins et al, 2010: 31)…decisions on whether or not to report a crime were influenced 
by…victims’ perceptions regarding the effectiveness of the criminal justice…whether criminal 
proceedings were likely to be successful…how far they expected their claims to be taken 
seriously…[i]n 2005, a review of the entire Charter was undertaken by the Commission…and in 
2010 a revised Victim’s Charter…was produced…to increase the information available to victims 
of crime…[i]t sets out the entitlements a victim has from these various services, but it does not 
confer legal rights.” Edwards, C., Harold, G. and Kilcommins, S. (2012) Access to Justice for 
People with Disabilities as Victims of Crime in Ireland Cork, Ireland: UCC, p.  55, 45.  
117 “Working with an annual budget from the Department of Justice…the Commission provides 
funding for services and supports to victims of crime. The Commission also works to improve 
cohesion and consistency of service and information available to victims of crime.” Edwards, C., 




Helpline, which receives financial assistance from the Commission for the Support 
of Victims of Crime. This consequently enables it to convey assistance as well as 
materials to victims, and also function as an important initial reference point.  
The spirit behind such action is one of consideration, solidarity, discretion 
as well as open mindedness. As a helpline with its number in every police station 
the centre receives calls concerning all manner of offences ,from a host of various 
different bodies. Its brilliant work in providing materials to victims is facilitated by 
the provision of funds by the Commission for the Support of the Victims of Crime, 
which represents a critical investment in victim accommodation. Despite its 
success, the European Commission has recommended that this single avenue for 
the provision of victim material needs to be complemented by several other kinds 
of means of communication, so as to reach as many victims as is possible.118 
 
Harold, G. and Kilcommins, S. (2012) Access to Justice for People with Disabilities as Victims of 
Crime in Ireland Cork, Ireland: UCC, p. 48. 
118 “The Crime Victims Helpline is funded by the Commission for the Support of the Victims of 
Crime. The organisation provides support and information to victims of crime as well as acting as 
a central referral centre. It aims to carry out these activities in an atmosphere of respect, support, 
confidentiality and non-judgment. The contact details of the Helpline are included on the Garda 
Charter and posters detailing information about the Helpline should be displayed in all Garda 
stations. It is a national service; it deals with the entire spectrum of crime and acts as a single point 
of referral to other agencies…[h]owever…the European Commission…makes clear that no one 
method of information-giving is sufficient; rather, effort should be concentrated on developing 
different mediums of communication to ensure that all victims of crime are fully informed of the 
process.” Irish Council for Civil Liberties (2008) A Better Deal: The Human Rights of Victims in 
the Criminal Justice System, Dublin: Irish Council for Civil Liberties, pp. 49-50 15-16. 




The Victims of Crime Office first came into being in 2008, and was created 
by the Department of Justice. Mr Dermot Ahern set up the office in order to 
advance the Justice for Victims Initiative he was promoting at the time. This also 
ensured that the Director of the Victim of Crime Office had a seat in the 
Commission for the Support of Victims of Crime as Commission secretariat. Since 
this Commission plays a key role in the bankrolling of victim NGOs, having a seat 
at the table for the Victims of Crime Office is important. Indeed, it keeps the Victim 
of Crime Office abreast of major financial developments. This is of assistance to 
in the pursuit of its own functions, as well as the implementation of its policies.119  
The Department of Justice states that its functions include: utilising the 
Victims Charter to augment service provision, advancing consciousness about 
victim needs and bodies that can fulfil them. keeping the Minister for Justice 
abreast of the domestic situation concerning victims as well as any more global 
advancements that might be relevant. It also liaises with COSC, the Anti-Human 
Trafficking Unit, the Criminal Law Reform Division and appropriate divisions of 
the Department of Justice to help establish unified governmental response to 
 
119 “The Victims of Crime Office was established as an executive office by Mr. Dermot Ahern, 
T.D., Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in September 2008 as part of his Justice for 
Victims Initiative.  The Director of the Victims of Crime Office is a member of the independent 
Commission for the Support of Victims of Crime; the Office provides the secretariat to the 
Commission. The Commission funds voluntary sector organizations to provide support to victims 
of crime.” Department of Justice (2009) Victims of Crime Office, available: 
http://www.victimsofcrimeoffice.ie/en/vco/Pages/WP09000162 [accessed 22 Jul 2020], About Us.   




particular victim problems. 120  From the outset it is critical to realise that the 
Victims of Crime Office has a particular function which differentiates itself from 
more grassroots victim organisations. It is very much geared towards policy 
creation, as well as assisting various victim support groups to work together.121  
The facilitation of vulnerable victims is somewhat lacking in this area, as 
not much information is retained and studied with a view to reform in this context. 
The Victim of Crime Office fails to comprehensively collate data from each section 
of the country in order to better comprehend the overall national picture. Although 
certain related bodies do retain some information, this is somewhat limited to 
particular categories like gender and crime, which, although beneficial, could be 
 
120 “The core mandate of the Victims of Crime Office is to support the development of competent, 
caring and efficient services to victims of crime, by state agencies and non-governmental 
organisations…its key activities are: [u]sing the Victims Charter to achieve improved standards of 
treatment of victims by relevant State and voluntary sector organizations. Promoting awareness 
concerning victims’ needs and services available to victims of crime. Advising the Minister for 
Justice and Equality on victim issues in Ireland and on international developments pertinent to 
victims. Working in co-operation with COSC, the Anti-Human Trafficking Unit, the Criminal Law 
Reform Division…to ensure a co-ordinated policy response to issues in relation to victims of crime 
by the Department.” Department of Justice (2009) Victims of Crime Office, available: 
http://www.victimsofcrimeoffice.ie/en/vco/Pages/WP09000162 [accessed 22 Jul 2020], About Us.    
121 “…the Victims of Crime Office…was established in the Department of Justice…in 2008… to 
improve…services to victims…by state agencies and non-governmental organisations… 
organisations…work in different ways…[s]ome are responsible for policy formation…such as the 
Victims of Crime Office…” Edwards, C., Harold, G. and Kilcommins, S. (2012) Access to Justice 
for People with Disabilities as Victims of Crime in Ireland Cork, Ireland: UCC, p. 48, 98. 




improved. This can be seen if a comparative approach is taken between the Irish 
Office of the Victims of Crime and its US counterpart. This body much like the 
Irish branch, in that it is under the aegis of the Department of Justice. However, it 
does gather more comprehensive data, which it can then use in order to set out 
reformative procedures that police can then use to assist vulnerable victims. There 
have also been several such guidelines published in the US as a result, which are 
all highly cognisant of victim needs, and are backed up by comprehensive data.122 
7.2.2 Greater Information Rights 
Several International Law provisions have heavily influenced the reform of 
domestic law in this area. In fact, Article 1 of Recommendation No. R (85) 11123 
emphasised the importance of ensuring that the Gardaí were ‘constructive’ in their 
interactions with victims. It also mandated that all signatory nations inform victims, 
where they elect to be notified, of whether a case will actually be taken on their 
 
122  “In terms of…victims of crime with disabilities, then, there is little…centralised data…the 
region-by-region basis are not collated…support organisations…say that they recorded data on the 
clients they had assisted, and a number were able to provide a gender breakdown…as well as type 
of crime…The Office for Victims of Crime, under the United States Department of Justice, has 
produced a series of guides for law enforcement officers which address working with people with 
disabilities.” Edwards, C., Harold, G. and Kilcommins, S. (2012) Access to Justice for People with 
Disabilities as Victims of Crime in Ireland Cork, Ireland: UCC, p.103, 67. 
123 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Position of the Victim in the Framework 
of Criminal Law and Procedure. 




behalf.124 This is a crucial measure since the UN has guaranteed that all victims are 
entitled to request an inquiry into why a prosecutorial agent did not pursue their 
case.125 Indeed, Article 4 of Directive 2012/29/EU, which bolstered a victim of 
crime’s entitlement to information during their first contact with the Gardaí has 
also further complemented this recent reformative trend (O’Flaherty 2016, pp. 120-
126; Kilcommins et al. 2018, pp. 72-73; Muller-Rappard 1990, pp. 239- 241). 
This Directive led to The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017, 
which now outlines the information rights victims have under Irish Law. 126 
However, this Act also circumscribes these particular right entitlements, as the 
scope and precision of the data provided are factors for the Gardaí, who must 
consider the class of crime, as well as the requirements of the victim involved.127 
Victims can even ask that the relevant authority to provide this information to them 
 
124 As stipulated in Article 6 of Recommendation No. R (85) 11 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure. 
125 As laid out in Article 7 of Recommendation No. R (85) 11 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure. 
126  This gives them a right to information under several grounds. Like services; reporting; 
complaints; when they might receive interpretation and translation; their position in criminal justice, 
victim services in their home country; in what way they might be safeguarded; compensation 
schemes and orders; their entitlement to provide an impact statement; the complaints procedure 
where their rights under the Act are ignored; in what way and whether restorative justice can be 
pursued; when they can receive legal counsel or assistance, as well as their expense rights as per 
Section 7 of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act,  2017. 
127 Under Section 7 ss. (2) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 




verbally, in writing, or in a digital format. They are also entitled to receive this as 
soon as possible, and as in keeping with their desired format as is practicable.128  
 The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017 also gave victims a 
legal right to bring a lay or legal person with them when they initially contact the 
Gardaí to report a crime and receive information. Certain authorities can however 
remove this individual where the Gardaí feel that there is a distinct possibility that 
their presence could be detrimental to either the victim involved, or the legal pursuit 
of the complaint they are reporting to the Gardaí.129 However, when this transpires, 
the Gardaí are obliged to inform the relevant victim that their legal right is still very 
much operative, and that they can elect to have a different individual of their choice 
accompany them in lieu of the person the Gardaí have removed.130 The Gardaí must 
also record when such a decision is made and note their justification for it.131 This 
duty to maintain these records also extends to all information the Gardaí provide to 
a victim, and that a relevant victim requests of them.132 
Victims similarly have a supplementary entitlement to information from the 
Gardaí133 about their right to make, or alter their request for information,134 as well 
 
128 As laid out in Section 7 ss. (3) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
129 Under Section 7 ss. (5) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
130 As per Section 7 ss. (6) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
131 As per Section 7 ss. (7) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
132 As per Section 7 ss. (8) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
133 Under Section 8 ss. (1) (a) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
134 Under any of the grounds that are stipulated within Section 8 ss. (2) of The Criminal Justice 
(Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 




as how they need to go about doing this. These predominantly relate to a victim’s 
right to information from the State about the progression of an investigation into 
their complaints.135 Victims are also entitled to information about the category of 
offence alleged, as well as data regarding the time and location of the prosecution.  
They also have the right136 to know a prosecution’s outcome; whether it 
was a jury trial; the penalty; whether a convict is released or absconds from prison; 
their release date; as well as the conditions of their release; their movements outside 
of prison; their absconding or fatality, either in prison or post release; and, if a 
convict is a minor, information about their release, transfers, re-integration, escape 
or death. Similarly, if a prosecution is successful, a victim is entitled to information 
regarding a convict’s sentencing137 and the date this is going to take place on.138  
This provision complements another one,139 which gives victims the ability to 
extend this to cover the date and location of any subsequent appeals that either the 
convict or their representatives pursue, as well as the appeals of the agent or body 
that prosecuted them in their trial of first instance. Victims can make these requests 
for information directly, and are entitled to receive the relevant details quickly 
 
135 Such as a detainment; a formal charge; a bail agreement, as well as its terms; the placing of a 
suspect in custody; duplicate copies of any assertions made by them during an investigation; the 
abandonment of an investigation, as well as why this was done. 
136 Under Section 8 of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
137 As laid out in Section 8 ss. (2) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime Act), 2017. 
138 As stipulated in Section 8 ss. (2) (h) (i) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
139 Contained in Section 8 ss. (2) (h) (ii) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 




when requested.140  The relevant authorities must provide this data in an oral, 
written or digital format, as well as in a language that the relevant victim can 
understand. They must also provide this without any additional expense.141  
The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017 gave victims the right 
to information about a decision to abandon a charge.142 If the Gardaí or DPP inform 
a victim they will not pursue such a charge they must notify the victim involved of 
their right to have this decision re-examined, and how to go about doing this.143 
The relevant victim then has 28 days to forward their submission to re-examine this 
decision. 144  However, the Gardaí or DPP can extend this deadline. 145  These 
authorities can also stipulate the form such a submission ought to take.146 If it is 
successful, an impartial Garda member, the DPP, or their representative, must 
personally conduct this re-examination.147 The authority must then give a written 
 
140 Under Section 8 ss. (4) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
141 As laid out in Section 8 ss. (5) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017.   
142 As well as why this was taken under Section 8 ss. (2) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) 
Act, 2017. 
143 As stated in Section 9 of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
144 As laid out under Section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
145 As laid out in Section 10 ss. (2) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
146 Under Section 10 ss. (3) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
147 Under Section 10 ss. (4) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 




update of the outcome of this to the relevant victim as promptly as possible,148 
although the Gardaí can convey this to the victim involved via digital means.149  
7.2.3 A Pro-Complainant Application of Recent Complaint 
Another important area that has seen considerable victim centred reform is 
the legal concept of recent complaint. Before this change, most people tended to 
accept the position that long lapses of time between the commission of an offence 
and the reporting of it by a victim would invariably undermine a successful 
prosecution, since the courts tended to perceive this as damaging the overall 
validity of the victim of crime’s complaint. However, the potentially undesirable 
impact of this rule’s strict application has ultimately led to a rethink of this area. 
Reforms are evident in the new approach of the courts towards the doctrine 
of recent complaint, which appreciates the trauma that victims of crime often 
undergo, as well as how the unfortunate contexts that they frequently find 
themselves in can operate in such a way as to dissuade them from coming forward 
at the earliest available opportunity. This now means that the law will no longer 
allow such a situation to detract from the perceived authenticity of the claim that 
they eventually do report. The case of The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) 
-v- D.R.150 is illustrative here, as it held that the administration of justice should not 
prejudice certain victims of sexual crimes for their delayed reporting in certain 
instances. D.R. was a case concerning whether or not to allow an appeal against a 
 
148 Under Section 10 ss. (6) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
149 Under Section 10 ss. (7) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
150 [1998] 2 i.r. 106. 




rape and sexual assault conviction. The appellant based their contention upon the 
argument that the evidence of their victim should have been inadmissible, due to 
their allegedly inordinate delay in the reporting of their complaint. Although 
Barrington J. noted that the law required victims to report “...as soon as is 
reasonably possible...” he decided to deny the appeal. The learned judge felt “... 
that it was not in fact reasonably possible for her to make the complaint until she 
did make it...” (1998, pp. 109-110). There was consequently nothing wrong with 
the trial judge admitting her statements, even though she had only reported the 
details of the events in question to her husband a day after they had actually 
transpired (Charleston and Byrne 2010, pp. 1-83; Kilcommins et at. 2018, p. 66). 
The judiciary recently confirmed this reasoning in the case of The People 
at the suit of the Director of Public Prosecutions -v- G. C.151  In G.C., the appellant 
appealed against the five convictions they received for indecent assault. One of 
their grounds for appeal was that the trial judge that presided over their prosecution 
had inappropriately admitted evidence of complaints made by the victim of G.C. 
The appeal that was lodged on behalf of G.C. therefore argued that the member of 
the judiciary that had managed their case had wrongly applied the law during these 
criminal proceedings by not rendering these pieces of evidence inadmissible due to 
the allegedly inordinate delay of the victim in their reporting, as it appeared that 
they had not made their complaints at the earliest available opportunity.152 Edwards 
 
151 [2017] i.e.c.a. 62. 
152 G.C. also contended that the victim’s delay was inappropriate, as the victim had informed their 
family members of the abuse years before they officially disclosed it. 




J., in denying the appeal, instead felt that the evidence involved “...was both 
relevant and probative in terms of providing a possible explanation for the 
complainant's delay...”. He also went on to conclude that the “...first disclosures 
[that were] made by her to professional persons...were made as early as reasonably 
possible in the circumstances... [meaning] the trial judge acted within the scope of 
[their] legitimate discretion...” (2017, para 84). 
7.2.4 Increased Accommodation of Complainant Delay 
An examination of the law on complainant delay also evidences the reform 
of this related but separate doctrine, which has led to the better accommodation of 
victim complaints. Indeed, it was the influx of delayed historical abuse allegations, 
which eventually began to present in the 1990s, that were particularly influential in 
this regard (Ring 2012, 2013, 2017, p. 90). They allowed the courts to ‘carve out’ 
exceptions to the strict application of this rule, which could have meant that victims 
of crime would have had their attempts at receiving justice not only persistently 
delayed but also ultimately denied by the Irish criminal justice system. However, 
an alternate outcome resulted in the better accommodation of victims of crime 
within the legal system of Ireland. The case of P.C -v- D.P.P153  is indicative of the 
reasoning behind this approach (Ring 2013, 2017, p. 92).  
In P.C., the accused faced sex crime charges dating back 15 to 17 years. 
Keane J. deemed the decisive factors in this case to be whether the delay 
undermined the right of the accused to an expeditious trial, whether the victim of 
 
153 [1999] 2 i.r. 25. 




crimes’ delay was justifiable, taking into account the conduct of the suspect and 
whether a trial would infringe upon the due process rights of the accused.154 In 
addressing the second ground, Keane J. stipulated that the assessment of this 
necessarily entailed examining whether the suspect had exercised ‘dominion’ or 
‘suppression’ over their victim. If this occurred, the delay would be justifiable, and 
would therefore not bar a prosecution (Ring, 2009, 2017, p. 565). Despite the 
progress that the courts have made with the use of this concept, the utilisation of 
the specific term ‘dominion’ in this context was somewhat unfortunate, as it tended 
to evoke the previous conceptualisation that abuse was a proprietary question rather 
than an issue relating to the non-interference with ones’ bodily integrity (Ring 
2017, p. 92; Brownmiller 1975). The conceptualisation also had the undesirable 
impact of ensuring that this theoretical construct was both patronizing to those 
admirably resilient individuals who had vehemently contested their abusive 
treatment and effectively been silenced by Irish society when they had tried to 
contest it, whilst ensuring that those who did manage to exert sufficient control 
over their life despite their abusive experiences were also prejudiced,. As the law 
did not deem them as having suffered enough as a result of their abuse to warrant 
the hearing of their allegations within a court of law (Ring 2017, p. 93).  
Several cases followed on from the PC ruling, cementing the idea that abuse 
victims should have an opportunity to receive justice, even where a significant 
 
154 This third limb would prove controversial, as it purported to suspend the accused’s innocence 
presumption, as noted by Hardiman J. in the case of O’C (J) -v- DPP [2000] i.e.s.c. 58. 




delay had occurred.155 The case of SF -v-DPP156 was one of these cases, as it 
related to an abuse which allegedly dated back to the 1980s. However, the Supreme 
Court found that this lapse was caused by the conduct of the accused in question, 
and, since the suspect’s due process rights were deemed by the court to not be 
infringed by a criminal prosecution, the trial went ahead (1999, pg. 252). The cases 
of PJC -v- DPP157 and RC -v- DPP158 are also illustrative. In PJC, the alleged 
abusive conduct purportedly dated back over thirty years. Yet MacMenamin J. held 
that this lapse in time resulted from the suspect’s exercise of control over their 
victim. He therefore allowed the matter to proceed to trial, since he felt that the fair 
trial rights of the accused were not unfairly prejudiced in this instance. RC 
concerned alleged conduct dating back over twenty years. He allowed the suspect 
to face these charges due to the control that they had exercised over their alleged 
victim, as well as the lack of prejudice to their fair trial rights. These cases 
demonstrate the endeavours of the Irish judiciary to recognize the perspectives and 
contexts that shape the post-crime behaviour of crime victims, as well as their 
attempts to incorporate these practical realities within the rules of Irish criminal 
procedure in order to make them more accommodating to victims. 
 
155 Provided of course that the victim be subject to conduct that deterred them from reporting and 
that bringing the case to trial in such instances would not prejudice an accused’s fair trial rights. 
156 [1999] 3 i.r. 235. 
157 [2005] i.e.h.c. 98. 
158 [2005] i.e.h.c. 97. 




Such an approach to complainant delay has meant that victims of crime in 
Ireland now have much better access to procedural justice, as the judiciary can now 
balance the rights of crime victims and their alleged abusers in order to decide 
whether a trial ought to proceed. This reform advanced upon the previous position 
in which a court might deny a victim of crime the opportunity to receive justice 
merely due to the apprehension that such a trial might unfairly impinge a suspect’s 
due process rights, whilst simultaneously overlooking the colossal impact of an 
allegations’ non-prosecution upon a victim. However, it is important to take note 
of the safeguards that do exist in this regard159 (2005, para 14). In T.S. -v- the DPP 
and Ors, the court prevented 35 indecent assault charges from proceeding after a 
35-year delay. The court justified this due of the increased risk of undermining 
T.S.’s right to a fair and expeditious trial, whilst also importantly giving the relevant 
victim due consideration. This approach is also apparent within the case of O’C (J) 
-v- DPP,160 which concerned 16 indecent assault charges, which dated back to 
incidents that allegedly occurred during the 1970s. Keane C.J., who delivered the 
majority judgment in this instance, after having considering the perspective of the 
victim that was involved in it at length, argued that the lapse in time was not 
sufficient to prevent a trial in that particular case (2000, paras 8-10). 161  The 
judiciary also further clarified the due process safeguards that were applicable, as 
 
159 As McCracken J. did in T.S. -v-DPP and Ors [2005] 2 i.r. 595. 
160 [2000] i.e.s.c. 58. 
161 Despite Hardiman J.’s dissent, which highlighted how he thought the delay could risk an unsafe 
trial. 




well as a victims’ role within these assessments during the case of H -v- DPP,162 
by allowing indecent assault charges that allegedly occurred during the 1960s to 
proceed to trial. Murray C.J. noted that the “essential and ultimate” issue in that 
case was whether there was “a real or serious risk of an unfair trial” (2006, para 
39).163 This clarification of the judiciary’s approach to the vindication of victim 
rights where an allegedly prejudicial complainant delay had occurred was hugely 
beneficial. It had such an impact because it emphasized that the inclusion of victims 
into the judicial assessment of whether a trial should progress was not a zero sum 
game where the rights of victims necessitated the dilution of suspect entitlements, 
but was a balancing act, that required a consideration of all stakeholder interests, 
including those of the victim (Ring 2009, 2013, 2017, pp. 572-573). 
Since the assessment of the changes to how the law procedurally re-
incorporated the Irish victim of crime plays such a pivotal role within the 
description of the victim of crime’s newly juridified position in Ireland, this thesis 
must now turn to outline all of the major legal alterations that were so pivotal to 
the placing of the victim of crime back into the heart of Irish criminal justice. 
Although these developments can appear somewhat fragmented in isolation, their 
impact should be discernible when taken together. This chapter will therefore now 
demonstrate the reformative advances that have taken place at the pre-trial, trial 
 
162 [2006] 3 i.r. 575. 
163 He also incorporated Hardiman J.’s highlighting of the accused’s Presumption of Innocence 
guarantee in O’C (J), making the test whether the delay was so prejudicial as to prevent the accused 
receiving a fair trial. 




and post-trial stages. This thesis adopts this approach in order to portray how and 
when each reform helped to recentralise victims of crime within the criminal justice 
system of Ireland (Coffey 2018; Kilcommins et at., 2016, p. 339, 2018 p. 52).  
7.3  PRE-TRIAL REFORMS  
7.3.1 The Importance of the Pre-Trial Period to Victims 
The post-1990s era saw numerous crucial changes to the pre-trial stage, 
which have all had a major impact upon the procedural re-inclusion of victims of 
crime. This represents an important alteration, since the pre-trial stage is a period 
in which victims of crime are in need of considerable assistance. In fact, they may 
even wonder whether an offence has been committed against them at all. Or what 
rights they are entitled to if they decide to report their grievance as one, as well as 
how the criminal justice system might accommodate any vulnerabilities that they 
might have, either before or after the incident in question or if they have a right to 
be keep up to date about the progression of what may ultimately become their case. 
They might also be unaware of how they can submit statements, and what impact 
their statements can have at this particular stage and the impact they may have on 
a trial, as well as whether they are entitled to any explanation from the State if it 
ultimately decides to forgo the prosecution of their complaint as a criminal offence. 
Thanks to the recent reform of all of these important areas, victims of crime are 
now much more empowered to receive the answers to all of these questions in a 
timely and dignified manner. This represents a significant change in tact from the 
previous sole preoccupation of criminal justice with due process rights to the 
accommodation of interests that relate to procedural justice and user accessibility. 




7.3.2 Consent – Much More than Mere Acquiescence 
The legal concept of consent, the absence of which is a key component of 
serious offences such as rape, has recently undergone several redefinitions due to 
the historical shortcomings with some of its previous articulations (Leahy 2014, 
2015). This has given the victim of crime in Ireland much greater protection, and 
also represents a successful progressive step towards the better re-inclusion of 
victims of crime. The first alteration was a result of Section 9 of the Criminal Law 
(Rape) (Amendment) Act, 1990. This clarified that, regarding those crimes that 
require the absence of consent, the lack of any protestation by a complaint victim 
is not tenderable evidence of consent to an act (Campbell et al. 2010, p. 556).  
A second re-calibration of the aforementioned definition of consent164  led 
to the terms second re-definition, which has also aided with the legal re-
centralisation of crime victims. 165  This amended the previous definition, 166 
meaning that the current definition of the term167 now provides that consent must 
be free and voluntary and is not sufficient where obtained by force, its threat or a 
reasonable suspicion that it may be applied. Nor is it valid where a person is 
sleeping, unconscious or incapacitated due to intoxication, has a physical disability 
that prevents them giving their consent or where the person in question does not 
 
164 That was contained within The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017. 
165 Which is now laid out under Section 48 The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017. 
166 Contained within Section 9 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act, 1990. 
167 Provided for in Section 9 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act, 1990 as amended by 
Section 48 of The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017. 




fully appreciate the quality and aim of an act. Consent is also insufficient where a 
person misidentifies who they are committing an act with, when a person is 
illegally restrained, or where the only “consent” provided is given by a third party, 
and not by the person who is directly involved in an act’s commission (Leahy 
2018). 
7.3.3 Investigations – Victims must be Assessed 
European Court of Human Rights pronouncements on this subject have 
greatly assisted with the safeguarding of Irish victims of crime, by stipulating that 
the investigations of Member States into criminal offences require ‘immediate and 
effective action’.168 Even though the European Court of Human Rights has never 
actually gone into explicit detail and stipulated how exactly domestic authorities in 
a Member State ought to conduct these kinds of assessments, it mandated that they 
need to be transparent and victim centred. They must also be impartial, appropriate 
and timely, with justifications where a prosecutorial agent does not ultimately bring 
a criminal charge in relation to a victim’s complaint. In fact, the decision of Z -v- 
United Kingdom169  has stipulated that unjustified violations in this regard can 
breach Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights, and entitle 
victims to non-pecuniary damages. This means that a victim of crime can materially 
benefit if the European Court of Human Rights adjudicate that an improper State 
investigation has unfairly prejudiced the rights that a victim of crime is deemed by 
 
168 As laid out in Art 2 and Art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
169 (2002) 34 e.h.r.r. 3. 




the European Court of Human Rights to possesses under the European Convention 
of Human Rights (Doak 2009, p.171; De Than 2003, p. 182). 
The Criminal Justice (Victim of Crime) Act, 2017 provided for greater 
provision in the area of victim assessment. The Gardaí must now assess a victim of 
crime during the investigation of a crime in order to identify their safety 
requirements.170 They should also consider whether a victim would, and in what 
way they might; obtain some advantage from special measures during the 
investigation of a crime by the Gardaí, and the Gardaí must make this assessment 
themselves.171172 If the Gardaí discover ‘specific protection needs’, and feel that a 
particular victim requires ‘protection measures’ or a ‘special measure’ in order to 
safeguard them from interference, they must liaise with the victim involved and 
consider their thoughts.173 The Gardaí are also required to report their findings in 
 
170 Under Section 15 (1) ss. (1) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
171 Whilst considering a crime’s form and class; the context of its commission; if the victim has 
undergone serious injury as a result of the purported crime; the victim’s characteristics, association 
or reliance on the alleged criminal; their previous experiences of crime; if the crime appears to have 
a ‘bias or discriminatory motive'; and the susceptibility of vulnerable victim groups as per Section 
15 ss. (2) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
172 The ambit of this assessment ought to reflect the seriousness of the crime, as well as the victim’s 
ostensible injuries under Section 15 ss. (3) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
173 As laid out within Section 15 ss. (4) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 




this regard.174 Where a minor is assessed, their ‘protection need’ is presumed,175 
and the Gardaí will also have to consider, when adjudicating whether an child 
could, and in what way they would benefit from these kinds of protective measures, 
the best interests, thoughts and concerns of that particular child.176 The Criminal 
Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017 also provides for victim communicative rights 
during pre-trial investigations.177 These state that if a crime victim asks for, or that 
the Gardaí feel they might need this kind of support during an investigation, they 
must provide it, and give it to the victim of crime as quickly as possible.178 The 
Gardaí can do this orally, or in whatever manner they deem most practicable.179 
Directive 2012/29/EU was imperative to the creation of the requirement 
that victims receive assessments to discover any needs that they might have (Ring 
2017 p. 94). An emphasis on expedition was also seen within the Council of 
Europe’s Recommendation (97)13, with Paragraph 25 requiring this assessment be 
 
174 To a Gardaí member of no less than superintendent rank under Section 15 ss. (5) of The Criminal 
Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. However, they are not required to do this where a ‘specific 
protection need’ is not discovered as stipulated in Section 15 ss. (6) of The Criminal Justice (Victims 
of Crime) Act, 2017 
175 As per Section 15 ss. (7) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
176 This must be done whilst bearing in mind their youth, as well as the thoughts and concerns of 
their parent or guardian, provided they are not facing, or will face a criminal charge regarding the 
child involved. 
177 Under Section 22 ss. (2) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
178 As laid out under Section 15 ss. (4) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
179 As per Section 15 ss. (5) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 




conducted as swiftly as possible. However, the Directive was pivotal, as it set out 
an assessment provision,180 which now requires organs of the State to examine 
victims of crime so that they can help provide assistance to them. It also placed an 
obligation upon the State to identify the needs of victims. Victim interactions with 
organs of the State also need to be appropriate under the Directive, particularly 
when involving victims of crime that happen to be children.181 If any relevant 
authority discovers that a particular victim of crime possesses certain 
vulnerabilities, then the appropriate authorities are also required to take steps to 
address these during the conducting of that prosecution182 (O’Flaherty 2016, pp. 
120-126; Hall 2010, p. 3; Kilcommins et al. 2016, pp. 25-26, 2018 pp. 72-73). 
The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017 also improved the 
victim’s position during interviews and examinations, with the influence of 
Directive 2012/29/EU again being apparent.183 The Criminal Justice (Victims of 
Crime) Act, 2017 now states that184 when the Gardaí investigate a crime they must 
allow foreign victims to give their statement whenever suits them best.185 Victim 
interviews must also occur whenever is most ‘practicable following the[ir] 
 
180 That Article 22 of Directive 2012/29/EU sets out. 
181 With these victims benefiting from an assumption that they require additional safeguards as per 
Article 22(4) of Directive 2012/29/EU. 
182 As stipulated under Article 23 Directive 2012/29/EU. 
183 Particularly Article 19, which provided for the right to a speedy, non-burdensome interview, 
with the presence of counsel. 
184 Within Section 14 ss. (1). 
185 This is usually ideally soon after they report the crime. 




reporting’, and only where necessary in order to pursue a crime. A victim can also 
have a legal or layperson with them when the Gardaí conduct this.186 However, this 
person is removable if the investigating Gardaí is of the opinion that they would 
jeopardise an investigation, or that their presence is not in a victim of crime’s best 
interests.187 In these instances, the Gardaí are required to make the relevant victim 
aware that they are still entitled to have a person present, and can take steps to 
ensure this.188 The Gardaí must also make a note of any such decision,189 while 
legislation circumscribes examinations of victims to only those procedures that are 
essential to a crime’s pursuit190 (Coffey 2018; Kilcommins et al. 2018, pp. 72-73). 
7.3.4 Statements - Much More Admissible and Consequential 
Important legislative reforms regarding the admissibility of pre-trial 
statements have occurred in Ireland, making it easier for vulnerable victims of 
crime to tender this kind of evidence, which can now be of much greater 
consequence during a trial and can afford them far greater scope for procedural 
inclusion. The Criminal Evidence Act, 1992 allows191 child victims of crime to 
 
186 Which section 14 ss. (2) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017 stipulates.  
187 As per Section 14 ss. (3) and ss. (2) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
188 Under Section 14 ss. (4) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
189 As per Section 14 ss. (5) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
190 As laid out in Section 14 ss. (6) of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
191 Under Section 16 ss. (1) (a) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992, as amended by s. 20(a)-(b) of 
the Criminal Justice Act, 1999. 




provide video-recorded pre-trial statements via video link. 192  The legislature 
extended this exemption to statements made during Gardaí interviews, 193  that 
concern an offence that a child has suffered themselves, or an offence against 
another child194 such as a sex crime, child sexual exploitation195196or the trafficking 
of children or the mentally impaired.197  These reforms are vital, as they help 
prevent some of the most vulnerable parts of society from being victimised with 
impunity, and ensure the Irish legal system can bring those responsible to justice.  
The Criminal Procedure Act, 1967 also codified an exemption to the rule 
regarding the general inadmissibility of pre-trial statements.198 This permits pre-
trial witness depositions to be admissible as trial evidence where a witness dies, 
cannot attend a trial or becomes deterred from doing so by threats of violence. 
However, a court can only permit this where the suspect was present at the time 
that these statements were taken, and an opportunity exists for the defence to cross 
 
192 As stipulated within Part IA of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967. 
193 Under Section 16 ss. (1) - (b) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992, as amended by s. 37 of the 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017. 
194 As laid out within s. 16 ss. (1) - (b) (i) of The Criminal Evidence Act, 1992, as amended by s. 30 
(i) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
195Under either Section 3 (1) or (2) of the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act, 1998 as amended 
by s. 3(a) of the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act, 2008. 
196 Or under Section 3 ss. (3), as amended by s. 3(b) of the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act, 
2008. 
197 As laid out in 2, 4 or 7 of the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008. 
198 As Section 4G ss. (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967 was inserted by s. 9 of the Criminal 
Justice Act, 1999. 




and re-examine the witness in question. This Act also provides for the admittance 
of video recordings of the statements that a witness has provided via television link, 
so long as the court feels that it is in the interests of justice to permit this at trial.199 
The Children Act, 2001 also entitles District Court magistrates200 to permit 
child victims201 to give testimony via a sworn deposition or live video link. They 
can do this if a doctor feels that an in-court testimony would have an adverse impact 
on the minor in question. However, safeguards exist. These stipulate that the State 
can charge any child found to be lying with perjury202 (Walsh 2005, p. 21). 
 The Criminal Justice Act, 2006 also enacted reform203 in the wake of an 
infamous failed prosecution of a gang related homicide due to the intimidation of 
no less than six witnesses.204 This motivated the then Minister for Justice Michael 
McDowell to implement legislation that has permitted the use of pre-trial 
statements, even when an involved witness attempts to retract it. This comes into 
play when they withdraw, withhold or alter their testimony, and allows this to 
 
199 Under S. 4G ss. (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967. 
200 Under Section 255 ss. (3).  
201 Of certain offences under part 12 of that same act, this guards against child cruelty, exploitation 
and abuse. 
202 Under s. 255 ss. (5) of the Children Act, 2001. 
203 Under Section 16 (1) (a-c)  
204 This occurred in the case of The People (DPP) v Keane (Unreported, Central Criminal Court, 
March 8, 2003). 




remain admissible as evidence.205 The legislative provision also extends this rule 
to pre-trial statements.206 Testimony is now also admissible in cases where a judge 
feels it was given by a witness who recognised that they were obliged to tell the 
truth regarding such matters (Heffernan and Ni Raifertaigh 2014, p. 2000; Donagh 
2014, p. 118-21; Fitzgerald 2008, pp. 126-9; Kilcommins et al. 2018, pp. 58-60).   
Recent cases illustrate the trend towards greater inclusion of recorded pre-
trial victim statements. In The People (DPP) -v- XY, 207 although the prosecution 
was not ultimately successful, White J. allowed it to tender video footage of a 
victim’s pre-trial statement as evidence that the accused had forced an intellectually 
disabled person to commit a sex act with them. The case of DPP -v- AB208 revolved 
around the molestation of a victim, and the admissibility of a recorded pre-trial 
statement that the complainant victim had made. Although the defence argued that 
this was inadmissible, the court decided that it was not, since the victim was cross-
examinable by the defence. The court and jury then found the suspect guilty of the 
charges that they faced. The case of DPP -v- AF 209  revolved around a rape 
allegation in relation to an intellectually disabled victim. Hunt J. felt that the 
 
205 Where oral testimony of the issue is adducible; the statement has merit and the witness willingly 
tendered it under s. 16 (1) (b) of the Criminal Justice Act, 2006. 
206 Where a witness statement was sworn by the witness in question, or at least has a statutory 
declaration by that witness that it was correct and true to the best of their knowledge under s. 16 (1) 
(c) of the Criminal Justice Act, 2006. 
207 (Unreported, The Irish Times, 16 November, 2010). 
208 (Unreported, Circuit Criminal Court, 10 November 2014). 
209 (Unreported, Central Criminal Court, 20 November 2014). 




legislative provision for the admission of pre-trial video statements assisted with 
the submission of this kind of evidence where a victim of crime would otherwise 
find it difficult to tender these kinds of statements in person. He also noted that 
there was a legislative presumption in favour of admitting them, and that the 
defence could only dislodge this by demonstrating that such an admission would 
unjustly prejudice their defence. The presiding judge then permitted the 
prosecution to submit this evidence, and the suspect pled guilty to aggravated 
sexual assault shortly thereafter (Delahunt 2011, 2015; LRC CP 2011, p. 63). 
These decisions demonstrate a move away from the case of Rattigan -v- 
DPP.210 This was an appeal against the High Court’s failure to provide an order to 
prevent the Director of Public Prosecutions from pursuing a murder charge, where 
the appellant felt a lack of digitally recorded pre-trial evidence was so grievous as 
to risk them receiving a unfair trial. Although Hardiman J. felt the “failure to record 
interviews by the Gardaí, [was] ... a very grave matter” (2008, para 1), Geoghegan 
J. rejected the appeal, and approved the trial judge’s decision to exclude the pre-
trial witness statements in question. He did this as he felt they were inadmissible, 
since the witnesses had not made them during a trial. He also felt that the Gardaí 
were right to exclude them, as he thought that they were not obliged to record this 
kind of pre- trial information (2008, para14; Kilcommins et al. 2018, pp. 54-59). 
 
210 [2008] 4 i.r. 63. 




7.3.5 The Gardaí and DPP are Now More Accountable to Victims 
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has also had a 
reformative impact in relation to reasons for decisions. This is because Aydin -v- 
Turkey 211  considered the requirement of prosecutorial authorities to safeguard 
victim rights. There the court held that a Member State’s inability to quiz 
individuals and obtain testimony, or even gather evidence when pursuing a criminal 
charge, violated a victim’s right to the proper pursuit of their complaints. This 
consequently placed an obligation upon Member States to properly pursue victim 
grievances or risk domestically infringing their rights (Starmer 2014, p. 780).  
This change engendered reforms that have led to victim centred alterations 
in the approach of the Director of Public Prosecutions to victims, who can now 
offer them reasons for their failures to prosecute. The Director of Public 
Prosecutions was never previously required to provide these kinds of justifications. 
This position dates back to State (McCormack) -v- Curran,212 where Finlay C.J. 
stated that the Director of Public Prosecutions had considerable latitude when 
delivering these kinds of decisions. He also stressed that this discretion was not 
absolute, and could be subject to judicial review where a plaintiff was able to show 
mala fides or an untoward intention. However, failing that, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions had no obligation placed upon them to provide any justification for 
its decision to ultimately abandon a criminal prosecution, resulting in a very high 
bar for victims of crime who were seeking these justifications (1987, p. 237). 
 
211 (1998) 25 e.h.r.r. 251. 
212 [1987] i.l.r.m. 225. 




 This reasoning again found favour in H. -v- The Director of Public 
Prosecutions and The Commissioner of the Garda Síochána,213 where mala fides 
or untoward intention were again reiterated as the prerequisite for obtaining a 
justification from the Director of Public Prosecutions, who again was not 
compelled to give reasons for their decision to not take a prosecution. In H the 
applicant sought to compel the Director of Public Prosecutions to initiate 
proceedings against T.T.M., and his brother, for the alleged molestation of her son, 
or, failing that, to at least provide a reason for not prosecuting their complaint. 
O'Flaherty J. took the opportunity to reiterate how “...the Director of Public 
Prosecutions...was not obliged to give his reasons for not bringing a prosecution...” 
(1994, p. 602). While Denham J. noted that, the Director of Public Prosecutions “... 
cannot be called upon to explain...or to give the reasons...” (1994, p. 607). 
 Charleton J. confirmed this reasoning in The Director of Public 
Prosecutions -v- Monaghan.214 He cited public policy as the reason behind the rule. 
Monaghan concerned the fallout from a bar-fight in Mayo, where the Director of 
Public Prosecutions had alleged that the complainant, and alleged crime victim, 
was actually the appropriate person to charge in relation to the incident. Charleton 
J. confirmed the Director of Public Prosecutions “...is not...obliged to give reasons 
for his decision as to whether to prosecute ...unless it can be demonstrated that such 
a decision was made in bad faith or under the influence of an improper motive...” 
(2007, para 9). However, Charleton J. also referenced the European Court of 
 
213 [1994] 2 i.r. 589. 
214 [2007] i.e.h.c. 92. 




Human Rights’ jurisprudence in The X & Y -v- The Netherlands, 215  which 
confirmed the influence of these kinds of pronouncements upon the Irish judiciary, 
and also hinted at the kinds of legal changes that would eventually transpire.  
 Policy reforms followed these pronouncements. The ‘Reasons for 
Decisions’ trial undertaking now means the reasoning behind the failures of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions to prosecute can be provided to relevant victims of 
crime if they request to receive this information. The position of victims of crime 
when the Director of Public Prosecutions does not pursue a charge has also evolved 
under Chapter 4 of Directive 2012/29 /EU. This has vested victims of crime with 
safeguards to ensure that they receive dignified treatment from the bodies that the 
law has tasked with pursuing prosecutions. In fact, Article 6 gave victims of crime 
the right to be kept up to date about relevant prosecutions, and to obtain reasons 
where a criminal charge was ultimately not brought following their complaint; 
whilst Article 11 vested victims of crime with a right to appeal a decision of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions to not bring a prosecution (O’Flaherty 2016, pp. 
120- 126; Kilcommins et al. 2016, pp. 25-26, 2018 p. 41, p. 66, pp. 72-73).  
7.4 TRIAL REFORMS  
7.4.1 State Counsel and Material Assistance Are Now Available 
Although free legal aid for victims of crime was previously unavailable, 
domestic reforms, as well as international developments in the area have 
encouraged the provision of exemptions that have allowed certain victims of crime 
 
215 (1986) 8 e.h.r.r. 235. 




to benefit. This has occurred in various contexts, but the two major instances where 
in has arguably changed the most are in the fields of human trafficking and sexual 
offences. Irish acts mainly addressed sex crime victims, whilst international 
changes are what have primarily driven the reforms regarding victims of human 
trafficking. However, their domestic import was quite impactful in both cases. 
Certain victims can benefit from free legal aid.216 This includes the victims 
of rape217 aggravated sexual assault218 unlawful carnal knowledge219 or incest.220 
Victims of crime that fall within certain parameters 221  can even retain State 
counsel. 222  These victims can also apply to have their State-funded counsel 
changed;223 with any expense in this regard being borne by the legal aid fund.224 
Human trafficking victims can also avail of similar guarantees from the 
Legal Aid Board, as international provisions have augmented their domestic 
position. The European Union, Council of Europe, United Nations and European 
 
216 As stipulated in Section 26 ss. (3) (a) of the Civil Legal Aid Act, 1995. 
217 That have suffered an offence contrary to common Law or in contravention of Section 2 of the 
Criminal Law (Rape) Act, 1981 or a rape under section 4 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) 
Act, 1990. 
218 Under Section 3 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act, 1990 
219 As laid out in Section 1 or 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1935. 
220 As mandated for under Section 1 or 2 of the Punishment of Incest Act, 1908. 
221 As set out in Section 26 ss. (3) of the Civil Legal Aid Act, 1995. 
222 Along the lines specified by Section 31 ss. (1) and (2) of the Civil Legal Aid Act, 1995. 
223 As provided for by Section 31 ss. (3) and (4) of the Civil Legal Aid Act, 1995. 
224 Where the Legal Aid Board deems this is reasonable under Section 32 ss. (5) of the Civil Legal 
Aid Act. 




Court of Human Rights were the driving force behind all of these reforms. The 
rights they convey are extensive, and provide considerable domestic protection. 
Each right is also binding upon the Irish state (Kilcommins et al. 2018, pp. 67-68). 
7.4.2 Greater Account taken of Victim Privacy During Disclosures 
Although the psychiatric past of a particular victim and its disclosure to the 
defence can be of imperative importance and is secured as a key right of the accused 
(Leahy 2012, 2016), as can be seen in the case of People v Wall and McCabe,225 
where its non-disclosure to the defence led to the quashing of a life sentence for 
the rape and sexual assault of a minor, there are some instances in which this kind 
of information is not particularly relevant (O’ Sullivan 2008; Carolan 2016). In 
such cases, these materials are “…likely to produce evidence that is not only 
unreliable but also likely to be prejudicial, inflammatory, distracting or misleading” 
(Ring 2017, p. 95). This is predominantly due to the perception amongst some 
defence counsel that the fact that a person has had to seek the help of a mental 
health professional makes them an unreliable or ineffectual in-court narrator, 
something which significantly relies upon and strengthens the profoundly artificial 
distinction between “…the rational [usually masculine] legal subject and the 
irrational traumatised raped woman” (Ring 2017, p. 95; Kelly et al. 2005; Gotell 
2002, p. 134). This ideological formation is also symptomatic of some of the worst 
aspects of the ‘medical and psychoanalytical myths’ that were so authoritatively 
propounded in the past regarding the “innate hysteria” of femininity. These rules, 
 
225 (2005) i.e.c.c.a. 140 




against this historical background of medicalised gender bias can also be 
compounded by the common lack of awareness that tends to exist regarding 
psychic abnormality in such a way as to severely prejudice a complainant victim 
of crime solely by virtue of their own mental health history and/or difficulties (Ring 
2017, p. 95; Bronitt and McSherry 1997, p. 262; Ellison 2009; Raitt 2011). 
Therefore, in light of the highly personal, inappropriate and potentially 
sensitive information pertaining to victims which can inevitably emerge during the 
course of a criminal trial, the Oireachtas has passed several reforms of the way in 
which court actors can obtain victim information in order to secure the integrity of 
a victims’ private life. Section 39 of The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 
2017 created a procedure by which hearings are necessary to discover whether it is 
in the interests of justice to disclose the psychological information of a crime victim 
(Ring 2017, p. 95).226 Now a suspect applying for access to the psychological 
records of a victim must specify a file and justify its disclosure.227 They must also 
inform the person in control of the file, the victim, the prosecutor, as well as any 
other relevant person of their interest regarding its disclosure,228 and a judge must 
 
226 By amending Section 19 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1992 and thereby inserting Section 19A 
into the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992. Section 19A ss. (2) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992 
requires a prosecutor to notify a suspect of a victim’s psychological record; however, the substance 
of this record is not accessible without the trial judge’s approval. 
227 As stipulated in Section 19 A ss. (3) (a) and (b) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992. 
228 As laid out in Section 19 A ss. (4) Criminal Evidence Act, 1992. 




then convene a hearing.229 The victim, and any other relevant party, can present 
and contribute during this,230  and the relevant judge involved has to assess a 
number of factors.231 A judge can also make a conditional disclosure,232 but they 
must always justify their granting or denial of the files that they do release.233  
These changes are important, as they guard against fishing expeditions into 
the psychological past of a victim by the legal team of an accused in order to 
discover some irrelevant psychic abnormality that counsel for the defence can then 
use to character assassinate a crime victim, and thereby derail an otherwise 
uncontentious prosecution. However, there are numerous shortcomings with such 
regulation, as the language of the provision is couched in that of individual privacy 
rather than psychological harm. This ensures that there may potentially be issues 
relating to the lack of recognition surrounding the impact of a non-disclosure or the 
disclosure of redacted records upon a complainant victim. The provision also fails 
to ensure that a suspect is prevented from personally viewing the records of the 
 
229 In which the individual who has the file will supply them with it under per Section 19 A ss. (8) 
of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992. 
230 Under Section 19 A ss. (9) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992. 
231 Section 19 A ss. (10) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992 states that these include whether the 
suspect requires the evidence, its merit, the confidential nature of such files, the risk to privacy, 
policy considerations surrounding the reporting and counselling of sex crimes, the impact, 
disclosure on a prosecution’s soundness and the prospect of injury to the victim, as well as the 
quality and/or seriousness of that injury. 
232 Where they feel it is just under Section 19 A ss. (12) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992. 
233 As per Section 19 A ss. (13) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992. 




psychological past of their victim. The safeguards in this area also do not come into 
play if a victim revokes their entitlement to a non-disclosure, ensuring that they can 
be strong armed by other criminal justice stakeholders such as law enforcement 
into acquiescing to a disclosure that might not be in their own best interests or what 
they personally want. Such an eventuality is a distinct possibility considering that 
there is no obligation placed upon the State to give a victim information or legal 
counsel regarding this particular decision. The impact of this could be stark, as it 
tends to encourage victims to not seek the help that they might require until after 
the conclusion a trial, which can considerably delay their own personal recovery 
(Ring 2017, p. 95-96; Rape Crisis Network Ireland 2015b). 
7.4.3 Now Easier for Vulnerable Victims to Testify 
Those labouring under an intellectual impairment were often unable to 
testify in court due to the previous competency test that the State tended to impose 
in such instances, even where they could provide an accurate narrative that they 
were able to comprehend. In the period before the legislative remedying of these 
barriers the procedure that was in place in order to allow a potential victim of crime 
to provide testimony was much more dependent upon the outcome of an arbitrary 
medical assessment than whether a victim of crime could comprehend and recount 
an accurate narrative that they could fully comprehend. Indeed, the case of The 
DPP -v- JS234 illustrates this rather well. There a cognitively impaired victim of 
crime did not respond to questions put to them in relation to sworn testimony, or 
 
234 (Unreported, Circuit Court, Judge David Sheehy, April 13, 1983). 




the substance of an untruth. The court therefore deemed them incompetent to 
testify, and, as the prosecution had hinged upon such testimony, it collapsed.  
The case of The DPP -v- MW 235  also evidences this point. There a 
defendant faced charges of rape and unlawful carnal knowledge. However, when 
the court tried the first charge, the disabled victims’ statements were inconsistent, 
leading to an acquittal. Although the Director of Public Prosecutions pursued a 
second charge against the same accused, the court did not accept the victim of 
crime’s responses to ‘the nature of the oath’, and this case also ended up failing.  
Even though, as we have just seen, competence to testify could be an issue 
where a child or intellectually disabled person wished to testify, statutory reforms 
have tended to alter this position. Victim centred reform is evident in the area of 
competence to testify, where the law has given victims of crime a far greater 
latitude to contribute, so long as they can tender an accurate narrative and convey 
it whilst understanding its concrete impact and substance. In the past, minors who 
wished to testify had to give their statements under oath, but a minor, of no more 
than 14 years, can now give evidence where a judge deems that they are able to 
provide an accurate account of what they allege to have happened. 236  The 
legislature has also extended this to persons with mental impairments.237  This 
 
235 (Unreported, Circuit Court, Judge Frank Martin, July 15 1983). 
236 Under Section 27 ss. (1) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992.  However, Section 27 ss. (2) of the 
Criminal Evidence Act, 1992 provides that failure to give an honest account can open such an 
individual up to a charge of perjury. 
237 This includes those who have reached 14 years of age under Section 27 ss. (3) of the Criminal 
Evidence Act, 1992. 




means their testimony is now admissible where a judge feels that they can provide 
an accurate account to the court of what they alleged to have actually happened.  
An example of the impact that all of these changes have had in Ireland is 
evident in the case of The People (DPP) -v- Gillane,238 where the court managed 
to accommodate the testimony of a victim of crime with psychological difficulties. 
The case concerned an applicant’s appeal against their murder conviction. The 
convict involved brought this as one of the key prosecution witnesses in their trial, 
who had provided pivotal eyewitness testimony contending that the appellant had 
asked them to kill their wife had also alleged that staff at the Mater Hospital had 
inserted a mind control chip into their head. The convict therefore argued that their 
conviction was unsafe due to the reliance that the prosecution had placed upon the 
eyewitness testimony of this person. However, Lynch J. instead felt that the strange 
belief of the witness regarding what the staff at the Mater Hospital had done to him 
was actually quite “...peripheral and irrelevant...”, to the case in this particular 
instance, meaning he ultimately dismissed the appeal (1998, para 33-34; 
Kilcommins et al., 2018 pp. 62-63; LRC, 1990 p. 10). 
The case of O’Sullivan -v- Hamill239 is another example of this transition. 
There the applicant sought to overturn an order that allowed a mentally impaired 
victim of crime to testify against them in relation to a prosecution concerning their 
purported unlawful sexual interaction with a victim. O'Higgins J., refused the order 
and went on to state that the provision of “[u]nsworn evidence is provided for from 
 
238  [1998] 12 j.i.c. 1403. 
239 [1999] 3 i.r. 9. 




a person with a ‘mental handicap’ where the Court is satisfied that [they are] 
capable of giving an intelligible account of events which are relevant to those 
proceedings”. These pronouncements reflect the broader shift in the legal concept 
of capacity, which demonstrates how the judiciary have affected this re-
interpretation for the benefit of vulnerable social groups such as victims of crime. 
A parallel trend is also discernible from the clarification of the approach to 
a spouse’s competency to testify. Section 21240 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1992 
illustrates this. This stipulates that marital partners can testify against their spouses 
during criminal prosecutions. Such a change in the law was significant, as it 
recognises that an accused ought not to be able to use the institution of marriage to 
avoid culpability for their acts, simply because a witness at their trial happened to 
be their spouse (Kilcommins and Donnelly, 2014 p. 10; Jackson, 1993 p. 202). 
7.4.4 Marital Rape Exemption No Longer Applies 
The overruling of the marital rape exemption was ‘the foundation stone of 
a victim’s charter in Ireland’ (Charleton 1990:143). It occurred in The People 
(DPP) -v- JT,241 when a downs syndrome individual alleged that their father had 
molested them. JT appealed on the basis that the trial judge in their case was wrong 
to admit the evidence that his wife had tendered against him. He based this upon 
the marital rape exemption, which stipulated that because the law considers a 
marital couple to be one entity in law, and as rape involves two separate ones, a 
 
240 ss. (a) and (b). 
241 (1988) 3 Frewen 141. 




husband could not legally rape their own wife. However, the appeal judge, Walsh 
J., did not find in his favour, as he felt that JT’s attempted use of the marital rape 
exemption was incompatible with the privileged status of the family that is 
enshrined under Article 41 of the Constitution. Section 5 Subsection (1) of the 
Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act, 1990 advanced on this position by going 
so far as to stipulate that “[a]ny rule of law by virtue of which a husband cannot be 
guilty of the rape of his wife is hereby abolished.” Although Subsection (2) still 
mandates that the consent of the Attorney General in required when bringing 
proceedings in such instances, the section now means the previous exemption no 
longer subsists. These reforms were significant, as they acknowledged that 
although marriage unified a couple, this did not prevent a marital partner from 
violating their spouse, which ultimately allowed for more rape prosecutions to be 
pursued in Ireland’s notoriously private domestic sphere (Jackson 1993, p. 202; 
Kilcommins and Donnelly 2014, p. 10; Kilcommins et al. 2018, p. 64; Leahy 2018). 
7.4.5 Child Testimony No Longer Requires Support or Warnings 
Recent years have also seen reforms of the corroboration rules that have 
considerably benefited child victims of crime. Before the legislature introduced this 
the testimony of a child victim of a sex crime warranted an obligatory judicial 
caution, which highlighted the risks of solely relying upon the uncorroborated 
allegations of an allegedly sexually abused minor. This was because the law in this 
area had historically predicated itself on a fear of vexatious complaints. However, 
statute in this area has moved beyond these previous frames and narratives, and 




now permits the judiciary to decide whether or not to give such a warning to the 
jury (Healy 2004, p. 157; Leahy 2008, pp. 203-12; 2013, pp. 102-7, 2014).  
This trend liberalised the previous rules regarding unsworn child 
testimony.242 These had previously mandated that the unsworn testimony of an 
child required corroboration. That effectively made the allegations that children 
tendered insufficient to sustain a prosecution on their own. Even where a child did 
swear their testimony, and a prosecutor could introduce this at trial, the court still 
needed to advise the jury about the risks of finding guilt without corroboration. 
The case of AG (Kelly) -v- Kearns243 well illustrates this point. There the 
accused allegedly committed sexual crimes against three children. Despite the fact 
that two child victims testified that the purported molestations actually took place, 
and that several other children attempted to substantiate similar claims regarding a 
third child victim, the prosecution ultimately collapsed, as the law at the time did 
not deem their uncorroborated testimony to be sufficient. In fact, Molony J. noted 
that since the testimony of each child was uncorroborated, and could not be 
corroborated by another child, it was therefore insufficient to sustain a successful 
criminal prosecution in of itself in that particular instance (1946, pp. 45-48).   
 
242 That had previously existed under s. 30 of the Children Act, 1908. Although these allowed 
children to give unsworn testimony, they also stipulated that “a person shall not be liable to be 
convicted of the offence unless the testimony...is corroborated by some other material evidence...”. 
243 (1946) 80 i.l.t.r. 45. 




Legislative reform did away with this 244  by removing the need to 
corroborate ‘unsworn’ child testimony.245 It also repealed the previous rule that 
mandated that these instances required a judicial direction to the jury about the risks 
involved with convicting someone based upon a child’s uncorroborated testimony. 
The judiciary can now make this direction where they feel that it is necessary, and 
can do so in whichever way they feel is best. Unsworn child testimony can therefore 
now support the sworn or unsworn evidence of another minor,246 making a repeat 
of Kearns unlikely (Kilcommins et al. 2018, p. 65). 
7.4.6 Background Evidence Now More Admissible where Relevant 
Further victim reform is discernible from the Irish judiciary’s increased 
tendency to permit background evidence. The DPP -v- Gerald McNeill247  best 
illustrates the victim centred reform of this area. It concerned whether evidence 
regarding a pattern of abusive behaviour could be admissible, which was 
contentious, as it referred to allegations that were unrelated to those that were 
before the court. McNeill therefore sought to quash their conviction by contending 
that this information was prejudicial, and therefore rendered their conviction 
unsafe. However, O'Donnell J. highlighted that the blanket inadmissibility of such 
evidence was actually prejudicial to victims, as it prevented them from 
 
244 With Section 28(1) of Criminal Evidence Act, 1992 superseding Section 30 of the Children Act, 
1908. 
245 When Section 28 ss. (2) (a) and (b) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992 was implemented. 
246 Under Section 28 ss. (3) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992. 
247 [2011] 2 i.l.r.m. 461. 




contextualising their victimisation (2011, para 6). Denham J. therefore held that 
judges could permit it, where such evidence was “...relevant and necessary...”, 
meaning its admission at trial did not undermine the conviction of McNeill, 
allowing the court to dismiss his appeal (2011, para 48). This also meant that 
victims of crime could now submit relevant information at trial from other pertinent 
instances in which they were victimised by a suspect in order to convey the reality 
of the situation they found themselves in (Kilcommins et at. 2018, p. 67).  
7.4.7 Judges can Now Clear a Court of Non-Essential Personnel 
Broad provision now exists for the exclusion of court attendees from 
proceedings to create a more appropriate trial venue for victims.248 A judge can 
now remove any individual or group from their court, and/or any person from the 
public gallery.249 This entitles a judge to hold proceedings behind closed doors 
where necessary.250 However, the provision does not erode the right of a victim251 
to have an acquaintance, social worker or appropriate person252 with them during 
proceedings.253 These changes are to be welcomed, and will hopefully guard 
 
248 As stipulated in Section 20 of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
249 This can be done by the petition of the prosecution, where they deem it equitable in the context 
of the trial, or necessary to safeguard a victim from procedural or direct injury. 
250 However, they cannot exclude essential trial personnel or media operating in good faith. 
251 Set out in Section 18 of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
252 An appropriate person is a relative of any age, or adult that An Garda Síochána or an officer of 
the Ombudsman Commission appoints to accompany a child victim where their parent or guardian 
is unavailable. 
253 As laid out in Section 20 ss. (2) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 




against the humiliation of victims from the gallery, which has unfortunately 
caused considerable disruption within neighbouring jurisdictions in the past. 
7.4.8 Intermediary Testimony for Vulnerable Victims 
International provisions have helped re-include Irish victims by advancing 
vulnerable victim safeguards. This has assisted them with the provision of their 
testimony, and has allowed them to access third party assistance where necessary. 
The United Nations Model Law on Justice in Matters Involving Child Victims and 
Witnesses of Crime mandates 254  that testifying child victims receive expert 
assistance as soon as possible from members of the judiciary in order to provide 
them with any support and assistance that they might need. These international 
standards have had a reformative impact on the Irish legislature, as it has 
encouraged them to alter Irish legislation in order to bring it more in line with the 
leading international legal norms within this particular area.  
The changes that it initiated255 not only reflect this, but have also implemented 
procedural reforms that have meant that vulnerable victims are now better provided 
for domestically (Hoyano 2015, p. 9).  These reforms have meant that domestic 
legislation now allows vulnerable victims who are witnesses to have questions put 
to them by an intermediary.256 These particular concessions are important ones as 
 
254 As stipulated under Chapter I (e). 
255 That came to be stipulated within The Criminal Evidence Act 1992 and then advanced upon and 
reformed by the Children Act, 2001 and the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
256 Under Section 14 ss. (1) (a) and (b) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992, as amended by s. 30 (c) 
(i) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017 and s. 257(3) of the Children Act, 2001. 




those cases which involve the purported molestation of children by their nature 
incorporate those of tender years, who are evidentiary sources, for the purposes of 
such a case. As such, they are subject to being exposed to the analysis, as well as 
cross-examination of their narratives, by trained legal professionals, which will be 
conducted in a trial setting which typically incorporate a judge and barristers.  
This situation is understandably disconcerting for those children that are 
involved. Such cases usually also require a child to face their purported abuses 
within a setting which understandably could in of itself prevent certain evidence 
from emerging. The suppression of evidence is a major issue in this regard, as entire 
cases have been scuppered due to the rigours imposed upon the victim as an 
evidentiary source. The situation can frequently result in the DPP forgoing cases 
where a victim cannot adequately produce enough evidence for a conviction. 
Indeed, the task of doing so is exacerbated by having to deal with the 
deterrence faced by trying to provide such information in direct opposition to an 
alleged offender. Not to mention the highly charged setting of solemnity of a trial 
courtroom, which is often novel and frightening. Such measurers thereby represent 
a recognition and conscious decision by the legislature, and by extension the wider 
public, to tender protections to children. This is done in order allow them to tell 
their story without the added burden of engaging with their alleged offender and 
being subjected to the full rough and tumble that categorises trial-based inquiry.257 
 
257 “The prosecution of charges involving allegations of child sexual abuse often involve young 
children being examined and cross-examined as witnesses in open court. This can be a terrifying 
experience for any young child, particularly where, as is normally the case, it involves the child 




The changes have certain evidential implications. As a victim giving their 
evidence in relation to an alleged offence can now provide such information where 
either the prosecution or defence successfully petitions for this to be done. Such 
information can consequently be provided via an intermediary where the victim 
involved is giving their in-trial evidence via live television link. There are also 
important implications for the examination of this evidence, as the queries relayed 
to a vulnerable victim are mediated by their intermediary to effectively develop 
them into language the victim can understand. In calibrating the content that is 
mediated by the intermediary, the age of the victim, as well as their cognitive state 
is given due regard so as to ensure the victim properly understands the question.258 
 
victim having to confront his abuser. Indeed, prosecutions have been lost purely as a result of child 
witnesses not being able to cope with the demands of the criminal trial. Many more have not been 
pursued by the DPP on the basis that the key child witnesses would not be able to cope with the 
challenge of confronting their abuser and giving evidence against him in the unfamiliar and 
intimidating environment of the criminal court. Public concern at this situation eventually resulted 
in the enactment of measures to protect children from the obligation of having to confront their 
abuser and submit to examination and cross-examination in open court.” Walsh, D. (2016) Walsh 
on Criminal Procedure, 2nd edn., Dublin: RoundHall, Chapter 21 - Trial Evidence. 
258 “Under Section 14 (1) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1992, witnesses may, on application by the 
prosecution or the defence, also be permitted to give evidence in court through an intermediary in 
circumstances where they are using the live television link…[q]uestions put to a witness in this 
manner shall be either in the words used by the questioner or so as to convey to the witness in a 
way which is appropriate to her or his age and mental condition the meaning of the questions being 
asked…” Kilcommins, S., Leahy S., Moore, K. and Spain, E. (2018) The Victim in the Irish 
Criminal Justice Process, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 57-58. 




Although this is a laudable goal obvious evidentiary issues present 
themselves as such mediation of questions to the victim are constraint on the ability 
of defence counsel and the accused to interrogate the evidence against them.  
Indeed, the provision itself is arguably underutilised due to these very constraints. 
Commentators have labelled the situation a “one-way street” which mediates the 
queries tendered to the evidentiary source involved, yet allows that same 
evidentiary source to provide a virtually unconstrained response to this question.259 
It also allows for a child witness, who is giving evidence via video link, to 
have questions put to them in this manner. This is permissible where a judge deems 
this to be equitable in the circumstances. They are also empowered to permit this 
where they feel that a witness requires it. After having regard to their age and 
mental condition. The Oireachtas also extended this exemption260 to all adults a 
court determines to be suffering from a legally recognizable mental disorder .261 
There are also significant difficulties with regards to the manner by which 
this system operates, and the knock-on evidentiary impact this can have not only 
 
259 “S.14 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1992 provides for the use of an intermediary but this measure 
is not widely used, perhaps due to the limitations of the section. The use of an intermediary is 
essentially a ‘one-way street’ where questions may be ‘translated’ but not the responses…” 
Biggs, C. and Delahunt, M. (2017) ‘Prosecutorial challenges – vulnerable witnesses’, The Bar 
Review, 22 (1), 23-26, p. 25 
260 Under s. 19 of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992, as amended by s. 30(l)(i) and (iii) Criminal 
Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
261 As defined within Section 5 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 




for the evidentiary source, but also the defendant and trial. The incorporation of 
more vulnerable victims and allowing of them to play a more active trial role and 
provide evidence although progressive is still be open to a certain level of critique.  
Despite the fact that there are now several concessions made to this 
category of victim in to help them serve as evidence sources, there are a number of 
important issues that remain unresolved.262 The impact of such measures and its 
positive impact on these victims remains inconclusive. The use of the term “a 
mental handicap” in such an important area is disappointing. As it is dated, as well 
as cemented in pathologized conceptualisations of these issues. In addition, there 
is no flexibility for the various categories of person that are in need of such 
concessions, beyond the generic and problematic concept of “mental handicap”. 
Even greater importance ought to the attached to the fact that the 
concessions given were deployed in most cases to deal with child victims giving 
 
262  “Ireland has put in place provisions designed to support witnesses in the evidence-giving 
process…[y]et…[the law] only applies…to those under 18 years of age and ‘persons with a mental 
handicap’ who have experienced a sexual and/or violent offence… the language used to describe 
the victim in the case of disability is outmoded…moreover, it fails to reflect the needs of different 
groups of people with disabilities…this legislation was established…in the case of child 
witnesses… there is a danger that people with intellectual disabilities become infantilised, or rather 
just seen as an ‘add-on’ to children…Delahunt (2010) writes…[w]e have legislation here which is 
20 years out of date, which is limited in respect of the offences to which it applies which contains 
archaic, undefined terms, which does not provide statutory guidelines for Gardaí or courts to work 
within and which does little to safeguard the interests of either the complainant or defendant…”  
Edwards, C. (2014) ‘Pathologising the victim: law and the construction of people with disabilities 
as victims of crime in Ireland’, Disability & Society, 29(5), 685-698, p. 694. 




evidence against an alleged abuser. As the law in this area is synonymous with the 
provision of evidence by children an obvious dilemma arises in relation to the risk 
that individuals with mental abnormalities might be infantilised and might also 
potentially be overlooked. This is problematic from an evidentiary perspective, as 
these factors may deter or exacerbate the difficulties involved with giving evidence.  
Indeed, although many might laud such previsions, others are more critical 
of their implications for victims. Delahunt, one of the leading experts in this field, 
is particularly scathing. They perceive the law as outdated, heavily constrained in 
relation to the actual crimes covered and also littered with antiquated and unclear 
terminology. Worse still there are no guidelines for police or judges to use to guide 
them in its application, which offers scarce protection for victims and the accused.  
In fact, our nearest neighbouring jurisdictions were stirred into action by 
some of the very same dilemmas. These resulted in alterations to the duration and 
method of interrogation of victims with vulnerabilities when giving evidence. 
Delahunt would very much be in favour of further reform of this particular area, 
and believes this is a long time coming.263 Especially in relation to improving the 
manner by which vulnerable classes of victim are protected as evidentiary sources.  
 
263 “The use of intermediaries in England and Wales has prompted changes to the length and manner 
of cross examination of vulnerable witnesses at trial…[s]ignificant reform has been required for 
some time to protect vulnerable witnesses in trial proceedings in this jurisdiction and it should be 
considered that consistency and transparency may serve the defendant as well as the vulnerable 
witness. If reform is not prompted by constitutional and international momentum, the use of support 
measures will be left in the hands of the ingenuity of legal practitioners. It is also unjust that the 
judiciary must resolve issues which should be dealt with by the Executive. With minimal legislative 




Although international developments have had an influence in the area if 
they fail to motivate further domestic changes such alterations would be very much 
driven by the creativity of lawyers. It is unfortunate and unfair that courts often 
need to rectify problems that are really the domain of the legislature. Due to the 
paucity of advice from the Oireachtas the judiciary are forced to firefight by 
rectifying evidentiary problems as they emerge. Such a situation creates needless 
backlogs and precarity during prosecutions. The confusing obfuscation ends up 
creating disadvantages for the accused, victim and trial. Whilst Delahunt clearly 
desires extensive statutory reform of the way that we assist vulnerable victims the 
execution of these measures is arguably, in her opinion, as critical as their wording. 
7.4.9 Evidence via Video Link is Permissible in Several Contexts 
The permission of video link evidence is one of the most consequential 
reforms of Irish criminal procedure that has taken place in recent years. The court 
can permit it in circumstances in which a crime has a sexual or violent element to 
it. In these cases, victims of crime can provide their testimony via video link.264 
 
guidance, when issues arise, the court must resolve them anew on each occasion causing 
unnecessary delay and uncertainty within the trial process. This has a negative impact both on the 
defendant, the vulnerable witness and the criminal justice system. Comprehensive, updated 
legislation regarding the provision of support measures for vulnerable witnesses is required in this 
jurisdiction but...it is as vital to implement the legislation correctly as it is to have it well drafted.” 
Delahunt, M. (2015) Recorded Evidence for Vulnerable Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings The 
Bar Review 2015, 20(3), 46-49, pp. 46-49. 
264 Under Section 13 (1) (a) and (b) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992 as amended by s. 30(b) (i) 
of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 




These provisions also extend to minors where a judge does not object, and to all 
other persons where the court deems it necessary in the interests of justice. The 
interests of justice will of course take account of the rights of both the victim and 
the accused, as well as where due process lies in each particular case. This 
calibration of the justice of each case, in terms of procedural fairness, has taken, as 
we shall see, extensive consideration of the constitutional due process rights. 
Courts can also permit a victim that is a witness to provide testimony via 
video link265 where they have evidence regarding an indictable crime and suffer 
coercion, or feel they may be subject to it. However, the court is obliged to record 
such testimony.266 Judges can also provide flexibility to non-resident witnesses that 
are victims,267 by allowing them to provide remote video link statements regarding 
prosecutions or extraditions, but this testimony must also be video recorded.268 
The legislature has also provided for the use of video link testimony in 
certain cases of domestic abuse.269 Victims in trials relating to proceedings under 
the Domestic Violence Act, 2018 (Leahy 2017) which typically relate to 
applications for a wide range of civil orders, can provide testimony via television 
 
265 As stipulated in Section 39 ss. (1) and (2) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999. 
266 Under Section 39 ss. (3) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999. 
267 Under Section 29 (1) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992, as substituted by Section 24 of the 
Extradition (European Union Conventions) Act, 2001 and Section 30 (n) of the Criminal Justice 
(Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
268 As stated in Section 29 (1) ss. 2 of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992. 
269 As laid out in Section 25 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2018. 




link.270 Giving evidence in this way is permitted where an individual is a minor, or 
if a judge does not refuse, or in any other instance where they give their accent.271 
They can even move a trial from a venue in which video link services are not 
operational to one in which they are, if they deem this to be necessary in the 
circumstances of that case,272 but they are however required to retain a visual or 
auditory record of any testimony that is provided in this particular way by the 
relevant victim that is going to tender testimony to the court in this manner.273  
Statutory reform has also meant that274 those witnesses that are victims who 
provide evidence regarding any crime, or one that has personally affected them, via 
television link,275 or while using a screen,276 are no longer mandated to identify a 
suspect in open court if they are well known to them. This is now only required 
where a judge deems this to be necessary in the interests of justice. As previously 
mentioned, such a calibration will not only incorporate the rights of the victims, 
but the accused as well into the balance of due process in each case. This is a 
welcome change, as it recognizes the potential impact that these identifications can 
have upon a victim of crime during a trial. It has also consequently provided a more 
 
270 Under Section 25 ss. (1) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2018.  
271As provided for under Parts (a) and (b) of Section 25 ss. (1) of The Domestic Violence Act, 2018. 
272 Under Section 25 ss. (3) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2018. 
273 As laid out in Section 25 ss. (2) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2018. 
274 Since Section 18 of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992, was amended by s. 30 (k) of the Criminal 
Justice (Victims of Crime) Act 2017.   
275 As laid out in Section 13 (1) or 1A of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992. 
276 Or any other discretionary measure under 14A of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992. 




appropriate venue for victims who are understandably reticent about testifying 
against an offender that they know well (Kilcommins et al. 2018, p. 56, p. 60). 
 The constitutionality of the use of video links was contested in Anthony 
Donnelly v. Ireland, The Attorney General and The Director of Public 
Prosecutions277 and Algernon White -v- Ireland, The Attorney General and The 
Director of Public Prosecutions. 278  Both appellants contended that it unfairly 
prejudiced these due process rights, but the Irish judiciary refused to accept this. 
These cases hinged upon the manner by which due process is maintained. In 
particular whether Section 13 compromised the constitutional rights of the accused. 
White attempted to obtain a statement from the courts that the use of video 
link as contained within Section 13 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1992 was a 
violation of their constitutionally recognised fundamental due process rights to a 
fair trial, trial by jury, equality before the law and their vindication.279Yet Kinlen 
J. dismissed the appeal as he was “... not satisfied that ‘confrontation’ was part of 
due process”. He based this on the fact that “...the so-called specific right to eyeball 
to eyeball confrontation does not exist” (1995, p. 281, p. 282). In doing so the 
learned judge gave a considered appraisal of the constitutional rights at play in this 
 
277 [1998] I i.r. 321. 
278 [1995] 1 i.r. 268. 
279 “A declaration that s. 12, s. 13, sub-ss. 1 and 2 … of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992, are invalid 
insofar and to the extent that they are repugnant to the provisions of Bunreacht na 
hÉireann éireann and Article 38, s. 1, Article 38, s. 5, Article 40, s. 1 and Article 40, s. 3 thereof.” 
Algernon White -v- Ireland, The Attorney General and The Director of Public Prosecutions [1995] 
1 i.r. 268. Kinlen J. at 271. 




regard in relation to both the accused and victims, as well as how they factored into 
the assessment of due process and the overall procedural fairness of the trial. 
They very much felt that the video link was an advancement the courts 
ought to retain a tight degree of control over, and, in so doing, ensure the 
constitutionality and procedural fairness of proceedings. The court was also keenly 
cognisant of the fact that there are two rights bearers, the victim and accused. Even 
though the court did not believe the accused had an entitlement under the 
constitution to have the victim make their in-court contentions in person, they were 
of the view that where this the case such an entitlement would have to give way to 
those of the victim. They did believe that the case in favour of such an entitlement 
had not been proven, and that the accused could not demand an in-person trial. 
 Indeed, it was the prerogative of the courts to determine where the balance 
of justice lay, and how the rights of each would be calibrated at trial. The veracity 
or otherwise of a victim’s statements was consequently adjudged to be adequately 
interrogated through its analysis by legal representation at trial. As a result, the 
court was of the mind that the jury was best placed to make the determination as to 
the veracity of such evidence. They therefore felt Section 13 did not infringe the 
constitutional right entitlements of the accused within the context of this case.280  
 
280 “…[t]he trial judge is in complete control of all the equipment. He will act in accordance with 
constitutional and natural justice and will ensure that there are fair procedures…there are two rights 
here, that of the accused, and that of the child witness or accuser. If despite my finding the accused 
has a constitutional right to the physical presence in the same room rather than a physical 
manifestation by television, that “right” must yield to the “rights” of a young child…it must yield 
to the court’s concern for the well-being of the child…[t]he applicant has not established a 




Hamilton C.J. also dismissed a similar appeal regarding the 
constitutionality of the use of video link evidence in Donnelly. The case again saw 
a similar request for a court statement that the relevant provision, Section 13 of the 
Criminal Evidence Act 1992, violated the rights of the accused to fair trial, trial by 
jury as well as the protection and vindication of such rights.281 In that case they 
noted that the provision of such evidence did not curtail the accused’s rights under 
the constitution, as they did not have a right to compel a witnesses to give evidence 
in open court, since the veracity of their testimony was not dependent upon their 
giving of “...evidence in the physical presence of the accused...”(1998, p. 357).282  
Costello P. reiterated that not only does the provision fail to curtail the 
entitlements of the accused under the constitution, but that this consequently means 
 
constitutional right to an “eyeball to eyeball” trial…confrontation it is for the courts to decide the 
balance of hierarchy…the so-called specific right to eyeball to eyeball confrontation does not 
exist…[t]he fact that the child may be a congenital liar…is something which can be dealt with in 
cross-examination or by comments by counsel. It will arise out of the evidence as given over a 
video-link or in person in court. The jury probably has a better ability to judge the child…I 
accordingly rule that s. 13 of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992, has not been shown to be invalid 
having regard to the provisions of the Constitution.” Algernon White -v- Ireland, The Attorney 
General and The Director of Public Prosecutions [1995] 1 i.r. 268. Kinlen J. at 281-282. 
281 “A declaration that ss. 12, 13 (1) and (2) and 18 of Part III of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992, 
are invalid…to the extent that they are repugnant to…Bunreacht na hÉireann héireann and in 
particular Articles 38.1 and 38.5 and Article 40.3 thereof” Donnelly v. Ireland, The Attorney 
General and The Director of Public Prosecutions [1998] I i.r. 321. Costello P. at 324. 
282 They therefore concluded that the fact that the victim had given their evidence under oath, and 
was subject to cross-examination sufficiently guaranteed a trial’s procedural fairness. 




they do not possess any entitlement under our basic law to confront their victims 
in person. The court also considered the implications of the accused’s entitlement 
under the constitution to due process and evidential interrogation. They perceived 
that the entitlement was not undermined by video link evidence. As a result, the 
learned judge upheld the provision in question as there was no breach.  
There was also consideration of the contention that were it that the 
constitution did not afford such an entitlement to the accused to face-to-face 
interrogation, the provision itself could be deemed to breach the constitution. As it 
was seen as prejudicial as it placed an unwarranted burden on suspects to prove a 
victims’ appropriateness for a personal in trial interrogation. Yet the court deemed 
that where inequity had not been shown it was very much the prerogative of the 
legislature to set the parameters of such applications.283 Or indeed to permit the 
 
283 “…the section does not infringe the plaintiff's constitutional right to fair procedures…it follows 
that the right to a physical confrontation by an accused of his or her accusers is not a constitutionally 
protected right…[t]he constitutional right to fair procedures includes the right to cross-examine 
witnesses…I do not think that the effectiveness of this right is adversely affected if it takes place 
when the witness is not in the physical presence of the accused…I cannot agree that the section is 
invalid because it interferes with an accused's right of cross-examination…it was urged…the 
procedures adopted by s. 13 (1) (a) were unfair (and therefore unconstitutional) because…they place 
an unfair onus on an accused…to establish the witness’ competence to undertake a face-to-face 
confrontation. However, once it is established that there is no unfairness involved in allowing 
evidence to be given in the absence of a physical confrontation then the Oireachtas is free to adopt 
the proposals of the [LRC] as to the circumstances in which the procedures will be permitted or to 
enact legislation so as to require the trial judge to decide the point on evidence to be adduced in a 
case by case basis. The adoption of the [LRC]’s proposals was constitutionally permissible once it 




determination of whether evidence of this kind was to be permissible to be a 
question the judge in question, who would make this assessment based upon the 
unique particularities of each case before them. As such, the provisions of Section 
13 were in keeping with the constitutional principles of due process and accused’s 
rights once the courts decided that video link evidence did not produce inequity. 
Hamilton C.J. further interrogated the claims that Section 13 were an 
unconstitutional infringement of the due process rights of the accused in detail. 
After reiterating that the accused lacked a entitlement to in person interrogation of 
the evidence produced by a victim, they emphasised that the main factor to be 
maintained was the reliability of what was adduced through its strong examination. 
They outlined how the text of our Basic Law fails to set out a right to interrogation 
of evidence. However, the maintenance of due process and procedural justice set 
out something rather similar, that the prosecution against a suspect is equitable. As 
such, there must be a strong standard of examination through victim interrogation. 
Having said that, they were not of the view that video link evidence curtailed the 
entitlements of the accused under the constitution. Indeed, they felt the court had 
considerable latitude afforded to it court to introduce video link evidence for young 
and thereby vulnerable victims or in situation where justice demand it.284  
 
is established that there is no unfairness in permitting the absence of a face-to-face confrontation.” 
Donnelly v. Ireland, The Attorney General and The Director of Public Prosecutions [1998] I i.r. 
321. Costello P. at 336-337. 
284  “…the central concern of the requirements of due process and fair procedures is the 
same…ensure the fairness of the trial...[t]he impugned provisions of the Act of 1992 do not restrict 




They highlighted the fact that safeguards were in place in this regard, as the 
victim giving video link evidence must provide it on oath and be given over to 
defence counsel for cross-examination to vindicate the rights of the accused. 
Therefore, the veracity of such statements will be assessable through an 
interrogation of the manner of the victim, by both the court as adjudicator of law 
as well as the jury as the determinators of fact. They will also have considerable 
latitude to adjudge the veracity of this evidence. There was a contention that in 
court testimony was essential to maintain a due process trial, however the learned 
judge refused to believe that this was indeed the case within this particular context.  
Yet the integrity of such an examination was not adjudged to be dependent 
upon the victim providing their testimony in open court, as procedural justice is 
maintained by cross-examination of such evidence and it being given under oath. 
These ensure that the constitutional entitlements of the suspect to a fair trial are 
 
in any way the rights of an accused person as established by the constitutional jurisprudence of this 
Court and in particular by  In Re Haughey  [1971] I.R. 217…the reason for the procedure…was that 
it is generally accepted that young persons…are likely to be traumatised by the experience…its 
purpose is to minimise such trauma…[a] witness, permitted to give evidence in such fashion, will 
be required to give evidence on oath…and be subject to cross-examination…demeanour …will be 
clearly visible… to the judge and jury trying the case…[i]t is submitted…that if the safeguard of 
the physical presence of the accuser is withdrawn, the trial becomes unfair.The Court does not 
accept this…the assessment of such credibility does not require that the witness should be required 
to give evidence in the physical presence of the accused…” Donnelly v. Ireland, The Attorney 
General and The Director of Public Prosecutions [1998] I i.r. 321. Hamilton C.J. at 356-358. 




safeguarded.285  Indeed, the entitlement of the suspect to fair trial can be seen as 
additionally assured through the caveat that such evidence can be excluded where 
the suspect proves there is some basis to do so, or justice dictates. The 
determination of such problems will invariably mandate that the court take into 
account the constitutional right of the suspect to have a fair trial. In relation to the 
allegations that the procedures adopted by Section 13 were inequitable and breach 
the constitutional rights of the accused it was again reiterated that as soon as the 
courts determined the suspect to have no right to interrogate victims in person the 
calibration of how video link evidence is used was the preserve of parliament.  
Indeed, it is a matter of longstanding principle itself that once such 
legislation has passed both houses and the courts must presume them to be in 
 
285 “…fair procedures are adequately fulfilled by requiring that the witness give evidence on oath 
and be subjected to cross-examination…an accused person’s right to a fair trial is adequately 
protected and further protected by the fact that it is open to the court not to permit the giving of 
evidence by a young person through a live television link if the accused person establishes that 
‘there is good reason to the contrary’…[i]t was submitted…that…the procedures permitted by s. 
13…were unfair (and therefore unconstitutional)…[o]nce it is established that an accused person 
has no constitutional right to have a witness give evidence in his presence…then the circumstances 
in which evidence is given other than in his presence is a matter for the Oireachtas. The impugned 
sections…enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and the onus is on the plaintiff to establish that 
they are repugnant…[t]he Court is satisfied that the plaintiff has failed to discharge that onus and 
that the procedures complained of are not unfair and do not amount to an interference with an 
accused person’s right to a fair trial…” Donnelly v. Ireland, The Attorney General and The Director 
of Public Prosecutions [1998] I i.r. 321. Hamilton C.J. at 356-358. 




accordance with our Basic Law. This places the burden of proof that there is in 
breach of some constitutional entitlement on the accused themselves. However, a 
breach in this regard was not proven. Indeed, the judiciary felt procedural justice 
did not require a bespoke assessment of each individual vulnerable victim, and 
whether the in-person provision of testimony would be problematic for them. 
Consequently, the learned judge felt our parliament was well within its ambit to 
create a law that allows for the provision of victim testimony via TV link where 
appropriate. It was the view of the judiciary that Section 13 did not violate a 
constitutional right of the accused, and, as such, the relevant provision did not 
ultimately violate their constitutional rights. The appeal was therefore denied. 
In fact, recent decisions evidence a judicial willingness to permit the 
tendering of evidence in this way. In the DPP -v- Ronald McManus286 another 
unsuccessful constitutional challenge was lodged against the admission of this kind 
of testimony, this time where the witness was not a minor (2011, para 3). The 
appeal that was made in this case alleged that the initial prosecution of McManus 
was incorrect, both factually and legally, in permitting the adducement of such 
video link testimony. Since this was provided by an adult victim in this case. It was 
consequently argued that the prosecution was unsafe and procedurally unfair.287  
 
286 [2011] i.e.c.c.a. 32. 
287 “The learned trial judge erred in fact and law in allowing Samantha Conroy, a person over 18 
years, to give evidence by way of video link…the trial was manifestly unsatisfactory and not in due 
course of law.” DPP -v- Ronald McManus [2011] i.e.c.c.a. 32. Macken J. at para 8, 11.   




Macken J noted the provision evidently allowed all children to tender 
testimony in this way, where the presiding judge sees no fair basis upon which to 
prevent this. There are no prerequisites that might mandate such a decision or 
stipulated grounds that may curtail the ambit of the court when setting about 
making their decision. 288During the prosecution the victim disclosed their worries 
in a frank, detailed manner. Although expert testimony supported the contention 
that the victim was robust, they did note considerable issues with regards to their 
ability to formulate emotions, as well as those events that had happened to them. 
 In addition, they had only reached the age of majority during the 
prosecution. They were also expected to provide testimony regarding an alleged 
crime a close family member was accused of committing at a time in which they 
were only in their teens. In fact, the testimony of another expert labelled them a 
 
288 “…all persons under the age of eighteen may give evidence in this manner…[i]n all other 
cases…evidence may be permitted to be given in this manner with the leave of the court. No 
conditions are imposed…and no restriction is set down in respect of the exercise by the trial judge 
of his discretion…Dr. McDwyer indicated that the witness was both strong and direct of personality, 
it was also said that she had great difficulty talking about feelings, or "things that had happened in 
the past".…she had just barely reached her eighteenth birthday at the time of trial, she was giving 
evidence in a murder trial against her own father, concerning events that had occurred when she 
was only 15…was, on the evidence of the social worker, a vulnerable person…it is not possible to 
criticise the learned trial judge… the applicant was not unnecessarily or unduly restricted, or limited 
in his defence arising from the decision, since this witness was, in fact, cross-examined on behalf 
of the defence…[therefore there is]…no evidence…that there was a real or serious risk of an unfair 
trial…and no basis upon which this ground for leave to appeal can be acceded to...” DPP -v- Ronald 
McManus [2011] i.e.c.c.a. 32. Macken J. at paras 83-85. 




vulnerable individual, a contention that was subject to the full analytical rigor of 
our adversarial system. Taking all of this into account the learned judge did not feel 
they could deny allowing the victim to tender their testimony via video link.  
In fact, they felt that the prosecutorial court was in possession of all the 
relevant information in this regard, and, as such, were totally within their capacity 
to do so in this case. Furthermore, the accused did not have their constitutional due 
process rights unwarrantedly or unfairly curtailed or indeed even procedurally 
diluted as a consequence of this. Indeed, the victim in this context was subject to 
interrogation by the suspect’s counsel. This was done to such a degree that they 
were procedurally just and in keeping with the interpretation the judiciary had laid 
out in previous interpretations of the law. The court decided that any contention to 
the contrary was not supported by the evidence before them. They found there was 
nothing tendered in this case that might substantiate the assertion that an actual or 
grave danger existed that the prosecution was inequitable and improper. Since the 
prosecutorial court was fully within their rights to allow the victim to tender their 
testimony in this way, they determined that the argument that the constitutional 
rights of the accused had been infringed and that the prosecution in question 
violated due process and procedural justice was groundless and thus rejected it. 
Macken J. consequently dismissed the appeal in question and upheld the 
conviction. This determination was based upon that the judicial determination in 
this appeal that the admission of video link evidence in this case did not actually 
threaten the constitutional integrity of the appellant’s conviction. This conclusion 
was mainly based upon the fact that the trial judge’s actions in admitting video link 
evidence at the appellants’ trial did not breach the accused’s rights under our Basic 




Law. As the victim involved in this prosecution was cross-examined in such a way 
as to vindicate their due process and procedural justice rights under the constitution.   
Therefore, there was not “…a real or serious risk of an unfair trial...” (2011, 
paras 33–37). These decisions benefited the procedural re-inclusion of victims 
because they recognised that the practicalities of in-trial participation mean they 
can often be subject to intimidations that might prevent them tendering certain 
proofs. The cases also clarified that the exercise of such discretion by the courts in 
admitting such evidence, even in borderline cases, was not a breach of the 
constitutional rights of the accused to due process and procedural justice. Although 
it was  recognised as something that depends upon each case in question, and that 
is not to say that such a breach of rights might never occur (1998, pp. 356-357; 
Connolly 2015, pp. 24-7; Heffernan and Ni Raifeartaigh 2014, pp. 64-71; McGrath 
2014, p.153; O’Malley 2009, pp. 106-10; Kilcommins et al. 2014, p. 17, p.20).  
The O’D cases are also indicative of the manner by which the courts have 
sought to address the constitutional rights issues that video link evidence creates. 
In D.O’D v DPP and Judge Ryan289 O’Neill J heard an application to prevent a 
court permitting video link services to be utilised under Section 13. 290  This 
deployment of Section 13 drew resistance, as it was alleged that the operation of 
video link services in this case would impinge the accused’s fair trial entitlements. 
 
289 [2009] i.e.h.c.559. 
290  “An order of certiorari quashing the order of the second named respondent dated the 
20th February, 2009, directing the use of video link facilities pursuant to s.13 of the Criminal 
Evidence Act.” D.O’D v DPP and Judge Ryan [2009] i.e.h.c. 559 O’Neill J. at para 3. 




Indeed, permitting its use invariably implied that the victim laboured under a 
disorder of the mind, or at least strongly suggested that to the triers of fact. The 
dilemma in this instance revolved around perception, as the triers of fact here could 
infer that the victims, mature female adults, were permitted to provide such 
testimony via video by way of concession to their “psychological disorders”.  
It was argued that prejudice in this instance could be avoided by allowing 
video testimony to be admitted into evidence with a direction to the triers of fact 
that such a provision was immaterial to the consideration of whether the victims 
were psychological competent. Furthermore, suggestions were made that a judicial 
instruction might be conveyable to the triers of fact which would clarify that the 
question of the victim’s potential disorder of the mind is an issue they must decide 
without reference to any inferences that the video link testimony may encourage.291  
 
291 “The application under s.13 of the Act of 1992 was objected to on the basis of the right of the 
accused to a fair trial i.e. if evidence was given by the complainants by way of video link that it 
would…involve an intimation to the jury that the complainants suffered from some element of 
mental impairment or that it would tend to sway the jury to that conclusion…it might appear to the 
jury that, the complainants, who are women in the forties, are being allowed to give their evidence 
by video link rather than in the usual way simply because of mental impairment…the giving of 
evidence by the complainants by video could be explained to the jury by the prosecution in such a 
way as to convey to them that the use of the live video link did not involve or was not any 
determination on the question of the their mental competence…a direction could be given by the 
trial judge to the jury to the effect that the issue of the complainants’ mental impairment or otherwise 
was a matter for them to determine and to exclude from their minds any suggestion that the giving 
evidence by video link implied that the witnesses suffered from mental impairment…this would be 
an unsatisfactory approach…it would be, partially at least, untrue, given that the main reason for 




The learned judge was convinced that such a stance was inadequate. As 
these solutions were not wholly credible as the predominant justification of video 
link testimony was actually that the victim did possess a disorder of the mind. They 
did give consideration to the idea that an alternative stance here could be for the 
court to, during the prosecution, provide clarification to the triers of fact concerning 
Section 13. This would complement a judicial order that the jury also disregard the 
manner by which the testimony is provided, and instead resolve to base their 
decision as regards victim competency upon the testimony provided to them. 
 Yet, it was the view of the court that such a stance would still be 
inadequate, since such actions would be unable to make the trier of fact forget that 
the whole underpinning of the victim’s permission to tender testimony under 
Section 13 would effectively be a pre-trial determination with regards to the 
deficient cognitive state of the victims involved. Despite the fact that video 
testimony can be permitted within the wider ambit of the court to do so even where 
the victim is not impaired, the court did not think that the implication that the 
 
the use of the video link is because the prosecution satisfied the learned second named 
respondent…that they do suffer from mental impairment. Perhaps another approach that could be 
adopted is for the trial judge to give an explanation to the jury of the statutory provisions regarding 
video link evidence and to direct them to ignore the method of giving evidence and to determine 
the issue of mental capacity purely on the evidence they hear. But, this too would not be a 
satisfactory direction as it could not remove from the minds of the jury the fact that the basis of the 
complainants giving their evidence by video link was an implicit interlocutory finding of mental 
impairment.” D.O’D v DPP and Judge Ryan [2009] i.e.h.c. 559 O’Neill J. at paras 27-34. 




victim’s laboured under a disorder of the mind could be effectively dispelled by 
way of an clarification to the jury of the various nebulous intricacies of Section 13.  
The judge importantly emphasised that video testimony in this instance did 
in fact create a danger of inequitable treatment with regards to the suspect in this 
case. One that was not rectifiable through judicial orders or prosecutorial 
assertions. They highlighted how Section 13 permitted testimonial concessions in 
these instances with considerable latitude to the judge in question, which creates 
an issue as regarding how the judiciary ought to maintain procedural justice. Since 
it is of vital importance that they achieve the necessary equilibrium of the 
entitlements of the accused to their constitutional fair trial guarantees and the 
prerogatives of the state to adduce victim testimony via video link. They felt it was 
evident that what was necessary here what an adjudication of the situation which 
ultimately maintains an equilibrium of the entitlements of the state and accused.292 
 
292 The fact that the application for the video link was made under s.13(1)(b) rather than s.13(1)(a), 
if explained to the jury, could not…convey to the jury…the fact that the selection of the video link 
did not suggest or imply mental impairment affecting the complainants it is clear that evidence by 
video link in the circumstances of this case does carry with it a real risk of unfairness to the accused 
person which probably cannot be remedied by directions from the trial judge or statements from the 
prosecution. Manifestly, s.13 of the Act of 1992 provides for the giving evidence by video link for 
offences such as the ones the applicant is charged with. The discretion which the Court has under 
s.13(1)(b)…raises the difficult question as to how the Court is to achieve a correct balance between 
the accuse's right to a fair trial and the prosecution’s right…to have evidence given by video 
link…what is required is a test that achieves the correct balance between these two competing 
rights.” D.O’D v DPP and Judge Ryan [2009] i.e.h.c. 559 O’Neill J. at paras 27-34. 




In this instance, in which a judge finds a grave danger of prejudice to the 
accused right is not preventable they ought only allow such testimony to be 
provided in this way if strong proof shows a major unfairness would result 
otherwise. Namely, a critical curtailment of the arguments of the state in the 
presentation of its prosecution. The requirement of video link services would 
therefore defend the states entitlement to effectively pursue such allegations 
through the courts. In this assessment, the learned judge deemed the experience of 
the victim or the difficulty they might have in presenting themselves irrelevant to 
this determination. In fact, they stressed every prosecution would likely place strain 
on victims providing testimony, whilst also recognising the practicalities involved.  
However, they saw the appropriate determination to be, does the situation 
of the victim make the provision of in person testimony such a barrier that the 
integrity of the arguments of the state would be unfairly compromised. The bar 
needed to convince a judge under Section 13 was set as being that there is a chance 
the victim may forgo providing testimony or, if they do, may well not properly 
convey this. In making this determination they recognised that such a standard was 
a difficult one to meet, yet felt it necessary to achieve an equitable equilibrium that 
vindicated the entitlements of the accused to fair trial. In this case the learned judge 
held such an equivalence was not achieved. Since the previous hearing took 
account of, and based its determination upon, the interaction of the accused and 
their victims, the determinations as to the psychological competency of the victims, 
the difficulty, as well as undesirability of them enduring viva voce testimony, 
which all supported the determination that video link testimony was appropriate. 




 Such  information was appropriate for an adjudication of where the 
evaluation of the victims mental state was to be conducted.293 However, when 
considering a Section 13 order, they were solely of consequence where 
substantiating proof as to the fact that the victim was unable to tender testimony 
within court, or if they were able, could not effectively convey it in this context. 
The learned judge was also of the mind that such an important query was not 
actually ostensibly iterated, and where it was, it was done in a most cursory manner. 
This was limited to noting that the giving of video evidence would be beneficial. 
A proper assessment of the viability of the victims to testify in court was absent. 
They therefore felt this jeopardised the constitutional rights of the accused to 
receive a due process fair trial and consequently quashed the order that had been 
 
293 Where…the giving of evidence in this way carries with it a serious risk of unfairness to the 
accused…it should only permit the giving of evidence by video link where it was satisfied by 
evidence that a serious injustice would be done…[t]he fact that the giving of evidence viva voce 
would be very unpleasant…or…very inconvenient, would not be relevant…cases of this nature… 
will be very unpleasant and having to come to Court is invariably difficult…[t]he real question is 
whether the circumstances of the witness are such that the requirement to give evidence viva voce is 
an insuperable obstacle to giving evidence in a manner that does justice to the prosecution case. The 
evidence must establish …that the probability is that the witness in question will be deterred from 
giving evidence at all or will…be unable to do justice to their evidence…[t]his is necessarily a high 
threshold …to strike a fair balance between the right of the accused person to a fair trial and the 
right of the public….” D.O’D v DPP and Judge Ryan [2009] i.e.h.c. 559 O’Neill J. at paras 27-34. 




given allowing video evidence. The court also mandated that the case in relation to 
Section 13 video link evidence be sent to the Circuit Court for reassessment.294 
The implications of this Circuit Court reassessment can be seen in the case 
of O’D v DPP [2011] i.e.h.c. 238. Here Kearns J. heard a request to quash an order 
of the Circuit Court which permitted testimony to be provided via video link during 
a case of purported molestation. This case was made by the accused in the Circuit 
Court rehearing just mentioned.295 In this instance the appeal was based on an 
argument that allowing video link evidence is a violation of the suspect’s 
entitlement under the constitution to due process. As it was contended that it 
prejudices a pivotal aspect of prosecution and unfairly curtails its operation.296 
 
294 “…[Judge Ryan] did not apply the correct test…to achieving the correct balance…between the 
right of the applicant to a fair trial and the right…to prosecute the offences…she had regard to 
…[irrelevant factors] which…warranted…the order…these factors would only be relevant if 
they…established that the witnesses in question would not be capable of giving their evidence viva 
voce or would not be capable of doing justice to their evidence…[t]hat core question does not appear 
to have been expressly addressed…[t]here is no real exploration or consideration of the ability of 
either complainant to give evidence viva voce. [This]…fails…the test…the impugned 
order…places the applicant at risk of an unfair trial…[i]t is appropriate that the matter be remitted 
…for a rehearing...” D.O’D v DPP and Judge Ryan [2009] i.e.h.c. 559 O’Neill J. at paras 27-34. 
295 “…the applicant seeks an order [to nullify an] order…directing that evidence be given by way 
of video link…[t]he applicant is the defendant in proceedings brought in the Circuit Court 
concerning allegations made by two complainants contrary to Section 5 of the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences) Act 1993.” O’D v DPP [2011] i.e.h.c. 238. Kearns J. at para 1. 
296 “Now the grounds upon which relief was sought and granted included, specifically, the ground 
that the making of such an order breaches the applicant’s right to a fair trial as it predetermines a 




After a lengthy assessment of the situation it emerged that during a previous 
judicial review of this situation the same point was made, and, in addition to this 
was done by completely identical trial participants. This related to the fact that the 
relevant judge granted an order under Section 13 ss. (1) (b) as opposed to what the 
appellant argues was the more appropriate subsection (1) (a). Consequently, the 
issue in this instance mirrors one already raised. Although the appellant could have 
pursued this at that earlier time and was actually duty bound to, they let the relevant 
judge know they would not be following up on this particular point at that time. As 
such, it was obviously the case that this previous hearing was the relevant forum 
and opportunity for the accused to have debated that specific contention.297 
The learned judge went on to outline how the principle in such cases is that 
a legal participant is bound to tender their entire case during the proper period. As 
the judiciary cannot permit identical participants to repeatedly raise the same 
issues, simply due to the fact that they, as a result of their own carelessness or 
 
central issue in the case and thereby disproportionately interferes with the course of any such trial.” 
O’D v DPP [2011] i.e.h.c. 238. Kearns J. at para 3. 
297 “…it is only this afternoon, that it became evident that in the earlier judicial review proceedings 
this point was raised, involving precisely the same issue between exactly the same parties. Leave to 
apply for judicial review in respect of the earlier proceedings was granted on 2nd March 2009…[i]t 
is the very same point that is raised here today…[i]t was open to the applicant to advance this 
argument in the first judicial review proceedings. In fact he had an obligation to do so. Instead, the 
applicant informed the court during the first judicial review proceedings…that this ground was not 
being pursued. This is a clear case where…a prior set of proceedings…presented an …appropriate 
opportunity to argue this issue.” O’D v DPP [2011] i.e.h.c. 238. Kearns J. at paras 5-6. 




inadvertence, failed to pursue an issue that ought to be pursued at an earlier stage.298 
A duty is present that points be advanced that ought rightly to be contended as 
opposed to the pursual of identical points which might be better discussed earlier. 
They felt such a rule was one of public policy to ensure cases reach conclusion.  
This conclusion was reached in consideration of the impact of judicial 
review and the way in which it can frequently stymie prosecutions. Since a stay is 
provided without adjudication as to the merits of each review there are often 
ulterior motives behind such reviews. Although they did feel there was no intention 
here to frustrate a prosecution the court felt a duty existed which mandated that all 
issues are advanced during appropriate times and forums. They based this on the 
detrimental impact that the continued judicial review of identical cases has on our 
justice administration, and denied the appeal. Despite the pursual of additional 
 
298 “I believe I state the rule correctly when I say that it is up to a litigant to bring forward their 
whole case at the appropriate point and the court will not accept the same parties bringing the same 
case again, only because they have, through negligence or some other reason omitted to argue a 
point that could have been argued in the earlier proceedings… there is an obligation to bring forward 
issues which might sensibly be argued in litigation rather than arguing the same issues in subsequent 
litigation that could have been argued in previous litigation. This is a matter of public policy. Also 
litigation should not drag on forever… these sentiments apply with particular force in this case. The 
effect or result of judicial review can often be the stalling or delaying of criminal trials. The fact 
that a stay is automatically granted can be seen as an incentive to bring a judicial review.I am not 
suggesting that there is a deliberate attempt in this case to delay or stall the criminal trial. Whilst 
judicial review is a valuable and important tool there is an obligation to bring forward every point 
since the effect of repeated judicial reviews in the same criminal case is very damaging to the 
criminal justice system...” O’D v DPP [2011] i.e.h.c. 238. Kearns J. at paras 9-12. 




perceived unfairness with Section 13 the courts have been somewhat reluctant to 
fully address the issue of its whole impact on the due process fair trial constitutional 
rights of the accused. Indeed, they have tended to favour the avoidance of opening 
up such issues and sought out procedural certainty based upon policy imperatives.  
This reluctance could be perceived as problematic. As it could evidence the 
occasional lack of vigour in the defence of certain constitutional principles. Yet, 
this could be explained by reference to the unique particularities of that case, and 
as not being indicative of a judicial stance. It is therefore somewhat difficult to 
make a definitive determination on the impact of Section 13. However, based upon 
those instances in which the courts have made such a determination, they tend to 
uphold the constitutionality of the provision of video link evidence. Indeed, they 
would be very likely to do so again, although each case would turn on its facts.  
The predilection of the judiciary to uphold the constitutionality of the 
admission of video link evidence, as well as the implications of this for the due 
process rights of the accused, can also be gleaned from People (DPP) v D.O’D.299 
As Mahon J. had to deal with an appeal against the allowance of video link 
evidence under Section 13. The argument against this was that the context of the 
case was one in which the only question for the triers of fact was if the victims had 
a mental abnormality as per Section 5 of the s. 5 of the Criminal Law (Sexual 
 
299 [2015] i.e.c.a. 273. 




Offences) 1993. Consequently, the allowance of information to be given via video 
link was alleged to cause major, as well as material prejudice to this question.300 
Therefore, the main contention made here was that allowing the victim to 
provide testimony via video link unfairly inferred they possessed a psychological 
problem. Allowing this would then make the hearings determination, as well as 
determination of the triers of fact on that point inevitable. They submitted that 
permitting the testimony to be advanced under Section 13 (1)(b) created prejudice, 
as Section 13 (1)(a) was the more appropriate provision to deploy to prevent such 
issues. Yet due to the nature of the provision even an allowance under Section 
13(1)(a) might not have removed all the potential prejudice as to the victim’s 
competency. Therefore, in light of this, the prejudice against the accused would be 
present where testimony was permitted under either one of the subsections.301 
 
300 “The sole ground of appeal advanced…relates to the order made by the learned trial judge on 
23rd July 2010 permitting the complainant to give evidence by means of a live television link 
pursuant to the provisions of S. 13(1)(b) of the Criminal Evidence Act. It was contended that in 
circumstances where the sole issue for the jury in the case was to decide whether the complainant 
was mentally impaired for the purposes of s. 5 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) 1993, the 
making of the said order pursuant to s. 13(1)(b) of the Act of 1992 amounted to a real and substantial 
pre determination of that issue.” People (DPP) v D.O’D [2015] i.e.c.a. 273 Mahon J. at paras 5-6. 
301 “…the appellant's argument is that permitting the complainant…give evidence by video link 
amounted to a pre determination of her mental capacity…render[ing] the outcome of the trial…a 
foregone conclusion. It is the appellant's case that an order pursuant to s. 13(1)(b) amounted to such 
a pre-determination…and…ought to have been made pursuant to s. 13(1)(a)…However, if such an 
order had been made pursuant to s. 13(1)(a) such an order could, arguably, be said also to be a pre-




Despite the fact that the learned judge appeared to accept the point that no 
matter which subsection of Section 13 was utilised to permit the tendering of victim 
testimony via video link the consequences of either was completely identical. They 
felt that the danger that the question as to the predetermination of the psychological 
competency of the victim would exist regardless of the subsection used. However, 
they did think it was less likely here as subsection (1)(b) had be deployed. What 
was considered to be of the highest consequence was the judicial instruction that 
provided to the triers of fact. This was adequately forceful and direct enough to 
dispel any feelings of predetermination that might have clouded the thinking of the 
triers of fact. As a result, the learned judge did not ultimately approve the appeal. 
When considering this in conjunction with previous case law a number of 
salient points can be clarified. Cleary the use of video link evidence under Section 
13 can potentially create prejudice to the constitutional due process rights of the 
accused. it is therefore up to the judiciary to defend and vindicate those rights, 
which the jurisprudence in this area suggests they are doing. Although some cases 
might suggest there is some reluctance to declare a finding of unconstitutionality, 
 
determination of the issue…[i]ndeed, from that perspective, it made no difference whether an 
order…was made under s. 13(1)(a) or (b)…the court is satisfied that irrespective of whether 
permitting…video link was made under s. 13(1) (a) or (b) the outcome was exactly the same. The 
risk...of pre-determination of the mental condition of the complainant was present in either event 
and although probably less so where (as indeed occurred in this case) s. 13(1)(b) was used…the 
clear direction given to the jury at the conclusion of the learned trial judge's charge to the jury was 
sufficiently strong and clear as to render any sense of predetermination…of little practical 
consequence...” People (DPP) v D.O’D [2015] i.e.c.a. 273 Mahon J. at paras 52-55. 




it might be argued that in actual fact the courts have been rather vigilant and open 
to the idea of finding a breach. However, due to the particular facts of the cases in 
question, this has not been the case. Indeed, the courts have been rather competent 
as ensuring that the prerogatives of the accused and state are adequately respected.  
Although Section 13 appears constitutional it could curtail due process 
rights. Therefore, it is imperative that the judiciary reach an appropriate balance 
between the completing rights of the accused and state. In so doing a strong clear 
direction by the presiding judge to the jury is needed to dispel potential prejudice. 
Where this is the case, and section 13 it is deployed in a thoughtful manner, the 
judiciary should be able to maintain fair procedures in light of its recent case law.  
However, if there are indeed future constitutional violations of the due 
process rights of the accused this will probably be most likely as a consequence of 
Section 13 being deployed in an improper and/or unsafe manner. Yet, with the 
previous jurisprudence in place as a guide for the defence of the constitutional fair 
trial rights of the accused the judiciary should be able to maintain these standards. 
If deviations occur, these will most likely be identified and rectified in a robust 
fashion. Indeed, judging by some of the previous case law there is cause for 
cautious optimism. As the courts have set standards, and the judiciary have strongly 
recognised that maintaining these are essential to vindicating an accused’s rights. 
7.4.10 Sex Crime Suspects Cannot Question Child Victims 
The previous position in this regard was primarily offender based, as 
practitioners and academics generally saw cross-examination as an interrogation 
technique that subjected a victim to a no-holes barred contestation of their 




narrative. 302  Although this was previously the case, the situation has evolved 
considerably from the solely suspect oriented perspective that is probably best 
articulated by Hardiman  J. in the case of  Maguire -v- Ardagh,  where he described  
the procedure as the courts way of “…vindicati[ng]  [of]  innocent  people”.303 The 
entitlement of a suspect to cross-examine is, although not explicitly recognised 
within the body of the Constitution, perceived as a fundamental due process 
entitlement of an accused during a criminal trial. In fact, Hamilton C.J. found it 
integral to Irish due process in the case of Donnelly -v- Ireland.304 Although the 
judiciary continue to view it as highly procedural important, it has also been 
acknowledged, as it was by O’Neill J. in the case of D.S. -v- Minister for Health 
and Children, that it is “… not an absolute right…” and is therefore subject to 
specified limitations within particular well defined procedural circumstances. 305  
Case law has therefore reformed the previous position in this regard by 
incorporating the entitlements of groups such as victims of crime within Irish 
criminal procedure. This is best evidenced by Charleton J. in D.P.P. (Walsh) -v- 
Cash, who included ‘…the rights of victims in the balance’.306 A shift in emphasis 
 
302 “…evidence questioned, tested, challenged and contradicted and his credit impeached”. People 
(D.P.P.) -v- Kelly [2006] 3 i.r. 115 at 136. 
303 [2002] 1 i.r. 385 at 704-707; O’Callaghan -v- Mahon [2006] 2 i.r. 32 at 58.  
304 [1998] 1 i.r. 348 at 350. 
305 [2005] i.e.h.c. 58; Murray -v- Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse [2004] 2 i.r. 222 at 304-
305; Borges -v- Medical Council [2004] i.e.s.c. 9, [2004] 1 i.r. 103.  
306 [2007] i.e.h.c.  108 at para. 65. 




was also discernible in D.P.P. -v- J.C.307, where the judiciary amended the previous 
exclusionary rule,308 as it overlooked the victim of crimes’ interest in having their 
allegations pursued. These pronouncements have actually opened up a space that 
has allowed for a judicial re-interpretation of the previous model of what 
constitutes a fair trial. This has led to an alteration of the concept of what a cross-
examination actually entails in Ireland, in order to make it much more procedurally 
fair toward victim witnesses, whilst also maintaining important due process 
safeguards for suspects (Ward 2017, pp. 40-41, pp. 45-46 Bowden et al. 2014, p. 
559; Bacik et al. 2007, p. 37; Glynn 2012; Coffey 2018; Cusack 2017). 
The victim centric stance of providing concessions to victims during cross-
examination, such as intermediary measures, has existed for children and persons 
with a “mental handicap” since the Criminal Evidence Act 1992. However, in more 
recent times further reform has advanced upon these initial gains.309Legislation 
also prevents those accused of sex crimes310 from personally cross-examining a 
 
307 [2015] i.e.s.c. 3.1 
308 In D.P.P.  -v- Kenny, [1990] 2 i.r. 110 (S.C.). 
309 This can be seen in the effect of some sections of The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 
2017. 
310 This gain was achieved through the incorporation of Section 36 of the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences) Act, 2017, and thereby amending s.14 of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992 by inserting 
Section 14 C. S.14 C ss. (1) (a) and (b) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992. 




testifying minor.311 The legislature has also put safeguards in place312 in order to 
ensure that this does not come at an accused’s expense. Therefore, we can see this 
provision as a non-zero-sum re-inclusion of victims within Irish procedure, which 
acknowledges, and takes steps to remedy the potentially intimidating environment 
an alleged wrongdoer might create during a criminal trial in order to silence and/or 
coerce their victim into acquiescence. 
7.4.11 Victim Protection from Invasive, Irrelevant Questioning 
Contemporary Irish case law and statute has put various safeguards in place 
in order to circumscribe the disclosure of irrelevant victim details during cross-
examinations. These changes were essential to the procedural re-incorporation of 
victims of crime in Ireland, as they helped to protect them from the “rough and 
tumble” that often characterizes robust legal debate. Although these were initially 
simply limited to victims of sexual offences, the impact of the Irish legislature’s 
interventions have resulted in the expansion of these rules to victims of crime more 
generally. This chapter will now attempt to chart how this trend has evolved.  
The precursor to these alterations can be found the case of The People (at 
the Suit of The Director of Public Prosecutions) -v- Phelim McGuinness,313 which 
was, although a pro-accused driven reform, rather influential, as it ultimately led to 
a much more victim centred review of this particular area. This involved an appeal 
 
311 However, this can be allowed where the court deems this equitable under Section 14 C ss. (2) 
(a) and (b) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992. 
312 As stipulated in Section 14 C ss. (3-6) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992. 
313 [1978] i.r. 189. 




against a rape conviction because an appellant had alleged that a trial judge had 
acted improperly by excessively intervening during a victim’s cross-examination 
by asking 123 of the 423 questions that an alleged victim had put to them at trial. 
Kenny J. held, in quashing the conviction, and allowing leave to appeal, “...that 
[such] active participation by a judge … [was] undesirable...” (1978, p. 193). 
Indeed, this approach was what would eventually lead to the greater protection of 
victims of crime from undue interference during their cross-examinations.  
A more victim centred approach and shift in emphasis was apparent in the 
case of The People (DPP) -v- GK.314 This concerned an appeal against a number 
of sex crime convictions. The appeal related to a trial judge’s decision to deny the 
cross-examination of a victim in relation to a controversial issue that had emerged 
during sentencing. This related to the fact that the Impact Report of the child victim 
that was involved in this particular case had revealed that they had had other 
previous sexual encounters, and were open about, and easily able to discuss the 
details of their molestation. The trial judge did however refuse a cross-examination 
in this regard, as the report was confidential, and consent was not in issue in this 
particular case. The appeal contested this decision, and asked if it was correct to 
have done this. Kearns J. felt that it was, and highlighted that cross-examination 
“...should be confined only to what is strictly necessary, and should never be 
utilised as a form of character assassination...” (2007, pp. 103-104). 
 
314 [2007] 2 i.r. 92. 




This decision based itself upon a close textual reading of the relevant 
legislation in the area315 and actually prompted further review of it. The provision 
in question316 stipulated that during a contested sexual assault prosecution only the 
court can permit queries regarding irrelevant sexual experiences when the defence 
cross-examine a victim of an alleged crime. It is also the case that where a court 
grants this, and the defence does not adhere to their mandate, a court can obstruct 
a query, or, if the defence has already asked it, ensure that the victim involved does 
not answer it.317 These changes sought to prevent counsel for the defence from 
undermining the claims of victims by making the credibility of their allegations 
dependent upon their previous sexual histories (Kilcommins et al. 2018, p. 66).     
Recent provisions318 have paved the way for further improvement of victim 
provision in this area due to the transposition of Directive 2012/29/EU by the Irish 
State. In fact, Art 21 of this Directive mandates that victims of crime within 
European Union Member States have a right to the defence of their privacy during 
criminal prosecutions. Its development inspired statute to vindicate these privacy 
rights. This found expression in Section 21 of Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) 
Act, 2017. This section allows a judge, where it is equitable to do so, and the well-
 
315 In particular, Section 3 of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act, 1981, as amended by Section 13 of the 
Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act, 1990. 
316 Which is laid out in Section 3 ss. (1) of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act, 1981, as amended by 
Section 13 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act, 1990. 
317 As laid out under Section 3 ss. (3) of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act, 1981, as amended by Section 
13 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act, 1990.  
318 Particularly The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 




being of a victim is at stake, to make any direction that they deem fair and necessary 
regarding the evidence that counsel for the defence seeks to adduce during trial, or 
any questions that they try to ask of a victim of crime during a cross-examination.319 
This kind of legal reform has allowed the Irish judiciary to qualify any evidence or 
questions that counsel for the defence may seek to introduce in order to either 
prejudicially tarnish a victim of crime, or to unfairly undermine their personal 
and/or moral character within the courtroom (O’Flaherty 2016, pp. 120-126). 
There were also similar advancements in this regard that have considerably 
aided with the protections that are now afforded to victims of crime in Ireland. 
These were advanced through domestic pieces of legislation such as Section 36 of 
The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017. This legislative amendment 
altered The Criminal Evidence Act, 1992, by inserting Section 14C into it. The 
section now prevents a suspect from personally cross-examining a testifying sex 
crime victim or a child witness unless it is in the interest of justice for a judge to 
permit this.320 The legislature has also put important safeguards in place in this 
regard in order to help secure the rights of the accused. These entitle their legal 
representatives to cross-examine a relevant individual or to have a legal 
representative appointed in order to do this. They also provide for a judicial 
warning to the jury in order to help ensure that the relevant suspect in question is 
not prejudiced. A judge can also provide a warning where they deem it to be in the 
 
319 So long as the evidence or question concerns an irrelevant aspect of a victim’s intimate life. 
320 As stipulated under Section 14C Subsection (1) and (2) parts (a) and (b) of the Criminal Evidence 
Act, 1992, as amended by Section 36 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017. 




interests of justice that the jury receive one. They can also do this in order to ensure 
that the jury do not draw an adverse inference from the fact that the suspect was 
prevented from personally cross-examining a sex crime victim or child witness, or 
that they had to have a court appointed representative given to them in order to 
allow the cross-examination of either of these classes of trial participant.321 
7.4.12 Victims can now testify Behind a Screen 
Recent reforms have also allowed for the provision of screens, which can 
help to create a better trial environment for victims of crime.322 These changes have 
permitted both minor and adult victims to avail of barriers that obstruct their view 
of a suspect when they testify. A judge can permit this where they feel that it is 
equitable to do so. The provision implemented Art 23 (3) (a) of Directive 
2012/29/EU, which was again reflected in subsequent European Court of Human 
Rights decisions such as Baegen -v- Netherlands323 which perceived this as an 
important area of victim provision in order to help vindicate the European 
Convention on Human Rights entitlements of crime victims (Doak 2003, p. 12). 
 
321 These are mandated within 14C Subsections (3) - (6) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992, as 
amended by Section 36 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017. 
322 Under Section 30 ss. (d) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017, which inserted 
S14A (2) (a) and (b) into the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992. 
323 App No.16696/90, judgment of October 26, 1995 ECtHR This case held that crime victims are 
entitled to safeguards from untoward interference when exercising their right to provide testimony. 




7.4.13 A More Victim Centred Environment for Vulnerable Victims 
Statute324  has also provided for the creation of a less intimidating trial 
environment for victims who are testifying within Irish courts, as it has deemed 
certain circumstances sufficient to warrant the removal of traditionally official 
courtroom attire. A child victim is therefore entitled to a courtroom in which neither 
the judge nor legal counsel325 shall wear their official gown or wig. Legislation326 
has also extended this rule to individuals that are not children that possess disorders 
of the mind. 327  These changes are most welcome, as they are much more 
accommodating of the more vulnerable classes of Irish victim that may have to 
participate during trials such as children and the mentally ill. Such alterations, 
particularly when taken together with some of the other reforms that this chapter 
has mentioned, will collectively help to provide these types of victim with 
procedural concessions that should make their trial participation less traumatising. 
7.5  POST-TRIAL REFORMS  
7.5.1 The Importance of the Post-Trial Stage 
The popular recognition of the unenviable position that victims of crime 
have frequently found themselves in during the post-trial period in the past has 
 
324 That are laid out within Section 14B of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992, as amended by s. 30 
(f) of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
325 If they are involved in that individual’s assessment 
326 Under Section 19 of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992 as amended by s. 30(l) (i), (iii) of the 
Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act, 2017. 
327 As defined within Section 5 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 




meant that these issues have become an important area of contemporary reform in 
Ireland. It is common knowledge that the plight of victims has often been 
overlooked at this stage, resulting in their wholly avoidable re-victimisation and 
re-traumatisation. In fact, “…if one [were to] set out by design to design a system 
for provoking intrusive post-trauma[tic] symptoms, one could not do better than a 
court of law” (Herman 1992 cited in Ring 2017 p. 93).  In fact, the integral process 
of trial participation for a victim often involves the dredging up of rather painful 
memories that might elicit powerful and unpredictable responses that can 
considerably hamper a victim of crimes’ in-court temperament (Ring 2017, p. 93).  
However, despite this, recent reforms have sought to transcend these 
unfortunate outcomes. The legislature has pursued these more victim centred 
reforms by attempting to refocus the priorities of Irish criminal justice onto the area 
of victim provision, which has moved victims of crime from an afterthought to a 
much more central topic. It was in this way that the Irish victim of crime has 
become more re-centralised, both conceptually and procedurally, within the post-
trial legal sphere. The reform of this area that this chapter addresses is evidenced 
by the assistance that the Irish authorities have now put in place in order to help 
accommodate those victims who are: confused about what entitlements that they 
have to be kept abreast of, how a prosecution reaches its conclusion, as well as any 
ancillary issues that might be of immediate concern to them; the impact that their 
victim impact statement might have upon the sentencing of a convict at this 
particular stage; whether a perceived inadequate sentence can be contested; what 
protections are available to prevent their repeat victimization by the same offender 
in future; if they have any entitlement to compensation for the losses that they 




suffered as a result of undergoing a crime and whether, and in what circumstances, 
a previously exonerated accused individual can be re-prosecuted for an offence. 
7.5.2 The Impact Statement, An Opportunity to Explain a Wrong’s Consequences  
Victim impact statements are a provision that has helped victims e-capture 
their procedural centrality within Irish criminal justice. Victims of crime can tender 
these during sentencing. Although they warrant ‘genuine...respect’ from the 
judiciary (Guiry, 2006 p. 3) they cannot however substantiate criminal allegations, 
and also are not designed to be vindictive (Carey 2010, p. 10). The author can best 
illustrate this last point with the case of The People (Director of Public 
Prosecutions) -v- M.328, which tackled these kinds of statements head on (Coffey 
2018; Kilcommins et al. 2018, p. 61; O’Malley 1993; McGrath 2008, p. 85). 
The M case concerned an appeal by an applicant against the severity of a 
sentence that they had received at trial. This related to certain sexual offences that 
they admitted to committing. Denham J., in concurrence with Egan J., allowed the 
appeal. She noted that “…[s]entencing is neither an exercise in vengeance, nor … 
retaliation … [h]owever, the general impact [of a criminal offence upon a crime 
victim] is a factor to be considered...” (1994, p. 548; Murphy 1990, p. 220). 
Several recent cases demonstrate the impact of a victim impact statement. 
Indeed, its power was certainly clearly evident in the case of The DPP -v-. Finbar 
O’Rourke329 in which Mahon J. recalibrated a sentence for a drunk driving offence 
 
328 [1994] 2 i.l.r.m. 54. 
329 [2016] i.e.c.a. 299. 




that had caused a four-year-olds death. The statement was influential here because 
it involved a mother outlining her son’s injuries, the profound loss of her child to 
the family unit, as well as the economic hardship that the family involved had 
suffered because of the offence. He also noted that the trial judge had called it 
“...one of the most...vivid and upsetting that I have ever read” (2016, p. 13). The 
import of these statements was also similarly evident in the case of The People at 
the Suit of the Director of Public Prosecutions -v- W.M.330 In that particular case, 
the convict appealed against the severity of their sentence of thirteen years' 
imprisonment and five years' post-release supervision. A trial judge had handed 
this down for the sexual offences that the offender had committed against their 
child nieces. Edwards J. upheld the sentence and dismissed the appeal, as he found 
the “...harm done to each victim was considerable” after reassessing the impact that 
the offences had had upon each of them. He came to this decision by re-considering 
each one of their impact statements and finding “...the sentences [to be] 
proportionate…[both]…individually and cumulatively” (2018, para 44, para 49).  
Despite the impact and prominence that the victim impact statement has 
recently received, the legislature only relatively recently put this discretionary 
measure onto a legislative footing when it passed The Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 
However, even with this on the statute books, problems still persisted, as the 
government stipulated that it was only available to living victims, creating a lacuna 
in relation to those who wished to deliver these statements on behalf of a deceased 
 
330 [2018] i.e.c.a. 281. 




victim that was their relative. This was because the provision331 mandated that only 
those victims who were directly involved in a criminal offence could provide these 
kinds of statements. The provision therefore overlooked and did not provide for 
relevant third parties who wished to tender these statements (McGrath 2008, p. 79). 
The extension of the victim impact of statement to family members is 
another example of how European Law has engendered domestic reform. This is 
because the decision of the European Court of Human Rights to permit such 
statements in 1999 clearly had a positive impact upon the eventual decision of the 
Irish judiciary to adopt a similar stance. Although the European Court of Human 
Rights has tended to shy away from allowing victims of crime to influence 
sentencing, it did allow the family of a victim to address the court in the case of T 
and V -v- United Kingdom.332 This permitted family relations as well as their legal 
representatives to participate in a trial on the behalf of a victim, which was 
something that arguably had a great influence on the victim centred reform of these 
statements in Ireland. Shortly thereafter, it became customary in this country to 
permit these kinds of statements where a victim was unable to do so, in the case of 
The D.P.P. -v- Wayne O' Donoghue.333 In O' Donoghue, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions made an application against an allegedly unduly lenient sentence of 
four years in prison. Macken J. took the opportunity to broach the subject of the 
victim impact statement, and the impact that it should have on the sentencing of an 
 
331 That covered Victim Impact Statements, Section 5 ss. (1) and (3) of Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 
332 (1999) 30 e.h.r.r. 121. 
333 [2006] i.e.c.c.a. 134. 




offender. He also refused the appeal, which alleged that the trial judge was 
prejudiced by certain elements of the victim impact statement that they analysed 
before going on to articulate the correct position in this regard. The learned judge 
stated that although there was no statutory instrument in this regard, the judiciary 
had established a situation in which they permitted these kinds of statements to help 
the court during sentencing, since they allowed those that a criminal offence had 
aggrieved to convey the impact that a crime had had on them (2006, para 45; De 
Than 2003, p. 177; Gillane 2007, p. 38; Coffey 2018; Kilcommins et al. 2018). 
The legislature did eventually codify this judicial method of permitting 
family members to tender victim impact statements on behalf of an ill or 
incapacitated victim.334 They also extended the provision to cases where a child or 
adult laboured under a ‘mental disorder’ 335  and addressed the practicalities 
involved with families tendering these kinds of statements.336 Importantly, and in 
recognition of the fear that victims may feel in giving these kinds of statements, 
statute mandates that where no statement is tendered a court cannot ‘draw an 
 
334 As laid out in Section 5 ss. (2) (a) and (b) of Criminal Justice Act, 1993 as amended by Section 
4. of the Criminal Procedure Act, 2010. 
335 As per Section 5 ss. (3)(b) (ii) I and II of Criminal Justice Act, 1993, as amended by Section 4 
the Criminal Procedure Act, 2010. 
336 Section 5 ss. (3) (c) parts (d) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 2010, as amended by Section 
4 the Criminal Procedure Act, 2010 states that here more than one family member wishes to give 
such a statement a judge must advise the family to nominate a representative. If the family cannot 
reach a consensus, then the judge can consider the proximity of the parties to the victim and select 
a suitable candidate. 




inference’ regarding the lack of a crime’s impact upon a victim or their family.337 
In a similar vein, and in recognition of victim privacy, a judge can prevent a 
statement from being ‘published or broadcast’, 338  with a breach of this order 
permitting a fine of up to €50,000 and/or a sentence of three years in prison.339 
Provisions under the Criminal Procedure Act, 2010 340 have also made the 
legislative framework governing victim impact statements 341 much more inclusive 
of vulnerable victims.342 Child victims, or those with a ‘mental disorder’, can now 
tender these kinds of statements via video link.343 In fact, any victim of crime can 
now provide a video link statement where the presiding judge deems this to be 
appropriate.344 When a victim of crime without an intermediary attempts to do this, 
the judge or legal counsel that assesses them must also remove their wigs and/or 
gowns.345 The court can also allow a victim of crime to receive queries via an 
 
337 As per Section 5 Subsection (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 2010, as amended by Section 4 
the Criminal Procedure Act, 2010. 
338 If they deem this equitable, as laid out in Section 5 ss. (5) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
2010, as amended by Section 4 the Criminal Procedure Act, 2010. 
339 Under Section 5 subsection 5 (b)-(c) (i) and (ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 2010, as amended 
by Section 4 the Criminal Procedure Act, 2010. 
340 These are contained within Sections 5 and 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 2010. 
341 These are laid out in The Criminal Procedure Act, 1993. 
342 By inserting S.5A and S. 5 B into The Criminal Procedure Act, 1993. 
343 Under 5 A ss. (1) (a) of The Criminal Procedure Act, 1993. 
344 As per S. 5A (1) (b) The Criminal Procedure Act, 1993. 
345 Under S. 5 A ss. (3) The Criminal Procedure Act, 1993. 




intermediary346 where that victim, who is either a child or individual with a mental 
disorder, receives a question when they provide their video link statement. This is 
only permissible where equitable, having regard to the mental condition or age of 
the victim involved. In such instances, the trial judge can appoint an 
intermediary,347 who then puts the questions posed to the victim into a format that 
is more suitable, given their age or mental condition (McGrath 2008, p. 81).348 
The victim impact statement was also previously limited due to the 
definition of the term victim.349 This prevented certain people from tendering these 
kinds of statements. As a result, the court could only allow certain categories of 
victim to tender victim impact statements.350 However, legislative intervention has 
resolved this by broadening the definition of the term victim, which has widely 
broadened the class of victim who can now submit a victim impact statement.  
The transposition of Directive 2012/29/EU into Irish Law via The Criminal 
Justice (Victims of Crime) Act,  2017 has widened the definition of victim to 
anyone who undergoes loss from an illegal act that is ‘physical, mental... emotional 
 
346 As laid out in 5B The Criminal Procedure Act, 1993. 
347 Under 5B ss. 3 The Criminal Procedure Act, 1993. 
348 As per 5B ss. (2) The Criminal Procedure Act, 1993. 
349 Even after Section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 2010 amended the previous definition of the 
term victim, that was contained within the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 
350These are the victims of sex crimes under the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992, crimes of violence, 
or its threatened use and crimes involved with the attempt, conspiracy or assistance to commit the 
aforementioned offences as per the definition of victims contained within Section 5 ss. (2) of the 
Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 




... or economic’. 351 This has allowed a much wider group of individuals to tender 
victim impact statements, as Section 31 of The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) 
Act, 2017 also consequently altered the definition of victim that the legislature had 
used to circumscribe those who could tender these kinds of impact statements.352 
The new provision now mandates that those who have “…suffered harm, including 
physical, mental or emotional harm [,] or economic loss…” as an immediate result 
of a criminal offence can now deliver them. This has consequently made the victim 
impact statement far more accessible to a much wider category of victim of crime 
within Irish criminal justice (O’Flaherty 2016, pp. 120-126).   
7.5.3 Inadequate Sentences Can Now Be Contested by the DPP 
Although, as we have just seen, there were considerable reforms of victim 
input during sentencing, for those victims who are still unsatisfied with a sentence 
there is also a framework for the review of its leniency, as the Director of Public 
Prosecutions can now contest these sentences 353 where they believe that a penalty 
was inadequately punitive. The Director of Public Prosecutions can do this by 
petitioning the Court of Appeal to have a sentence re-considered if they feel that 
the punishment that was previously handed down by the courts for an indictable 
offence was too indulgent.354 The reviewing court can then grant this petition by 
overruling the penalty and handing down another that the convict could have 
 
351 As defined by Article 2. 
352 Contained within Section 5 (a) (1) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 
353 As stipulated by Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993.  
354 Under Section 2 ss. (1) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 




received in its place, where the court deems this more appropriate.355 Although 
there are rules that govern and prevent members of the public from contacting the 
Director of Public Prosecutions in order to influence their decision as to whether to 
contest a penal sentence,356 a caveat is in place that allows certain directly involved 
victims of crime to contact the Director of Public Prosecutions in this regard.357 
These changes have allowed victims of crime to have a much greater procedural 
say over this process of sentence review than they had previously, as well as 
considerably more influence over whether the Director of Public Prosecutions will 
ultimately seek to contest what a victim of crime might perceive to be as an 
inadequate sentence, where this is of direct relevance to them (Coffey 2018).  
7.5.4 New Victim Safeguards - Safety, Barring and Protection Orders 
After criminal trials, victims are understandably concerned for their own 
safety, and its potential compromise by an offender, therefore a plethora of post-
trial protection orders are now available to safeguard them. This is another example 
of how European developments have affected the legislative evolution of these 
orders. The European Court of Human Rights did this by placing an obligation 
upon Ireland to protect victims. The court has also held, in the case of Plattform 
Artzefiir das Leben -v- Austria358 that this duty to safeguard victims of crime also 
 
355 As provided for by Section 2 ss. (3) (a) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 
356 As laid out within Section 2 ss. 4 of the Prosecution of Offences Act, 1974 
357 As per Section 6 of the Prosecution of Offences Act, 1974 
358 (1988) 13 e.h.r.r. 204. 




includes those contexts in which the illegal acts of a criminal offender may 
potentially cause serious harm to a victim of crime (De Than 2003, p. 181).  
This jurisprudence would eventually influence the Irish government’s 
eventual decision to create specific orders, which seek to protect victims of crime 
from domestic violence.359 These allow the judiciary to issue safety orders where 
petitions are lodged to them, and where they feel that there is a legitimate basis for 
the view that the ‘welfare or safety’ of a spouse or civil partner is in jeopardy.360 
Such an order mandates that a person refrain from utilising, or threatening to utilise 
force, abuse or intimidation. If that person does not co-habit with the applicant, a 
judge can also mandate that they do not observe or harass an applicant’s place of 
residence. They are also empowered to construct each particular safety order that 
they issue in order to fit each specific case that comes before them in their court.   
Judges can issue barring orders.361 These require individuals to vacate a 
premise and to not re-admit themselves without a judicial mandate.362 However, 
the judiciary will also take into account the ‘safety and welfare’ of any other person 
that the respondent is responsible for, such as their child, if that dependent also 
resides at the location to which an order may pertain. A judge will also refuse to 
 
359 This statute took the form of The Domestic Violence Act, 1996. 
360 As per Section 2 ss. (2) (a) and (b) of The Domestic Violence Act, 1996. 
361 Again, if a petition is lodged and they feel there is a legitimate basis for the view that the ‘welfare 
or safety’ of a spouse or civil partner is in danger under Section 3 ss. (2) (a) (i) and (ii) of The 
Domestic Violence Act, 1996. 
362 This applies where the individual and the applicant are co-habiting the property in question. 




grant such an order where a respondent has a greater ‘legal or beneficial interest’ 
in the relevant property than the person who applied for the order (Coffey 2018).363  
The Oireachtas has also set out the requirements for the granting of such a 
protection order.364 Where a petition for this order is lodged, or adjudicated upon, 
and a judge feels that legitimate grounds exist for concern for the ‘welfare or safety’ 
of an applicant, or that a dependant of theirs is in danger, they can issue such an 
order. This has the same impact as a safety order.365 However, it expires once a 
court has made their final decision as to whether to issue a safety or barring 
order.366 
The European Union Directive on the European Protection Order also has 
certain benefits for Irish victims of crime in this regard, as it permits the possessors 
of an Irish protection order to apply to extend the latitude of that particular order to 
the jurisdiction of another European Union Member State. Directive 2011/99 EU 
mandates that Irish Protection Orders ought to be recognizable in every European 
Union Member State court. This allows victims of crime to extend the application 
of their protection orders to any European Union Member State, allowing Irish 
victims of crime that are resident within another European Union jurisdiction, or 
those that move between European Union jurisdictions to avail of such protection 
across the entirely of every European Union Member State (Costa 2015, p. 77).  
 
363 As stipulated within Section 3 ss. (4) (a) (i) and (ii) of The Domestic Violence Act, 1996. 
364 Under Section 5 (1) (a) and (b) of The Domestic Violence Act, 1996. 
365 Under Section 2 of The Domestic Violence Act, 1996. 
366 As per Section 5 ss. (5) of The Domestic Violence Act, 1996. 




The Domestic Violence Act, 2018 has also created two new orders that the 
courts can provide to victims of crime where time is of the essence, the interim and 
emergency barring order.367 A judge can provide an interim and emergency barring 
order where they feel that it is likely, having considered the application for another 
order that the courts have previously granted or that is currently being processed, 
that the person who requested such an order, or someone immediately dependent 
upon them, may be at risk of severe danger, and that their safety cannot be ensured 
without such an order. This order mandates that the person to whom it pertains 
must vacate a premise if they are co-habiting with either the person who has 
requested such an order against them or their dependents. They are also prevented 
from entering the premises where such a person who has requested this order 
against them, or their dependents, are located, until such time as they are permitted 
to do so by a judge.368 A judge can also allow such an order to be given to prevent 
the intimidation, harassment and/or stalking of the person who has requested such 
an order, or their dependents.369Although the courts will not grant an interim 
barring order to a spouse, civil partner or parent of a non-dependent child who 
applies for such an order against an individual who has a greater proprietary interest 
in the residence that such an order would potentially apply to, a judge may provide 
 
367 The interim barring order is provided for under Section 8, while the emergency barring order is 
provided for under Section 9. 
368 As laid out in Section 8 ss. (1) (i) and (ii) and Section 9 ss. (3) (a) and (b) of the Domestic 
Violence Act, 2018. 
369 Under Section 8 ss. (2) (a) - (c) and Section 9 ss. (4) (a) - (c) of the Domestic Violence Act, 
2018. 




an emergency barring order in such instances.370 The judiciary can also importantly 
award both of these kinds of orders ex parte. A judge can do this where they believe 
that the circumstances of the case make this equitable, and where the relevant 
applicant has provided either an affidavit or sworn evidence in support of such an 
application.371 Where this is done a note of such evidence should be made by the 
relevant judge, the applicant or their legal representatives and any other person that 
the judge deems to be necessary, and a copy of the order must be provided to the 
person to whom it pertains as soon as is practicable.372 However, it is worth bearing 
in mind that these kinds of ex parte orders will typically only last for eight working 
days from the date from which they initially become effective.373 
The Domestic Violence Act, 2018 (Leahy 2017) also contains victim 
protections to ensure the smooth operation of these orders. If a victim requests any 
one of the previous orders, and the applicant or respondent seeks to personally 
cross-examine a child or adult victim witness in their contestation of such an order, 
a judge will only allow this where they deem it to be equitable.374 However, the 
legal representative of such a person is entitled to do so, and if a respondent does 
 
370 As provided for in Section 8 ss. (5) (i) and (ii) and Section 9 ss. (2) (a) and (b) of the Domestic 
Violence Act, 2018. 
371 As stipulated in Section 8 ss. (10) and (11) and Section 9 ss. (11) and (12) of the Domestic 
Violence Act, 2018. 
372 As per Section 8 ss. (13) and Section 9 ss. (14) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2018. 
373 Under Section 8 ss. (14) and Section 9 ss. (15) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2018. 
374 As laid out in Section 16 ss. (1) and (2) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2018. 




not have one for this purpose, the court may supply them with one.375 The Act can 
also empower the Child and Family Agency to request a safety, barring or 
emergency barring order in relation to an actual or potential victim of crime.376 The 
court can also suspend proceedings where they believe that a dependent may need 
a care or a supervision order in order to allow the Child and Family Agency to 
inquire into whether it ought to issue such an order. The court can also grant either 
of these orders while the Child and Family Agency conduct this inquiry.377A safety, 
barring, interim barring, emergency barring or protection order also all become 
effective from the moment that they are communicated to the person to which they 
pertain. The oral conveying of an order’s terms by an applicant or a third party is 
sufficient to do this, provided that they also tender a written copy of the order to 
the person to whom it pertains. A member of the Gardaí can also achieve this result 
where they believe that it is very likely that the respondent will seek to avoid such 
an order, or where other relevant factors compel the taking of such action.378 
Drastic consequences also exist for the breach of any one of the 
aforementioned orders.379 A person commits a crime where they violate such an 
order, or prevent an applicant or their dependent from entering a location subject 
 
375 Under Section 16 ss. (3) - (5) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2018. 
376 As laid out in Section 11 ss. (2) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2018. 
377 As provided for by Section 12 ss. (1) and (2) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2018. 
378 As laid out in Section 18 ss. (1), (2) and (4) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2018. 
379 Under Section 17 of The Domestic Violence Act, 1996 and Section 33 of The Domestic Violence 
Act, 2018. 




to such an order.380 The penalty is a fine of €1,500 and/or 12-months in prison. This 
is also independent of any other penalty or fine a judge may impose for contempt 
of court, since the violators of judicial orders may also end up in this position.381  
7.5.5 The Harassment Order –Protection for Sex Crime Victims 
The work of international bodies such as the United Nations has also been 
rather influential in this regard, particularly with regards to how domestic Irish Law 
in this area has evolved, since United Nations’ regulations have again tended to 
stipulate the leading international norms in this particular area of law. Art 16 of 
Recommendation no. 85 extended safeguards to prevent victim reprisals. This had 
a considerable impact upon the Irish State’s eventual attempts to address this issue. 
It eventually did, and took action to help safeguard the interests of victims of certain 
sex crimes within Section 46 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017.   
This provided sex crime victims with a new kind of order, the harassment 
order, which any Garda member, probation officer or victim can request.382A 
member of the judiciary can order this from the moment a sex offender receives 
their sentence, until they serve it in full. 383  They may grant one where it is 
equitable, and they are convinced that the convict has unjustifiably created a 
reasonable apprehension that a victim could be harassed or receive unsolicited 
 
380  As per Section 17 ss. (1) (a) and (b) of The Domestic Violence Act, 1996. 
381 As laid out within Section 17 ss. (2) of The Domestic Violence Act, 1996. 
382 Under s. 46 ss. (2) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017.   
383 As stipulated in s 46 ss. (1) (a) and (b) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017. 




contact from them.384  The order prevents them from contacting a victim, and 
coming within a certain distance of them.385  This becomes effective once the 
applicant or their agents notify the convict.386 Anyone unjustifiably breaching its 
terms commits an offence that has a maximum sentence of five-years in prison.387  
7.5.6 The Compensation Order, Potential Offender Compensation 
Although victims in the past might have been concerned about whether or 
not they will be able to recuperate the losses that they have suffered as a result of 
a crime, recent reforms have initiated a framework that allows them to receive 
compensation that they may potentially be owed, making it procedurally easier for 
victims of crime to receive this kind of remuneration. The Irish State’s statutory 
provision for victim restitution also demonstrates the influence of international 
standards regarding the compensation of crime victims. Recommendation no. 85 
made it a possibility for offenders to be compelled to recompense their victims, 
since Article 11 mandated that domestic statute make allowance for victim 
compensation as punishment, with an award being permissible in lieu of, or in 
 
384 That creates ‘fear, distress...alarm or...intimidation’ as per Section 46 Subsection (4) (a) and (b) 
of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017. 
385 or their home, workplace or place of habitual residence under Section 46 Subsection (5) (a) and 
(b) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017 
386 As laid out in Section 46 Subsection (9) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017. This 
can be done orally when presenting them with a physical copy of its text under Section 46 ss. 10 of 
the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017. 
387 Under Section 46 ss. (13) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017 




addition to, chastisement. This led the Oireachtas to advance Irish legislation in 
this area with the Criminal Justice Act, 1993, which has provided for victim 
restitution by way of compensation order (Muller-Rappard, 1990 pp. 239-241). 
Domestic legislation, which allows victims of crime to access regulatory 
restitution, governs the mechanism for the provision of these compensation 
orders.388  This allows for the judicial granting of compensation orders, which 
compensate victims for their losses. A judge can therefore provide that a convict, 
in addition to, or in lieu of their sentence, give restitution to their victim.389 
However, they must deem the restitution owed to them to be suitable, and no more 
than they feel that a victim would receive, were they to pursue a civil claim.390 A 
judge can grant such an order where a convict steals from a victim, or damages an 
object that was in their unlawful possession, regardless of ‘how...or who caused…’ 
this.391 When a judge assesses whether or not to issue such an order, and its amount, 
they must consider a convicts’ means 392 and issue one in line with what they 
 
388 As laid out in Section 6 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 
389 Under Section 6 ss. (1) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 
390 This is stipulated in Section 6 ss. (2) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 
391 Under Section 6 ss. (3) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. However, Traffic accident victims are 
not entitled to pursue such an order unless the convict did not have insurance, or caused the damage 
during an unlawful possession under per Section 6 ss. (4) (a) and (b) of the Criminal Justice Act, 
1993. 
392 This must be considered along with those of their guardian under Section 6 Subsection (5) (a) 
and (b) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 




believe to be a reasonable payment plan. 393  A victim can apply to have an 
unsatisfied order increased394 by a judge where they feel a convict’s means have 
improved, and that this would not surpass what a victim would be entitled to in a 
civil court, as well as what the presiding judge can award (Coffey 2018; Coen 2014, 
pp. 371-386; Kilcommins, et al. 2018, pp. 75-76, p. 67; Fennell 2010, pp. 250-260; 
Rogan 2006c, pp. 202-208; Vaughan and Kilcommins 2010, pp. 59-75).395  
7.5.7 Double Jeopardy Exemptions – A Second Chance at Justice 
Reforms have also carved out exemptions to the double jeopardy rule. 
These are contained within Section 8 and 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010. 
Section 8 allows the Director of Public Prosecutions to have a case reheard where 
new and compelling evidence emerges. Section 9 permits the Director for Public 
Prosecutions to also do this if an acquittal was corrupted by illegality. 
  They therefore afford victims of alleged crimes with another opportunity 
to have their allegations reheard. This is restricted in both instances to those persons 
acquitted on indictment who were sent forward for trial, or tried on or not yet tried 
after the commencement of these sections. 396  Therefore, the sections are 
importantly not retrospective, and cannot affect acquittals made before their 
 
393 Under Section 6 ss. (6) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 
394 As laid out in Section 6 ss. (8) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 
395 As stipulated within Section 6 ss. (8) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. 
396 Under Section 8 ss. (1) (a) and (b) and Section 9 ss. (1) (a) and (b) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 2010. Section 8 only covers relevant offences under the schedule, whilst Section 9 does not 
distinguish between relevant offences that are under the schedule and those that are not. 




commencement. Both sections also do not in any way impact those acquittals where 
the accused was exonerated by a special verdict of insanity,397 or those, in the case 
of Section 9, where the illicit prejudicing of an acquittal has not yet been proven 
illegal.398 In each case, the Director of Public Prosecutions can apply to a judge for 
a re-trial order so as to have an issue re-litigated if compelling evidence concerning 
the crime in question exists, and there is a public interest in re-litigating a case.399  
However, the Director of Public Prosecutions can only lodge one petition 
for a re-trial order per contested offence acquittal in this regard, and if the courts 
acquit them for a second time, the Director of Public Prosecutions cannot bring 
another such petition in relation to the same offence.400 This is beneficial in terms 
of encouraging public buy-in. As before this, if a court acquitted a suspect on a 
technicality, or as a result of a wrongdoing, the victim of an alleged criminality 
would rarely see justice done regarding that grievance, undermining their overall 
faith in the legal system. There are also clear safeguards in terms of notification. 
The relevant person to which the requested re-trial order pertains must be informed 
of this petition.401 Where the person concerned does not present themselves before 
 
397 In accordance with Section 8 ss. (7) and Section 9 ss. (8) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010 
398 Under Section 9 ss. (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010. 
399 As stipulated in both Section 8 ss. (3) (a) and (b) and Section 9 ss. (3) (a) and (b) of The Criminal 
Procedure Act, 2010. 
400 As per Section 8 ss. (4) and Section 9 ss. (5) of The Criminal Procedure Act, 2010. 
401 Under both Section 8 ss. (5) and Section 9 ss. (6) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010. 




a judge at the determination of the re-trial order petition, a judge can, where they 
feel it would be fair, listen to, and judge on that re-trial petition without them.402 
In fact, the legislature has calibrated this reform in such a way as to afford 
the victims of such alleged offences in these circumstances with another chance at 
achieving a more equitable outcome. They did this whilst establishing safeguards 
that prevent the State from oppressively abusing these exemptions, thereby 
ensuring that the rights of victims of crime to have their legitimate complaints 
legally addressed for a second time does not come at the expense of the due process 
rights that are traditionally afforded to the accused. This can be seen from recent 
case law on the issue, as well as commentary from leading academics in the area.403  
 
402 As set out in both Section 8 ss. (6) and Section 9 ss. (7) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010. 
403 “It is clear from the Supreme Court decisions in DS v Judges of the Cork Circuit Court, [[2008] 
4 I.R. 379.] and AP v DPP, [[2011] 1 I.R. 729.] that if an accused has been previously subjected to 
one or more unresolved criminal trials, this will not, of itself, be sufficient grounds to prohibit any 
further prosecution in respect of the offences alleged…in DS, Denham J. explained …“[t]here is no 
firm rule as to the number of potential trials. In each case all the circumstances require to be 
considered.”…In AP, the Supreme Court held that a fourth trial was not per se prohibited where the 
trial had commenced on three separate occasions…[t]he court noted that there was no rule under 
statute law, common law or the Constitution that limited the number of prosecutions or 
retrials…[e]ach case was to be considered on its own facts to determine [if]…a further prosecution 
would be constitutional. There are competing…interests...the interests of the victims of crime must 
not be “swept aside”…[McFarlane v DPP [2007] 1 I.R. 134, per Kearns J. ]…the position of the 
victim is integral…as to whether a retrial should be permitted…[a]lthough the public interest in 
prosecuting offenders is of paramount importance, the integrity of the criminal trial process also 
requires protection…against the inherent dangers of repeated trials for the same offence. An 




Some points can be gleaned from recent Supreme Court cases on of double 
jeopardy, and its relationship with the due process rights of the accused. Even 
where an accused is brought before the courts in relation to the same offence on 
one or more occasions, such repeat pursual has not been adjudged to be a violation 
of their due process rights that would bar the re-pursuit of that same action. Indeed, 
even before the passage of legislative reform the courts had iterated that no hard 
and fast rule is set with regards to what constitutes a fair degree of re-prosecution. 
Indeed, each particular case often turned upon its own facts. In more recent cases 
even a fourth trying of the same offence was permitted as lawful and not in breach 
of an accused’s rights, where several trials did not progress past their early stages. 
It is telling that in that particular case the court was of the view that no law 
constrained the number of attempts to rehear a criminal case under domestic law. 
The stance was very much that the approach of the courts ought to be bespoke. Due 
process and procedural justice are key considerations here, as is the crime victim.  
 
applicant seeking to prohibit a trial following previously unresolved criminal proceedings must 
demonstrate some form of prejudice arising as a result of the renewed efforts to prosecute. The 
issue…was considered in McNulty v Director of Public Prosecutions. [[2009] 3 I.R. 572.]…“[t]he 
trial process may involve two or more hearings for a number of reasons. The jury may disagree, as 
happened in this case and happens not infrequently. Or the first jury may be discharged…[in] a 
second trial, neither side is bound to approach the case in the same way…[n]ew witnesses may be 
called, or witnesses called on the first occasion may be omitted…[i]t is perfectly legitimate for 
either the prosecution or the defence to...look[ing] again, at how it will present its own case... 
[[2009] 3 I.R. 572 at 580–581]”. Coffey, G. (2016) ‘A Review of Double Jeopardy Law’, Irish 
Criminal Law Journal, 26(3), 66-76, p.71.  




In fact, the stature of the victim in this area has grown considerably in recent times, 
and is fundamental to an adjudication of the procedural fairness of a repeat hearing.  
Despite significant imperatives to bring the guilty to justice, the overall 
justness of the prosecutorial process is also in dire need of vindication. As there are 
also obvious dangers with regards to the re-prosecution of charges, which can cause 
procedural unfairness. Where a person attempts to prevent such a re-prosecution, 
they need to show how such a hearing would have a discriminatory impact on them. 
The permissive approach of the courts, even before the introduction of recent 
legislation is well encapsulated by Hardiman J. in a case before their introduction.  
They felt that it was only normal that a prosecution might involve several 
trials. Since the divergence of juries and their dismissal is a common feature of our 
law. This frees up both parties to take a different approach to proceedings. Some 
novel evidentiary sources might be introduced, or previously relied on sources 
excluded. The learned judge also believed that there were no reasons why both 
parties ought not be permitted to re-evaluate the manner by which they had 
previously tendered their arguments. Some of the statements made in this regard 
may however be somewhat susceptible to charges of an overly romanticised 
reading of offence retrials. Since their proponents clearly revel in the cut and thrust 
of legal debate and are loath to flag some of the issues with rehearing such trials. 
Some academic commentators do however highlight some of these, particularly in 
light of some of the recent legislative intrusions within this particular area of law.  




Coffey notes how the DPP is404 able to argue for the rehearing of a case 
without the presence of the accused. They emphasise that such a procedure creates 
‘due process concerns’. These are obvious when considering the fact that an absent 
party in this context could fall foul of the long-standing principle of equality of 
arms, among several others. Although it is recognised that the accused will be 
informed of this development, that does little to remedy the potential imbalance. In 
addition, the petition of the DPP  has no set limitations with regards to timing. This 
affords them great latitude and further exacerbates due process concerns.  
Having said all this, and taking the statute as a whole, the author agrees 
with Coffey that the legislative interference does create a situation that is broadly 
conducive and respectful of procedural due process. As the principles set out by 
the legislature focuses on indictable offences and not crime generally. In doing so, 
Sections 8 and 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010 involve a trade-off between 
the sanctity of a determinative judgment and the desire to uphold justice. 405  
 
404 under Section 8 ss. (6) and Section 9 ss. (7) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010. 
405 “The D.P.P.’s application to the Court can be in the absence of an acquitted person, about which 
due process concerns will arise. The application must be made on notice but it can be done in a 
person’s absence. Unlike its English counterpart, there is no time limit within which the D.P.P. may 
make such an application...”  “Statutory modification of the double jeopardy principle is concerned 
with the most serious offences, which represents a trade-off between the interests of finality in the 
criminal justice process and the interests of justice in determining whether an acquittal should be 
reopened. This relates to the most innovative recent changes in criminal law and the conduct of 
criminal trials, admissibility of evidence and procedure. It is imperative that applications for post-
acquittal retrial are limited by procedural safeguards and that the Court’s decision in any case strikes 




Although this area constitutes one of the most novel advancements 
regarding the procedural administration of justice, petitions to reopen cases must 
have parameters. Particularly ones that respect due process and motivate judicial 
determinations which vindicate the entitlements of all criminal justice interests. It 
is thereby asserted that, taking the sections as a whole, this is still the case. As now 
a circumscribed, as well as managed, partial caveat is permitted to the historical 
ban on the general rule against the re-prosecuting of the same offence twice.  
7.6  CIVIL PROCESS REFORMS  
7.6.1 The Civil Law, an Alternative Justice Avenue 
Although Public Law reforms mainly drove the re-centralisation of crime 
victims, alterations to Private Law further evidence the trend toward the victim of 
crime’s procedural re-inclusion within Irish Law. Due to these changes, civil 
procedure can be just as, if not more accessible and fulfilling to victims. This is due 
to the actions and damages that are available to them under the Law of Tort, its 
flexible procedures and less onerous burden of proof. State organs have also 
complemented this by altering the approach of the judiciary to certain limitation 
periods, as well as by changing official State policy in relation to the liability of 
prosecutorial organs. This chapter addresses each one of these topics in an attempt 
 
a fair and proportionate balance between the fundamental rights of the accused, the victim and the 
public interest. This balance exists where there is a limited and controlled exception to the 
prohibition on double jeopardy.” Coffey, G. (2013) ‘Post-Acquittal Retrials for Serious Offences in 
the Irish Criminal Justice Process: Lessons from England and Wales’, Irish Journal of Legal 
Studies, 3(1), 36-66, p. 63, 65. 




to help demonstrate how the reform of Irish civil procedure has helped victims of 
crime to regain some of their lost procedural centrality within our legal system. 
7.6.2 Tort – A Viable Option for Victims Seeking Compensation 
Tort Law allows victims of crime to bring civil claims and pursue 
compensation in damages when they suffer wrongs through the Private Law courts. 
This is evidenced by the decision of Whelan v Whelan,406 which involved an appeal 
by Fiona Whelan against a High Court Order that prevented her from taking a civil 
claim against the estate of James Whelan, whom she alleged had abused her on 
several occasions. Hardiman J., pointed out that victims of crime were able to 
receive civil redress in damages for the loss that they had suffered due to a criminal 
offence (2014, para 7). In fact, crimes often result in these kinds of claims, which 
entitle victims, or their family, to pursue civil damages (Quill 2014, pp. 500-504).   
Irish victims of crime have also had their right to civil recompense 
augmented under Directive 2012/29/EU. Article 16 created a victim right to 
compensation for losses, while Article 14 stipulated that victims of crime must 
receive compensation for the cost of contributing to a prosecution, and that they 
can pursue this from their offender. The impact of these provisions is that the Irish 
victim has the right to pursue compensation for not only their losses, but their 
expenses as well (O’Flaherty 2016, pp. 120-126; Kilcommins et al. 2016, p. 26). 
 
406 [2014] i.e.s.c. 75. 




7.6.3 The Victim Accommodating Civil Claim 
A civil suit is just as, if not more desirable for victims of crime than criminal 
prosecutions, as it gives them an even greater latitude to participate, whilst 
providing them with surmountable evidential burdens, and an important right to 
not tender evidence, which they do not possess during a criminal trial. If a victim 
satisfies the parameters of the Legal Aid Board, they are also entitled to free legal 
counsel from the State in order to help them seek redress in the law of tort, or to 
apply for court orders. Indeed, the State established these civil law processes to 
help defend the rights of its citizens. Hardiman J. reiterated this in the case of Grant 
-v- Roche Products,407 which related to a claim in damages for the loss caused by 
a drug that had purportedly caused a student to take their life. Hardiman J., while 
considering the case, noted that “… the law of tort is...an important tool for the 
vindication of constitutional rights...” evidencing its considerable value to victims 
in their pursuit of justice (2008, para 74; Kilcommins et al. 2018, pp. 67-68). 
7.6.4 Flexibility Regarding the Civil Claims of Abuse Victims 
Irish case law illustrates the flexibility that the courts have shown towards 
the civil claims of crime victims, particularly regarding child victims of abuse. In 
the case of Connellan -v- Saint Joseph's Kilkenny & Ors,408  a victim pursued 
compensation for the physical, sexual, emotional and racial abuse that they suffered 
as a child. O’Donovan J. noted that he did “...not think it necessary that the victim 
 
407 [2008] i.e.s.c. 35. 
408 [2006] i.e.h.c. 119. 




identify each and every incident...” and, that “...only a substantial sum of money 
would be appropriate” compensation in this instance (2006, para 40, para 43). In 
awarding €300,000 in civil damages to the applicant, the judge dealt with the entire 
period of abuse cumulatively, whilst also drawing particular attention to how the 
“...abuse affected [the victim’s] ability to concentrate...with the result that… he 
never achieved his [academic] potential...” (2006, para 42). 
The Irish judiciary have also considered ‘aggravated damages’ relevant to 
the quantification of how much compensation a victim may be entitled to receive. 
This arises when a plaintiff’s conduct may well have compounded the impact of 
their tort, as was the case in the decision of O’Donnell v O’Donnell.409 This related 
to a claim for damages that arose due to the historically sexually abusive behaviour 
that a child had previously endured. Kelly J. awarded an additional €3,000 under 
the rubric of aggravated damages in this regard due to the correspondence of the 
defendant, which had attempted to prevent the matter from proceeding to trial. He 
did this because he felt the defendant’s conduct had crossed a line from merely 
urging the plaintiff to prove their case, into the more inappropriate territory of 
“...threatening [,] in a very formal way [,] to bring cross proceedings [,] 
which...could have had no substance in fact” (2005, para 73, para 74). 
7.6.5 Convictions can be used by Victims to Help Prove Liability 
The civil accommodation of victims by the judiciary in Tort went so far as 
to overturn persuasive precedent in Hollington v F. Hewthorn and Company, 
 
409 [2005] i.e.h.c. 216. 




Limited, and Another.410 In that case, the defendant appealed against the plaintiff’s 
use of their careless driving conviction in a civil claim for damages. Goddard L.J., 
in allowing the appeal, surmised that “...on the trial of the issue in the civil court, 
the opinion of the criminal court is...irrelevant”. He therefore felt that it was 
“...safer in the interests of justice that...” the issue be re-addressed within a civil 
law court that ignores the previous findings of a criminal court (1943, p. 595, p. 
602). This effectively prevented victims of crime from re-submitting successful 
findings of guilt as evidence when an analogous matter came before the civil courts, 
even though the civil burden of proof is lower than the criminal one. Worse still, it 
effectively meant the re-litigation of a more or less settled issue with a clean slate, 
as well as the potential inadmissibility of certain pivotal pieces of evidence. 
However, the case of Patrick Nevin and Margaret Lavelle -v- Catherine 
Nevin411 changed all of this. This revolved around the fallout from the defendant’s 
conviction for soliciting the murder of her husband. Although the court found her 
guilty, her husband’s pub passed to her, which she sold for £620,000. Although a 
claim to disentitle her did not go ahead during her prosecution, two new joint 
plaintiffs pursued the matter after it finished. They sought, as the initiator of the 
initial claim was now dead, to use the criminal conviction of the defendant against 
them in their joint civil proceedings to try to disentitle her from this windfall. 
 In Nevin, Kearns P. highlighted the criticism, and the overturning of 
Hollington in several jurisdictions, as well as how it drew the ire of Lord Denning. 
 
410 [1943] k.b. 587. 
411 [2013] i.e.h.c. 80. 




Kearns P. went on to favourably quote North P., who referenced the comment of 
Mr. Wright at p. 976 of Jorgensen -v- News Media (Auckland) Ltd.412 Kearns P. 
did this to show the absurdity of how “... ‘a civilised community is willing to see a 
man hanged on [a criminal] finding...but to treat such [a] finding as a mere opinion 
in a subsequent case involving a matter of dollars and cents...”. He then went on to 
conclude that the issue at hand had not in fact been decisively addressed in favour 
of Hollington within this jurisdiction, and that the Irish case law of the subject 
actually tended to contradict the reasoning of that particular case (2013, para 64).  
 This all led Kearns P. to follow the reasoning of Jorgensen and conclude 
that “...the conviction of the defendant for her husband's murder is admissible in 
[these] civil proceedings as prima facie evidence of the fact that she committed 
such [a] murder”. He felt that not permitting such evidence to be adduced 
“…would...be contrary to logic and common sense and offend any reasonable 
person's sense of justice and fairness”. The decision has meant that Irish victims of 
crime can now use previous convictions as rebuttable evidence of liability in their 
civil claims (2013, para. 101, para 104; Kilcommins et al. 2018, pp. 76-77). 
7.6.6 Convicts cannot Now Inherit from their Victims 
Irish statutory changes were integral to the resolution of the Nevin case, as 
well as the cases of a similar nature that followed it.413 The Oireachtas initiated 
these reforms in order to prevent convicts from inheriting the property of their 
 
412 [1969] n.z.l.r. 961. 
413 As the issue of unworthiness to succeed was clarified by the legislature under Section 120 of the 
Succession Act, 1965. 




victims. A sane individual, whom a court convicts of murder, attempted murder or 
manslaughter can therefore not inherit any part of their victim’s estate.414 Statute 
also precludes an individual that a court has convicted of a crime415 that has a prison 
term of two or more years as its’ most serious penalty from inheriting what would 
have been their legal right share from the estate of their victim.416  
The application of these principles is evident from the recent controversial case of 
Cawley & Ors -v- Lillis.417 In that instance Laffoy J. was at pains to clarify that 
Lillis was, statutorily disentitled under Section 120 from inheriting the property 
that his late wife had left for him within her will,418 as he had been previously 
convicted of having caused her death by manslaughter. However, Lillis was able 
to ultimately inherit those sections of the property in question that were the subject 
of a joint tenancy in that particular case. The learned judge did, at the same time, 
infer a constructive trust in order to prevent Lillis from obtaining the benefit of the 
property, which they held on trust for the estate of the deceased (2011, para 1.4).419 
 
414 Unless their victim bequeaths them part of it after one of the previously mentioned offences 
transpires under Section 120 Subsection (1) of the Succession Act, 1965. 
415  That they have committed against a victim or their, spouse, partner or child. 
416 In accordance with Section 120 Subsection (4) of the Succession Act, 1965. When a convict is 
disentitled in this way, the relevant authority consequently distributes their portion as if they 
predeceased their victim as laid out in Section 120 Subsection (5) of the Succession Act, 1965. 
417 [2011] i.e.h.c. 515. 
418 This is due to Section 120 of the Succession Act, 1965. 
419 “…the legal title to the assets…under a joint tenancy passed by survivorship to the defendant on 
the death of the deceased…in order to prevent the defendant from benefitting… the Court imposed 




The unjustness of the outcome was somewhat mitigated by the actions of 
Laffoy J. However, it did prompt the bench to suggest that the Oireachtas look at 
the law in this area to ensure the judiciary are not constrained in their pursuit of 
justice were a similar scenario to reoccur. These pleas did not fall on deaf ears 
either. The legislature adopted the advice of the LRC in 2015 and set about looking 
into whether the relevant provision in Section 120 ought to be repealed or amended 
to prevent a repeat of Lillis. It ultimately recommended that this be done, and set 
out a draft version of the manner by which these reforms could be achieved.420  
 
a constructive trust so that he held the deceased’s share on behalf of the victim's estate.”“…Laffoy 
J commented [at 303.] that [‘]…there should be legislation…which prescribes the destination of co-
owned property in the event of the unlawful killing of one of the co-owners by another co-owner.[’] 
[This would have to comply with] with the property rights in Articles 40.3 and 43.2…including the 
general right to inherit property…“regulated by the principles of social justice” [Article 43.2.1°.] 
and delimited with a view to reconciling their exercise with “[‘]he exigencies of the common 
good.[’] [Article 43.2.2°]” Law Reform Commission (2014) Issues Paper on Review of section 120 
of the Succession Act 1965 and Admissibility of criminal convictions in civil proceedings, LRC IP 
7-2014, Dublin: Law Reform Commission, p. 5, 6 available: 
https://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Issues%20Papers/ip7AspectsSuccessionLaw.pdf. [accessed 
11 Jul 2020]. 
420 “The LRC suggested reform and even provided a Draft Bill in its 2015 Report, which was 
adopted by Jim O’Callaghan and advanced as a private members bill. [‘]…a person who is 
convicted of murder or manslaughter should be presumed to be unsuitable to administer the estate 
of the deceased and that no grant of probate or letters of administration in the estate shall issue to 
such person notwithstanding that such person is the nominated executor of the deceased or the 
person who would but for this recommendation be the person entitled as of right to extract letters 
of administration intestate of the deceased person’s estate…[‘] Law Reform Commission (2015) 




This reformative process was advanced under Part V of The Courts and 
Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2017 421  The Bill was also 
complemented by the forwarding and passage into the second stage of the Dail of 
The Civil Liability (Amendment) (Prevention of Benefits from Homicide) Bill 
2017.422 This sought to repeal the previous law on the issue and replace it with new 
previsions that would actively prevent a situation like Lillis  repeating. It however 
lapsed with the dissolution of the last Dail and was not enacted. 
7.6.7 Extended Limitation Period to Permit Abuse Claims 
The legislature has also reformed the limitation periods for child abuse 
claims, further illustrating the attempts that it has made to incorporate vulnerable 
groups of victims into its procedure (Ring 2017, p. 90). Statutory amendments423 
now govern the civil claims that relate to the abuse of disabled minors, particularly 
those whose psychological trauma was so profound as to prevent them from 
promptly reporting their abuse. These claims424 are now permissible, if the victim 
 
Report on prevention of Benefit of Homicide, LRC 114 – 2015, Dublin: Law Reform Commission, 
[4.74] available: https://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/r114.pdf. [accessed 11 Jul 2020]. 
421  Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2017, No 152/ 2017, Dublin: 
Oireachtas.ie, available: https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/bills/bill/2017/34/ [accessed 11 Jul 2020]. 
422 The Civil Liability (Amendment) (Prevention of Benefits from Homicide) Bill 2017, No 34/ 
2017, Dublin: Oireachtas.ie, available: http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/WP17000275 
[accessed 11 Jul 2020]. 
423 That exists under Section 48A subsection (1) of The Statue of Limitations Act, 1957, as amended 
by Section 2 of the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act, 2000. 
424 That the statute of limitations had hitherto barred. 




of crime involved informed the Gardaí of their abuse, or received legal advice 
which indicated that their claim was statute barred.425  These provisions are of 
course subject to the caveat that a judge can dismiss any action before them on the 
grounds of delay, if it is equitable in the circumstances of the case to do so.426  
 The judiciary have also reaffirmed their commitment to affording 
considerable latitude to the civil claims of these kinds of victim in the cases of 
Doherty -v- Quigley427 and Tom Hayes -v- Anthony McDonnell, Collette Cullinane, 
the Minister for Education and Science, the Minister for Health and Children, 
Ireland and the Attorney General428. In Doherty, the respondent received €400,000 
from the High Court due to their sexual abuse and rape by the appellant when they 
were a minor. However, the appellant appealed and contended that the trial judge 
had erred in law by permitting the victim to benefit from a statutory amendment 
that permitted the extension of a limitation period to impaired children,429 as they 
argued that their victim was not impaired enough to benefit under these grounds. 
Murray J., in dismissing the appeal, concluded that “...the fact that such a person is 
aware of the relevant limitation period, and its implications, does not of itself defeat 
the application of the section” (2015, para 47, para 37). The Hayes case concerned 
an appeal to prevent the plaintiff from initiating their civil proceedings. They were 
 
425 Under Section 48A Subsection 3 (a) and (b) of The Statue of Limitations Act, 1957 
426 As per Section 48A   ss. (4) of The Statue of Limitations Act, 1957. 
427 [2015] i.e.s.c. 54. 
428 [2011] i.e.h.c. 530. 
429 As laid out in Section 48(A) of The Statue of Limitations Act, 1957. 




seeking redress for the abuse that they had suffered when they were a child, half a 
decade ago. Hanna J. inferred that “[a] monstrous injustice could ensue were an 
alleged wrongdoer to find shelter...in the impediment [that they] spawned...to ward 
off consequential proceedings”, before dismissing the appeal on the basis that there 
was “...sufficient material...to excuse the inordinate delay”. He also felt that it was 
in the interests of the public to allow the matter to proceed to trial, and that any 
inconvenience the defendant might suffer was outweighed by the prejudice that the 
victim would endure if their civil claim were frustrated (2011, para 54, para 55). 
The case of Cormac Walsh -v- Michael Byrne430 is also indicative of this 
trend. It concerned a sex crime victim who pursued civil damages for the negative 
impact that the defendant had had upon them through their inappropriate actions 
after a 31-year delay. Since the plaintiff in this particular case was a minor at the 
time, and the defendant was a ‘trusted and respected member of the community’ 
who was like a ‘father figure’ to him, he contended that the court ought to consider 
their entire relationship to be oppressive. Not only did White J. feel the plaintiff 
should be permitted to advance with their claim despite the delay,431 he also went 
so far as to highlight how the case law “… of the High Court and the Supreme 
Court...powerfully reinforce[s] the progressive development of the law of civil 
wrongs.” With this in mind, he held that the grooming of a child for sexual abuse 
was a new civil wrong in Ireland, before going on to award €200,000 in damages 
to the victim of crime involved (2015, para 4, para 1, para 22, para 26). 
 
430 [2015] i.e.h.c. 414. 
431 In accordance with the grounds set out under Section 48 (A). 




7.6.8 The State can now be Liable to Victims for Mistakes 
The alteration of the previous position whereby the judiciary tended to 
dissuade the claims of crime victims against prosecutorial organs for negligence is 
another area that evidences considerable reform. This is because a wider class of 
victim can now obtain civil redress and also now have a much greater chance of 
receiving it (Walsh, 2013, pp. 1-28). However, before the judiciary introduced 
these changes the courts tended to absolve the Gardaí and Attorney General of legal 
responsibility. The cases of W -v- Ireland (No. 2)432 and Lockwood -v- Ireland & 
Ors,433 evidence this, and illustrate the reasoning behind this particular stance. 
 In W, the plaintiff alleged that the Attorney General was negligent in their 
delayed extradition of Father John Brendan Smyth to stand trial in Northern 
Ireland. However, Costello P. denied this. He thought there was no duty of care 
between the Attorney General and any victim. He also felt that victims of crime did 
not deserve to benefit from such a duty because of the conflict of interest that might 
potentially emerge between them and the public, as well as the theoretically 
restrictive impact of any such duty upon the actions of the Attorney General.  
The Lockwood case concerned an attempt by a victim to hold the Gardaí 
liable for their role in a failed rape prosecution. The prosecution failed because 
when the issue went to trial it emerged that the Gardaí had unlawfully detained an 
alleged offender. This happened because the power that the Gardaí had used to 
arrest them was not in operation at the time when the Gardaí had detained their 
 
432 [1997] 2 i.r. 141. 
433 [2012] 1 i.l.r.m. 72. 




suspect. O'Higgins J. was therefore obliged to deem all of the considerably 
incriminating evidence that the Gardaí had obtained from their unlawful detention 
to be inadmissible in court, which had fatal consequences for the prosecution.  
Although the victim involved demanded compensation, the court decided 
that the Gardaí were not, without mala fides, responsible for the carrying out of 
their official duties. In the words of Kearns P. “... no action arises...for negligence 
against the [G]ardaí in the absence of mala fides...”. The learned judge justified this 
stance based upon the idea that “[a]ny other view would have quite alarming 
consequences. One might begin by enquiring where the duty of care would begin 
or end.” He also believed that the judicial inference of such a duty of care to victims 
of crime in such instances would effectively “...cripple the capacity of An Garda 
Síochána...to carry out its duties...with expedition...” (2012, para 79). 
However, the position of the courts altered in the jointly heard case of L.M. 
-v- The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, The Minister for Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform, The DPP, Ireland and The AG and Belinda Lockwood -v- Ireland, 
The AG, and The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána.434 These cases related to 
the appeals that two Irish victims of crime had lodged. In both of these cases each 
victim contested the High Court orders that had impeded their attempts to hold the 
State negligently liable for what they felt was negligent conduct that had caused 
them significant pain and loss. Their claims concerned what they contended to be 
the negligent pursuit of convictions by the State in relation to purportedly criminal 
offenses that the victims involved alleged were committed against them. 
 
434 [2015] i.e.s.c. 81. 




 L.M. and BL both concerned instances where victims of crime argued that 
the State had breached its duty of care to them, and was therefore responsible, in a 
civil sense, for the damage that it may have caused. O’Donnell J. decided that the 
suits of L.M. and BL actually merited adjudication, as their cases raised serious 
concerns about whether the State could infringe the rights of crime victims in an 
actionable way. This was impactful, as it established precedent which indicated 
that when a victim of crime alleged that the State had breached their rights there 
would no longer be a blanket policy of permitting it to act with impunity towards 
them. It also allowed for the possibility that the State could be held liable by the 
victims of crime that it prejudiced (2015, para 44; Kilcommins et al. 2018, p. 78). 
This chapter has illustrated the different kinds of legal reforms that have 
transpired at a domestic level within Ireland, which have all cumulatively helped 
to considerably re-integrate the victim of crime within the legal system of the 
country. Although these changes were significant, they were all more or less non-
zero-sum advances, which did not really come at the expense of the accused. This 
thesis will now conclude by synthesizing the previous points that it has made in 
order to show how all of the previously discussed changes were pivotal to the 
victim of crime’s procedural re-centralisation within Irish criminal justice. It does 
this because a crucial aspect of this thesis is that the re-emergence of the Irish 
victim of crime was not just a socio-cultural phenomenon, but a juridical one also. 
7.7 CONCLUSION  
This chapter endeavoured to illustrate the legal move from victim exclusion 
to inclusion within Irish criminal justice. It asserted that the modern victim now 




occupies a more central position than they did in the nineteenth century. This is, in 
certain ways, akin to their position of central importance in the eighteenth century, 
although there are obvious differences. Their central position is obvious from the 
socio-cultural evolution of the victim as an “everyman”435 in Ireland. Indeed, there 
are even similarities with the common law victim of the past.436  
This is particularly evident in the role that they now occupy within criminal 
justice procedure. As the State has afforded them considerable latitude to influence 
proceedings, whether that be during their initial contact with the system where they 
are afforded information, protections and accommodations from the police 
regarding their statements. Or during trial, where further important 
accommodations are present such as discretionary screens and TV links, 
 
435 “Ever since the nineteenth century there had been repeated calls for government and its agencies 
to do more to relieve the plight of crime victims…the victim’s role…was routinely reduced to that 
of complainant and witness…and the injuries victims suffered typically went unacknowledged 
…the system…had little to offer to individual victims, who were neither consulted nor informed 
about the way in which ‘their’ case was handled.” “The victim is no longer an unfortunate 
…subsumed within the public interest…[t]he victim is now…a much more representative character, 
whose experience is taken to be common and collective, rather than individual and atypical.”“…this 
vision of the victim as Everyman has undermined the older notion of the public…[i]t is no longer 
sufficient to subsume [their] experience…” Garland, D. (2001) The Culture of Control: Crime and 
Social Order in Contemporary Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 121, p. 11. 
436 “…images of the victim that were on offer seem…part corporeal, part incorporeal; showing the 
personal victim serving both as an embodied individual and as a cipher for the suprapersonal many.” 
Rock, P. (2004) ‘Victims, prosecutors and the State in nineteenth century England and Wales’, 
Criminal Justice: The International Journal of Policy and Practice, 4 (4), p. 334 




particularly if vulnerabilities are accounted for by the state. Indeed, even after trial 
the voice of the victim is heard through various court orders, consequential impact 
statements  and influence over case reviews, which are materially substantiated by 
entitlements to information about an offender’s penal sentence. 
Although there are obvious differences between the victim of the eighteenth 
century and the victim of today, certain limited similarities in terms of procedural 
centrality can be gleaned. These can be seen in trial procedure, at key moments 
both before, during and after trial. Victims possess significant rights that influence 
the way these events transpire, in much the same way that the victim did during the 
eighteenth century. There are caveats here regarding procedural fairness to the 
accused.437 However, the incorporation of many, if not all, of these rights evidence 
that crime victims can procedurally participate without sacrificing due process.438  
 
437 “…victims are…being consulted about punishment and decisions about release, being notified 
about the offender's subsequent movements. There is, in short, a new cultural theme, a new 
collective meaning of victimhood…” “These ranged from uncontroversial innovations…to much-
disputed developments such as ‘victim-impact statements’…offered to the judge about sentencing, 
and to parole boards about release…the criminal justice system strove to reinvent itself as a service 
organization...” Garland, D. (2001) The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in 
Contemporary Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 12., p.122. 
438 This can be seen in both the Council Directive (EC) 2012/29/EC of 25 October 2012, arts.  2,4, 
6,8,9,14,16,19,21,22,23 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of 
victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, available: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012L0029&from=EN [accessed 01 
May 2019] and The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act 2017, No 28/ 2017, s. 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 
15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 30, 31, Dublin: Stationery Office, available: 




 All of the aforementioned reforms collectively attest to the creation of a 
novel legal landscape for victims of crime in Ireland, one in which they are no 
longer ignored, but seen as pivotal criminal justice end users, and one whose rights 
matter. However, how exactly does the modern victim of crime occupy this more 
centralised position.  This new step change in the attitude and approach of the law 
to arguably its most important criminal justice consumer, the victim, has therefore 
been effectively written into Irish Law. Evidence of this is discernible from the 
domestic reforms that have transpired at each stage of the Irish criminal justice 
process. Such as the creation of new judicial orders, the extension of video link 
testimony; the increased inclusivity of pre-trial statements and witness 
identification; the introduction of victim impact statements; the reduction of 
barriers regarding a victim of crime’s competency to testify; more progressive 
approaches to delayed prosecutions in sex abuse cases; the phasing out of doctrines 
prejudicial to victims; the relaxation of corroboration prerequisites; the giving of 
justifications when prosecutions are not taken; the making of State bodies 
responsible to victims; allowing victims of crime to access free State counsel and 
legal assistance as well as much more procedurally progressive attitudes toward the 
civil claims that victims of crime may initiate as a result of their victimisation. 
It is also worth clarifying the role of the politicisation of law and order in  
Ireland and its relationship with victim inclusion. The socio-political rhetoric of 
 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2017/act/28/enacted/en/html [accessed 01 May 2019] which, 
although highly consequential in this regard, often delineate the rights of vicitms in order to not 
unfairly impinge upon the due process safeguards of those that are accussed of criminal offences. 




penal populism was persuasive. Indeed, it may have even influenced criminal 
justice policy discourse at a broader level. However, on the subject of victims, they 
were used more as a fig leaf to allow for the advancement, and implementation of 
some of the unpalatable crime control measures that were pursued at the time.  
Yet, despite this, within the narrower field of victim’s rights and 
reintegration, penal populist rhetoric was disconnected from the more permanent 
legal realities of what was actually implemented by the judiciary and legislature. 
As such measures were often devoid of penal populism and usually took account 
of due process rights. Therefore, the politicisation of crime was influential as a 
socio-political, or cultural driver of change, but was perhaps not as influential 
within the field of victim reform. Since due process and human rights served as 
important checks on the kind of reformative policies that were implemented.439  
 
439 “…the victim has assumed a significant role. The victim support movement has grown quickly 
and receives significant funding from the state, victim impact statements were introduced …and a 
victims charter has been published … [p]rotecting the public and preventing the next victim have 
become imperatives…[o]ther changes took place around the time of the 1997 general election but 
do not seem to have left an indelible mark. A shift in the emotional tone of crime policy became 
evident from the mid-to-late 1990s, but this hysterical edge has not endured…in June 2001, 62 per 
cent of the population voted in favour of deleting all remaining references to the death penalty from 
Bunreacht na hÉireann…and preventing its reintroduction…opinion polls…do not indicate the 
continuous presence of an overwhelming concern about law and order…[t]he perpetual sense of 
crisis that Garland has identified as epitomizing the situation in Britain and the United States since 
the 1970s appears to have been transient in Ireland.” O’Donnell, I. and O’Sullivan, E. (2003) The 
politics of intolerance—Irish style. British Journal of Criminology, 43 (3), 253–66, p. 57.  
 




All of these legal alterations consequently demonstrate how domestic 
reform has helped to shape the re-inclusion of victims within Irish Law. In fact, the 
improvement of the way in which Irish juridical bodies and actors treat victims of 
crime has vested them with rights that have enhanced their legal status. The 
confluence of these advancements has also brought about a change in the way in 
which the organs of criminal justice perceive victims of crime. Before this, they 
had little procedural say, and the legal authorities that they did meet did not really 
consider them to be significant, nor did the law deem them worthy of many 
significant entitlements. However, after these developments victims of crime now 
play a much more procedurally central role, receive far better treatment from 
criminal justice stakeholders and possess both substantive and procedural rights.  
The preceding chapter endeavoured to illustrate how recent legal changes 
have transformed the Irish criminal justice system into one that is much more 
accommodating of victims and their interests. It outlined several diverse areas of 
Irish law, in which procedural justice for victims is now actively pursued. This 
thesis will now move onto its next and final substantive chapter, chapter eight. 
There it will attempt to consider the points made throughout its body and re-
emphasise how these support the overall thesis. Although several contentions have 
been made in relation to the various mode of inclusivity applicable to the victim in 
an Irish context, the golden thread that links these ideas is that recent ruptures in 
conventional legal methods have opened up a space for victims. The second main 
contention was that despite these profound changes this incorporation has been 
exercised in a manner that is cognisant and respectful of due process rights. Indeed, 
judicial loadstars, at both a domestic and European level, have been decisive in 




securing a place of prominence for the victim, whilst also in maintaining the 
delicate equilibrium of procedural justice. This has in large part been due to the 
way in which these reforms have been pursued. As well as the endeavours of 
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CONCLUSION  
This conclusion is to ends this treatise by answering the research question, 
and using this knowledge to advance scenarios that may transpire in future. The 
author posits that the interaction of social forces and the law has re-included 
victims. This has meant that the victim has re-emerged as a socio-cultural and 
juridical phenomenon. It is more accurate for the author to say that their re-
emergence was more or less a non-zero sum one given that it did not benefit or 
prejudice the rights of any other justice stakeholder other than the victim . 
The victim’s eighteenth-century position was central, as they played a 
pivotal role before, during and after a prosecution. Although they had to rely upon 
paternal authorities, this was counterbalanced by their strength in numbers, and the 
latitude that the law often afforded them. Victims were therefore pivotal to order, 
as their centrality was of importance to its maintenance. However, the problems 
the British encountered exacerbated the difficulties with how power was effectively 
organised and administered within this victim centred system. This eventually 
coalesced in a desire of reformers to grasp the nettle of how exactly the State was 
to be aggrandised. Although Irish instability forced their hand, such strife resulted 
in the world’s first police force. A force that was now part of one of the world’s 





All of this reformative transformation led to the structural exclusivity of the victim.  
In fact, the transition was not only affected by society but also in the way in which 
the reformers reified rationality. Bentham’s rotary flail is a metaphor for this, as 
the object ideologically concretises the de-personalisation of punishment, which 
exemplified the way in which the reformers sought to reconfigure justice. The 
making of the justice system into a depersonalised machine had implications for 
the victim, who now found themselves surplus to requirements. The movement of 
victims from the procedure of administering justice to an almost superfluous entity 
created a marginality that solidified the severance of the “emotional victim” from 
the “rational” justice system. This manifested itself not only in the desire of State 
actors to retroactively justify their actions, but also the negative impact that this 
had on victims. They went from an influential group to one largely dependent upon 
the State. A State that now solely pursued prosecutions in the name of the people.  
In fact, a time or space that was uniquely theirs no longer existed, which 
contrasted with the previous century, in which they held greater procedural sway. 
A newly established trial procedure was also imperative to this, as it privileged 
certain bodies. This transformed the power dynamics of its processes into a State-
Accused affair, with no place for interlocutors. The impact of this was profound, 
since a mentality, which saw the victim as a group with no greater position other 
than that of an informant or witness was entrenched. However, feminism and 
victimology were essential to the procedural re-inclusion of victims, as they 
provided the knowledge necessary to take the steps necessary for their re-
integration. This empowered the masses to question the way the legal system 





impact of criminality. Not only that, but they were also more inclined to identify 
with victims, who transitioned from marginal abstraction to empathetic reality. 
This tended to humanise victims for the Irish public, which engendered calls for 
their structural re-incorporation within the frames of the criminal justice in Ireland. 
The drivers of change that emerged in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries ultimately complemented these transitions in order to bring about a 
situation that engendered the victim to re-enter Irish criminal justice. These, 
primarily grassroots alterations, created the conditions for the re-introduction of 
victim rights, as victim surveys, media representation, politicisation as well as 
activism shifted the emphasis from criminals to victims. The politicisation of law 
and order in 1990s Ireland did garner some socio-cultural attention and changed 
the narrative around crime, using the victim as a fig leaf  to implement policies that 
would have arguably have been rejected by the public under normal circumstances. 
In this way, although this politicisation of crime effectively used victims in a 
charged way to push its policies and agendas, it did not ultimately serve to re-
introduce the victim as a penal populist weapon, as, although some might have 
wanted this, they were prevented from doing so by the due process safeguards the 
judiciary and the legislature respected in their implementation of victim inclusion.  
The judiciary in particular were robust in their defence of the rights of the 
suspect and were able to calibrate the reincorporation of the victim without 
allowing such rhetoric to give way to penal populist measures. Although the media 
sought to transform victimisation into a circus of intrigue, digital communication 
hampered its ability to manufacture consent. Ideological messages were therefore 





they presented, and the atomised way they were conveyed. This revolutionised the 
way victims were perceived, by transforming how victimisation was framed.  
The re-centralisation of the victim as a criminal justice stakeholder was also 
largely the result of a transition in victim rights from supranational norms to 
domestic rights. The evolution of human rights to incorporate the rights of victims 
was therefore instrumental to the victim’s legal re-emergence. Indeed, the Irish 
justice  system relied on the concept as the vehicle through which to include them. 
The influence of supranational courts was also noticeable, as they fostered debate 
within the Oireachtas and Irish Bench. These also tended to adopt the spirit of such 
discourse to codify victim rights in a manner respectful of other stakeholders.  
The twentieth and twenty first centuries were periods of enormous legal change, as 
courts and legislatures discovered victim rights. These served as a watershed 
moment for victims by confirming them as a stakeholder empowered to play a 
participatory role. Such change was therefore not superficial, but evidences a real 
move toward inclusion, particularly of diversity. The codification of the rights that 
victims had in Ireland was therefore transformative to their material conditions.  
This thesis addressed the main research question through six sub questions, 
which were outlined within the introduction of this work. The first revolved around 
examining what the role of the victim was within the justice system of eighteenth-
century Ireland. During this time the victim occupied a position of considerable 
centrality and importance. The entire system of prosecution was moulded in 






Nineteenth century industrialisation and urbanisation changed the contours 
of social life and the victims place within it. The obvious flaws of the previous 
justice system were now untenable in this new context. Its bloody spectacle was 
replaced with a justice system which was more rational and systematic. 
Consequently, laws were changed as well as how they operated, as the justice 
system now embodied new values of human perfectibility and offender rights.  
Victim inclusivity was now seen as anachronistic. The whole idea of victim 
prosecutions was jettisoned. Yet the loss suffered by the victim was considerable. 
Their role was now be circumscribed, and they lost not just it but their dispute. The 
bureaucratic state entrapped victims inside a system that they had once operated.  
The third strand of this work studies the influences that helped change 
mindsets to shatter the stifling bureaucratic contours that had constrained victims. 
Victimology was central to highlighting the victim as an area of concern. While the 
decline of human perfectibility shifted focus onto the field of victims. This shift 
produced knowledge on not just the victim but their socio-legal position.  
However, these theorists saw the victim as a product of their offender. Yet 
their studies exposed the socio-legal ramifications of victimisation. This eventually 
began to show the prevalence of victimisation, as well as considerable non-
reporting of offences. As a consequence, there was a change in the narrative in 
favour of victims, which would be transformative and prompt right based reform.  
Feminism was another ideology that complemented victimology. The 
feminist turn was motivated by the raising of awareness about victimisations and 
resulted in better recognition of victims and their issues. This awareness formed 





Feminist scholars in the area began to expose prejudices against female victims. 
This undermined the patriarchal structures that had kept hidden victims silenced. 
All of this reform eventually lead to a wider criminal calendar, more effective 
remedies and, ultimately dedicated victim legislation in order to protect their rights.  
The fifth part of this thesis addressed the frames which facilitated victim 
re-accommodation. The rights-based model used is not surprising, and mirrors 
similar advances. The primacy of rights is crucial to understanding how victim 
rights did not undermine due process. Since a rights-based conceptualisation 
evidences how the accused’s due process rights were balanced with victim rights. 
A key factor in this transition was the ECtHR and ECHR.  Both, in their 
own way, encouraged the domestic recognition of victim rights. They did this by 
encouraging member states to vindicate victim rights. Irish judges began to feel 
victims had entitlements compatible with accused rights and a due process trial.  
This recognition represented the move from soft norm to hard right and the 
transition of the victim from peripheral legal entity to recentralised rights holder. 
The new position of the victim was cemented through domestic legislation. This 
reform was a protracted process, but recent dedicated statute has been passed. 
Victims were also safeguarded through a process of widening the concept of crime. 
This broader criminal calendar now puts the victim at the heart of criminal justice.  
 These reforms have recentralised victims during every trial stage. The 
victim now has greater flexibility surrounding delay, a reformed definition of 
consent and a right to information. Greater accommodation of pre-trial statements 
is also present, which are also now given more consideration. Furthermore, victims 





 There have also been concessions during proceedings. Certain classes of 
victim are permitted independent legal representation and legal aid. More 
consideration is given to victims when intimate details are sought to be adduced. 
Discretionary screens and video link evidence are also permitted. Spousal partners 
are not allowed to use their marital status as a defence to rape. Child testimony can 
be given without corroboration or judicial caution. The wider context of 
victimisation can be adduced. The court can remove certain people from 
proceedings. Particular classes of victim can avail of an intermediary. The actual 
grounds upon which video testimony is allowed were expanded. Alleged sex 
offenders are precluded from questioning their victims. While even more 
concessions were made to vulnerable victims to made the court less intimidating. 
After trial, victims are entitled to tender an impact statement. Where they 
are not satisfied with the sentence there is now the ability to contest this. The DPP 
also has the capacity to re-prosecute a person in certain limited circumstances. 
Specialised judicial orders can also be obtained if they are in fear of reprisal.  
Victims are also able to receive monetary compensation from their offender. 
Important reforms of civil law are also now in place. Tort now recognises 
new wrongs like child grooming. Victims are also entitled to free legal aid for civil 
remedies, which are easier to obtain than a conviction. The courts are also 
accommodating, and recognise how victimisation can persist and be exacerbated. 
A conviction can now be adduced as evidence against a defendant in a civil hearing. 
The statute of limitations for historical sexual abuse crimes was also amended. It 





The core argument of this thesis is a modest one, that the victim has now 
reclaimed their centrality. We can see this not only in the criminal justice system 
but within society more generally. This has ensured that the justice system has 
become more accommodating of a novel triangulation of state, accused and victim. 
It can also be argued that this change has not resulted in due process being 
compromised. The outcome, it is asserted, is the result of the judicial maintenance 
of the constitutional fair trial rights of the accused and some legislative restraint.  
 When considering the forces behind victim reintroduction causation is a 
difficult issue to resolve. Its debate revolves around whether change is socially or 
legally driven. Yet, it would be wrong to try to resolve these debates here. 
However, certain points can be made within the scope of this work. Mainly that 
this thesis has gone to considerable lengths to show that such change much to the 
legal reform, but that there are also social, political and cultural factors at play. 
 There is a clear demonstration of how societal forces helped shaped the 
transitions the victim has undergone. Much effort was also expended on how class 
and race relations contributed to the public’s participation in the justice in the past. 
These integral aspects helped the kind of legal transitions which prompted reform. 
Indeed, all these factors collectively led to the victim’s procedural re-introduction.  
The best example of socially motivated change would be feminist ideology. 
In fact, it was highly impactful in breaking the hitherto victim exclusive status quo. 
Feminist activism has also secured key gains for victims under within Irish law. 
This progress is also shaped by the social realities in Ireland at various times.  
 Politics is another factor this thesis incorporated. It is evident in the analysis 





This was subject to fluctuation in the nineteenth century, as the idea of a larger state 
in areas like justice was encouraged by liberalism and the intractable Irish question.  
These undermined the previous justice system, and the resulting disorder caused 
by political pressure and ineffective remedies ensured that its days were numbered.  
Politics also plays a role in the victim’s re-emergence. Indeed, crime 
politicisation helped turn victim debate into a political football. A political 
consensus amongst most parties ensured no politician was neglectful of victims. 
The victim fig leaf even allowed the pursual of crime control, but this situation was 
moderated by the judiciary, who ensured that this did not undermine due process.  
Yet, these transformations ensured that victims were gaining ground. They 
became a justice symbol, that secured inclusionary victim reform. Indeed, they 
were unlikely to receive such gains in sedater contexts. The politicisation of law 
and order therefore operated as a transient stage that aided victim reintroduction. 
 The impact of cultural considerations is also captured. These are shown to 
have engendered greater victim centrality. In fact, it was the corruption of the 
Beggars Opera that required victims-based justice. The primacy of property also 
had implications, as it was not rare for proprietal offenders to be put to death. This 
ensured victims were revered at trial for having the literal power over life and death.  
Much of this falls by the wayside due to nineteenth century cultural forms. 
Since laissez faire capitalism’s corrosive impact creates a new social reality. This 
erosion of values diminishes the victim’s position through procedural exclusion. 
The tyranny of the clock and the nationalism now re-shape dynamics. Time 
becomes of the essence and colonisation subject to critique. These, along with the 





New liberal ideas such as the primacy of contract and human perfectibility 
motivated reforms like the creation of the police and officialisation of proceedings. 
These sounded the death kneel for victim centrality. Such reform also imbibed 
racial and essentialist notions, making it, if not the project itself, a more 
disingenuous exercise. It was also a traumatic one for the victims who lost out.  
Furthermore, feminist gains would be tied to the 1960s social revolution. 
Therefore, the Post World War II movement owes a considerable debt to De 
Beauvoir. In addition to other culturally significant figures, like Greer and Paglia. 
Since they motivated the progress that helped the victim emerge as a stakeholder. 
It is also worth remembering that culture is a diverse range of mediums. 
Each consciousness raising medium have as such been effective in helping to 
promote victim re-inclusion. Mass media mediums such as the film Omagh and TV 
shows like RTE’s States of Fear were significant developments in opening 
meaningful dialogue about victimisation. In fact, it was this culturally open 
dialogue which ultimately helped produce immense socio-legal change for victims.  
Shows like RTE News and Crimecall helped shape the Irish public’s 
perception of victims via their dramatic reports and reconstructions of 
victimisation. In doing so, the author has tried to capture the debt victim inclusion 
owes to high and low culture. These mediums, which are more accessible, in a 
Brechtian sense, have engaged the masses and shaped progressive change. This has 
clearly been the case within contemporary Irish victim-based activism and reform. 
The victim’s changing position is a complex interplay of interaction of 
social, political, cultural and legal factors that combined to bring about real change. 





Therefore, there is a productive dialectic between these various factors. As each 
one shapes and often reshapes the other, in a dynamic transference of ideas and 
policies. 
 Yet it is difficult to predict the direction of all of this process. The 
relationship in the context of victim re-emergence is best characterised as fluid. In 
the final analysis, whether the non-legal drives the legal, or the legal inspires non-
legal progress, this debate detracts from the author’s major conclusion. This is that 
each area can dynamically alter the other, often in highly unpredictable ways. 
One of the first things that strikes the eye between the early and late modern 
periods is the popular perception of victims. The similarities are obvious, although 
victims are identifiable figures, they can often be seen as more than that. The 
perspective that any one of us could become one is present, as are ideal victims. A 
fusion of sympathy and apprehension frequently characterises public perception. 
Much of this strongly resonates with victim perceptions in the eighteenth century. 
 There are also disparities, the modern image is more strongly 
mediated through a cultural lens, which distorts public perceptions. This can be 
seen within low culture forms, or popular culture tropes. Indeed, the public is 
transfixed with victim narratives and highly informed of their lived realities. 
Although the public was aware of crime in the eighteenth century, this would be 
very different from today, as such representation mainly focused on the offender.  
In modern life the victim is a motif of import. Yet, the eighteenth-century 
public did not take much notice of victims. Indeed, today strangers can even fund 





finances to prosecute. Although some victims may still not receive enough 
attention, the eighteenth-century offender was undoubtedly the star of the show.  
Before trial the theme that resonates would be the clientism of victims. We 
can see this today as the victim has a right to information from the police and DPP. 
Indeed, they have a right to be kept up to date about the evolution of a case 
comparable to the accommodation of victims of crime in the early modern period.  
Although the lack of due process safeguards permitted this accommodation to a 
degree that would not be permissible in our contemporary criminal justice system.  
Eighteenth-century authorities permitted victims to use search warrants, 
and seek out and detain alleged offenders. This represented a clientistic relationship 
between legal authorities and prosecuting victims. However, the concessions now 
afforded are still rather expansive.  The present position therefore mirrors the spirit 
that characterised the bond between justice organs and the victim of the past. 
During trial the theme that echoes most is the victim’s procedural voice. 
Modern due process ensures stringent limitations in this regard. These assure that 
the victim’s right to counsel does not undermine the fair trial rights of the accused. 
In the eighteenth-century, although rules of evidence could operate against victims, 
a prosecuting victim was entitled to full legal representation to support their case.  
This allowed them to strongly forward numerous allegations against an 
accused, who was typically unable to properly contest them. Due to fair trial rights 
the present right of victim to counsel is minor by comparison. Modern procedural 
justice now involves a triangulation of interests between the state, accused and 
victim. Such a situation thus ensures that the fair trial rights of both the accused 







This state of affairs is different from even the recent past, where 
proceedings where state accused affairs, predicated on victim exclusion. The 
evolution of victim rights mirrors procedural shifts in this regard. As the victim has 
moved from a time where they were entitled to full representation, to one in which 
this was completely prevented, to a more recent partial reopening. While there are 
similarities with the past, as the victim now has representation rights and a voice in 
proceedings, this is, at the same time, considerably restricted by new safeguards.  
The dilemma that resonates most with post-trial is the rectification of loss. 
At present this is done via compensation order, where loss is remedied by damages. 
The order shares similarities with the eighteenth-century tolerance of 
compounding, as money is paid in order to try to remedy a victim’s loss. However, 
there are several major differences, compounding would occur before a trial, and 
prevent it, while a compensation order can only be granted after its conclusion. 
While compounding was encouraged by the judiciary to prevent prosecutions, the 
compensation order is given by a judge in addition to or instead of punishment.  
Another difference worth mentioning is the degree of control victims have 
in each situation. In the eighteenth-century victims controlled the terms and 
quantum of compounding through personal negotiation with their alleged offender. 
This can be contrasted with the powerlessness of the victim over the quantum and 
the nature of a compensation order. Although the court can take victim perspectives 





to have an order changed once granted, but all orders are limited by an offenders’ 
capacity to pay, and even then, can be revised downward by a judge if necessary.  
 There are a number of implications of this research findings for victims, the 
public and offenders. The main one revolves around the impetus their re-inclusion 
gives to restorative justice approaches. There is a strong case to be made here in 
this regard in an Irish context due to the much less confrontation manner by which 
the triangulation of interests has been ironed out by the legislature and judiciary. 
This opens the door to meaningful restorative justice, where neither victim nor 
offender feel strong armed into participation. In addition, the compensation order 
may also be suited to modification in order to advance restorative justice goals.  
It would also be important, in light of the issues flagged in this thesis, that 
independent bodies take steps to ascertain whether victim reform has vindicated 
victim rights. This would be needed to improve the capacity of the state for further 
reform. These inquiries should also be conducted in various contexts, and it would 
also be advisable to broaden the field of analysis. Since taking other stakeholders 
into consideration will help evidence how such reforms have impacted them.  
There may well be instances where reform might be wholly beneficial for 
the victim but there could be some considerable impact upon other stakeholders. 
The compensation order offers an example of this. Such reform would evidently be 
beneficial to victim interests and rights Yet based on recent controversy in the area 
such a remedy is arguably more acceptable to the victim involved than the public.  
Such change tends to undermine the notion that the public is an interest our 
justice system takes into account when assessing penality. This is problematic 





is that far from bolstering public support such reforms may actually do the opposite, 
and further alienate them as a stakeholder. It should also be said that victim re-
inclusion does not, in of itself, erode the public interest, but it does seem to alter it.  
There is a tension between private victim interests and those of the public. 
It is ironic that the public may be more punitively minded than victims, particularly 
where compensation orders reduce sentences in favour of affluence. While it is 
easy to dismiss such criticism as hysteria, there is a kernel of legitimacy to such 
protests. Can the public interest be sufficiently served where wealth is used to, at 
least in the eyes of the public, buy one’s way out of offending? This situation can 
undermine the law’s levelling force, or at the very least its social perception as one.  
Turning to the implications of victim re-inclusion on due process, the area 
which encapsulated this best is the provision of separate legal representation. It is 
here that tensions are most evident, since the impact of such reform is questionable, 
considering its due process impact and potential to retraumatise female victims. 
The latter of these problems supports the view that such measures be extended. 
However, there is no appetite for this in light of previous inquiries into the area.  
The accused’s constitutional due process rights make further expansion of 
these kinds of areas contentious. Yet vindicating them places debilitating limits on 
the effectiveness of present reforms. Expanding these may remedy victim issues, 
but would be controversial, given past resistance to this thus far. However, many 
of the fears of most commentators have neither materialised nor scuppered reform, 
which could be advanced upon again in cases where its impact has not been as 
transformative for victims. Given the prevailing winds of justice, this would most 





There is a danger that due process could be undermined by further reform. 
This is particularly evident in relation to ILR, but can also be said to exist where 
further expansion of procedural reform is being considered. It would thus be 
prudent to implement constitutional safeguards via referendum to assuage such 
concerns. However, due process rights under the constitution are presently being 
vindicated, whether this continues is dependent upon our socio-political context.  
The author therefore sees three models of development of the victim’s 
position in Ireland. The most likely is European, where victims are further 
procedurally reincorporated without curtailing due process. Ireland’s government 
as well as European Union and European Court of Human Rights membership 
favour this, with the latter loadstar tending to promote further expansion. The 
second, far less probable option is American, where re-inclusion erodes due 
process. Although some promote this, governmental and supra-governmental 
organs like the European Court of Human Rights would buttress against it through 
its insistence on procedural rather than punitive inclusion. The third model is 
British, as the severance of European Union ties could permit countries to renege 
on some of their rights commitments. Even though this is unlikely, it ought to be 
considered when contemplating whether these rights deserve constitutional 
protection. Such debate is going to become more pertinent in future, as current 
events shape how human rights, which are increasingly under threat, are viewed. 
However, the law, and its robust judicial defence in Ireland, could ultimately ensure 
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